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SUKMARY 
This thesis is about how tbe members of a long-established multi-
craft union, originating in the coachmaking trade, coped with the 
massive changes in the means of transport, culminating in the dominance 
of mass production motor car firms. Part I explores changes in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century with the rise of railways and 
motor cars. In both, some coachmaking skills were made redundant, while 
others were very necessary. The rise of the motor industry, far from 
destroying coachmaking unionism, wrenched it out of a long period of 
stagnation. 
Part II focusses on the interwar period, which witnessed major 
changes in car body production. Brush painting and varnishing was. 
replaced by cellulose sprayingi wooden framed bodies were replaced by 
all-steel oneSi assembly lines came into use, and the division of labour 
greatly increased, with large numbers of semi-skilled workers employed 
in the biggest firms. Analysis of the main technical changes, and the 
changing state of the car industry, shows that, despite massive 
unemployment among its members, and a membership decline of over one 
third, in the early 1930s, the RUVB did not suffer "technological 
unemployment". 
Although there was a material basis for craft unionism in much of the 
car body industry in the 1920s, and in the rest of vehicle building 
during the whole interwar period, the union still tried to organise 
semi-skilled workers. But when an "Industrial Section" was created in 
1931i' it was a response to the union's financial crisis caused by 
unemployment parments, and no serious recruitment of mass production 
operatives took place. The contrasting experiences in Coventry and 
Oxford in the 1920s and 1930s are analysed in detail. 
The study is not a conventional head office-based union history, 
instead favouring case studies of the organisation of work, technical 
developments, industrial structure, and local union organisation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A. WHY THIS SUBJECT. 
The National Union of Vehicle Builders organised, until 1972, tens of 
thousands of workers in British car factories. Its merger into the TGWU 
gave that union the predominant position in the motor industry it has 
enjoyed ever since. During the 138 years of the independent existence of 
the NUVB and its main predecessor union, the United Kingdom Society of 
Coachmakers, profound changes took place in the types of vehicle built 
and the manner in which they were built. 
This thesis is about those changes, and how union members 
collectively, both through their official institutions and at the place 
of work, sought to cope with them. Consequently, it is not a 
conventional narrative trade union history; neither does it cover the 
whole period of the union's existence. While some developments are 
traced through past 1945, the period covered by the thesis ends in 1939. 
By then the "decisiv8 changes had taken place in both the motor industry 
.' h' 
- mass production. oligopoly, assembly lines, steel bodies, integral [ie 
chassis-lesal conEttruction, and spray painting; and also in the 
interested unions, with the NUVB's and ABU's formal commdtment to "open" 
unionism, and the TGWU's irreversible encroachment into the BUVB's newly 
expanded "job territory". 1 
2 
While the bulk of the thesis concentrates on the interwar years. a 
significant section is devoted to the years before 1914. also a period 
of change, but of a less dramatic nature. The emphasis of the study is 
on the motor industry. but NUVB members also worked in other vehicle 
building sectors, in many districts being mobile between them; these 
sectors are examined because the total experience, complex and uneven, 
affected the attitudes of members and officials to developments in the 
more rapidly changing motor industry. One result of this emphasis is 
that the history of industrial and technical change in those industrial 
sectors employing vehicle builders had to be discovered. The thesis is 
therefore. as its title implies, also a history of industrial change. 
As with many pieces of research, there has been a shift of emphasis 
from the original conception. When I first formulated the research 
proposal, it had been my intention to stUdy the union up to and beyond 
the 1972 merger with the TGWU. The questions I wanted to answer 
generally covered the post-1945 period. The concerns for the earlier 
years revolved around the impact of the tremendous technical changes on 
the union, and the extent to which the craft heritage of the union 
sustained or hindered trade unionism in the interwar motor industry. 
The "opening" aut of the union, very partially in 1919, and then 
fully in 1931, appeared relatively nan-controversial. It was surely a 
classic case of Turner's argument that "the most obvious cause of such a 
transformation in a closed union's character is a technical change which 
undermines the permanence or blurs the identity of its members' 
occupation". In fact, Turner even cited the IUVB as an example. 
3 
referring to the "violent" technical revolution of mass production that 
confronted the IUVB in the 1920s, causing it to "open its ranks" to mass 
production operatives.~ 
The evidence seemed straightforward. Allen, for example, wrote in the 
mid-1930s "a few years ago the bodies of cars were painted by skilled 
workers", but "new types of paint can be sprayed on to the bodies with a 
gun, and so the need for skilled workers no longer exists". 3 Similarly, 
the rise of all-steel bodies, dating from the establishment of the 
Pressed Steel Company in 1926, eliminated the woodworking skills 
necessary in traditional wooden-framed bodies. From the beginning of the 
1930s, car production was rapidly concentrated in the "Big Six" mass 
producers. As "proof" of the cumulative impact of these changes, there 
was the NUVB's own predicament - in the 2~ years from the beginning of 
1931 its membership fell by one third, from roughly 29,000 to 19,500 (at 
a time when total union membership only fell by about 10~4)j and, during 
this period, between 4,000 and 6,000 of the union's members were 
unemployed at anyone time. Total numbers employed in the car industry 
had contracted sharply in 1929-31, but increased again from 1931 
" '-onwards·~· Here Was an obvious case of what could be called 
"technological. unemployment", the exact features of which merely needed 
to be "recorded. (Since this research started, a number of authors have 
also made similar assumptions when referring to the NUVB in the interwar 
years. ) 
But a closer stUdy revealed that this explanation did not hold up. 
The decision to open an "Industrial Section" in 1931 was motivated 
4 
primarily by other factors; it was an attempt at the time to reduce the 
inflow of members who would be able to claim union unemployment benefit. 
The membership loss of the early 1930s was largely a reaction of 
employed members to the regime of increased subscriptions and reduced 
benefits necessitated by the exceptionally heavy burden of supporting 
unemployed members. The high unemployment itself was only marginally 
"technological" and mainly caused by the general depression of economic 
activity in the various vehicle building sectors. 
From being a relatively non-controversial period, the interwar-years 
became the central focus of the theSiS, generating a number of empirical 
questions that needed answering. What technical changes actually took 
place in the motor industry, when did they take place, and how universal 
were they? How dominant were the mass producers? How significant were 
the coachbuilding firms supplying the motor industry? Did the same 
technical developments affect vehicle building outside the motor 
industry? Kore specifically, on the union: how did it organise or 
attempt to organise in the motor car factories? Did the establishment of 
the Industrial Section make any difference to its organising policy in 
the industry in the' 1930s? 
Further, the experiences of the 19205 and 19305 were not totally 
unprecedented. Railway carriages had been built using machinery for 
decades. Some of the railway company workshops were huge factories 
already in the nineteenth century, employing several thousand people. 
All the craft unions had been affected by the massive growth of the BUR 
in the workshOps around the beginning of the first world war. Important 
5 
changes also occurred in the motor industry prior to the rise of mass 
production. To situate the interwar developments in their context it was 
necessary to study the nineteenth century and the pre-first world war 
era. 
Any historical case study inevitably raises a number of more general 
questions thrown up by the research findings. This thesis is no 
exception. The most obvious, given the emphasis of this study, relate to 
technical change and the changing nature of "skill". But there are 
other, more neglected, areas, such as the significance of a union's 
financial situation as a determinant of policy, and the role of the 
state in sustaining trade unionism. Such questions will be considered in 
the conclusion. 
B. HISTORIANS AND THE IUVB 
When the research for this thesis started in 1979, there was very 
little published information on the union or its predecessors. That 
situation has imp~oved in the interim, as interest in the development of 
. 
motor,industry t~ade unionism was awakened during the 1970s, and further 
" , 
~ ~ 'v.:-' . 
mater1al~hould.be published in the next few years. Unfortunately, most 
, 
of the limited comments concerning the IUVB in the literature to date 
have been misleading or simply inaccurate. 
Taking the coachmaking unions first, Thompson's reference to the 
conviction under the Combination Acts of the General Secretary and 
others of the Benevolent Society of Coachmakers does not make it clear 
6 
the Society was destroyed by this legal action.S Cole inaccurately 
claimed that in the third quarter of the nineteenth century "The 
coachmakers had a strong Union, chiefly in London", when London was 
their weakest area. 7 The Webbs' main use of the UKSC was as part of the 
evidence for their reconstruction of the movement of unions away from 
the stage of "primitive democracY"j but this has been shown elsewhere by 
the author to have imposed a time sequence on the UKSC's governmental 
changes that is not borne out by the actual dates. e A similar problem 
encompasses the trade itself. An 1837 publication was the source for a 
description of the status and earnings hierarchy of the different 
branches of the trade, cited by Hcbsbawm and Thompson9 j but Burnett" 
using it, wrongly assumed that workers "might move up the hierarchy 
from trimmer to carriage-maker to body-maker-, 10 whereas these 
constituted separate trades in their own right. 
The major reason for such errors in the secondary literature relates 
to the near-absence of published material on coachmaking unions, and the 
relative inaccessibility of material on the trade. The IUVB's own 
centenary history in 1934," written by a union official, is 
,. 
unfortunately at; 've'ry 11 ttle use; and while a much better account of the 
, '" 
early days of the UKSC was produced earlier, 12 very few copies probably 
.. ' 
ever went beyond: union circles. The excellent 1837 book on coachmaking 
by Adams was reprinted in 1971, but most other material is confined to a 
small number of libraries, where research can also be frustrated by 
incomplete runs of the various nineteenth century journals of 
coachbuilding and related trades. 
7 
Similar difficulties exist for the interwar years. While there is an 
extensive technical periodical literature, and primary union and 
employer materials, very little secondary literature has been published. 
In particular, a great injustice has been done to the union by the 
generally accepted account of its role in the General Strike. Phillips, 
for example, argues that "some local branches of the AEU and the Vehicle 
Builders, particularly in the midland car industry, took action 
unofficially" and refers to these stoppages as "unauthorised", though 
put on "a legal footing" when the "second wave" of strikes encompassed 
engineering. 1:~ However, a fierce debate took place inside the IUVB 
executive on Xonday Kay 3rd 1926 as to whether the union should come out 
in the "first wave" of strikers which included transport workers. It was 
eventually decided by 7 votes to 6 that "all our members other than 
those engaged on making and repairing vehicles used in Distribution of 
Food and Sanitation must cease work immediately", and telegrams were 
sent out. 14 Organisers' reports and benefit payments suggest that around 
90~ or more of the union's membership were out from the first Tuesday, 
with major consequences for the strength of the union's future finances. 
Apart from mentions in a number of standard accounts of trade union 
institutional .. practices of the post-1945 era, the only recognition, 
until very recently, of the JUVB's role in the motor industry, was in 
Turner, Clack & Roberts's classic study. 15 The IUVB's existence has been 
acknowledged in the 1980s, but all too often with conclusions based on 
insufficient research. This has especially been the case with the 
supposed effect of technical changes on the NUVB's membership. For 
example, Whiting has claimed that 1n the interwar car industry "the use 
8 
of car bodies made up in metal sections with a timber frame, instead of 
those made entirely with wood, reduced many of the requirements for 
skilled woodworking and hit the BUVB membership hard". 16 Yet metal-
panelled, wooden-framed, cars were the norm well before the first world 
war, and members of the NUVB's predecessor unions were usually engaged 
in fixing the metal panels on the frame. 
Whiting has also argued that the NUVB in Coventry were "on the 
defensive in the later 1920s" and were "unable to stop the introduction 
of new machinery". Their 1931 branch membership had halved by 1935, and 
this was implicitly blamed on "efforts to 'dilute' skilled body-building 
labour" which "continued into the 1930s".17 Thoms and Donnelly have 
similarly declared that the Coventry BUVB were "in retreat for much of 
the 1920s as employers sought to enforce dilution and adopt new systems 
of manufacture". Ie Yet the research for this thesis shows that the NUVB 
were in a relatively strong position in Coventry throughout the 1920sj 
the one universal technical change of the 1920s' motor industry - the 
cellulose spray - does not appear to have displaced many, if any, 
members. The decline in Coventry in the early 1930s was part of the 
dramatic national membership decline; while it took place at a time of 
important changes in the motor industry generally, there was no direct 
immediate link, such as technological unemployment, which is the 
suggestion of the above writers. 
The size and importance of the coachbuilding sector in the interwar 
motor industry has also been consistently ignored by academic writers on 
the industry, 19 though not by motoring historians. Attention has 
9 
traditionally been, concentrated on the mass production car 
manufacturers, but even here there are significant oversights. In 
particular, while many writers have recorded the existence of the Horris 
Bodies factory in Coventry,20 it has never been considered important. 
Whiting argues that Horris "had purchased supply firms in Coventry" but 
"had as little trouble there as in Cowley", and, again, he "was as 
untroubled in Coventry as in Cowley by labour organisation".21 This 
account appears to be based on the Horris Engines factory,' whereas 
Harris Bodies (formerly Hollick & Pratt) formed the largest single bI'ock 
of BUVB members in Coventry in the mid-1920s, and experienced a number 
of strikes later in the decade (see chapter 8). 
In fact, Friedman, using the Hinistry of Labour Gazette, has claimed 
that no strikes were recorded for the Coventry motor industry until 
1934.22 This is no doubt true, but its significance does not appear to 
have been challenged. The Gazette only gave details of what it called 
"Principal Trade Disputes"; Whiting has since found that 118 strikes 
were recorded for the whole motor industry, including Coventry, in the 
years 1921-38. 23. Yet not only do the official statistics, by definition, 
exclude.certain small strikes, they also under-record those eligible for 
inclusioD, as well as ignoring other forms of industrial action. In the 
, 
1970s this meant a serious underestimation of the number of incidents 
of industrial action. 24 While there was undoubtedly much less of this 
unrecorded action in the interwar years, this thesis produces evidence 
for a minimum of about forty incidents involving IUVB members in 
Coventry in the years 1919-1929, which challenges Friedman's conclusion 
- 10 -
of "the weakness of collective worker resistance" in Coventry at this 
time. 25 
On probably the first occasion the NUVB's national agreements have 
been discussed, the separate agreements with the EEF and the UKJWB were 
muddled together, though fortunately with no consequences for the 
ensuing argument. 26 Finally, it is necessary to note a very recent 
article by Tolliday on the interwar motor 1ndustry,27 which, I believe, 
correctly concludes that "the existing unions can be criticised for 
tactical and strategic failures and for not making better use of 
opportunities for growth that did exist within their potential frames of 
reference ...... But .... the mass unionisation of semi-skilled workers 
in new industries was a task in a different league from that of routine 
trades unionis~'. However, Tolliday makes a number of factual and 
interpretative errors in his section on the NUVB, which cumulatively 
give a very distorted view of that union. 
To start with, he claims the NUVB was an amalgamation of woodworking 
craft societies, and that its "core" was in the woodworking trades, an 
'1-,.: 
assumPt1on.;chall~nged in this thesis, which allows him to claim, that, 
,', ot.. 
in common. with., other unions, the HUVB's "motor membership was on the 
periphery of their vision". Noting correctly that their membership held 
up in Coventry in the 1920s, he argues that they were not locked out in 
1922 (despite the current author's already published claim that they 
were2S ). While recognising the importance of the union's own financial 
crisis in its membership decline of the early 1930s, Tolliday 
incorrectly states that, as unemployment rose, the NUVB "sought to ... 
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payout relatively high levels of unemployment benefits to members". In 
fact, the union cut its unemployment benefit in half in May 1931, and 
then again in September 1932. He further asserts "they were squeezed by 
the collapse of high-class work at the bottom of the depression in 1931-
33 and the simultaneous rise of new techniques such as all-steel bodies 
and cellulose spray painting which eliminated many of their crafts". 
While" high-class" work declined, it was only part of a more general 
problem of unemployment in the vehicle building industries at the time. 
Kore importantly. Tolliday appears to be subscribing to the 
"technological unemployment" thesis noted above, whereas the actual 
situation was significantly more complex. 
The NUVB is specifically accused of having "refused to recruit the 
striking female trimmers" at Rover in 1930, despite Tolliday's own 
earlier recognition that the union's rules did not empower this at the 
time, and that these were changed "in the aftermath of the Rover 
strike".29 Further, the union is more generally indicted for rejecting 
"potential members" in a number of disputes in the early 1930s. but no 
evidence is given. for this, as it probably does not exist. 
" 
A myth is also created about the union to portray it as being 
incontrovertibly stuck in nineteenth century craft union methods. The 
NUVB "concentrated on traditional but increasingly ineffective forms of 
craft control. For instance. when firms like Armstrong Siddeley or 
Harper Bean refused to pay NUVB rates in the early 1930s, the JUVB 
withdrew their members from the firms and instructed their members to 
'black' them. They were quickly replaced by non-unionists and the NUVB 
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were excluded from the shops." This account is very misleading. Harper 
Bean, it is true, was blacked for about a year following a long strike 
in 1925 (not the 1930s),~O but this was a very unusual step by this 
time; Armstrong-Siddeley was not, and the reasons for the union's 
decline in the factory, following the 1931 strike there, are 
investigated in chapter 8. 
There can be no doubt that the IUVB's craft heritage coloured the 
general response of its officers and members to interwar developments in 
the motor industry, so there is no need to misrepresent their actions to 
prove that point. Carr has noted that not only has the historian an 
"obligation to see that his facts are accurate", but also that "he must 
seek to bring into the picture all known or knowable facts relevant, in 
one sense or another, to the theme on which he is engaged and to the 
interpretation proposed.M 31 Historians of the motor industry and its 
trade unions have sometimes failed the first obligation because of a 
more general failure with the second. Hopefully, this thesis will 
establish a sufficient body of facts on the IUVB to make it less likely 
that similar errors of fact and interpretation to those analysed in the 
last. few pages will continue to be made . 
. . ,' 
Of course, in those areas where I have myself relied on secondary 
sources or limited primary material, I have no doubt sometimes 
perpetrated similar mistakes. This is an inevitable feature of any piece 
of historical writing, and can only be minimised by making as much as 
possible of the central interpretation reliant on a variety of primary 
sources. The next section deals with the use of sources. 
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C. METHODS AID SOURCES 
As noted already, this thesis is not a conventional trade union 
history, but it does make extensive use of union records. Any attempt to 
break away from the more traditional history must take into account the 
deficiencies of that genre. 
Problems of Trade Union History 
Husson has accurately, if somewhat brutally, observed that "MAny 
trade union histories, particularly older ones, are merely hotchpot 
collections of random snippets from voluminous records". Such works, 
based essentially on chronological narrative, clearly "do not provide a 
thorough and penetrating analysis". Yet it is doubtful whether they even 
match up to Husson's claim that "only such popular presentations are 
likely to interest the average trade union reader".32 Trade union 
histories are among the great unread books of our time, whatever their 
projected audience; Despite Hobsbawm's belief that only a few trade 
union histories were still being written "in the old way" by 1974,33 it 
is still the case, as Hobsbawm himself noted in 1964, that "jubilee and 
.' souv81i~(·volumeB or pamphlets" are "mainly written by elderly officials 
or sympathetic publiCists with a very much greater sense of union piety 
and retrospective self-satisfaction than scholarly competence or 
critical sense".34 
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Even the more academic histories of trade unions suffer from similar 
problems to their "popular" counterparts. Price identifies the 
"greatest" fault in most accounts of trade unions as "the failure to 
place the rise of labour within any other perspective than its own 
heroic boundaries"; with the further criticism that "mainstream, 
traditional" labour historiography treats "labour's rise to prominence" 
as "a natural. progressive evolution".~s 
Samuel has partially explained the reason for the persistence of this 
approach. "Organisations can swallow the historian up if he approaches 
their records unwarily. because they offer a ready-made subject for 
research, with all the materials perhaps to hand". In the case of trade 
unions, the documents are ·chiefly· executive minute books; the subject 
is defined in a "teleological" way - "the origin and growth of national 
organisation"; the perspective is from head office, with the rank and 
file appearing in the records "only as troublemakers, or seceders, or 
members in arrears". Consequently. "the researcher may begin by wanting 
to find out about a group of workers and end up .... writing about their 
union executives instead".36 
~", >~ 
" . 
The fact· that -nearly all trade union histories are based on union 
evidence alone",~7 has meant a serious obstacle to alternative 
perspectives, more critical and less nationally oriented. An important 
corrective, access to employers' records, has only recently become more 
commonplace. A number of earlier histories suffered from a lack of such 
access <whether or not their authors wished to use this source). 
- 15 -
One long accepted advance from the more traditional narrow 
perspective, however, has been the recognition that "union history must 
be firmly set in the context, structure, technological development and 
economic situation of its industry", Jefferys was the earliest and most 
celebrated example of this development, But Hobsbawm has warned that 
"the awareness of economic history as a background may conceal a failure 
to think out the more specific relations between the union's fortunes 
and the history of its industry", He has also argued that "single union" 
histories necessarily distort the almost invariably multi-union 
experience of individual industries,38 
Many modern historians of labour have chosen to break away from the' 
boundaries that a study of one union imposes, The subject is, for 
example, richer for the studies of Hinton and Croucher on the 
engineering shop stewards' movements of the two world wars,3~ Similarly, 
the History Workshop series of publications has focussed attention on 
the relatively neglected central role of work experience. 40 However, the 
development of labour historiography in these and other areas, while a 
healthy reaction to narrower traditional institutional accounts, does 
','" ..... 
not invalid4te the usefulness of union histories, On the contrary, it 
" adds extr~.dimensions. 
Francis and Smith, for example, incorporated some of the newer 
approaches in their study of the South Wales miners. Of course, the SWXF 
was exceptionalj it was not only more "intimately associated with its 
society" (the South Wales coalfield> than most unions, but was also, 
until 1945, effectively an area union, covering only a small, though 
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densely populated, part of Britain. Yet despite the relative advantages 
of their Mchosen unionM, the authors argue more generally that Mthe 
dismissal of histories about trade unionism as 'old hat' can be as 
crippling as making them the sole purpose of labour historyM.41 
Recognition of the above paints has affected the approach taken in 
this thesis. It is not an institutional history; it is not based solely 
on union sources, nor is it concerned only with a national perspective. 
It is not a narrative history, nor does it attempt to cover the whole of 
the union's existence. It is, however, a Msingle union- history, but 
this is not a serious problem for the pre-1939 period. There was, at 
this time, a general absence of other unions in IUVB Mterritory", and 
coachbuilding (and bodybuilding> activities were usually separated from 
engineering operations in the various industries. (The major exception 
to this was the NUR's presence in the railway company workshops from 
1913.> 
Given the necessary reliance on historical records, the method 
adopted in this thesis can best be illustrated by a discussion of the 
source material. 
. Primary documentary sources and their problems 
The main primary source has been national and local IUVB records. 
These were supplemented by archives of employers' organisations, and, 
where appropriate, other unions' records, especially the GRWU. Union 
material included minute books of branches and executive committees, 
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union journals, and miscellaneous correspondence. Employer records were 
generally minutes of internal meetings, correspondence and memoranda, 
but also, for the EEF, verbatim notes of central and some local 
conferences. The national records, of course, reflected the various 
organisations' decisions of what to keep. Accordingly, NUVB head office 
correspondence did not survive in the national archives; where it was 
found, in other locations, it proved extremely illuminating. Even the 
massive EEF records had their own lacunae in the form of NCase 
Registers", recording the briefest mentions of those cases where the 
files were not kept. The use of surviving national material was 
essential given the topic, while the choice of which local records to 
consult is discussed below. 
Of the car industry areas, Coventry selected itself, being the home 
of numerous large and small car manufacturers and a number of 
coachbuilders, as well as a very high level of IUVB membership in the 
1920s. The Coventry IUVB branch minute books, complemented by the 
Coventry engineering employers' minute books and other NUVB and EEF 
material, enabled a fairly detailed picture to be constructed. 
",. 0· .. '.1. 
. .. - ~ . 
Similarly~ Oxford"with two large initially non-union car factories (one 
of which,became unionised by the TGWU) , and a very weak IUVB presence, 
not only enabled a contrast with Coventry, but also raised the 
centrality of the 1934 Pressed Steel strike in establishing the TGWU as 
a rival organisation in the industry. Here, in the absence of employers' 
records, the main, but not the only, source material was the local 
branch's minute books; however, given the emphasis in this part on the 
IUVB's faltering efforts at organisation in Oxford, the existing sources 
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appeared to be adequate. A detailed study of the IUVB's efforts 
throughout the interwar period at Austin, Ford, and Vauxhall would, even 
if the material is available, have merely duplicated much of the Oxford 
experience, which is clear from the sources used for these firms in 
chapter 8. 
As the study of the interwar period focussed mainly on the car 
industry, it was unnecessary to investigate in detail any particular one 
of the railway company or contract shop branches. 10 attempt was 
therefore made to see whether any local material survived beyond that 
available in national JUVB records, nor to consult the railway 
companies' archives. However, to acquire a greater understanding of the 
union in its more traditional craft-based areas, it was decided to 
investigate one of the larger (non-railway> centres. Some of this could 
be garnered from organisers' reports and minutes of quarterly District 
Councils published in the JUVB Journal, but more detailed material was 
necessary. 
lost large centres of membership posed a number of problems. London 
.. .,.. . 
was split~into a large number of geographical branches, while a 
'; • Ib> •• , 
signific&nt:port1oa of the membership were forced to move around London 
" . 
• ct',' 
>. • 
in search:'oi worJr:>;A very inadequate picture would have emerged even if 
branch records could have been located, while the surviving minutes of 
London-wide IUVB comDdttees for this period were not particularly 
detailed. With the amalgamation of the Wheelwrights & Smiths in 1925, 
many big English provincial cities (eg Xanchester, Liverpool, 
Birmingham> then had two separate branches. In Birmingham there were 
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also theSaltley and Handsworth branches (based mainly around the 
railway contract shops). The Greater Manchester area, apart from the 
railway branches of Newton Heath, Dukinfield. and Openshaw (the last 
having a sizeable non-railway membership), also had a number of smaller 
branches. Glasgow, however, had the advantage of having a single branch 
(apart from the Springburn branch for the two Glasgow railway 
workshops). Its branch minute books were also publicly available, along 
with the manuscript records of the Scottish District Council. Glasgow 
was therefore chosen, and had the unforeseen bonus of Charlie Kilne's EC 
reports to the Scottish District Council, which were an invaluable 
addition to the otherwise fairly terse and unhelpful minutes of the IUVB 
EC in this period. 
If the study had been continued forward into the postwar period, 
then, irrespective of the need to study developments in Luton, Dagenham, 
and Paisley [for Linwood], it would have been my intention to devote 
considerable attention to the Birmingham area; for here a militant 
policy developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s around the various 
car factories and railway contract shops. Also, as the NUVB was in 
compet1tion with" other unions to organise motor industry workers in the 
postwar-era, . any further study would have had to situate the NUVB in 
, .' ; '?- ... 
this multi-union environment. This would necessarily have involved 
treatment of the accommodations and conflicts with the TGWU especially, 
the AEU to some extent, and the Sheet Xetal Workers. It would have built 
on the classic study of Turner, Clack and Roberts, as well as producing 
factory case studies of the type recently published by Tolliday.42 
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Of the employers association records, the NFVT and UKJWB were a minor 
source, but gave some insight into the coachbuilding employers, 
otherwise totally unavailable from the published literature. By 
contrast, the EEF had immensely detailed records, though, fortunately 
(only in respect of the time spent reading often hazy microfilm> 
relatively limited on the NUVB in the interwar period; the Coventry 
engineering employers minute books were very helpful in highlighting the 
major issues in Coventry. Minutes of board meetings of three firms were 
useful in illuminating particular points on production stategy, but were 
otherwise very limited. With the normal constraints on the time 
available for research, no attempt was made to include any more company 
records, though they would have assisted in painting a fuller picture of 
the period. 
A number of issues are raised by the use of such documentary 
material, which are not often discussed, According to the Webbs, the 
"Document" (and minutes of meetings were included in this category> was 
"a kind of mechanical memory, registering facts with the minimum of 
personal bias",·3 Carr, for one, has attacked the nineteenth century 
"fetishism of documents", the attitude that "If you find it in the 
documents, it. is so", His riposte was that "10 document can tell us more 
J 
than what the author of the document thought",·· 
The main document writers, in this case, were the union minute-
takers, the branch and area council secretaries and the general 
secretary, Omission (wilful or otherwise) of reference to certain issues 
would often be impossible to detect <though potentially serious for the 
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researcher>. Despite the Webbs' comment above, they also acknowledged in 
the same publication that "documents, however frank and confidential, 
are apt to distort facts as well as to display them", and gave an 
example of the seriousness of such omission. Trade union branches "may 
have been engaged in a peaceful but successful maintenance of their old-
standing Working Rules, or a new regulation may silently have become 
habitual, or an old one silently dropped, without this action on the 
part of the members rising to the surface in any document whatsoever, 
public or private."4S 
Distortion or misrepresentation of the discussion, and sometimes even 
the proposed action (if any>, would be difficult to detect in the 
absence of alternative sources; but where some idea of the minute-
writer's general position has been acquired, and especially where other 
sources exist, some compensation can be made (though the general problem 
of verification will be discussed below>. In the research for this 
theSiS, a further serious problem encountered in the perusal of union 
documents (apart from illegibility of many manuscript sources> was 
brevity, often to the point of rendering the minute almost worthless. 
"' . Necessarily, in this case, other sources (where available) were 
essential-just to make sense of many such minuted points. 
The important source material of regional organisers' reports in the 
NUVB Journal more obviously reflected their interpretation of the 
important disputes and negotiations of the previous quarterj but also 
gave them the opportunity (if they were prepared to use it, and not all 
were) to openly put forward their views on general issues facing the 
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membership. The verbatim minutes of EEF conferences, while being 
constrained by the· "ritualism" of formal bargaining,46 were usually very 
clear statements of the respective parties' negotiating positionsj in 
that sense, they were among the better primary sources. but where 
examples of some practice. raised by one side. were disputed. caution 
was again necessary. 
Finally. even the Webbs conceded that while "The written word ... is 
usually of higher evidential value than the spoken word". it is "equally 
in need of verification·. They acknowledged the "exceptional 
difficulties" of this process in social investigation, arguing that the 
"accumulation of many observations .•.. may amount to quite effective 
verification·. 47 It is in this spirit that the verification of the 
various documentary material used has been attempted. 
Oral sources 
While based mainly on written records, some oral sources were used 
for this thesis. In particular, Bert Edwards and Stan Wyatt gave 
extensivelr'of .. their time to answer all sorts of questions concerning 
the union and the: trade. Other oral archives and secondary accounts 
~.. ~ 
based "on oral sources have also been used. But although the description 
of particular work processes would probably have been improved by 
further oral accounts, which are particularly valuable for giving the 
"feel· of periods and places, in other respects there would be a number 
of limitations. 
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The technique used by Friedlander4s of identifying a key individual 
and, in conjunction with that person, building up a picture of 
particular events, was not feasible for this thesis. Shorter contacts 
ran up against lapses of memory, conflation of events, and confusion of 
dates. This was further heightened by the time period under 
considerationj at best, surviving NUVB members would have only been 
young men in the 1920s and many would not have been "union-minded" at 
the time. Particular recollections would often be unverifiable in the 
absence of other written or oral sources. For the post-1945 era, these 
drawbacks would be less serious. 
Secondary sources 
The emphasis on technical changes in both the materials and the 
methods of production necessitated an extensive search into the 
technical periodical literature, supplemented by various in-house motor 
and railway company magazines. No claim is made to an exhaustive search 
of these sources but, for the present purposes, the material presented 
and analysed is more than adequate. The collection and selection of 
.' . 
further data would only refine, rather than alter, the analysis. 
Again, the importance of an understanding of the structure of the 
industries the HUVB organised in, required building up a picture, 
achieved mainly through the use of secondary sources. The material 
relating to car and car body production figures was generally based on 
primary research by the authors in question, though there were some 
problems which have been examined in chapter 5. In surveying the railway 
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companies, the interpretation is based on the extensive secondary 
literature. Attention was focussed on the railway workshops, and 
specifically the carriage workshopsj this important area of railway 
activity has received very little coverage, not just in the histories of 
the numerous railway companies, but also in the field of trade union 
history. The account of the origin and development of company workshops 
in Appendix 1 should therefore be seen partly as an attempt to rescue 
these, often enormous, "railway factories" from the obscurity they have 
suffered. They were major employers of engineering and coachmaking 
labour, and remained so throughout most of the motor car era. 
Personal observation 
Finally, one further source needs to be acknowledged, and that is my 
own personal observation and experience of car factories. Having worked 
in a car body factory for nearly five years I had acquired some 
knowledge of the various technical processes of car body production. 
Although I was a spot-welder on a body-building assembly line for most 
of the time. I initially also worked in the paint shops, the press 
shops, and on a trim line. Visits to the body, paint, trim and assembly 
shops at Dagenham, Longbridge and Ryton, as well as what was the Korris 
, 
Hotors plant at Cowley confirmed the basic similarity of the various 
assembly line processes which had not changed greatly (except in scale> 
since the 1930s. 
Ky main motive for working in a large motor car factory was to gain 
first-hand knowledge of the realities of shop floor life and industrial 
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relations in the industry. The choice of factory was accidental, and 
while I soon became acquainted with the history of the union 
organisation in the plant, I did not realise at the time how significant 
that would be. When I started my historical research on the motor 
industry a few years later, I gradually became aware of the importance 
of the Pressed Steel Company in two major respects. Firstly, how 
dominant a supplier of steel bodies it had been to a large section of 
the industry. the evidence for which was still visible in the early 
1970s. And. secondly. the fact that the TGWU had organised the factory 
in the mid-1930s. the only example of mass unionisation in the interwar 
industry. with the implications that had for the NUVB's own organising 
policy. The years I had spent in II A" Building. where the 1934 
recognition strike had started. and as a member of the TGWU "5/60" 
branch established as a result of that strike. took on a new meaning. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
As Bain has argued. "Every scientific investigation has some 
analytical framework to guide the selection of relevant data from the 
.-
infini te mass of- :available material and to help organise this data in a 
meaningful and coherent form once it has been gathered".4~ The 
analytical, framework chosen for this thesis reflects the rejection of 
conventional trade union historiography. in favour of a thematic 
account. While there are other possible arrangements of the material. 
this particular organisation provides a suitable framework for tackling 
the questions raised at the beginning of this introduction. 
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Very briefly, the thesis is divided into two parts covering separate 
periods, being roughly divided by the first world war. Within each part, 
the IDaterial is arranged ,into four chapters, not in a narrative 
sequence, but each covering a separate topic. The chapters themselves 
are divided into sub-topics. Sometimes the division between the IDajor 
sub-topics is chronological (for example, parts 1 and 2 of chapter 7, 
and sections A and B of both parts 1 and 2 of chapter 8, where the 1920s 
and the 1930s are covered separately), but more usually thematic. Only 
chapter 1 is based mainly on a narrative account, and while a narrative 
sequence is observed, where appropriate, in the treatment of individual 
sub-topics in the other seven chapters, their emphasis is on description 
and analysis. 
The first part of the thesis covers the period up to 1914, and 
clearly develops the argument that the coachmaking trade overall was far 
from the "static" backwater of industry that Pelling has suggested. so 
The different branches of the "private" trade developed and changed over 
time, and the rise of new vehicles further changed the nature of much of 
the trade where these vehicles were built. The pace of change varied 
between-the different sections of the increasingly disparate vehicle 
building industry. Change was therefOre a fact of life for coachmakers 
before 1914, and was not confined to the interwar years. 
The first two chapters deal with the coachmaking trade generally, 
chapter 1 concentrating on the development of trade unionism and chapter 
2 on the different branches of the coachmaking trade. The main areas of 
painting and wood and iron working are identified, and the changes that 
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took place in them up to the end of the nineteenth century. The varying 
quality of apprenticeships is highlighted, and chapter 2 ends with an 
analysis of the "piecemaster" system of subcontracting in the industry, 
which had enormous consequences for coachmaking trade unionism and the 
division of labour in the centre of the trade - London. 
The next two chapters move away from "private" coachmaking and cover 
the new areas of railway carriage and motor car body building. While 
motor cars developed from 1896, railways started at the beginning of the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, both areas taking over and 
eventually adapting traditional coachmaking techniques. The 
undercarriage of the private coach was replaced by the railway carriage 
underframe and the motor car chassis, and work correspondingly lost by 
coachmakers. The scale of production (in terms of size and numbers 
produced) of these new vehicles made the application of woodworking 
machinery more feasible. Not only, therefore, were some branches of the 
trade redundant, but the transferred bodymaking skills required less 
handwork. At the same time, the new trade of "coach finishing" was 
spawned by these two industries, and bodymakers came to handle metal 
panels as part 'of their job. Chapters 3 and 4 also look at trade union 
activity,"·1n these new industries, the former especially relating the 
,. 
rise of.the GRW'and then the NUR to mass unionisation in the railway 
company workshops. 
The second part is divided into four, much longer, chapters, each 
covering the whole interwar period but focussing on particular aspects. 
Chapter 5 deals with vehicle building generally, concentrating on two 
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features - the structure of the different industries; and the increasing 
division of labour and the introduction of assembly lines. Chapter 6 
looks at the two major technical changes during this period, chapter 7 
at the union's attempts at organisational change, and chapter 8 at the 
union's situation in the car factories. While the issues covered in each 
chapter are analytically distinct. their treatment necessarily involves 
some cross-reference. 
Chapter 5 is divided into three parts: cars and coachbuilding; 
railways; and buses and trams. The importance of the interwar 
coachbuilding sector in the production of all sorts of bodies for the 
car companies is detailed. The major changes in the organisation of 
motor car work are analysed. dealing with a chronology of the 
introduction of assembly lines into various factories, and the changes 
in wood-framed bodymaking and trimming. The second part identifies the 
introduction of flow production techniques into the railway company 
workshops. as well as looking at the rationalisation of the railway 
companies into four main groups. and the rationalisation in the railway 
contract industry. The final part on buses and trams looks at the 
situation facing IUVB members in the bus and tram operating companies 
. " 
"II, •• 
(especially London> and the London bus building industry. 
~. '''~'' . ',. ' .... 
... 
Chapter 6 is a study of two major technical changes. The first is the 
rapid transition from paint and varnish to cellulose. The almost total 
changeover from paint to cellulose on car bodies took two to three 
years. and. in that sense. constituted a revolution in the trade. but 
its impact on the union was tempered by three factors. Firstly, the 
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cellulose spray of 1925-26 had been preceded by paint spraying and 
flowing techniques in the bigger car factories since the end of the 
first warj secondly, car output was still expanding (until 1929)j and 
thirdly, even the spraying of paint (let alone cellulose) on vehicles 
other than cars remained very limited until well after the second world 
war. 
The second technical change is the change from wQod-framed, metal-
panelled to all-metal vehicles. The change is analysed first in the car 
industry where it is shown to have been a much slower overall change 
than was the case with paint technology. In particular, the rise of new 
steel body factories is identified (especially Pressed Steel) which 
meant that in most car factories it was not the existing workforce that 
was confronted with the new techniques and the employers' desire to 
employ semi-skilled labour on them. The next three sections look at the 
introduction of the all-metal bus and railway cariage, which transition 
took place over a much longer time-scale than in the car industry. It 
also tended, again unlike the car industry, to occur in the same 
establishments and with the same labour force that had built "composite" 
vehicles. In the case of at least one railway company, the changeover 
from all-wooden to composite carriages had hardly been completed when 
all-metal carriages were being built by another. 
The problems involved in NUVB members retaining the bulk of the 
eqUivalent operations on all-metal structures varied from one workplace 
to another. Where they had won the right to do the metalwork on 
composite vehicles, they were in a stronger position to challenge for a 
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substantial proportion of the all-metal vehicle. Section B also 
therefore includes a protracted and very bitter struggle between the 
HUVB and the Sheet Metal Workers in Scotland over the line of 
demarcation as buses gradually Changed their material of construction. 
Section D also deals with the HUVB's attempts, in particular in the 
early post-second world war period, to implement a common pOlicy in the 
bus and railway carriage sections of the industry. 
The first part of chapter 7 covers the union's efforts to cope with 
semi-skilled and female labour in the car industry in the 1920s. The 
second part then looks at the complex events that led to the setting up 
of an Industrial Section in 1931, identifying a financial crisis as the 
key factor. The actual coverage of Industrial Section membership in the 
19305 is analysed, and its irrelevance in the car industry branches 
noted. A major organisational factor limiting any substantial change in 
memberShip recruitment patterns is identified as the need to fund the 
union's superannuation benefit commitments. Finally, the last section 
analyses the massive loss of membership in the early 1930sj and finds 
the cause to be closely linked to the increased financial demands put on 
the empioyed membership, rather than any permanent shrinking of the 
skilled vehicle building workforce due to technical changes and the rise 
of mass production. 
Chapter 8 analyses the strength or weakness of the union in different 
car and car body factories. The numerous Coventry workplaces are taken 
together in part 1 and the NUVB shown to have been in a relatively 
strong position throughout the 1920s, based to a large extent on the 
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employers' needs for their members' specific vehicle building skills in 
a tight local labour market. The union's position was shattered in the 
early 1930s, though partly rebuilt later in the decade. While the need 
for skilled labour was declining throughout the 1930s, this is shown to 
be too simple an explanation for the collapse that took place. The 
second part deals with those mass producers sited outside of Coventry. 
Particular attention is paid to Morris Motors, where the union's failure 
to make any headway in the 1920s was not for want of trying, and Pressed 
Steel, which became the only large car factory to be successfully 
organised in the 1930s. The success of the TGWU at Pressed Steel, due to 
a unique combination of circumstances, had immediate consequences for 
the NUVB's claim to speak for the body side of the car industry. The 
failure of the 1929 Austin strike, where the NUVB was more prominent, is 
analysed, and some attention paid to the non-union firms of Ford and 
Vauxhall. 
The conclusion then summarises the main arguments of the thesis, 
answering the empirical questions raised above. It also discusses the 
three general issues mentioned at the end of section A above, and 
includes a brief note on interwar strikes, before ending with a few 
further comments· on method. Finally, when this study refers to the NUVB 
, 
it does so in the understanding that "Organisations do not perform 
actions or take decisions: rather, certain people decide and act in the 
name of organisations".·5 1 
- 32 -
PART I 
BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR. 
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CHAPTER 1. EARLY COACHKAKING TRADE UNIONISX 
A. INTRODUCTION - THE COACHKAKIIG INDUSTRY 
Compared with many trades, coachmaking was a relative latecomer. While 
the evolution of the coach from its sixteenth century origins will be 
addressed in the next chapter, this chapter will be mainly concerned with 
the nineteenth century. Coach ownership was for the minority, it being 
noted in 1842 that "as it is only persons in affluent circumstances· that 
can afford to keep them for their own use, they are liable to change of 
fashion, both in their shape, size, ornaments, and name, like most other 
articles used by that class of the community.·' 
One constant complaint by the trade was the taxation of the use of 
carriages, variously on the owner (either private or public, viz. stage 
coaches or hackney carriages), and the coachbuilder who hired out 
carriages, as most did. Starting in 1637, these taxes were particularly 
heavy in the early 1790s and between 1810 and 1825, with consequent effects 
on the levaL-of e~loyment in the industry. Although there were various tax 
1 ,I' .... 
," . . 
reductions.and relaxation of restrictions in the third quarter of the 
.. 
..•. , 
nineteenth"century, ,the income from carriage tax licences was around 
t550,OOO each year between 1876 and 1886, compared to the turnover of the 
coachmaking industry of about t2~ million. 2 Despite this high level of 
taxation, the number of carriages in use expanded very significantly in the 
middle years of the nineteenth century, as shown in table 1:1 .. 
1814 
1824 
1834 
1844 
1854 
1864 
1874 
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Table 1:1 lumber of carriaies in use. 1814-1874. 3 
~-:tlheel54 2-l:lhee15s 
23,400 45,800 
29,000 51,000 
49,000 50,000 
62,000 33.000 
68.000 137.000 
127,000 170,000 
150.000 285,000 
TotalS 
69,200 
80,000 
99.000 
95.000 
205.000 
297.000 
435,000 
While this table has a number of problems (explained in the footnote) it 
does illustrate the big growth in the number of carriages in use between 
the mid-1840s and the mid-1870s. despite the development of the railway 
network at this time. How many vehicles were actually built from year to 
year is not known, though a duty levied on carriages for sale between 1810 
and 1825 gives some figures - namely, 3,636 built for private use in 1814, 
and 5,143 in 1824.7 This would suggest a life of some 15-20 years for 
existing carriages early in the nineteenth century, which highlights the 
importance of repair and repainting work in the trade. 
, 
Along with the growth of carriage usage. there was a steady expansion of 
the number of coachmakers enumerated in the census returns. S 
Table 1;2 Adult male coachmakers. Eniland and Wale5. 1831-1871. 
5,155 10,031 12,900 15,909 19,012 
- 35 -
During the second half of the nineteenth century, there were generally 
around a thousand coachmaking businesses in Britain and Ireland. About one 
quarter of these were in London, though the exact proportion declined as 
the century progressed.~ A UKSC branch survey in the mid-1860s revealed 
their knowledge of at least 436 coachmaking shops in Britain and Ireland, 
excluding London and a few other towns. 10 
Of the 915 coachbuilding employers reported in the 1851 census for 
England and Wales, about 19% did not furnish details of the number of 
employees, and as this group employed an estimated half of the employed 
coachmakers, it makes it impossible to gain an accurate impression of,the 
size distribution of firms in the industry. This is further compounded by 
the inclusion of railway coachmakers in the figures, and the use of sub-
contractors known as piece-masters (see chapter 2). However, from the 
information available, we know that a minimum of 549 of the firms employed 
less than 10 each, averaging just over 4 apiece. At least another 128 firms 
employed only between 10 and 19. The bulk of the employers were therefore 
small, and many very small. London, with 29% of the employers in Great 
Britain, and 30% ~f the total workforce, might be expected to have a 
similar size distribution. And, in fact, at least 158 of the 280 London 
~ 
firms,empl~yed less than 10, averaging less than 4 each. There were, 
however, a number'of fairly large employers scattered around the country. 
While the census returns only definitely pick out 16 firms employing 
between 50 and 150, there were undoubtedly more, particularly in London. 
Coachmaking firms were scattered in towns and cities around the country. 
Because of the need to service the local market (especially for hiring and 
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repairs) in country districts, many small towns had coachbuilders, as well 
as the large metropolitan centres. Apart from the relative decline of 
London, there was further unevenness among the districts. Thus, while 
Newcastle and Dublin, for example, declined in importance,'1 the Xidlands 
increased. In 1891, Benison Brothers of Leamington (which had recently 
taken over the Mulliner business in that town) was employing about 60; 
while Forder Brothers of Wolverhampton, which specialised in hansom cabs, 
employed about 120, though this was down to 70 at one stage in 1892. In 
Birmingham, a few years earlier, Marston had 200 in constant employment, 
Startin a "very large" number, while Xul1iners claimed "by far the largest 
number of workmen .•. of any coach factory in the Xidlands". 12 
However, the development of the railways even before the UKSC's notional 
date of formation in 1834 (see below) brought in its train the phenomenon 
of very large factories (explored in chapter 3 and appendix 1) which co-
existed with the traditional smaller employers of "private" coachmaking. 
The growth of large motor car factories in the first decade of the 
twentieth century did not therefore mark a major break with the previous 
employment pattern in the industry. 
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B. COACHMAKING TRADE UNIONISM, 1700-1850. 
Eighteenth Century Unionism 
A number of years ago, Allen criticised the Webbs' approach in "The 
History of Trade Unionism" in leading them to neglect the eighteenth 
century. 13 However, as Allen himself noted, "There was, in a sense, no 
trade union history until they wrote it". 14 The neglect of the eighteenth 
century can more properly be laid at the door of nearly a century of 
subsequent labour historians. When Hobsbawm surveyed trade union 
historiography in the early 1960s, he observed that, apart from the 
printing trade, eighteenth century trade unionism had hardly been touched 
upon. 1$ This situation has not significantly changed in the interim. 16 
When studying early combinations of workmen in vehicle building in the 
eighteenth century, it is clear that there is evidence of some 
organisation. One picture of combination in the eighteenth century building 
industry is suggested by Postgate. "Actions 'in defence of the craft', 
first against improperly employed apprentices, and then generally against 
worsening conditions, become more and more frequent, and the club which 
originally was held only for sociability and beer-drinking - at the most, 
for some 'friendly' benefits - gradually becomes a trade union."17 It is 
clear from the available evidence that this speculative account would not 
do justice to the vehicle building experience, where wages appears to have 
been the main issue stimulating combination in this period. 
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References to combination date from the first quarter of the eighteenth 
century, The Webbs, referring to "The Case of the Master Taylors etc" in 
1720, cite a contemporary report that "This combination of the Journeymen 
Taylors, '" is of very ill example to Journeymen in all other tradesj as 
is sufficiently seen in the Journeymen Curriers, Smiths, Farriers, 
Sailmaker-s, Coachmaker's, and ar·titicers ot cliverlOt other ;'rtlOt ;.nd myRhr~"'~1 
who have actually entered into Confederacies of the like nature", 19 And in 
1721 the journeymen coachmakers were criticised for having entered into a 
combination to raise wages, thereby setting "a very ill example to 
journeymen in all other trades", 19 
In 1753 the Worshipful Company of Coachmakers and Coach Harness Makers 
complained that "very many of the best hands of the journeymen, '" have 
risen to such an intollerable, insufferable, insupportable heighth of self-
sufficiency and disobedience in behaviour towards the Masters, not in the 
least submitting to their government, management, or direction - very many 
of them refusing to work by the day, or any otherways than by the Great, or 
peice", And these journeymen demanded "unusual and unwarrantable wages",20 
A committee of the court of the Company was appointed in 1789 "to consider 
.. 
of some regulatio~,to be made in respect of the prices now paid to the 
j our,neYllen of this' trade, and to draw out a regular set of prices to be 
paid'to th& said journeymen by the masters", Three years later a book of 
prices was agreed by the committee and then "it was submitted to 
consideration by five journeymen, three of them coachmakers, and the others 
harnessmakers and trimmers" ,21 
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The other London company that concerns this study, the Wheelwrights, had 
more trouble with their journeymen in the eighteenth century than the 
coachmakers. As early as 1714 in this trade a journeymen's club was formed 
"with the object of furthering the interests of employees of the Trade, 
particularly in respect of wages and conditions of employmentN.22 A strike 
took place in 1718 over wages and hours of work. 23 This was followed in 
1734 by a strike of the "Journeymen Coach Wheelers" for a two hour 
reduction in the working day, an extra shilling for every pair of hind 
wheels, and an extra shilling for hewing everyone hundred spokes. A charge 
of conspiracy was brought against 42 journeymen. The journeymen suggested a 
compromise - an extra sixpence for 100 spokes, and working hours to be 5am-
7pm in summer, and 6am-8pm in winter. The outcome is unknown, though we are 
told this was "the third time they have advance their wages within these 16 
years".24 
Another wages strike in 1745 was restricted to Holborn, Westminster, and 
Southwark. 2s And in 1781 a further demand throughout London for an increase 
from 14s to 18s for a set of wheels, with daymen's wages raised in 
proportion, led to a strike in 1781 or 1782, and several men were tried in 
court and found guilty.26 The evidence suggests that most, if not all, of 
these "strikes were of coach wheelers, who built coach wheels, rather than 
cart wheelers, who built the whole of the cart.27 Despite the Webbs' 
refusal to countenance any continuous link between guilds and trade unions, 
there appears to be a connection between this early organisation of 
journeymen coach wheelers, and the London SOCiety of Coach Wheelwrights 
which later joined the United Kingdom SOCiety of Coachmakers.2~ 
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The early nineteenth century 
Outside of London, surviving evidence of journeymen organisation dates 
only from the early nineteenth century. One example of a friendly society 
which was not a trade union was in Edinburgh where in Kay 1800 the Friendly 
Coachmakers Society was formed. "Several individuals in the employ of .... 
Messrs Cleghorn & Wilson .... having observed the many advantages resulting 
from the establishment of Friendly Societies, particularly of those 
following the same occupation, conceived an idea of forming an association 
to consist of coachmakers only". Ken from the firm of Kessrs. John 
Learmouth & Co also joined at this time. 29 In 1808, when new rules were 
established, the society was confined to men employed by the above two 
Edinburgh coachmaking firms. The two employers contributed to the Society's 
fund, which was for sickness, incapacity, and funerals. The Society, an 
alternative to the friendly society benefits offered by trade unionism, was 
still in existence in 1852, being called "The Princes Street Coachmakers 
Benevolent Society" by then.~o 
Ireland boasts the earliest documented evidence of trade union activity 
" 
among,coachmakera,in the nineteenth century. The "Coachmakers Friendly 
Society of the City'of Cork" dates from at least October 1812, when there 
were 8 members on the committee and 24 other members. Each man had to prove 
his "lawful" time, and any "lawfully entitled" coachmaker coming into Cork 
and unable to get employment, would be helped financially to Dublin or 
Bristol. One early resolution of this Society was that those men working 
"the long hours", ie 6amr7pm, should refuse and only work 6am-6pm from Kay 
10 1813, having given the employer 6 clear days' notice. In October 1813 it 
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was agreed that any man, believing himself entitled to an advance of wages, 
should see the comDdttee, and if they agreed, he would be supported if it 
was necessary for him to leave his employment. 31 
Dublin also saw an incident in 1813 suggesting some kind of 
organisation. The firm of Huttons engaged an English coachmaker who was a 
polisher. This man brought with him new processes of working, which led to 
the men under him earning higher wages. The other men objected to him, 
because he was English, and because of his new methods, and he was 
physically attacked so that he was unable to work again. Huttons spent t450 
discovering the perpetrators and having them imprisoned, but the firm found 
this "cheap, in the tranquillity which it secured to them afterwards·.~2 
The "tranquillity" broke in December 1824 when 54 of Hutton's 58 smiths 
(out of a workforce of 221) came out on strike for a fortnight, objecting 
to the importation of English ironwork at a time when Hutton claimed all 
the forges were fully occupied. The "Coach-smiths of the city of Dublin" 
contacted him, but he refused to see them, meeting instead a deputation of 
his own workDen. He refused to budge, and 47 of the smiths returned. Two of 
those who did not go back were his best workmen, and he believed they were 
held back to put pressure on him.33 
In England, the most important coachmaking organisation was based in 
London. The "Benevolent SOCiety of Coachmakers" was officially established 
as a friendly society only in 1816, containing a rule that "no journeymen 
shall combine against their masters". The Duke of Suffolk was even their 
patron. But there was another, secret, set of rules, and a Grand ComDdttee 
was elected from the different branches of the trade, it being punishable 
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to reveal the names of its members. That same year, masters in the 
coachbuilding industry had met in Holborn to agree upon a general reduction 
of wages. Journeymen gathered outside to protest. The Benevolent Society 
was formed soon afterwards with William Connell as its general secretary, 
and became active in a number of towns. A journeyman came from Bristol to 
London, where he came into conflict with the SOCiety. When he returned to 
Bristol, members there told Connell where he was working, and Connell 
threatened his master into dismissing him. 
Correspondence from Connell to a member in Reading aCCidentally fell 
into the hands of a Reading employer who passed it on to the London 
employer, Luke Hopkinson. This letter explained that all tramping was to be 
stopped in order to preserve finances for the support of a big strike 
expected in London in 1818. If this strike was successful, attention would 
be turned to the provincial towns which Mwe will attack, one after another, 
until our system is established allover the kingdomM. A letter was left on 
the various masters' premises in London in February 1819, signed MAn Enemy 
to IntoleranceM, which listed 14 demands. Hopkinson told his.own men they 
must leave the Society or leave his service, which precipitated a strike of 
the spring makers, spreading to the master smiths who were employed by the 
coachmakers. However, the earlier letter to Reading was used as the basis 
for a prosecution against Connell and twenty others. They were all found 
guilty, but discharged on condition of not reviving the combination. 
Comnnell had, in April 1618, apparently approached Hopkinson and 
proposed a plan for regulating the trade. Masters should observe union 
rates, and agree among themselves their selling prices. The union would 
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coerce those masters who tried to undercut these prices by withdrawing 
labour and cutting off supplies. But these ambitious ideas came to nought, 
and the defeat of the Benevolent Society had long-lasting consequences for 
the future of coachmaking trade unionism in London. Despite remaining the 
centre of the coachmaking trade throughout the nineteenth century, London 
became a blackspot for trade unionism in the industry.34 
Elsewhere, however, organisation was relatively unaffected by the London 
events. Bristol and Dublin coachmakers were among those sending 
communications to Parliament asking for an alteration in the combination 
laws in the mid-1820s. :35 Further evidence of trade unionism before the 
Combination Laws were repealed is shown by the establishment of societies 
in Leicester and Nottingham in 1823.~6 In later years, UKSC members 
claiming superannuation benefit dated their memberShip of coachmaking 
societies back to 1822, 1821, 1820, and even 1815. 37 Regional groupings 
existed in the late 1820s and early 1830s. A society existing in Carlisle 
in 1829 joined the NNorthern DistrictN sometime before 1834 j 3& a Leeds 
Coachmakers Friendly SOCiety existed in 1829j 3'3 the Hanchester UKSC branch 
dated itself back to 1829,40 while a document survives of the NLiverpool 
branch ot'Lancashire Union of coachmakers, established Karch 1832N.41 
''''''·7 
The regional grouping covering the biggest area was the Xidland Counties 
Union, formed in 1831 when Ndelegates met to revise the former existing 
laws, and .... the SOCiety was changed from the Jottingham Society to the 
Xidland Counties UnionN•42 A tramping card of this organisation proclaims 
NTo prevent and detect fraud, the Trade of the above towns give notice, 
that no Cards from the said towns are legal, unless bearing the above seal 
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and impression". Twenty eight towns were listed, most of them in the 
Kidlands broadly defined; but also included were Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Devizes, Reading, Twickenham, and Windsor. 43 An XCU card, issued in April 
1834, was relieved that month in St. Albans and Hertford, both absent from 
the MCU list, suggesting some reciprocal arrangement existed. 
Interestingly, the Midland Counties Union did not include Wisbech, where 
a society had been established in lay 1827, despite its relative proximity 
to Spalding, which was in the XCU. The Wisbech SOCiety rules have 
fortunately survived in the Webbs' manuscript notes, but it is not clear 
whether the rules date from the 1827 origin or from 1835, when they were 
printed; and this is of significance because of the later controversy 
surrounding the actual date of formation of the United Kingdom Society of 
Coachmakers. The Wisbech rule that "Every person who can produce a regular 
certificate satisfactory to the Secretary, or members of this Society, 
shall receive his proper relief for the purpose of defraying his expenses 
to the next town" provides confirmation of the existence of reCiprocal 
arrangements between local societies for tramp relief. While.the absence of 
a society.in London at the time is shown by the rule: "If any member shall 
work in London or in any town where there is no Society of coachmakers, he 
shall send his card to the nearest town where there is a Society; he shall 
also contribute the same as the Society to which he sends it, and on his 
leaving shall receive one of their certificates in its stead".44 
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Origins of the UKSC 
When it comes to deciding when the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers 
was formally established, the existing evidence is similar to a jigsaw 
puzzle with many of the pieces missing. General Secretary John Waldron told 
the Royal COmDUssion on Labour in 1892 that the UKSC had been established 
-from an early date in the present centurYi I could not give the exact 
date, but as near as I can get it about 1825.- 45 In the same year another 
union member told the Webbs that the original society was founded in 1827, 
and was reconstituted in 1834. 46 Charles Kinggate, a future General 
Secretary, wrote in 1904, -I have tried to find out who were the founders 
but have not been successful, we have no records in the archives of our 
office, but we have proofs of its existence in 1827, though we date from 
The year 1834 had been decided upon, for benefit purposes, by a vote of 
the members in 1858. The relevant copies of the Quarterly Report have not 
survived, but Charles Kinggate's brief history supplies the details. The EC 
discussed in 18?8 the qualification for superannuation benefit in terms of 
't ,- ~ 
years of membership: -The question is, has this Society been in existence 
40 years? We have r~cords of men paying money and relieving unfortunate 
. u ," 
brethren 'in 1817. Our superannuated members assert that they have paid 
since their apprenticeship, but still the query is, was it to this Society? 
Can they, having paid money, ruling their own affairs, giving relief to 
Coachmakers as they passed through, as much as they could afford, holding 
little or no intercourse with other towns, be called being uninterrupted 
members of this SOciety .... ?_48 
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The EC asked for a vote on the date of origin of the UKSC, and the 
members voted for 1834.4~ However, eight years later, in 1866, the then EC 
complained that the 1834 starting date "haa been overlooked by our 
predecessors" for superannuation purposes, and therefore "we have 
reluctantly had to reduce the payments to most of the superannuated 
members."SO Later that year, the Delegate Xeeting thought differently. "We 
consider that under the old rule great injustice was done to those of our 
members who in 1834 were too old ever to become entitled to the highest 
rate of Superannuation Benefit. The injustice done to such we have' 
endeavoured to meet by a law which will at once enable those belonging to a 
Coachmakers Society 8 'consecutive years prior to the above date, to come 
upon the highest rate of superannuation. "51 
The EC therefore reinstated on the higher rate those who could prove 
membership of a coachmakers' SOCiety since 1826. An appeal from one member, 
for example, was answered by evidence against him having joined before 
1831; but the EC complained that it was often impossible to find proof of 
membership back to 1826, and that some, not entitled to the higher rate of 
benefit, would receive it only because no one disputed their claim. So they 
~". ! 
prop~sed1n1867 to return to the original ruling, and this was accepted. 52 
, . 
It has been suggested that before 1834 what became the UKSC was a 
"federation" for tramping purpose6.&~ Certainly, tramping remained a 
central feature of the society for a good number of years, but in 1834 
there took place an event which, according to Kinggate "undoubtedly 
consolidated our society, and fixed the date of its establishment". In the 
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first week of December 1834 a strike started in Liverpool and Manchester 
over the employers' demand that the men should leave the Society. 
This demand was probably related to two factors. One was the increase in 
trade union activity generally in the early 1830s, exemplified by the six 
month lock-out of building workers in Lancashire in 1833;64 the other was 
the increase in coachmaking work generated by the early railway companies, 
meaning that employers in the area most affected initially (the north west) 
felt vulnerable to Society activity. Whatever the exact reason, the strike 
continued until August 1835, by which time only 4 Liverpool employers were 
still holding out, leaving 11 Society members still on strike. All the 
Xanchester members had returned successfully. 
Over one hundred separate towns subscribed to the strike fund. The nine 
towns contributing over tl00 provided some 60% of the total t4,983 
subscribed. Kinggate believed that there was no question of fixed levies, 
and that contributions were voluntary.s. From other sources we learn that 
John Evans "did, along with others working at that time in Liverpool, pay 
lOs a week for 6 months on behalf of it", and that James Ball, also working 
in Liverpool,. "paid from 2-3 days wages [per week] to support it".s", 
It seems' highly likely that there was a local levy in Liverpool, and we 
can guess the same applied in Manchester, judging by the amounts donated. 
Strikes lasting several months, in Lancaster in 1838-39 and Exeter in 1840, 
were supported to the extent of the strikers being paid 4~ days normal 
wages each week. 57 These donations suggest that. pay was policy, and, in 
fact, the 1840-47 Rules, noted by the Webbs, provide for that level of 
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-turn-out benefit- to be paid by a levy on the whole Society. A national 
levy would probably have required some central authority to sanction it, 
and therefore nationally accepted rules. There is no evidence of either 
before 1840. The 1840-47 Rules say "Rules established at Edinburgh 1840. 
Revised and corrected at Taunton 1847". No record exists of any such 
meetings at Edinburgh or Taunton, but the inference is that these were the 
first national rules. They include the rule that no local law would be 
tolerated, and that any alterations must be made at a delegate meeting in 
Leeds on the first Monday of September 1843 <though again there is no 
record of such a meeting>.se The fact that national rules definitely did 
exist in the early 1840s is reinforced by the Nottingham District rules of 
1842 which were, according to the Webbs, -merely a reprint of the General 
Laws of the Society at the time.-s~ 
However, while national rules existed, Kinggate believes there was still 
no central authority, no executive comDdttee or general secretary; and that 
the society was in effect still divided into districts which had some local 
autonomy. The 1840-47 Rules state that strikes were not allowed without 
consulting district comDdttee and -Central ComDdttee at Xanchester-. But 
the only surviving reference to Manchester as a centre is in early 1848, 
and it is difficult'to tell how effective it was.~O It is also clear from 
... , 
the surviving evidence that branches maintained a fair amount of autonomy 
until the 1848 reorganisation of the Society, and that it took a few years 
before that tradition was finally broken. A good example of the pre-1848 
reorganisation behaviour comes from Hull branch. The branch minute book 
shows that ,between early 1846 and early 1848, contribution and relief 
payments fluctuated in line with the immediate state of branch funds. s1 
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The 1848 reorganisation 
In July 1847 the Hull branch decided there should be a "District 
Delegate meeting to form laws for the better Government of the Society", 
Such a meeting of the Yorkshire district took place in Leeds in October, 
and issued a circular, stating, among other things, "Tramps have increased 
fourfold; wages in most parts of the three kingdoms have fallen twenty per 
cent",52 The Society was in deep financial trouble. and this circular 
started the train of events that led to a General Delegate Keeting of the 
Society in Leeds on April 10 1848 where the Society was "re-establishedM.6~ 
The Delegate Keeting sent out an appeal MTo the Coach-makers of the 
Three Kingdoms" calling the UKSC "so perfect a wreck. so worthless, so much 
below the requirements of the trade. and practically insolvent",54 The most 
important outcome of the meeting was the centralisation of the Society. 
with a local executive based in Leeds and a full-time General Secretary; 
while a national scale of contributions and benefits was laid down, The new 
rules became operative from July 1. and it was intended to bring in a 
scheme of Stationary [unemployment) Benefit from lovember. "a change so 
desirable: in the constitution of our Society" ,55 It was much cheaper. as is 
, . 
shown 1fwe compare the cost of tramping (at 1s + bed for weekdays. and 
.'~ 
1s6d + ~d for Sundays) to stationary benefit (a two week qualifying 
period. followed by 13 weeks entitlement at 6s per week), 
The number of tramps relieved in the three months from July 1848 was 
enormous, and such a saving was necessary both financially, and in terms of 
members' morale, in such periods of heavy unemployment. However. the first 
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quarter's expenditure on tramping was so high that the Society was 
immediately t164 in debt, and the stationary benefit scheme had to be 
abandoned. 66 The only way to meet this level of expenditure was to levy 
those members still in work, and for the first few years after 1848, 
general levies were common. This was done reluctantly. as the first 
(provisional) executive had stated: NLevies at all times are objectionable, 
and must, as far as possible, be avoided; yet, all will acknowledge that 
money is the mainspring of actionN. 57 But non-payment of levies rendered it 
impossible for the executive to send money where it was needed, and they 
asked the delegates to the April meeting to support them in stopping 
tramping benefit.68 The financial situation was further compounded by the 
first general secretary, John Lawson. embezzling much of the funds that did 
reach the head office. 59 
Manchester branch, however, decided to continue the benefit for one 
month, expending just over tll on it. When the EC demanded they refund the 
money, they refused to do SOj and of the 272 Manchester branch members, 54 
attended a meeting at which it was decided to secede from the UKSC. They 
issued a circular suggesting that the Society be based on -its original 
\ .; ,,',., 
.- .• I 
principle that'each District manage its own affairs-. They also announced 
they would be issuing their old travelling cards, and that any town not 
honouring theD must not expect their cards honoured in return. Initially 
the UKSC were left with only 5 members in the town, but that was sufficient 
for Manchester to remain a relieving branch. 70 
In 1849 a national vote was taken on removing the head office from Leeds 
and changing the mode of government, but Leeds and the centralised system 
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were upheld,71 The MManchester IndependentM Society carried out its promise 
to collect the 3s levy ordered by the UKSC EC in 1848, but distributed it 
to those branches which were in debt, The EC took a conciliatory line and 
urged these branches not to take offence, The Manchester Independent 
recognised UKSC travelling cards and paid relief, and this was reciprocated 
by a number of UKSC branches. But a conference with the breakaway society 
to discuss amalgamation was a failure, and the EC finally severed any 
connection, stating that they would not sanction any member applying to the 
Manchester society for relief,7~ 
The Manchester events were the most dramatic, and symbolised the 
teething problems in enforcing a uniform policy, particularly at a time of 
heavy unemployment, Early in 1849 the EC complained of Mthe shameful and 
brutal treatment of our unfortunate fellow-workmen, at present on the road, 
In many instances they have to travel 2 or 3 days without a farthing of 
relief, and others have nat been able to procure a bed on which to rest 
their wearied bonesM,73 
In the absence of available funds, branches were usually dependent on 
the goodwill of local publicans, Thus two pounds were sent to Hull in mid-
1849 because the landlady of the club-house refused to advance any more 
". ~ 
money until the whole or part of her account was d1scharged,74 And the Hull 
branch was forced to pay only 6d tramp relief in February 1850 Mon account 
of not being able to uphold the present rate of relief-,7& But by mid-1851 
the EC could claim that very few branches were giving less than the rule 
rate of relief - "We trust that all towns dissenting from the rules, will 
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see the propriety of following the example set them. and let us no longer 
be disunited",76 
Because many early Hull branch records survive, it is possible to chart 
the slow application of national rules in this branch. but it would not be 
surprising if their experience was not repeated elsewhere. Thus in January 
1852. the branch secretary wrote to the General Secretary as follows: 
"There being so many tramps through at present and so few members that we 
are unable to meet the demands of our landlady, The amount she wants of us 
this month which she has given to tramps is 19s6d "" and our income is so 
small through being so few of us we shall either be obliged to lower the 
relief or you will have to remit us money to keep it Up",77 Only three 
months later the General Secretary had to inform Hull branch "never relieve 
a certificate, but obtain them and send them to Ee, they are illegal", As 
certificates from the earlier district societies had been outlawed in 1848. 
this further demonstrates the slow application of uniform national rules. 7e 
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C. LOCAL AND SECTIONAL COACHMAKIHG SOCIETIES. 
A number of locally-based coachmaking unions existed in the nineteenth 
century both before and after the formation of the UKSC. Many of them were 
in London, but there were a number outside, usually based in the bigger 
cities. Various organisations were reported in Scotland, especially in 
Edinburgh, from the 1840s through to the 1890s, and a ·Scottish Association 
of Operative Coachmakers· attended the 1875 TUC with a claimed membership 
of 200. 7 '3 
Outside of Scotland, the main provincial non-UKSC organisation was the 
Manchester Independents <referred to above), who rejoined the UKSC in 1866. 
They had 228 members, about 100 of whom had joined since the beginning of 
1866, While 55 dated from their original entrance in the UKSC, 3 going back 
to before 1826. While they had a number of ·country· members, the bulk of 
their Manchester-based membership worked in the local railway shops. Years 
later they were referred to as the ·Railway Coachmakers·, and soon after 
their amalgamation, a separate Openshaw branch was formed for members 
working at Ashbuiy's contract shop and the Gorton workshops of the KS&L 
Railway. eo 
Reference has already been made to the lack of a coachmakers' SOCiety in 
London in the late 1820s and early 1830s. After the 1848 reorganisation of 
the UKSC, its London branch claimed some 80 members, but only 20 paying 
members were claimed at the end of 1851. Membership picked up soon after, 
with 97 in late 1853. By 1855 a Stratford branch in East London had been 
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formed (presumably based around the Eastern Counties Railway workshops 
there) and the total London membership was 124. By the early 1870s, the 
London branch had over 300 members. 
In relation to the number of coachmakers in London (see below) this 
level of membership was tiny. There were, however, a number of sectional 
societies present in London, about ten operating in the third quarter of 
the century. The most important was the London Coachmakers' Friendly 
Society, later called the London Coachmakers' Trade Union (and from 1908 
the London & Provincial Coachmakers' Trade Union), which was formed in 1843 
and had a continuous existence through to 1919 when it was one of the 
founding constituents of the IUVB. It confined itself to bodymakers and 
carriage makers, and its original membership of 15 had increased by the 
late 1870s to between 150 and 200. a1 
There were two coach painters' societies in London. One was fairly 
short-lived - the United Coach Painters was formed in 1866, but transferred 
its 22 members to the UKSC in 1877 after an overwhelming vote of the latter 
had agreed. 82 An older society also existed, as an unnamed London coach 
painters' society contributed funds to the 1834-35 coachmakers' strike in 
the nort~-west. A sectional society also existed in 1861, though the first 
definite reference to the Sovereign Friendly Society of Coach Painters 1s 
in 1862. In the 1890s its secretary spoke of it as ·one of the oldest of 
its kind·, while the UKSC Journal called it -a very old society·. It 1s 
likely therefore that the Sovereign Society dated back to at least the 
1830s. In October 1892 the UKSC General Council almost unanimously (only 
London branch voting for) refused to allow it to amalgamate. By then it had 
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less than 50 members, most of them old. It had numbered nearly 200 at one 
stage, and declined mainly through the deaths of existing members and its 
failure to make new members, finally dissolving in 1894. 93 
In the trimming branch two separate societies existed. One, reported in 
1861, was based as the "Crown" public house, had 93 members in 1868, and 
was still in existence in 1879. The other, based at the "Globe", which 
appears to have been called the United Trade Society of Coach Trimmers and 
Harness Xakers, had 47 members in 1868, and was still extant in 1871. It is 
not clear, though, whether this SOCiety had any relation to the "Globe 
Coachmakers" of the eighteenth century that Cole and Postgate refer to; but 
given that the Coachmakers' Company also contained harness makers, this is 
quite possible. Both these trimmers' societies disappeared before the end 
of the nineteenth century.e4 
The London Society of Coach Wheelwrights, already mentioned, steadily 
declined in numbers towards the end of the nineteenth century, and its 40 
members of 1892 had fallen to 18 in 1909 when it amalgamated.with the 
UKSc.e. A London coach smiths' society donated to the 1834-35 UKSC strike, 
• 
while in,l86l, two such societies were reported, one of which had 200 
members in 1871', 'and was still functioning five years later. In 1879, when 
a coachsmiths' and vicemen's society was established, this was presumably 
an extension of this smiths' SOCiety. This maintained an independent 
existence right through to the formation of the IUVB in 1919, though its 
numbers were low, fluctuating around the 50 mark in the 20 years after 
1892. e6 Some more ephemeral societies also existed, but generally the 
London sectional coachmaking unions either dissolved or eventually joined 
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the UKSC/IUVB. The only one worth noting was the small "Federal Union", 
which was set up in 1894 to "take in the unskilled in the coach trade, and 
likewise, those too old to join the existing societies, as while the 
present disorganisation exists in London we Society men are only like 
grains of sand on the sea shore".87 
The London societies' membership included "country" members. In 1869, 
for example, we find that one of the 23 coachmakers working "black" in a 
Liverpool firm was a member of a London society. In Leamington in 1871, the 
union affiliation of coachmakers in two shops was: lulliners - UKSC 17, 
London societies 4, non-society 4; Glover - UKSC 6, London society 1, non-
society 5. It is clear that in disputes, the UKSC needed the support of any 
London society members. And when a dispute occurred at a Liverpool firm in 
1876, the UKSC paid a member of the London coach smiths' society some £9-5s 
in strike pay to keep him out.8~ 
The largest of the London societies, the LCTU, had the greatest number 
of "country" members, with an estimated 130 of its total 1903 membership of 
350. It was not until 1908 that this union changed its name to the "London 
& Provincial", signifying the intent to recruit outside of London, but 
there- is evidence of members having joined in the provinces before this 
date.·' . -
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The UKSC, local societies, and non-unionists 
In L~ndon the proliferation of sectional societies and the weight of 
non-unionists had its greatest impact. The number of adult male coachmakers 
in mid-nineteenth century London is given in table 1:3 below. 
Table 1:3 Adult male coachmakers in London. 1841-1871. 
llll 
3,821 
1.8.21. 
4,512 
lati 
4,855 
lMl. 
5,187 
In the late 1860s and early 1870s, for which membership figures of most 
societies exist, about 1,000-1,100 London coachmakers were in trade unions, 
including the UKSC. This amounts to just over 20% of the total workforce, 
but is a lot higher than the figure for 1841 which was probably less than 
10%. As noted in the Introduction, these figures contradict Cole's 
assertion about the strength of coachmaking unionism in London during this 
period. Evidence of the coachmaking trade movements in London (the 1859-60 
short time movement and the 1872 9-hours movement> shows how the trade 
unionis~s .attempted to overcome this problem. 
The ·United Coach Trades Association" was set up at a meeting of workmen 
held in July 1859. A few days later, a meeting of delegates appointed by 
the various shops elected a committee of 23 to meet weekly, while general 
meetings of shop delegates were to take place monthly. By September, 501 
workmen had enrolledj by October 600, increasing to 750 by December. At the 
December general meeting it was noted that "nearly all the members belonged 
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to the trade societies". In fact, this figure could not have been far off 
the combined membership of the societies in London at that time. 
The LCTU appears to have taken the initiative. The Honorary Secretary of 
the Association, Reavely, was an LCTU member, and both he and his fellow-
member Cornelius Redlington, who spoke at one of the Association meetings, 
later took out individual membership of the First International in 1868. 
Reavely was also later active in the "United London Coachmakers' Nine Hours 
League" in 1872. The October 1859 meeting agreed to issue a memorial to the 
employers, who replied that it suggested "impracticable" changes. Some of 
the leading employers called shop meetings of their men to "test" the 
feeling on shorter hours. At Peters, for example, a meeting voted 29-110 
against the adoption of the memorial, despite there being 50 members of the 
Association working there. A number of employers did, however, start to 
reduce hours. The London-based Association's policy was to support any 
member who was discharged for advocating the shorter hours, but "any member 
striking work, or inciting others to do so, to gain our object, or behaving 
in a threatening or disrespectful manner, either to his employer or to his 
shopmates, will on no account receive any support whatsoever."'O 
The· UXSC .. took a not dissimi lar stance when in 1860 the executive issued 
national guidelines on gaining shorter hours, but they were prepared to use 
the strike as a means of last resort. "Begin by a voluntary levy on each 
man in the shop, to defray necessary expenses •••• Show by your manner you 
are determined to do an action peaceably, quietly, but firmly, soliciting 
your employers for the boon, setting before them the example of those who 
have already granted it, and not allowing one favourable opportunity to 
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elapse without saying something about it. We would not wish anyone to be 
impetuous, nor to interfere individually .... But sometimes one man will 
arise who fancies all the rest asleep, and by his eagerness throws himself 
out of work. Avoid this, it does no good, and injures the cause .... guard 
against strikes; let every other method be tried, and well tried, and fail 
before you resort to these means - and, before resorting to them, see your 
way clearly for support."91 
Generally the UKSC preferred the society's name not to be involved in 
agitation for shorter hours. When members in Manchester (alongside the 
"Independents"> and Leeds gained concessions on hours in 1866, the 
executive reported that this had been "entirely by their own exertions, 
without even the name of Society being brought into the question, which 
will be a stimulus to others to act more on their right to advance with the 
times than on their right to demand as members of the Society, the name of 
which might in many instances be entirely left out of the question."92 
In the smaller towns the UKSC would usually take the lead in the 
movemen~ for shorter hours, but in the bigger towns, where there were 
. t .. 
generally large numbers of non-unionists, and sometimes local societies, 
the UKSC were usually swept along by events. Thus, in Leamington in 1870, 
the UKSC was anxious to gain the support of the London societies' members 
working in Xulliners for a joint campaign for shorter hours on Saturdays. 
While in Dublin, also in 1870, the number of UKSC members was greatly 
outweighed by non-members and "blacks", and it was necessary "to be very 
careful over striking a shop".93 
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However, moves for a shorter working week from the 1850s to the 1870s 
could draw in large numbers of non-unionists, as epitomised by the London 
building workers in 1859 and the Newcastle engineers in 1871. 34 Similar 
movements developed in coachmaking. In Glasgow in 1872 a total of about 250 
society and non-society men struck for the 51 hour week. At the time the 
UKSC branch only claimed 68 members, but this was increased in the quarter 
of the strike to 84; only to fall back to 60 another 3 months later. The 
hours issue also united the coachmakers of Bristol in 1873, when about 70 
UKSC members and about 200 non-members worked together. Again, in Edinburgh 
in 1876, non-society men and members of the Edinburgh local society, who 
jOintly outnumbered the UKSC there, determined to strike several of the 
shops for wage increases. 9 • 
The exception to this was London, which had no significant movement of 
non-society coachmakers, and also had the longest working week. The 
unionists in London, although in a small minority, would have had 
significantly more impact if they had not been split among so many 
different societies. The UKSC executive argued that this division meant 
Minterlopers of all kinds are to be found working in their shops, which 
might' be prevented.Were we united in one body, and thus scores of men who 
~. 
have served seven years at the trade, and are now idle, would find 
employment in place of those who have no right in a Coachmakers' shop.- But 
there were some signs of cooperation, as when the UKSC London branch 
secretary got the other London societies in 1867 to do all in their power 
to prevent their members from going to any of the provincial shops recently 
blacked by the UKSC.96 
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In February 1872 moves were made to get united action on hours among the 
different London societies, and in Hay the "United London Coachmakers Bine 
Hours League" was formed. Once again, this was not a UKSC initiative. From 
February to August, some 20 general meetings and 8 committee meetings had 
been held, with 9 different societies represented. Memorials were sent to 
300 employers, asking for the 54 hour week, with a 1 o'clock Saturday. A 
notional deadline of July 1st was appended, but by the time the master 
, 
coachmakers of London met in June, almost all the large firms had already 
conceded a 55~ hour week (10 hours a day, and 1 o'clock finish on 
Saturdays). By August, only 5 firms had given the 54 hours, while a further 
40 were operating 55~ hoursj with a large number, mainly of the smaller 
firms, still on 63 hours, the League amended its target to 55~ hours. While 
it was agreed to ask non-society men to enrol in the League in order to 
support them in the event of a dispute, nothing more is recorded. 97 
Despite such united action, amalgamation talks with the local societies 
in London (and Edinburgh) in the early 1870s came to nought.~~ While a 
number of small societies dissolved or did join the UKSC, it was not until 
the amalgamation of 1919 that all the exclusively coachmaking societies 
j oined together--~ in one organisation. 
- 62 -
D. THE 1879 CRISIS 
The history of the UKSC in the second half of the nineteenth century 
can be divided into two very distinct periods, separated by the year 
1879. Generally speaking, prior to that year, the UKSC had gradually 
established a position of strength in many localities. Following a long 
drawn out dispute that year, the UKSC was very much on the defensive 
well into the 1890s. 
The national membership, after a very volatile period immediately 
after the 1848 reorganisation, grew fairly steadily from around 3,000 in 
the mid-1850s to over 8,000 in 1878. But the dispute and its aftermath 
saw this fall by nearly half to around 4,500 in 1882. After a number of 
years at this level, the total crept above 6,000 in 1896, and 7,000 five 
years later. The expansion of the motor industry saw a big jump to 
nearly 9,500 in 1907, followed by a drop to around 7,000 in 1910-1911. 
This figure marked the low point and membership surged to over 12,000 in 
1913, before further dramatic growth in 1917-1919. 
The years 1878-79 were marked out by the Webbs as "a stagnation which 
must rank. as one of the most serious which has ever overtaken British 
industry". While the ASE noted that the employers' response was 
"irregular attack •.. in preference to the development of any general 
movement by their Associations", and that union managed to defend the 54 
hour week, the Webbs reported that "other trades were not equally 
successful". They argued that 1879 was "a low-water mark of the Trade 
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Union Xovement", with "widespread national organisations .. [shrinking] 
... practically into societies of local influence, concentrated upon the 
strongholds of their industries".99 The Coachmakers were very badly hit, 
with a newly formed employers' organisation leading the assault in the 
north western bastions of the union. Despite a substantial defeat, 
membership generally held up in the strike-hit areas, but fell away 
where the union was weaker but not generally under attack. 
UKSC members in Liverpool, Manchester, Doncaster and Rochdale struck 
in early January 1879 when employers tried to increase the working week 
from 53 to 56~ hours. As a result, members were locked out in the 
Lancashire towns of Oldham, Bolton, Burnley, Preston, Wigan and 
Altrincham, the Yorkshire towns of Leeds, Halifax, Harrogate, Ripon, 
Scarborough and York, and also Huntingdon. The dispute was eventually 
closed by the union almost 25 weeks later, at the end of June, when 
there were still nearly 500 members on strike (just over one half of 
them in Manchester>. The Xanchester employers resolved that "each 
workshop is declared and shall henceforth be absolutely free·in respect 
of the person or persons to be engaged, and as to wages, piecework, and 
. -
number of apprentices". 100 
The Bolton branch claimed that after the strike, the employers 
"refused to employ any man whom they suspected of being in the Society, 
and carried out a perfect system of boycotting, by writing after every 
SOCiety man that they could hear of being in employment, and getting 
them discharged". But there was a limit to how far the employers could 
pursue this strategy, even at a time of generally depressed trade. What 
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was probably more disturbing for the UKSC's officers was the reaction of 
the membership to the levies imposed on them from the beginning of the 
strike through to August 1879. When the levies stopped, many members 
were substantially in arrears. This compounded the already precarious 
financial situation, which meant that unemployment, superannuation and 
funeral benefit were halved, and half the towns were closed for tramp 
relief. Xany "lost faith in the Society, they felt certain it would 
collapse". Membership plumetted in 1879 and 1880, not showing any growth 
until 1882, in which year those still in arrears with levies were given 
12 months to pay, failing which they would be suspended from all 
benefits until 1 month after they were clear. By this time the main 
damage had been done, and many eX-members found they were either 
debarred from rejoining because of age, or they had already wasted 
several years of superannuation contributions for it not to be worth 
their while. 101 The impact on many areas is investigated in chapter 3. 
The role of employers' organisation was crucial in the dispute. Two 
years afterwards, a Bolton employer confessed that before the Northern 
Counties Kaster Coachbullders' Defence Association had been formed (in 
.. ' .. ' ,.. 
1878,oa)~ •• W8. in the north were tied hand and foot. Special shops had to 
"', ~. -~ .. ~ 
pay special,.. Wages .. " irrespecti ve of the abi 11 ty of their workmen. Certain 
men had to do certain work. In no case was piecework permitted when the 
UKS were strong enough to prevent it .••.• we got men, or we did not get 
them, as it suited the temper or policy of the 'town secretary'. In a 
word we were not masters in our own shops.-
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He continued, "The Defence Association has completely altered this. 
Now we can employ whom we like, pay by merits .... as a consequence 
there has not been a single strike - a thing unprecedented in my 
experience - for more than 12 months". 103 The scale of the employers' 
victory is underlined by the comment of a London employer in 1902, when 
he argued that the Defence Association had "crushed" the UKSC, "a blow 
from which this union has never really recovered". 104 
Prior to 1879, many branches had various "privileges" formally 
embodied in by-laws or working rulesj for example the large Manchester. 
branch had a minimum wage for each branch of the coachmaking trade, and 
many branches enforced an apprenticeship ratio. But all this was lost as 
a result of the dispute. 106 A further consequence of 1879 was that the 
gradual elaboration of trade policy in the union's rule book abruptly 
ended, with most trade policy actually removed from the union's official 
rules until it started reappearing in the 1890s. 
It would be wrong, however, to exaggerate the UKSC's strength before 
1879. The craft tradition of "blacking" shops that failed to follow 
union rules was carried out with regard to the realities appertaining to 
the'individual'situations. From 1859 the rules stated that ·any person 
belonging to the coachmaking trade· (ie not just UKSC members) working 
in a struck shop or blacked shop automatically became black themselves. 
All such blacks, past and present, were "regularly published in 
Quarterly Reports until they make satisfactory terms with the SOCiety·. 
A total of 162 blacks in 1859 had increased to 476 (in 74 shops) some 
ten years later. After 1872, because of the 1871 Criminal Law Amendment 
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Act, the lists were not published, but were still produced for branch 
officers' use. 10& 
While such blacking sometimes worked, often it did not, demonstrating 
the UKSC's inability to recruit or hold sufficient numbers of 
coachmakers. Thus, in 1860, a large railway contract shop in Birmingham 
had its blacking lifted, despite the grievance remaining (see chapter 
3), while the 1866 Delegate Meeting later ruled that "EC shall have 
power to open any black shop after it has been black 2 years". Using 
this new rule, the EC opened shops in Wakefield and Grantham, for 
example, the next year "as we have been repeatedly asked by the 
neighbouring towns, and consider it useless to keep them closed any 
longer". 107 But even this new rule was considered too restrictive, and 
in 1869 the EC argued "we gain directly very few strikes .... Although 
we do not often succeed in getting the employer to acknowledge defeat, 
few employers will venture on a strike a second time". They therefore 
proposed that three quarters of a branch's members could, with EC 
approval, vote, at any time, to open a blacked shoPi and this was 
accepted by ~ large majority in a national vote. loa 
Although UKSC branches were limited in their power over local 
employers, 'the coachmaking trade was not swamped by cheap labour, either 
unskilled adult or apprentice. From 1848 and possibly before, the UKSC 
rule on apprentices requested employers not to employ more than one 
apprentice to 3 journeymen in each branch of the trade, sons of 
coachmakers excepted. George Howell argued in the late 1870s that the 
UKSC had "to some extent been able to enforce [these) restrictions". 
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However, this was mainly because "a larger number of boys could not well 
be employed on account of the skill, care, and nicety required of the 
workers, in all branches of the trade". This will be further examined in 
chapter 2. Although disputes did occur sometimes over the issue, these 
were not "numerous or important". 109 
But UKSC officers had to be continually alert, and were forced to 
tighten up apprenticeship rules in the 1860s. In 1862, for example, 
there were deputations to four Liverpool employers over the number of 
apprenticesj a Congleton shop employing 14 boys to 12 men, discharged 
those the EC delegate singled outj and in Belfast, a shop employing 14 
men and 19 boys was waited upon, with the result that 3 boys were 
removed "so it is a little gain". Undoubtedly, this tendency was 
sufficiently advanced for the 1866 Delegate Keeting to rescind the 
exemption for sons of coachmakers. The new rule was enforced, as when a 
Liverpool employer set on an extra apprentice in 1867. "Under the old 
rules Xr.Stokes enjoyed the privilege of having a number of apprentices 
who were sons of coachmakersj which privilege being now done away with, 
it becomes necessary to reduce the number as opportunity occurs". 110 
, :,. 
Rules on apprentices also disappeared in the 1880s, and a Royal 
COmmission survey in 1885 of 20 UKSC town branches found that three 
quarters of them had no effect on the numbers of apprentices. 111 Kore 
generally, General Secretary John Waldron told the 1892 Royal Commission 
that since 1879 "I should not think we have spent t150 in grievances, 
and they have been merely isolated cases". But, despite the massive 
retreat from their earlier more aggressive stance, the UKSC still 
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retained a solid core of membership in the north west. Waldron informed 
the Royal Comndssion that 90% of coachmakers were in the union "in 
Liverpool and Manchester, and the greater part of Lancashire and 
Yorkshire", though "in a scattered trade like ours there is a very large 
percentage never in the Union", it being "the other counties, West 
Midlands and South, where the great number of non-society men are". 112 
The historical weakness in London has already been noted, the Booth 
survey in the 1890s confirming that "neither separately nor collectively 
are the Societies strong, and the employers are hardly conscious of 
their existence". 11~ 
While Price has argued that a major non-industrial relations 
explanatory factor for nineteenth century trade union membership was the 
friendly society benefits offered, he does not see them also as an 
inhibiting factor. The UKSC experience shows that when membership fell 
in 1879-81, it was mainly a result of the friendly benefit side becoming 
less attractive in relation to increased contributions. When trade 
picked up again in the late 1880s and early 1890s, large numbers of ex-
members were debarred from rejoining because of their age, and this must 
have been a more general experience across craft unions. From his study 
of the building industry, Price claims "it was one of the 
characteristics of union membership to fluctuate wildly from year to 
year and from place to place". A study of nineteenth century coachmaking 
does not support this particular contention, but gives credence to his 
more general point that "the whole question of relations between union 
and non-union men is one that is rent with ambiguity and complexity 
which makes any generalisation at best uncertain". 114 
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CHAPTER 2. THE COACHMAKIRG TRADE. 
A. EARLY COACHES AND COACHMAKERS 
Like its eventual successor, the motor car, the coach was in a 
constant state of evolution. It follows, therefore, that the "skills" 
necessary to construct and finish the coach also changed throughout its 
long history. 
The first coach (ie, where the roof formed part of the framing of the 
body) made in England was reputedly built in 1555,1 and it is claimed 
that by about 1580, they "had come into general use among the wealthy 
classes".2 By the first years of the seventeenth century, coaches were 
"straight-bottomed, open at the upper sides or quarters, which were 
furnished with curtains of cloth and leatherj at first they were tied 
on, and would roll up when air was required; they had no doors, but were 
entered on either side by a moveable rail, over which a leather screen 
was hung." 
The next major development was a curved bottom to the body, with a 
wooden door half-way up it. There seem to have been no glass windows nor 
complete doors before 1650, while the lower parts of the body began to 
be panelled in wood, instead of being covered with cloth, from about 
1660. Carving, gilding, and painting were introduced along with wooden 
panelling. Then, about 1670, steel springs started to be used; as these 
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meant less destructive wear and tear, the amount of timber in carriage 
construction could safely be reduced. 3 
In 1747 the coachmaker's business was described as follows! "to make 
the Body of the Coach, and all the Carriage except the Wheels .... He is 
a carpenter as he frames the Body and Carriage of Wood; a Taylor [sic], 
as he lines the inside with Cloth, Silk, Velvet or other Materials, to 
which he is obliged to use his Needle; and he is a Shoe Maker as he 
covers the Top and Sides with Leather, in which he is sometimes obliged 
to use his Awl."4 
His work was then finished by the tire-smith, wheeler, carver, and 
painter. The term "coachmaker" therefore still only included at this 
time what later became three separate branches of the trade - the 
bodymaker, the carriage maker, and the trimmer. It is not clear, 
though, whether the trade had already split into these three separate 
components by the mid-eighteenth century.s The determining factors of 
this initial division of labour would have been the complexity of the 
coaches being constructed, the number of journeymen employed by a 
master. and the amount of work on hand at any particular time. It has 
been claimed that a Scottish coachmaking employer, named John Home, went 
to Londcnin 1738, received "instruction" in the trade, and returned to 
Edinburgh with a supply of tools. Allegedly, "there had hitherto been no 
division of labour in making a coach" (at least in Scotland) and Home 
"allotted to different workmen the fashioning of the various parts of 
the carriage. Thus the men became expert at their parts".s 
- 71 -
Whatever the actual sequence of events, the division into three 
separate trades had certainly occurred by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. And the trimming work itself would often later be 
executed by separate individuals - the leather work being the specialism 
of the "budget" or "black" trimmer, while another would do the cloth 
work.?' 
Of the other supporting trades, the coach carver was a historically 
transi tory figure, as carving work generally died out. Iii The other three 
trades, however, were central to the nineteenth century coach. Coach-
wheeling generally remained a branch of the trade carried on in separate 
establishments in London, This originated with the Charter given to the 
Wheelwrights' Company, which organised coach-wheelers (who made coach 
wheels) and cart-wheelers (who made the whole of carts), Outside London, 
coach wheels were made on the coachmaker's premises. 
Coach painting was also carried out separately in the eighteenth 
century in London, and there is evidence to suggest that coach painters 
in provincial towns were also employed in separate establishments. 3 
According to Ge'orge; in eighteenth century London, "coach-painting and 
sign-painting were both trades and arts. It was the custom to apprentice 
budding, artists to sign- or coach-painters", 10 Initially coach painting 
was very elaborate and lavish among the wealthier classes: 
"The panels had beautiful paintings upon themj sometimes the whole 
was the subject of a picture in which a landscape and figures appeared, 
sometimes surrounded with a continuous ribbon border of flower work, or 
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the panels were divided into squares or diamonds of diaper work, each 
little partition bearing a flower or device". 11 "For the decoration of 
the panels the services of artists of the highest order were engaged. 
Smirke, the Royal Academician, served his time to Bromley the heraldic 
carriage painter of Lincolns Inn Fields. Monamy, the marine painter of 
the latter part of the eighteenth century, painted the carriage of the 
ill-fated Admiral Byngi and Charles Cotton R.A. decorated coaches with 
armorial bearings."12 And in the mid-eighteenth century, the artist 
Watteau also frequently painted coach panels. U However, lavish 
painting, like carving, had mainly died away by the early nineteenth 
century, and coach painting was done on the coachmaker's premises. 
The other main branch of the trade - coach smith work - was also 
carried on separately in the eighteenth century. Again, there were 
important changes in the material used for parts of the coach. As Adams 
notes, "The name axle-~ at once denotes the substance originally 
employed for it - viz. wood". Similarly, it appears that wood was 
sometimes used as a primitive form of spring. 14 A licence for the 
invention of "axeltrees of iron" and "springs of steel" was granted in 
1626; but steel springs did not come into normal usage until 1770. 15 In 
London, "tire-smiths" or "tyre-smiths", so named after the iron tyres 
used on wheels, were employed in the eighteenth century in making all 
the iron-work for waggons, carts, and all other kinds of carriages, 
rarely doing anything else. Tyre-smiths generally employed "the best 
hands in the Smith Trade", while of their work lithe nicest piece is 
Springs. Nl6 As the division of labour increased, one part of the smith's 
work became the specialised trade of the "viceman", whose job was to 
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Mfile and smooth the work from the rough marks of the hammer, to fit 
joints and finish screw-bolts and nuts". 17 
Adams claimed in 1837 that "few carriage builders carryon many 
branches of work on their own premises; none carryon all the branches, 
for it would not be worth their while on a small scale, and on a large 
, 
scale it would be too enormous an undertaking", 18 This may have been 
generally true in London, but in the provinces, apart from varying 
amounts of bought-in ironwork, the seven main branches of the trade were 
usually employed under the same roof, though in separate shops. Unlike 
the sectional societies discussed in chapter 1, the UKSC claimed· that 
its "first principle is a recognition that the painter and trimmer is as 
essential as the bodymaker or the smith"," and it acted on this 
principle. Only one list of UKSC members and their trades has survived. 
Compiled in 1860, it is broken down in Table 2:1 
Table 2:1 Breakdown by trade of UKSC membership. 186020 
Trade 
Woodworkers: Bodymakers 
Carriagemakers 
Wheelers 
[Sub-total: 
Ketalworkers: Smiths 
Vicemen 
[Sub-total : 
Painters 
Trimmers 
lumber 
854 
157 
373 
665 
311 
1,011 
507 
fercentage 
21. 8~ 
4.0~ 
9,5~ 
35. 3~] 
- 74 -
It is clear therefore that the UKSC was a multi-trade society. Only 
one other partial breakdown exists for national membership, in 1911, 
when out of about 8,000 members, 3,100 (about 39%) were woodworkers, and 
2,700 (about 34%) were painters, meaning proportionately less 
metalworkers and trimmers.~l Carriagemakers and wheelers were absent 
from railway carriage and tramcar work, as well as motor vehicles. 
Coachsmiths and vicemen/coach fitters were generally also displaced in 
the first two categories of work, though not for a considerable period 
in the last. Consequently, from the middle of the nineteenth century 
until the beginning of the first world war, the proportion of bodymakers 
(and the related trade of coach finishers> and painters in the UKSC 
increased relative to the other traditional woodworking trades and the 
metalworkers. While there was less trimmdng in rail and tram work, the 
rise of motor cars reversed the relative decline in this section. 
How representative the UKSC was of the different branches of the 
trade can only be estimated from parliamentary wage returns. The lists 
in table 2:2 overleaf are not strictly comparable, as the Liverpool 
figures have disproportionately more wheelers and smiths, suggesting 
that wheelwrights·' premises were included. But, allowing for that and 
• 
discrepanciea.lnthe category of labourers and boys, then the number of 
woodworkers in-the three cities of London, Liverpool, and Dublin, was 
roughly of the same order as painters. and slightly more than the 
skilled metalworkers. Despite variations in the amount of machine made 
wheels and bought-in ironwork, as well as differing types of 
establishment, it appears that the UKSC's national membership roughly 
reflected the actual proportions of different branches of the trade. 
75 -
Table 2:2 Breakdown of coachmaking trade by occupation. 1877-188322 
London Liverpool Dublin Dublin 
1811. l.8.aQ. 1811. l.a.U 
Bodymakers 13 8 13 16 
Carriagemakers 4 8 5 4 
Wheelers 3 16 3 3 
Smiths 13) 16 7 7 
Smiths' Hammermen ) 12 9 7 
Vicemen 5 8 13 8 
Painters 26 24 17 19 
Trimmers 14 8 16 13 
Labourers/Helpers/Boys 12 17 21 
Others 10 2 
Sections B and"C will analyse the varying levels of skill and 
division of labour in the wood, iron and painting trades in "private" 
• ~"v~., •• 
coachmaking. To demystify any mistaken assumptions about the 
pleasantness of actually working at the craft, the physical working 
conditions in coach painting will be explored. Finally, section D will 
investigate the piecemaster system, which in London led to many skilled 
men being denied the best skilled work, and was a major factor in the 
weakness of coachmaking trade unionism there. 
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B. THE WOOD AND IRON TRADES 
(i) The Ironworkers 
The amount of iron used in building a carriage was "enormous": "It is 
used in the cast form for the boxes of wheels; and in the wrought form 
it is used in almost every possible shape, from the wheel tire, the 
axle, the crane, the bar, the stay, the hinge, the plate, the bolt, up 
to the most minute screw and nail". There was also "great consumption" 
of steel for the manufacture of springs.2~ 
As noted in section A, specialist coach-smiths existed from at least 
the middle of the eighteenth century, it being observed early in the 
nineteenth century that "ordinary bred smiths are not, without a good 
deal of practice, fit to be employed by coachmakers except in the 
coarser parts". But for the best results, the trade was subdivided -
"some workmen being constantly employed in making springs, others at the 
axle trees, others at the steps, some at the iron work upon the wheels, 
some at the different plates and stays for new carriages, and others at 
repairs upon old work of all kinds."24 The actual amount of sub-division 
depended:on the size of coachmaking firms, and the amount of ironwork 
purchased ready-made. Thus, at Huttons in Dublin in 1824, with 58 
smiths, an extensive division of labour probably operated. 
While the cheapest axle consisted of a square bar of iron being 
rolled to shape between mill rollers, these were liable to break. The 
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best axles were made by welding together several flat bars of iron 
forged into shape under a hammer, a process known as "faggoting". This 
process was still in the 1830s being "imperfectly executed by hand 
labour, with a destructive wear of human life". Adams equated the 
"considerable skill and strength" required by axle-tree smiths "to unite 
large masses of iron at a welding heat, and to reduce them to accurate 
forms", with the work of anchor-smiths, one of the trades singled out by 
George as putting "an enormous strain on human endurance". Hand-forged 
axles, however, produced "a round shaft with a surface of irregular 
texture and very unequal transverse strength". When this method was used 
for the production of axles for the earliest railway vehicles, "they 
often snapped in service". Attempts to make axles from rolled sections, 
shaped like orange segments started in 1835, and in 1838 the Patent 
Shaft & Axletree Company was established in Wednesbury, Staffordshire, 
concentrating on the production of railway axles. 2s 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, other advances 
were made in axle manufacture, with patents being taken out on two types 
of axle lubricated with oil - one the "mail" axle, so named as it was 
first used in mail'coaches, the other, "Collinge's Patent" after a 
Lambeth manufacturer. Collinge's factory in fact specialised in both 
carriage wheel boxes and axle-trees, for which they also had patents. 26 
The development of various new techniques in axle production led to the 
establishment of a number of specialist coach ironwork firms in the 
Xidlands. The oldest such firm surviving in Birmingham at the end of the 
nineteenth century had started producing axles in 1826. In West Bromwich 
alone, some 18 such firms were operating in 1851, of which 5 specialised 
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in railway work.27 But there was some resistance to buying out ironwork, 
and G.B.Hooper commented in 1873 that it was surprising that the 
machine-forged "excellent carriage axles" of a late Sheffield firm had 
not been more generally adopted. 2e 
While Adams suggested that axle and spring making was not normally 
done on the coachmaker's premises, larger coachmaking establishments 
tended to continue making their own axles and other ironwork, as was the 
case at the London firm of Pearce & Countze in the 1840's and Holmes of 
Derby in the 1850's where some smiths were solely engaged on axle or 
spring making. 29 
"Springs in locomotive vehicles", were defined by Adams as "the 
elastic substances interposed between the wheels and the passengers or 
load, in order to intercept the concussion caused by the wheels 
revolving on an uneven surface". Steel springs were made by several 
steel plates of diminishing length being hooped together with an iron 
hoop shrunk on hot, and riveted through at the point of fulcrum. The 
main skill in spring making lay in tempering the steel correctly, which 
appears to have been attained only by long practice. Spring-makers' work 
required a viceman to file all exposed parts prior to hooping and 
, . 
riveting. Later, it appears that the rivet was replaced by a bolt, which 
also became the viceman's responsibility.30 
Apart from axles and springs "a large quantity of expensive iron-
work" was also used in carriages, the expense being due to "the highly 
skilled labour which is necessary in preparing it". The most complicated 
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work was involved'in making the "loops" which were used to suspend the 
body. These were "curved in many opposite directions, ... tapered, and 
irregularly formed every way, yet requiring to have bearing bolts 
accurately adjusted, and sundry contrivances for affixing iron-work to 
them, and all this without a single straight side for the maker to work 
from". The bulk of the remaining ironwork consisted of "stays" <1e 
brackets}, "plates" (which were bolted on to the entire length of wooden 
surfaces requiring strengthening), "hoops" (to secure timbers together 
side by side), "clips" (open hoops secured by nuts and bolts), "steps" 
(to allow access into the carriage), "bolts" of varying sizes, and a 
number of other items. ;311 
"Vicemen" generally worked in conjunction with the coach-smith, and 
required "much skill and practice in filing, to enable them to work 
true, which is absolutely necessary in axles". As Adams noted "Were 
these men taught to work in wood first, as is the case with millwrights, 
skill would be more frequent amongst them than is the case at present". 
Adams refers to vicemen as a category of coach-smith,3~ and it is likely 
that ?uch workers originally served an apprenticeship as a smith. UKSC 
, "s.', 
rules from, 1857 to 1866 specified "No viceman to be allowed to join the 
., 
Society' unless he has served his time as a smith", and the Webbs later 
described th~m as "unsuccessful" smiths. 33 
In 1876, the UKSC rulebook was altered to include "vicemen or coach 
fitters", in order "to suit more particularly those in railway works, 
where, in some cases, through being termed vicemen, they do not receive 
as high rate of wages as if they had been known as fitters".34 But they 
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were generally referred to in the private trade as vicemen, until the 
mid-1880s at least. 3s The 1889 UKSC rulebook dropped the term vicemen 
altogether, in favour of (coach) fitters, though, in Scotland, they 
continued to be known as vicemen. 
The viceman's general level of skill was still being questioned at 
the end of the nineteenth century when it was observed that they "might 
.... endeavour to attain a somewhat higher standard of accuracy in their 
work. It is not expected, nor is it necessary, that they should work to 
a one hundredth of an inch, as fitters in some trades have to do, but 
one too frequently observes carriages of which the ironwork would not 
bear a critical examination by a person accustomed to other classes of 
fitting," The actual coach-smith's role was very important, as "some 
smiths produce forgings of a far higher character than others, and the 
ironwork made by one man may not require half the filing needed by work 
produced at an adjacent forge", But there was "absolutely no excuse for 
a vice-man who gives the ironwork a coat of lead colour in order to hide 
bad work or defects that have never been touched by his file",3& 
The other figure in the coach smithy was the "hammerman" (known as a 
"smith's striker" in some other trades37 ), His job was to aid the smith 
in his work ·with the sledge hammer, when heavy blows are required to 
reduce the metal in size or formi they also blow the bellows and make up 
the fire - in short, perform the office of labourers", As they worked in 
conjunction with a smith, they were dependent on him for employment, If 
the hammerman attempted to do any of the smith's work in the latter's 
absence, this would cause friction and lead to their discharge. "Thus, 
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the hammermen live in a position from which they are forbidden to 
emerge, even if they possess the necessary skill".36 Despite proposals 
for their admission to the UKSC at the 1913 Delegate Keeting, they were 
debarred from membership until the NUVB was formed in 1919. Not only was 
this rather late in the day, as coach smith work was in decline, but 
also out of line with the Associated Blacksmiths Society, which voted to 
admit hammermen in 1912. 39 
(ii) The Woodworkers 
Bodymakers, wrote Adams in 1837, were "very skilful joiners, using 
several kinds of wood, and working up many forms in which there is not a 
single plane surface." They had to "make correct joints at every variety 
of angle" and "resort to every mode of uniting" their materials. This 
meant using the wooden joints of "the tenon and mortice, the scarf, the 
lap, the groove" as well as "the glue joint, the bolt, the screw, and 
the nail". 
Sixty years later, very little had changed - "The coach body-maker 
usee a variety· of framing joints that are rarely seen in either joinery 
or cabinet-making, and it is in the highest degree necessary that he 
should.kno",,'h~wto make a framed structure so that it may offer the 
greatest possible resistance to the strains or weight it may have to 
bear. Unlike some other workers in wood, the body-maker must secure his 
joints from the inside so that they shall not show through the paint and 
varnish. They must be accurate, and the grooves must not be too large 
for the panels, otherwise the mouldings will soon be rotted by water 
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lodging in the open spaces." In addition to this, it was necessary that 
"every joint should be truly fitted and tightly screwed" or the 
combination of weight and movement when the coach was in use would lead 
to rattles, creaks, and vibrations. 
In Adams's day, it was estimated that a bodymakers' tools were worth 
from thirty to forty pounds, significantly higher than other woodworking 
crafts such as cabinet-makers, coopers, and the later nineteenth century 
trade of patternmaking. In the 1890s this tool kit included five types 
of wood saw, eight sets of planes, three hammers, a mallet, axe, and 
adze, as well as routers, chisels, brace and bits, screwdrivers, 
squares, gauges, bevels, compasses, and innumerable other necessities.~o 
The carriagemaker, who made the undercarriage, required less skill 
than the bodymaker. "Their work is heavy, and requires great truth in 
all the framingsj but the lines are on a larger scale than those of the 
body-maker, and therefore slight inaccuracies are not so perceptible". 
Much of the carriagemaker's work was carried out in conjunction with the 
coach smith and/or viceman, as various parts of the undercarriage 
_.. '"" . 
required hoops. stays, and plates attaching at different stages in its 
production;; The bodymaker also handled metal, as the body was 
strengthened in various places by plates; in particular, open bodies 
were heavier than closed ones because they required a heavy bottom plate 
or "body plate" to stop the body altering shape. 41 
By comparison, the other main woodworking branch of the trade, 
wheeling, was simplicity itself. The three main wooden components of the 
- 83 -
wheel were the nave (the centre>, the spokes (the radii), and the 
felloes (the circumference>. The wheeler's job was to prepare and unite 
the three. The spokes were attached to the nave by mortice and tenon 
joint, then shaped by a special implement known as a "spoke-shave", and 
attached to the felloes by a cylindrical tenon being made on the end of 
every spoke to fit into a drilled hole in the felloe. The felloes were 
united together by dowels, and the spokes finally secured by wedges 
inserted in their ends. There were, though, a number of peculiarities in 
the construction: the hind wheels, being larger, had more spokes than 
the fore wheels; the spokes' positions in the nave alternated, with one 
half nearer one end of the nave, the other half nearer the other end, to 
give strength; and finally the wheel was "dished" (ie the line of the 
wheel from its top, through the nave, to its bottom, was concave on the 
outside), also to give strength. Finally an iron tire was heated and put 
on; its shrinking compressed the wheel. The tire was secured by iron 
pins driven through tire and felloe, and riveted inside the felloe. The 
nave was also further strengthened by iron hoops.-3 
(iii) The limitations of machinery 
Samuel, has demonstrated in great detail the limited strides that 
mechanisation made in nineteenth century British industry generally, and 
private coachmaking was no exception. Among the factors responsible he 
highlighted the "crude and indiscriminate" nature of machinery, its cost 
compared to alternative sources of power (usually human), the cost of 
coal in southern England being double that in the northern manufacturing 
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districts, the irregular and limited demand for many products, and the 
changing tastes and fashions in some. 43 
His analysis systematically echoes the points raised by Adams when 
discussing the role of machinery in carriage building in 1837. Adams 
argued that "carriage building still remains one of the arts to which 
steam and machinery have not been directly applied to facilitate 
construction and produce cheapness", There were a number of reasons: it 
was "to a certain extent an art"j there were not enough purchasers "to 
produce a regular manufacturing businessj ie a repetition or copying of 
certain established forms"j carriages were "articles of fashion and 
fancy", and "changing fashions in a limited demand will not pay for the 
outlay of machinery"j and they were "still in a state of progressive 
improvement" ,44 
In the mid-1870s, it was still rare for two carriages to be exactly 
alike, and in 1890 one coachbuilder remarked "owing to the numerous 
sizes and great variety of design, even the very largest establishments 
can only place a limited number of any carriage in hand at one time",4S 
, . ' 
But much earlier in the century when standard design stage coaches were 
. t," --
being, produced, they were almost "entirely the result of uncertain 
.' 
. " 
handicraft iabour of various degrees of skiU",41i The same appears to 
have been the case with mail coaches,47 
The main reason for the absence of machinery must have been as Adams 
noted: "as the forms of carriage timbers are for the most part 
irregular, maChinery has not yet been introduced for the purpose of 
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sawing them". However, for the production of wheels, he thought they 
were essential. The traditional method of making wheels by hand meant 
that "scarcely any two wheels are alike .... To get them at all 
accurate, it is necessary to employ very skilful workmen", and that was 
expensive. There was another problem with hand labour - "a workman may 
put his work badly together, and there is no means of detecting it 
except in practice .... Unless the master watches every wheel while the 
spokes are driving, he can only depend on the good faith of his 
workman". The conclusion was clear - "there is no remedy for this evil 
except substituting machines for men's hands. The machine, if it cuts 
true once, will cut true always. Every piece of wood in a wheel ought to 
be shaped by machinery". This was possible, as block-making machinery 
had been in operation at the naval dockyard of Portsmouth <and probably 
also Chatham) since 1808, and involved various sawying, boring, 
mortising, shaping and other woodworking maChinery.·· 
By the mid-1850s, wheel-making maChinery had been in use "for several 
years". There was,however, one important drawback. Hand-made spokes 
were split and chopped into shape "in order that the grain of the wood 
,-
',,\.-,' .; ... 
may run .. fraIl end' t~ end of the spoke, and give its utmost strength; were 
":- -." 
they sawn,. 1tiis possible the saw might not always follow the grain of 
• >' ." .:{~~ ;" • 
the wood. and;1nthat case the spoke would almost infallibly break when 
in use". G.N.Hooper, a very knowledgeable London coachbuilder, believed 
it to be a "disputed point", at that time. as to whether machine- or 
hand-made wheels were best. "It may. I think, be conceded that good 
wheels may be made by both means".·9 
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The Holmes factory in Derby had, in the mid-1840's, installed a steam 
engine, partly to get work finished "with greater accuracy and 
expedition", But because of frequent changes in fashion, they had to 
decide on which parts it would be advantageous, and then to contrive 
suitable machines, By 1850, the steam engine powered circular saws for 
cutting wood, a lathe for turning both wood and iron, a tenon-cutting 
machine, and, specifically for wheel manufacture. a felloe machine and a 
spoke machine which could produce 300-500 "perfect" spokes a day,SO 
A few years later, Holmes was using machines for "wood sawying and 
turning of every kind". and for "drilling. tapping and screwing bolts 
and nuts, grinding the spring plates and iron work", A pair of carriage 
wheels could now be made in 2~ hours, He was about to replace his 
original steam engine by two of much greater power, It was noted at the 
time that "The cost of machinery was considerable, and the space 
required for it and the expense of fuel, would probably prevent its 
application with immediate advantage to the London coachmakers", 
G,J,Hooper also claimed that as there were comparatively few· parts of a 
private carriage to which machinery could be economically applied, the 
price of 'coal in "London prohibited its use there, To pay for the outlay 
necessary. the·machinery had to be kept in constant use, "if not, hand 
. . 
labour was the cheapest",51 
In the mid-1870s in London, machinery was still "chiefly confined to 
patent-Wheel factories, We also use a few steaDrdriven saws, some paint-
grinding mills worked by hand, and drilling and punching machines", 
Outside London, wood-shaping maChinery was used in Derby, Newcastle, 
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Nottingham, Worcester and some other towns. This meant that in London, 
it still took "from two to three months in building a brougham, of which 
at least five weeks are consumed simply in preparing the wood and iron 
work, a period which might easily be shortened by machinery".52 
However, the relative costs of machinery and labour (and possibly 
fuel> seem to have shifted soon afterwards, as the London coachbuilder, 
Lucas, (admittedly with its workshops at Brixton, away from central 
London> installed machinery in the late 1880's. A band saw cut the wood 
out roughly before a "Double Spindle shaping" machine was used for more 
accurate work, costing "very much below what would be involved in 
performing the same work were manual labour alone resorted to". Planing 
machines could plane panels, boards, or planks, varying from one-eighth 
of an inch to nine inches thick. A boring machine could drill holes of 
any size in any position in any piece of wood, while the firm also 
possessed a drilling machine for working in iron and steel. 53 
Elsewhere, one Wolverhampton coachbuilder was reported in 1891 as 
using "all the most. improved appliances". 54 But the Liverpool-based UKSC 
General Secretary believed that, apart from railway shops, only "some of 
the larger private shops have a little machinery, such as sawing 
machines and drilling machines",SS This would change markedly with the 
development of the motor car (see chapter 4). 
The railway shops, however, were already much more advanced. Railway 
carriage bodies were, in effect, huge "wooden boxes" (see chapter 3), 
and were standardised to some extent. Consequently, the application of 
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woodworking machinery was not only feasible, but it was probably also 
essential. Many shops had such machinery in use in the 1860's, if not 
before. At Ashbury's contract shop in Manchester, it was noted that 
there was "scarcely anything left to hand labour, as far as the cutting 
and preparing the wood is concerned, all parts being fitted together in 
the same state in which they leave the machines".56 While at the Oldbury 
works, steam had almost totally superseded hand labour in the sawmill, 
and there was "every conceivable appliance for saving manual labour" 
when preparing the wooden components. 5'7 
These developments were not just confined to the contract shops in 
the 1860s, but were also found in railway company workshops. At the 
North British Railway's works at Cowlairs in Glasgow, "logs ... are cut 
by vertical and circular steam-saws into planks of the required 
dimensions". After drying, they were taken to "the cutting-out shop, 
where they are planed, moulded, morticed, tenoned, and bored by 
machines. Every piece is fashioned according to a standard pattern".se 
By 1898, the Xidland Railway carriage works at Derby had 138 machines 
for mortising, tenoning, boring, planing, grooving, band-sawing, 
carving, turning, dovetailing, panel-planing, sand-papering, and so 
Finally, a note on the trimDdng branch of the trade. G.I.Hooper 
observed in the mid-1850s that the various attempts to produce a machine 
for sewing the leather needed for carriages and harness had been 
unsuccessful. They could not be adapted to use the strong waxed thread 
necessary, and they did not draw the stitches sufficiently tight. Nearly 
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twenty years later it was reported that these "difficulties" were "being 
overcome", And by the early 1880s there were claims that a wax thread 
sewing machine had been successfully adapted, It is not possible to 
estimate to what extent these sewing machines were used, though it is 
clear that their slow adoption in the related trades of saddlery and 
harness was in no small amount due to resistance by workers, and fear of 
such resistance by their employers,60 
(iv) Limitations of the Craftsman 
Given the extent of handwork in coachmaking, it is necessary to 
emphasise that while some craftsmen had a very high level of all-round 
skill in their particular trade, a large number were much more limited. 
William Bridges Adams clearly exposed the limitations of craftsmen early 
in the nineteenth century. Born in 1797, he was "brought up" to the "art 
and mystery of coachmaking", The "mystery" was prominent in his thoughts 
when he recounted how he "acquired the common amount of routine skill in 
imitating certain prescribed forms". but "as to the principles of the 
art. - as to the mode of originating the forms. he was left in utter 
ignorance", That-Was not all. as "in fact. those to whose instruction he 
was confided were as ignorant as himself. Had the patterns of the 
factory been destroyed by accident". he speculated, "the business must 
have stopped, unless external talent had been brought in to renew 
them".61 
This situation had not changed significantly by the mid-1850s. Hooper 
argued that while "each mechanic should have some knowledge of drawing 
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to facilitate his work, and to enable him to prepare his patterns", the 
reality was that they were "almost entirely dependent" on their foremen 
or employers for such assistance. 62 In the 1880s there were complaints 
that "a strong, active, young man, just out of his time, who can handle 
his tools well, can make a mortice, cut a tenon, put in a panel, hang a 
door ..... In nine case out of ten he has never had the opportunity to 
make a drawing or to make the cant of a drawing, his lengths and bevels 
are given him by the experienced bodymaker for whom he works".63 
And even more damning criticism came near the end of the century from 
a teacher of City & Guilds classes, who observed of bodymakers, -I have 
seen and worked with men, and good men too, that could only make a good 
brougham or landau; any other body they were lost with. There was no 
fault in their ability, but they had not had the opportunity of gaining 
experience in other forms of construction". Although the landau was 
considered "the most difficult body to construct", this did not 
compensate for lack of wider experience. 64 
....... ; . 
.. 
1 ", 
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(a) Apprenticeship and Improvership 
ThEt< experience of work on a variety of types of construction and, 
~ .. ~" . "" 
. ./'. 
especially for bodymakers, the ability to be able to read draWings, 
depended on the quality of the apprenticeship, and then, either where 
the finished apprentice moved on, of the subsequent "improvership", or, 
where he stayed, the extent of sub-division of labour in his workshOp. 
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Disposing of the last point first, apprentices were more likely to 
stay in the larger firms, bec~use they employed proportionately fewer of 
them; but the division of labour would be greatest in these. If it is 
accepted that "the apprentices' opportunity of learning from the old 
experienced workmen the many trade 'wrinkles' acquired during a 
lifetime, ceased with the introduction of a subdivision of labour",6S 
then this must be part of the explanation of low levels of skill. 
Apprenticeship generally in late nineteenth century industry has been 
studied by Kore, who has argued that where genuine training was 
provided, there was a practical limitation on the proportion of 
apprentices employed. Too high a proportion would mean inadequate 
training as, irrespective of any union sanction "journeymen covertly 
refused to train excessive numbers of apprentices properly".6& 
But even where journeymen did train excessive numbers, it was an 
expensive business for the employer. As the Dublin UKSC branch secretary 
complained in 1885, -If a w07kman has two bays to look after, his time 
is lost-~n,instructing them, and in most cases rectifying their 
mistakes,,- and what must be the loss sustained by the employer where 
there is i large, number of boys!-. Where it did occur, the apprentices 
-in most cases .,. turn out inferior workmen",57 However, in 
coachmaking, as argued in chapter 1, the "overstocking" of apprentices 
was in practice limited to a small number of employers. 
Other explanations therefore need to be sought for the generally low 
quality of much of the training given. Kore has claimed -there is no 
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evidence that there was widespread exploitation of apprentices, in the 
sense of using them as cheap labour to do elementary work". However, he 
does admit that some apprentices, placed on repetition work, for 
example, left for other workshops in order to learn more, while others 
might leave in order to earn more. S8 This appeared to happen to some 
extent in coachmaking. When indenture duty was reduced from £1 to 2s6d 
in 1853, the UKSC executive hoped it would ~materially assist to the 
binding of a regular, but limited, number of apprentices" as "those 
unbound often prove a direct injury to both employers and operatives by 
shifting from shop to shop".6~ 
Coachbuilding employers themselves admitted that one attitude towards 
an apprentice was to employ him "on such simple work as he can 
accomplish at a profit rather than to run the risk of teaching him the 
more difficult parts of the trade as quickly as he can master them, and 
so render him a valuable acquisition to some other employer who, having 
incurred no expense in teaching the youth, can well afford to pay him 
higher wages". This seemed to be a problem in the bigger towns where 
there were a number of competing employers. In London, which was 
exceptional in its low number of apprentices, there was the further 
factor of the'piecemaster system - "engaged nominally by the firm, boys 
are in reality employed by the workmen, who, being paid by the piece, 
are consequently tempted to hand the lad such work as he can accomplish 
at a profit and with the least possible supervision". 
In the smaller towns, with fewer immediate alternative employment 
opportunities, apprentices were more likely to stay and also to receive 
- 93 -
a wider all-round training due to the variety of work. Many then 
gravitated towards London "the seat of the carriage industry" which 
"depends upon the provinces for its supply of skilled labour".7o The 
Booth studies revealed the same point a few years later, in the 1890s. 
There was, in London, no "regular system of apprenticeship, or the 
training of boys in any form .... The London trade is fed from the 
provinces. Young men who have seen the general course of work in some 
provincial ... shop, where apprenticeship frequently obtains, find 
employment as improvers". The 1891 census revealed that only 44% of 
London coachmakers and wheelwrights who were heads of families, had been 
born inside London. This, however, was not exceptional, as the equvalent 
figure for carpenters and joiners was 41%, masons 46%, blacksmiths 47%, 
engineering workers 49%, and so on, though the bulk of occupations were 
in the 50-70% category. 71 
This situation was also not new in coachbuilding. It is clear from 
table 2:3 overleaf that London had for decades had a much smaller 
proportion of apprentices than the rest of England and Wales. What was 
significant about coachbuilding in London was the preponderance of the 
, '. pie?emaster system~ The result was that the large numbers of time-served 
apprentices who went to London as improvers would have found their 
opportunity to "improve" severely limited by their employment situation. 
As the Booth survey noted, "Host ..• find a place in establishments that 
'work for the trade'."72 The combination of a small number of 
unsatisfactory apprenticeships and large number of unsatisfactory 
improverships meant there was a comparative scarcity of the "highest 
grade of skilled workmen" in London. 73 The aggregate of the above 
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factors substantially accounts for the low quality of much of the 
training, and allows a more accurate assessment of general skill levels. 
Table 2:3 Approximate Journeymen/Apprentice Ratios for coachmaking in 
London and the Rest of England and Wales. mid-nineteenth century. 
k.l.e..5. Males 
~~ Under ~ Ratio 
Lend.en: 
1841 3,821 372 10.3:1 
1851 4,512 436 10.3: 1 
1861 4,855 598 8.1: 1 
1871 5,187 480 10.8:1 
Re~:t of England. and. Wales; 
1841 6,210 1,247 5.0:1 
1851 8,488 1,844 4.6:1 
1861 11,054 2,920 3.8:1 
1871 13,825 3,214 4.3:1 
(b) Drawing Skills 
The ability to make and read detailed drawings was an important part 
of the all-round craftsman's skill, particularly the bodymaker's. The 
practice in the larger establishments was that before a coach was built, 
a drawing would be made and agreed with the customer. The elaborateness 
of this depended on the size of the establishment. One account from the 
1840's suggests that the employer would produce a rough drawing of any 
alterations or improvements from their standard design of that type of 
coach. A draughtsman, known as a "coach-pattern-drawerM then produced a 
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scale drawing of various views of the coach. This was then shown to the 
prospective customer and any further alterations then made until a final 
design was agreed, before a full-scale drawing of the several parts was 
made.?4 
A contemporaneous account from practice at a London factory intimated 
that the customer only saw a full-scale drawing made in chalk on a large 
black board, and this also appeared the practice at Holmes of Derby in 
1850, where blackboards twelve foot high by nine foot wide were used, 
this large factory employing specialist designers and draughtsmen.?8 In 
all three examples, patterns of thin wood were then made to guide the 
saw and plane of the workman. 
Drawings were only usually made in "the larger manufactories". But 
even here, while full-scale drawings allowed "a great sub-division of 
labour, for there may be seen in the workshop where this system is used, 
one man making corner pillars, another hinge pillars, another doors, 
another cant rails, and so on", the drawback was that "it can only be 
carried out successfully, or rather profitably, in those shops that work 
for the trade~~so that a dozen or more bodies can be made from the same 
drawingi'as it would not pay to make an elaborate full-sized geometrical 
, 
working drawing for every single carriage made".?& 
In smaller establishments, much was left to the discretion of 
individual workmen.?? The traditional alternative to the full-scale 
drawing was the "cant-board", which was "a plan ... not a plan taken in 
anyone place, but the body is shown at the cant rail, elbow and bottom, 
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and anywhere that an important joint is located. Here we find all these 
lines plotted together, as it were, on one plane surface".7e While 
drawing could only be properly taught through technical instruction, 
knowledge of the cant-board could be acquired during a traditional 
apprenticeship. But there were a number of reasons why even the latter 
did not happen. "Every craft has its mystery; and unfortunately for a 
learner, the mystery is maintained with needless selfishness by many 
workmen, partly from the fear that they would be training a younger man 
to supplant them, and partly from incapacity to elucidate to a learner 
the reasons for certain results. The mystery in coachmaking is the 
'cant-board'."79 
Some employers attempted to partially remedy this situation. Holmes 
of Derby from about 1860 trained "at his own expense" apprentices in 
mechanics applied to coachbuilding. By 1890, several of these were 
foremen and managers of leading London factories. Philipson of Newcastle 
also started classes at the same time under his management. eo Carriage 
building was one of the five trades initially covered when the Society 
of Arts established technical examinations in 1873, accounting for over 
half the total candidates over the first five annual examinations. These 
were taken over-in 1879 by the City and Guilds of London Institute, 
....... 
establishe~by the' City Livery Companies.·' The syllabus for carriage 
building included "Freehand and Hodel Drawing, Practical, Plane and 
Solid Geometry, Mathematics, Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, Carriage 
Building".a2 In 1880, City and Guilds classes were also established at 
the Manchester Hechanics Institution. The local master carriage builders 
"from the firm conviction that the great want of their young workmen was 
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a knowledge of scientific principles as applied to their particular 
tradeN formed a comDdttee, and paid and engaged teachers to conduct 
classes in the Institution. e3 
Hooper, as owner of one of the premier coachbuilding houses in 
London, had at one stage found the difficulties of dealing with 
indentured apprentices so great, that he refused to take any more, and 
employed only Nfinished workmenN. However, with the establishment of 
technical classes, his firm insisted on all their lads attending, and 
paid their fees. A register was kept of their attendances, and each year 
Hooper examined their work, awarding prizes to the most diligent and 
attentive. "The result had been most satisfactory, and he [Hooper) found 
the lads behaved better and took more interest in their work".e. But the 
various efforts by some employers towards the end of the nineteenth 
century made little impact on the overall quality of coachbuilding 
skill. 
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C. THE PAINTERS 
Introduction - The painting process 
While bodymaking was the only one of the "private" coachmaking wood and 
iron trades that was generally performed by coachmakers in railway (and, 
later on, electric tramcar) shops, it did not require the same level of 
skill, reflecting the relatively simpler shapes encountered in these larger 
vehicles. The basic processes of coach painting, however, remained the 
same, irrespective of the type of vehicle. They are outlined here as a 
prelude to a discussion of the changing division of labour in the 
nineteenth century trade, and also as background to the revolution that 
occurred in motor car painting in the 1920s, which is the subject of the 
first part of chapter 6. 
Very briefly, coach painting consisted of priming the woodwork, adding 
coats of "filling", which were then rubbed down, and followed by the colour 
coats, and finally by several coats of varnish. es 
.~'.i ' 
... 
Looked at in,more detail, nineteenth century coach body painting 
practice was as follows. The woodwork was primed using 2-3 coats of lead-
based paint, with 8-10 hours drying needed between coats. Each coat was 
sand-papered when dry, and could not be "wet" rubbed down, as this would 
have raised the grain of the wood. Some 5-6 coats of "filling", containing 
white lead, were then applied to all visible woodwork, to fill the grain of 
the wood. Each coat of filling had to be hard and dry before the next coat 
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could be applied. 10 rubbing down was done between these coats. "Hard 
stopping" (white lead thinned sufficiently to make a paste) was then 
applied by putty knife on nail and screw holes. 
This was followed by a coat of "staining", and the woodwork then rubbed 
down or "stoned" with pumice stone and water until all or very nearly all 
of the staining was removed. About one third of the filling needed to be 
removed before a level surface, as smooth as "polished marble". was 
obtained. This rubbing down required changing the bucket of water every ten 
minutes. A number of coats of the requisite colour would be added, 
sometimes with sand-papering or rubbing down between them, though the 
colour painting was generally a much cleaner phase. Finally about 5 coats 
of varnish would be added. In between each varnish coat, the body was 
"flatted" down with fine pumice dust, flannel and water, to take the gloss 
off. A piece of cloth made up into a roll as hard as possible, perhaps two 
inches wide, being dipped into pumice dust, and used with water applied 
with a sponge. Not only did the water have to be clean, but the bucket 
also. "A paint shop should be as clean as a dairy". Any "lining" or 
heraldry work would usually be done after the first varnish coat, while the 
final varnish coat would be followed by polishing. 
(i) Division of labour 
The potential for division of labour in the painting process depended 
very much on the scale and type of output from each coachmaker's shop. The 
key factor was the necessity for long drying periods between the various 
coats, which would free the workman to do other work. Very low output might 
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provide work for only, say, one man and perhaps an apprentice or boy. Here 
the painter would follow the work through from beginning to end, while 
higher outputs might lead to some sub-division of tasks. Railway carriages, 
because of their size, required more labour and hence increased the 
opportunities for sub-division. 
The first identifiable specialisation of labour was in herald painting, 
where a separate class of workmen is noted from at least the mid-eighteenth 
century.e& While at the end of that century there were alleged first-class 
all-round workmen who could start at the first coat and finish with 
heraldic work on panels, in general by the middle of the nineteenth century 
heraldic artists were invariably specialists. s7 Where a firm was of 
sufficient size, as Holmes of Derby employing some 150 in 1850, they would 
employ their own heraldry and ornamental painters. Otherwise, firms would 
have to call on the' services of these men as and when necessary. ee 
Heraldry itself underwent substantial changes. The large coats of arms 
that took up half the surface of a carriage door on early carriages of 
state gave way on Victorian private carriages to a miniature crest or 
~. .",. ~'. ,~J 
intertwi~~d moriog~am often no larger than the size of a florin. Coats of 
."10., _.' •• ~.,. M 
arms were~emblazoned in paint on the panels of early railway coaches, 
though by later in the century, heraldry and monograms were usually 
"transferred- and not painted on railway coaches.e~ A company like the 
Bristol Wagon and Carriage Company could at the end of the nineteenth 
century still have panels painted by an outside heraldic painter when only 
a few such designs were needed, but used paper transfers for large 
orders.~o By the early twentieth century in London, for example, heraldic 
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work was confined to a few men, always employed on piece-rate. The work was 
increasingly scarce, as monograms and crests were not usually painted on 
motor cars, and even transfers were sometimes used on private carriages. g, 
After the separation of most heraldry work from ordinary coach painting, 
the next major division had probably occurred by the early nineteenth 
century. Body painters were distinguished from ordinary coach painters or 
carriage painters, and paid the wages of first-class painters, with 
carriage painters paid those of second-class.~~ Carriage and wheel painting 
required significantly fewer coats of paint and varnish than did bodiee, 
and the surface did not have to be so smooth.~3 Once again, any division of 
work into these two categories depended on the scale of production. 
One important feature of nineteenth century carriages was the "lining" 
whereby colours were "edged" or "picked-out" in a different colour. It was 
reputedly unknown at the end of the eighteenth century when it was the 
fashion simply to fill in the beadings with a colour in relief to the 
colour of the body.94 But by the 1830s, when a very dark colour Was used 
for the "grpund colour", it was the practice to run a very fine line of a 
lighter shade "in. order to definitely mark the inner edges of the 
" 
framework".' Whe~ lining developed, it occurred not just on the body but 
also on the'under-carriage and wheels. "Were the perch, beds, and wheels 
painted of one colour, they would look exceedingly heavy and clumsYi but 
the skilful management of the fine lines .... produces a pleasing optical 
illusion".~s One estimate was that a first-class private cariage could have 
more than a mile's length of lines painted on it.~-
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After herald painting, lining was thought to require the greatest skill; 
everything depended upon the steadfastness of the hand in drawing clean and 
well-defined lines. The fine-liner was described as "the head workman, par 
excellence, if not in responsibility, in a paint loft". In large factories, 
lining came to be done by a special workman, while in smaller shops the 
fine-liner was a varnisher also. 97 Varnishing was also a very skilled job, 
an English commentator in 1871 suggesting that "to lay on varnish perfectly 
is the most difficult part in the whole art of coach painting ....• I may 
safely say there are hardly a dozen really first-class varnishers in the 
trade". An American contemporary similarly complained of the "comparatively 
few, even of good workmen, who can varnish a car properly".9~ 
The laying on of the colour coats, lining, and varnishing, were the top 
end of the trade, but they required good surfaces. The work involved in 
this was far from pleasant, and where the scale of output could sustain it, 
there grew up a distinct category of workmen performing these tasks at a 
lower rate. Thus we find reference to "painters' labourers" in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.99 In the USA in 1860, a factory making rail 
cars and omnibuses had the painters divided into classes as ·primers, 
rubbers, colorers,- flatters, letterers, landscape painters, scrollers, 
varnish'finishers~~100 In Britain such a division of labour probably only 
approached this in railway carriage shops. It is difficult, however, to 
find direct evidence because of the catch-all term ·painters' labourers" 
which would have included primers and rubbers at least.101 
In Britain, the term "brush hand" came eventually to signify most 
workers in paint shops who were not fully qualified painters. It is not 
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clear when the term came into general use; certainly the secretary of the 
London-based Sovereign Friendly Society of Coach Painters did not use it in 
1893, dividing the trade into three groups - labourers, carriage painters, 
and body painters and fine liners. 102 A Liverpool brush hand described in 
1911 how his work was much dirtier than the painter's. While labourers did 
the priming coats, the brush hand did the filling coats. tiThe brush hand 
has to splash the paint about. It does not matter how it flows, because it 
will all be levelled with the stone." He used heavy brushes called "pound 
brushes", and when doing overhead work, the paint ran down his hands. By 
contrast, the painter put on spirit colours with fine soft brushes. The 
brush hand had to make up his own filling, while the painter often, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, received his colours already ground with 
turps at the paint mills, and mixed up with gold size or varnish. 103 
Compared to the pound brush, a "varnish brush .... is treasured almost 
like an heir-loom. Certainly, some of them used for finishing coats only, 
last for 15 or 20 years, and are very carefully preserved in keepers or 
pots'made expressly, and not allowed to become dry. They are when raised to 
the dignity of varnish-brushes only good ordinary ground brushes that have 
been used 1n'col~ur for some time, or for first coats, so that the loose 
halrsmay'comeaway, and after a while each single bristle splits up. and 
the brush becomes softer and more even."104 
Given the vast difference in working conditions between brush hands and 
painters it is important to understand how the two groups separated. A 
1920s official publication suggested that coach painting apprentices first 
learned to apply the lead paint foundation. then became, in succession, 
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rubbers, flatters, and brush hands. The better apprentices would then 
receive further training as liners and finishers. 10. In fact, there was a 
big difference between London practice and elsewhere. Outside of London, 
painters who had served their time but were not very successful at lining 
as a "pencil hand" would become a brush hand. They were known in the trade 
as "broken painters", and how far they went in the painting process would 
depend on local custom. 10& One Newton Heath member claimed that in nearly 
all railway and tram centres, brush hands painted not only all the inside 
of coaches, but frequently did the filling up, the colour painting and the 
varnishing on the outside as well. He also believed that this practice 
prevailed in most private shops. 107 Only the ability to do lining separated 
them from coach painters. 
However, "In London", according to UKSC General Secretary Charles 
Kinggate, "painters are made from brush hands". The practice was for brush 
hands to go as far as putting on the colour coats up to the varnish coats. 
To get employment as painters, brush hands would have to show competence as 
liners and finishers (ie varnishers>. loa A handbook on London trades at the 
beginning of the century recommended boys going into coach painting to 
practice at home the mixing and matching of paints, varnishing, and 
especially lining;. and further suggested they should also attend technical 
, . 
classes. 10' At the LCC Trams, where a few years before there were 
complaints that brush hands were out of all proportion, the manager 
eventually agreed in the 1900s with Kinggate on the necessity of raising 
competent men only, and putting them on one month's probation. 110 In this 
Situation, therefore, the only mechanism for improvement for the brush hand 
was by their own efforts. But as the London coachmaking trade was dominated 
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by piecemasters (see section D below), there were vested interests 
restricting the number of painting vacancies, as piecemaster painters would 
employ brush hands where possible as they commanded a lower rate of wages. 
The Newton Heath member, cited above, argued that the UKSC had been too 
conservative in its methods of organisation. Some brush hands were employed 
solely on finishing bodies, and earned a high rate, but because they could 
not "line", they were barred from joining the UKSC. This was an 
anachronism, as the society admitted vicemen, or fitters, many of whom 
earned a lower rate than brush hands. In London the huge division between 
coach painters and brush hands, exploited by piecemasters, accounted for 
there being only 400 painters there in the UKSC. "We do not arrest this 
evil by keeping these men out of our Society". 111 His plea was to 
eventually touch a nerve. 
(ii) The physical side of painting 
Painting required its share of hard manual labour. While the Holmes 
factory 'in I>erby already had two steam-driven grinding mills by 1850,112 
they were not common until much later in the century, by which time paints 
could be bought from suppliers ready mixed. "To grind enough ..•. occupied 
days with muller and slab", recalled one former coachpainter. He thought 
the hardest colour was patent yellow - "For one of those apprentices to 
grind half a pound of this patent yellow •.•• in one day, would prove to be 
the hardest day's work ever they had attempted since going to the 
business". He himself remembered spending "many a day grinding lake to be 
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ready for the coach painter, and a long and tedious job it was". 113 George 
Sturt, the wheelwright, similarly recalled "I hadn't enough strength in my 
arm to grind up Prussian-blue for finishing a waggon body". 114 
When carriages were brought in for repainting at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, it would take 8-10 days of rubbing down, just to get 
out the cracks. No preparation of any kind was used to take off the 
varnish. "It was then quite a customary thing to see the coach painter's 
fingers all tied up at the ends, being quite worn through with having so 
much hard rubbing to do". Only from about 1830 did the coach painter use 
anything in the shape of a pickle to soften and take off the varnish before 
rUbbing. "This pickle was of a very disagreeable nature, and was boiled by 
the apprentices, and used hot, viz: - boiled urine". The polishing of the 
finished carriage also involved "an enormous amount of work". A receipt for 
polishing a carriage in 1770, using an old silk handkerchief and flour, 
showed the man receiving 50 shillings on piecework. This was at a time when 
a first class painter commanded weekly wages of about 18 shillings. 11. 
As well as the physical side of some aspects of the painting process, 
the, work was generally reckoned to be unhealthy, in particular because of 
the·p~eponderance of lead paints. Adams 1n 1837 referred to the "unhealthy 
nature" of coach painters' employment "in heated apartments impregnated 
with mineral and other odours". But he believed painters were becoming 
healthier, and attributed this to greater personal cleanliness. 116 How true 
this was is debatable. Fourteen year old Alexander Robertson, apprenticed 
at Atkinsons of Newcastle, told the 1843 Royal Commission on Children'S 
Employment that anyone caught washing their hands in the paint shop would 
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be fined two shillings. There was no place to wash them and boys fetching 
their teas had to take them a~ they were. He had had very bad headaches, 
dizziness, and sickness his first week there. Another apprentice, 16 year 
old Anthony Hetherington, often felt dizzy as well. The paint shop was very 
hot, being situated above the smiths' shop, which was compounded by the 
need to keep the windows closed when varnishing took place. The working 
hours in the paint shop were very much longer in the summer, sometimes 
whole weeks from 4am to apm. compared to the normal 6am to 6pm. leaving no 
time for any outside pursuits. Hetherington found that grinding the lead-
based colours also caused him to spit a lot, because of the nasty smell. 117-
Thackrah found that coach painters suffered in lesser degree from the 
disorders affecting house painters. Bilious and gastric problems were 
frequent. but the most serious illnesses were colic and palsy. Often there 
was a local affliction - one arm, or even one finger losing its power of 
motion, generally the one that had held the brush. His researches also 
suggested that house painters in London were greater affected because they 
worked longer hours than in the provinces ·so that the men had not leisure 
enough to make it worth their while to clean themselves properly in the 
intervals". 118 These observations would certainly apply to London 
coachpainters, who. also had a longer working week than in the provincesj 
while the coach trade, like the building industry, was seasonal, though for 
different reasons, and this would generally exacerbate the problem of 
cleanliness in the summer months. 119 
Thus. one account in the early 1870s refers to coach painters, whose 
·working clothes would almost stand upright with the successive coatings of 
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paint that are upon them and who unmistakeably carry about with them the 
nature of their calling in the s:mell of their clothes". "':0;:0 While the 
materials remained the sa:me, little changed in the paint shops. In 1893 the 
secretary of the Sovereign Friendly Society of Coach Painters complained of 
the "bad atmosphere caused through using so much white lead and varnishes 
and bad ventilation (a great deal of it because we are obliged to be shut 
in because of the dust spoiling our varnishing>". 121 And a few years later 
a visitor to the North British Railway workshops at Cowlairs remarked of 
the paint shop "its odorous atmosphere would indicate to a blind man the 
industry being carried on". 122 
Despite comments in trade journals, such as "most painters know how 
prejudicial white lead is to the health of those who have to use it",123 
washing facilities continued to be inadequate or non-existent. In 1910, 
factory inspectors in the south east of England reported that "considerable 
pressure has had to be exerted to obtain proper conveniences" in 
wheelwright and coachbuilding works. In the same year, a Birmingham factory 
inspector investigating a case of lead poisoning in a carriage building 
shop found "the usual lavatory accommodation was not provided". 124 Of 
course, a major factor in prolonging this state of affairs was the weakness 
of the union. One example of the :members organising to change this was at 
the LCe tram-Works at Leytonstone where in the few years prior to its 
closure in 1911, a trade union committee was set up. This commdttee 
established the right for men to use the lavatory during working hours (as 
well as stopping the manager watching the :men through a little window when 
they were in the lavatory>; it also won the right for them to wash their 
hands after they had been using white lead, and for water, basins, and soap 
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to be provided for this purpose. In this instance, the management had the 
last laugh when, with the transfer of the work from Leytonstone, the eight 
coachmakers who were discharged and not transferred had all been on the 
committee - 4 UKSC and 4 Wheelwrights' Operatives members. 125; 
There was, however, an awareness by some employers of the problems 
associated with lead. In the mid-nineteenth century, the London employer 
Hooper had tried replacing white lead paint, because it was "pernicious to 
health", with white zinc paint, but found the latter had trouble drying and 
did not retain its white colour as well as lead paint. 126 Consequently lead 
paint continued to be used on all vehicles into the twentieth century, and 
with it came fatalities. It was estimated that some 75 pounds of lead were 
used to cover the top of each tramcar in Sheffield, being poured on the 
roof canvas to keep water out. 127 A review by the factory inspectorate of 
lead poisoning in coachmaking early in the twentieth century concluded 
that: "Poisoning is largely due to dust arising in sand-papering the coats 
of paint, or the stopping used to fill up cracks or irregularities of 
surface". 12& The main problem was dry sandpapering, with exposure to the 
dust dependent on the time spent on dry rubbing. Table 2:4 below shows an 
estimate at the direct exposure to lead dust, from sandpapering, of 
different~grades ~~ paint shop labour in a motor car works in 1911. 12g 
Table 2:4 Hours sandpapering per day by grade of paint shop labpur.1911. 
Painters 1-2 hours 
Brush hands 2-316 hours 
Painters' labourers 4-5 hours 
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However, a Birmingham inspector claimed that lead paints were seldom 
rubbed down dry, except around beadings and door joints where the pumice 
stone would have had to be shaped to the curve. One Wolverhampton motor car 
works decided that in future any dry rubbing down would be done under 
exhaust-draught, while after any wet rubbing the floor would be cleaned to 
avoid the rUbbings drying out and forming dust. A year later, inspectors 
claimed progress in motor car works in Coventry and elsewhere in locally 
applied exhaust ventilation for dry rubbing down of paint on wheels, and 
the substitution of wet for dry rubbing down of bodies. l~O There were some 
moves away from lead-based paints before the first world war. Thus a 
Birmingham factory inspector reported in 1911 that a large motor car 
factory had discontinued it after several cases of lead poisoning had 
occurred. In the south-east, a number of firms adopted leadless paints, and 
at one large van works in north London, the manager found that zinc white 
was cheaper and had better covering power than white lead. '3' A large motor 
firm in Coventry also changed over to practically leadless paint once the 
factory inspector proved they had more cases of lead poisoning than the 
rest of the Coventry motor industry. 
But a number at Coventry side-car body manufacturers were reluctant to 
change over because of their familiarity with lead paint. Similarly, while 
the Leicester factory inspector urged leadless paint on a tramcar works, 
the management countered by explaining they had to work according to 
contract specifications. 132 The railway carriage works experienced the 
worst problems. From 1900 to 1909, inclusive, at least 342 of the 697 lead 
poisoning cases in coachbuilding were found in railway carriage works, with 
a further 185 of the 386 cases from 1910 to 1914, inclusive. 133 
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Coach painting, therefore, remained distinctly unhealthy before the 
first world war, as figures in table 2:5 at the end of this section 
demonstrate. Of the six officially recorded fatalities of coach painters 
from lead poisoning in 1909, all were fairly young - viz., 29, 32, 34, 36, 
38, and 40 years old.l~4 As noted above, the skilled painters usually had 
less exposure to lead than other paint shop workers. At the Midland 
Railway's works at Derby, 13 of 18 cases of lead poisoning in the years 
1900-1905 were of "inside painters". These men were a "quite different" 
class to the skilled coach painter, got "dirtier", and were "more 
careless". The chief foreman painter there speculated that many of them 
slept in the shirt that they wore during the day at work; and this was 
corroborated by the Wolverton works manager. 135 
Exposure to lead came from a variety of sources, of which painting and 
sandpapering have been mentioned. Another was the preparation of the 
paints, where practice varied considerably between different workplaces, 
and was not just based on their size. Thus, Bernard Daly, a Liverpool brush 
hand, said that stopping was mixed "usually by the painter or the brush 
hand who is using it. Sometimes an apprentice is told off to make 
sufficient fd~ h~i'f a dozen men" • At Xaythorns, in Biggleswade, employing 
. 
about •. 150 ,In total, the men mixed the stopping themselvesj while at a 
•. ' "~..I{,~ ' .. f . .. ' 
Redhill carriage manufacturer, with some 55 employees, the head painter 
usually mixed the stopping for his men. At the LCC Tramways Charlton repair 
depot, a "colourman" mixed all the stopping, as well as the colours. 1~6 
The number of workers potentially involved with lead in coachbuilding 
was very large. It was estimated in 1913 that some 29,308 persons <all but 
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one being male) had contact with lead in the manufacture of locomotives, 
coaches. carriages. and other vehicles. Of these, 3,971 were involved in 
mixing and preparing paint; 14,895 in rubbing down and painting; and a 
surprising further 10.442 on work other than painting, such as bedding and 
jointing (ie bodymaking work). Factory inspectors pointed out that lead 
poisoning in coachbuilding was proportionately much less frequent than in 
trades such as file cutting or printing. 137 However, the lead-related 
illnesses still constituted a major health hazard in the coachbuilding 
industry, and even the highest skilled craftsmen were not immune to it. 
Figures compiled by the UKSC for the period November 1892 to 1910 show 
that their painter membership on average died younger than any other branch 
of the trade (being followed by bodymakers, the other group exposed to 
lead). These returns in table 2:6 overleaf include men who left the trade 
before they retired but remained members to gain the friendly benefits. The 
compiler of the table commented "this tends to raise the average age at 
death very materially. especially in the case of painters who are 
frequently advised to seek other employment on health grounds". 138 
", 
In conclusion. as well as being significantly more unhealthy than other 
• 
coachmak1ng trades. coach painting was generally. even in the nineteenth 
< 
century, 'a branch of the trade already based on an extensive division of 
labour. Painting consisted of a rigid sequence of tasks. It often suited 
the painters, as well as the employers. that the former should concentrate 
on the top (and cleaner) end of this process. where possible; and that 
those workers exclusively performing the earlier stages should not be 
considered skilled nor paid skilled wages. The coach painters, therefore, 
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entered the twentieth century in a very different situation to the 
bodymakers and trimmers, where no such sub-division had occurred. 
Table 2;5 Lead poisoning in coachbuilding. 1899-1914.13~ 
Y.e.a.t:. Cases Deaths 
1899 65 1 
1900 70 5 
1901 65 4 
1902 63 1 
1903 74 5 
1904 49 4 
1905 56 3 
1906 85 7 
1907 70 3 
1908 70 3 
1909 95 6 
1910 70 6 
1911 104 5 
1912 85 7 
1913 71 2 
1914 57 4 
Table 2; 6 Aver"ate age at death in different UKSC trades. 1892-191Q. 
Branch cf trade !yerage age at death 
Painters 53.1 
Bodymakers 54.7 
Sm! ths 57.5 
Coach fitters 57.7 
Wheelers 58.0 
Trimmers 60.0 
Carriagemakers 61. 7 
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D. PIECEMASTERS 
The piecemaster system has already been encountered earlier in this 
chapter. Where it existed, its beneficiaries, the piecemasters, were an 
"aristocracy" within what has often been considered an "aristocratic" 
trade. So far, its implications for levels of skill in the industry have 
been considered, but it also had profound implications for the ability of 
coachmaking trade unions to organise during the nineteenth century, 
especially in London, the centre of the trade. No account of the 
coachmaking industry and its unions would be complete without a description 
and analysis of the piecemaster system. 
Due to problems of terminology, it is necessary to look briefly at 
definitions. According to Cole, piecework "in the widest sense of the term 
implies simply that the employer is paying not so much per hour to the 
workers employed on the job, but so much for the job itself". The employer 
would pay a price for the job, but it would be a matter of "comparative 
indifference" to the employer "to whom he pays it or how it is finally 
distributed" ... But. for the worker, it was fundamentally important. Cole 
argued that the term "piece-worker" used to be given to a sub-contractor 
who found··the labour, received a lump sum payment from the employer, and 
made his own terms with the individual workers he had engaged. The 
Amalgamated SOCiety of Carpenters & Joiners even used the terms "sub-
contractor" and "pieceworker" synonymously in their rule book. 140 
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Schloss found it necessary to distinguish between the "contractor", the 
"piece-wage foreman" and the "sub-contractor". The contractor would take on 
a piece of work at a particular price; his subordinate workers would draw 
only their normal time-wages, and the contractor would be entitled to what 
was left over at the end. The piece-wage foreman would be remunerated for 
his supervision by a piece-wage or premium. Schloss enumerated three 
different arrangements for this, one of which was a contract work system, 
identical to that operated by the contractor. He deSignated the piece-wage 
foreman, irrespective of the method by which his own and his subordinates' 
wages were calculated, by the generic name applied to him by the working 
classes of the time - viz. "piecemaster". 
Neither of these first two categories, the contractor nor the piece-wage 
foreman, was an employer, thus distinguishing them from the third, the sub-
contractor, "a sub-employer working under a superior employer". However, 
according to Schloss, the distinction between the sub-contractor and the 
piecemaster or piece-wage foreman, was of little practical importance, as 
both were under a strong incentive to "sweat" their workers .. The major 
difference was that while a sub-contractor could effectively set what rate 
:: 
of wages he liked,for his subordinates; under a piece-wage foreman, the 
employer was ultimately responsible for deciding the level of time-wages 
paid to subordinate workers, even if he did often follow the foreman's 
advice. But having to accept a higher level of wages for their subordinates 
than they would have paid if they had been sub-contractors, did not only 
not stop piece-wage foremen from "sweating" their operatives by making them 
work far faster than their normal speed, it may even have encouraged it.141 
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In the sources on the coachmaking industry, the terms "pieceman", 
"piece-boss", and "piecemaster" regularly occur, meaning someone who takes 
a job piecework, with people under him. 142 But it was not always clear 
whether the person taking piecework was a contractor, piece-wage foreman, 
or sub-contractor. The term "sub-contractor" did sometimes occur, however, 
and the evidence points to sub-contracting being the most common form of 
piecework in the industry, especially in London. Given the wide usage of 
the term "piecemaster" in coachmaking, confirmed by later collective 
agreements to abolish "the piecemaster system", I intend to use this term 
in the following pages to cover both contracting and sub-contracting, as 
well as Schloss's more limited use of it as piece-wage foremanship. 
Early meaning of piecemaster in coachmaking 
Adams wrote in 1837 of piecemasters as a class of small coachbuilding 
tradesmen. In some instances these men produced the complete product, and 
the ostensible coach builder was merely a retailer. In other cases, the 
piecemasters produced the body and carriage, while the painting and 
finishing were done by the coach builder. 143 This latter type were referred 
to by Holmes of Derby in 1850, when describing piece masters as "small 
tradesmen who carryon one branch of the trade only". 144 Many of these 
early piecemasters apparently produced very good work. But because of their 
limited capital, they could not afford to keep a stock of dry material, and 
consequently "their work, even if good, will not stand". Often, though, 
piecemasters employed only apprentices and "inferior workmen". 145 
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In the 1870s, according to a later union account of the system, "it was 
no uncommon thing for bodies built in back alleys and mews to be hawked 
around to the Baker Street Bazaar or to one or other of the coachbuilding 
firms proper and sold to meet the current week's wages of the men working 
for the smaller semi-employers who were in existence in these rat-
holes". 146 Even in the 1890s, while the highest class London firms built 
the complete product, other "less particular" firms made use of those small 
employers who worked "for the trade", especially in bodymaking. These 
latter produced more cheaply, by employing improvers from the country at 
low wages. The Booth survey quite clearly distinguished this practice from· 
the piecemaster, understood as a sub-contractor of labour only.14? 
While labour and materials sub-contracting may have historically 
preceded, and then survived alongside, labour-only sub-contracting, the 
latter was definitely entrenched in London by the middle of the nineteenth 
century. At Hoopers, it was reported in 1855 that each department had a 
foreman in charge. If employed on daywork, he kept a record of work done 
and time worked by the menj while on piecework he employed "men of his own 
choice" and made up his account weekly or monthly. 148 At about the same 
period-it was also noted that "the great mass of coachbuilding in every 
. . 
branch i6 accomplished by the piece", and "the system of piecework in the 
coach trade opens unusual facilities for clever workmen, who, by industry 
and application are enabled to earn very high wages, and to make a 
comfortable provision for failing health and old age". 14~ 
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Coachmaking unions and piecework 
The UKSC had a formal position against all piecework from an early date. 
The 1840-47 rules state "wherever piecework is found injurious to the trade 
it is to be discontinued". The 1848 rules attempted to go further - "this 
Society discountenance piecework altogether" - but with the saving rider 
"and calIon the members to abolish it where it is practicable to do so". 
This position remained in the rule book until 1913. 
There was a slight elaboration in 1876 which did not last long - "that 
any town may make bye-laws .... to regulate the system of piecework and 
abolish it where practicable". That, of course, was difficult. Thus, in 
1875, the General Secretary wrote to the Hull branch, "where good piecework 
prices are offered it is sometimes difficult to resist the introduction of 
piecework". But it was not impossible. In Preston, the following year, 
according to an employer, a UKSC member went in for piecework, but "before 
the man had finished his first job the union called him before them and 
told him he must take no more work, as piecework was not recognised in 
Preston, and he left us". 150 The Webbs were therefore correct when they 
cited the UKSC as one of those unions which insisted on timework.lsl 
In practice,however, piecework operated in a variety of forms in a 
number of parts of Britain, and the union was often powerless to stop it, 
especially in London. Writing as late as 1907, W.Awcock, the UKSC London 
branch preSident, admitted that piecework only existed in London was 
because the union was not strong enough to prevent it. Both daymen and 
piecemen agreed it was "a pernicious system", but the choice was often that 
- 119 -
of "becoming a pieceman or working for one". If the union forbade members 
to take piecework, it could not prevent the non-unionist from doing SO.152 
Under these circumstances, the union seems from an early date to have 
attempted to control the system where it could not eradicate or prevent it. 
The first manifestation of this in the rule book was when in 1866 a number 
of rules were introduced regarding the employment of non-UKSC members by 
UKSC piecemasters. This offence was punished by a series of fines, followed 
ultimately by expulsion, which was used. But in 1889, the fines were 
decreased, and expulsion dropped. 
Secondly, there was the issue of the wage rate paid by the piecemaster 
to his daymen; and, thirdly, the issue of the share-out of the balance left 
at the end of the job. Rules on these were not brought in until 1895, which 
was in sharp contrast to the ASH. In 1861 that union had fixed penalties, 
fines, and eventually expulsion on any member working piecework who did not 
share equally any balance. Even more forceful was that these penalties also 
applied to any member working under a piecemaster, when, on not receiving 
an equa~ share of the surplus, the member refused to leave that employment. 
It was lat,er claimed that "being a well-organised trade" enabled the 
engineers ~o.render the use of the piece master system "unobjectionable". 153 
By contrast, the UKSC took a very long time evolving a national policy. 
In 1874 there was a dispute at the two railway shops covered by the 
society's Openshaw branch, Ashbury's contract shop and the Gorton works of 
the X,S, & L Railway, over the sharing of the piecemen's balance. The UKSC 
was unable to solve the problem even though the piecemen and the bodymakers 
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concerned were in the society. Eventually the Gorton manager decided that 
the piecemen were to receive 2s per week more wages than the daymen they 
employed, and, on completion of the contract, 7~% of the balancej the 
remainder being divided amongst the pieceman and his daymen, according to 
each individual's wage rate and time worked on the contract. The UKSC 
journal reported that the engineers already worked this system at Gorton 
and its neighbourhood, but it was "new to our trade". 154 
Generally, issues concerning piecemasters were dealt with on a 'local 
basis as and when they arose. Events in Sheffield in 1892 finally prompted 
a centralisation of policy. At Craven's railway contract works UKSC members 
struck against their piecemasters keeping all the balance money. Xost of 
the piecemasters were in the UKSC, but promptly advertised for blacklegs 
and worked with them, while the strikers had to seek other work. The local 
branch secretary told the Webbs that while the piecemaster system was 
prevalent, elsewhere the surplus was generally divided up with the men. The 
situation at Cravens, however, did not improve, and in 1894 the 
piecemasters were still against sharing profits with the men. las 
Following this,'the 1895 UKSC rule changes spelt out that piece masters 
should pay the standard wages of the shop; produce their book for checking, 
when requested by the town comDdttee; and that any piecemaster not sharing 
his balance should be expelled - though this required the sanction of the 
EC and the General Council. It was never the aim of the society to drive 
piecemasters out. Numbers of UKSC members who became piecemasters kept up 
their contributions in order to gain the friendly benefits the society 
offered, especially superannuation. 156 
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Unionist piecemasters could behave very differently from non-unionist 
ones. In the 1859-60 hours agitation in London coachmaking. no less than 7 
of the provisional committee were piecemasters. One explained why he 
supported a memorial to the employers - "If he were a dayman, he should go 
into it with all his heart and soulj therefore he would advocate it now, 
because he did not know that but next week he might be a dayman 
himself". 157 Charles Kinggate, a future UKSC General Secretary. was in the 
1890s the only pieceman carriage maker in the London branch. Not only was 
he branch president, he was also instrumental in setting up the Federal 
Union in 1894. Further, he was president of the "Auxiliary Stationary· 
Benefit Society", with some 125 members in the mid-1890s, set up to counter 
the LCTU's payment of high unemployment benefit for long periods. Various 
efforts were made to blacken his name by some members in London, which were 
readily seized upon by the Liverpool-based executive. 15Q This resulted in a 
new rule in 1895 barring piecemasters from holding SOCiety office. 
By contrast, the smaller London union, the LCTU, was actually built 
around the piecemaster system. One account early in the twentieth century 
suggested that it was "at one time almost exclusively composed of 
piecemasters·. 1 .' In 1894, a "London Bodymaker" wrote to Reynolds News 
complaining that if a man spoke against the piecemaster system at a union 
meeting. he would become a marked man. be boycotted and not get work. In 
the same year the LCTU's secretary, assistant secretary, and president, 
were all piecemastersj160 while even in 1907, when change was beginning to 
occur, its secretary, J.R.Annison, had been a piecemaster at Corbens for 
"very many years" before he retired from work. and half its committee were 
still piecemasters. '61 
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LCTU rules stipulated that piecemen members had to employ union men 
where possible. If they took one off the union's unemployment book they 
even received a payment of 2s6d. If no union men were available, then an 
applicant for the work had to join the union if he were a good enough 
workman. If non-members were employed, this had to be entered in the job-
book under pain of a lOs fine. 1G2 
The theory was that "One man takes the piece of work, then employs a 
mate, sometimes more". But in practice, the available work could be 
monopolised - "in some shops one man has all the work much to the loss of 
the other men employed". 163 A UKSC critic of the system wrote that "To be a 
shop boss is an irresistible claim to high honour", and claimed that when 
an LCTU man got the shop boss job, the UKSC daymen had to Join his union or 
get out. In one establishment where both unions had daymen and piecemen 
members working, an attempt to reduce piece prices by the employer had been 
resisted by both unions, but one LCTU piecemaster stayed on under the 
reduced rates, and had 20 mates working for him instead of 3 before, yet he 
was only subject to a ·paltry· fine. It was also claimed that while the 
LCTU allowed. young, men to join if they were ·capable" of earning a certain 
rate, it did not follow they would get it if working under a 
piecemaster. 1 &4 The union's rules were also framed to keep piecemasters in 
the workshop in the event of disputes. 
Infighting among the various small unions in London led to accusations 
of the UKSC's London branches being run by piecemasters. In fact, in 1907, 
only one piecemaster held any office in the four largest branches of 
London, London West, London South, and Stratford. There were, however, six 
- 123 -
piecemaster branch officers in the two new branches of Kilburn and London 
North, these having been opened through the piecemasters' "zeal and 
energy". 165 The 1907 UKSC rule book did reiterate the position that "Any 
member being a piecemaster or charge hand in a shop, having power to put on 
or discharge men, shall not be allowed to hold any office". But this was 
softened in 1913 by the rider that they could not hold office only "when 
any other qualified member is nominated". 
Taking a leaf out of the LCTU's book, the UKSC in 1907 changed the rule 
on fines for piecemasters employing non-society men to one where it should 
be a condition of employment that the man join the society. If he did not, 
the piecemaster could suffer a small weekly fine subject to the discretion 
of the branch committee. At the same time the recently introduced penalty 
for not sharing balance money had been reduced from possible expulsion to 
fines, again at the branch committee's discretion. The UKSC was reacting to 
a situation where, in London, it had to use the piece master system, being 
too weak to outlaw it. In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
piecemaster system existed in the London wheelwright trade "to as great, if 
not greater, extent than the coach trade" and the secretary of the London-
based Wheelwright Operatives' Union was a piecemaster at Liversedge's. 166 
Extent of the system 
The main benefit of piecework for the employer was the cost. UKSC 
General Secretary Waldron guessed in 1892 that men were worse paid under 
piecework than they had been twenty years earlier. 167 In line with this, an 
employer, W.H.Hamshaw, estimated in 1902 that piecework prices were about 
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the same as forty years previously, and had actually fallen over the last 
twenty to thirty years. This compared to about a 15% rise in the day wages 
of skilled men, and nearly 40% for labourers, along with a 7~-10% reduction 
in the working week over that 40 year period. 
For Hamshaw, the "obvious remedy" to rising day wages was piecework. He 
alleged that men were more willing to work piecework than daywork, but that 
many factories had stayed on daywork through the difficulties of getting 
reliable men. There were two methods of piecework open to the employer. He 
could pay daywork wages and pay the balance when the work was completed, or 
"the same plan holds good if a piecemaster has the loft and employs his own 
labour". 1G~ Both systems had their problems for the ordinary craftsmen. 
According to Waldron, while there were some good piecemasters, "human-
nature-like" the piecemaster got men to work "as cheaply as he can". 1G~ One 
worker alleged that the whole piecemaster system encouraged "sweating" 
because if the piecemaster earned too much, the employer would reduce the 
price, thus leading the piecemaster to further pressure the men under 
him. 170 But it was also acknowledged that "many piecemen pay better wages 
than the master coachmaker". 171 
• !I>" 
.' 
.A Bristol employer believed that piecemasters would probably employ 
lower class men in order to pay lower rates, to increase their own profit; 
and this would lead to bad workmanship. 172 But the LCTU, with its vested 
interest, complained that the system whereby the employer, rather than the 
piecemaster, gave out piecework, led to "the gradual introduction of young 
unskilled men at low wages, so ousting the higher paid men". 173 
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The UKSC experienced a particular problem in the painting branch of the 
trade. A Newton Heath member claimed in 1905 that some UKSC piecemasters in 
London employed an "outrageous" number of brush hands; while the average 
was three brush hands to one painter, there were some instances of 20 brush 
hands to two painters. 174 General Secretary Kinggate wrote to the London 
District Committee in 1912 urging it to concern itself with flagrant cases 
of UKSC members "employing the cheapest labour" to do painters' work. He 
also complained to the London West branch secretary that a piece-boss, whom 
he thought to be in the UKSC, had 6 brush hands to one painter. "There 
would be more work for painters if you compelled these kind of men to 
employ painters. No, they employ them because they are cheap."17& 
The Booth survey called the system "the great evil· in the coach 
building business. The employer ·has no direct relation with the men 
employed by the piecemaster, has generally no knowledge of what they are 
paid, and sometimes keeps no record of their numbers·. The system also 
intensified "the evils of irregularity of employment, as the piecemaster 
has no inducement, nor indeed any power, to find work for his men in 
seasons of slackness. Under a piecemaster the tenure by which men hold 
thei~ work is practically limited to the job in hand, and an evident result 
of this insecurity of tenure is found in the extent to which men shift from 
shop to shop·. 17.' 
Firms using piecemasters often also directly employed part of their 
workforce on day work. Alford and Alder, for example, in 1892, had only 
about half their work done by piecework ·under piecemasters or sub-
contractors, who are selected for their good qualities, and who engage the 
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men who work under them; they also are responsible for the excellence of 
the work, and pay the men they engage". I?? Another firm with about half its 
workforce on day work was Thorn of Great Portland Street. Table 2:7 shows 
the small scale of most of its piecemasters in 1893: 
Table 2:7 Piecemasters and their mates in a London firm. 1893. 1 ?9 
Carriage maker 
Bodymaker 
Bodymaker 
Bodymaker 
Trimmer 
Trimmer 
Viceman 
Smith 
+ 3 mates; 
+ 1 mate; 
+ 1 mate; 
+ young mate 
+ 1 mate; 
+ 3 mates; 
+ 3 mates; 
+ youth; 
+ 3 smiths + 4 hammermen + 1 lad. 
Holmes & Company, with a major works in Derby and branch shops in 
Lichfield, Sheffield, Burton, and London, believed piecework to be the best 
system but only had one man working it out of 119 employed at Derby. 
However they considered "payment through sub-contractor a bad plan, but we 
use it in the London paint shops, not having been able to alter it yet·, 
with some·.5 of· the' 7 employed there on it. l?SJ 
Evidence o:('a number of UKSC branches to the 1886 Royal Commission on 
the "Depression of Trade and Industry", and some employers to the 1892 
Royal Commission on Labour, enables a picture to be drawn of the extent of 
piecemasters in private coachmaking outside of London (except for railway 
shops, which will be considered below). In Scotland, union branches in 
Kelso, Perth and Dundee, and employers in Dundee and Stirling reported no 
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piecework. Similarly, in Yorkshire, branches in Wakefield, Halifax, and 
Leeds reported none. In the north, Carlisle branch had none, while 
Newcastle said only a few were on it, with the large Newcastle employer, 
Angus, claiming they used it to some extent. Lancashire had some, with 
Blackburn branch reporting both daywork and piecework, as did the Preston 
employer James Walmsley, who had overcome union opposition to piecework 1n 
1886 (see chapter 1). In Ireland, Downpatrick branch had none, while Dublin 
had some, it operating at Huttons for one. The south west had none in 
Devises, Bridgwater, or Taunton, nor at an Exter employer of 46 men, though 
it did operate in Bristol, with Perry & Co using sub-contractors. ,.0 
Outside of London, therefore, there were a number of pockets of 
piecemasters, but most areas appeared free. 
It is interesting to compare these findings with an ASE survey of 1861. 
The latter found that out of 173 districts, only 22 had piecemastersj and 
of the 533 piecemasters identified, nearly 75~ were in Lancashire. The 
system was confined to the machine and stationary steam-engine making 
districts of northern England, plus a few locomotive centres. Unlike the 
ASE, which was. little troubled by it after 1890, ,., the UKSC was up against 
f' ...... 
. . 
the piecemaster system until the first world war. Its survival in the early 
motor b9dr. building industry will be examined in chapter 4. 
~. ~i ' 
Piecemasters and railway shops 
The piecemaster system also operated in a number of different variants 
at most, if not all, railway carriage shops. The ASE survey of 1861 
specifically identified them in the locomotive centres of Swindon, Derby 
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and Wolverton (being called "leading hands" at Derby>. 1&2 Their presence 
probably related to the railway companies' initial need to sub-contract the 
management of the maintanance of their rapidly increasing numbers of 
locomotives and rolling stock. The evolution of the system at Swindon 
illustrates this. 
When the GWR locomotive workshops were established at Swindon in the 
1840s, nearly all of the work was carried out on a contract system. The 
contractors each specialised in a particular branch of the work, for 
example, steam hammer work, foundry work, wheel and tyre repairs. The 
theory was that the contractor would supervise the work and share any' 
profit with his men, who received a low base rate. While some contractors 
made little profit, others left considerable fortunes. This system did not 
last very long, being followed by a piecework system where the gross 
balance payable to a gang was handed to the "chargeman", who would work out 
the amount to be given to each man. 183 Under this procedure, the charge man 
"could and did pay the gang what amount he pleased, and kept several punds 
a week extra for himself". Quite likely this system was in operation when 
the carriage works were built at Swindon in the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
At some stage befo~e the 1890s, this was in turn superseded by the 
chargeman being paid a sum equal to ten per cent of his weekly wages, 
deducted out of the "balance" earned by the gang. The rest of the balance 
was paid direct to the men along with their day wages, ~eaving the 
chargeman no opportunity to use his initiative in the matter of wages. 1&4 
At the Midland Railway shops in Derby in the 1840s the company paid 
contract prices for the labour involved in certain jobs, such as painting a 
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second class railway carriage, and these prices were paid to gang leaders. 
The smiths, among others, were responsible for setting on their own staff 
and deciding how much each man was paid. By the 1890s the leading hand 
still contracted to take on work at a given price, but he and his 
assistants received stated weekly wages, and equitably divided the balance 
when the work was finished. However, when certain old carriages came in for 
repair, the work would sometimes still be given to one man who would hire 
others at weekly wages to do it.les 
Piecework operated at the LIWR carriage shops at Wolverton, though there 
are few details. However, around 1900, in the shop building horse-drawn 
buses for the company, the foreman acted as a sub-contractor. MA gang of 
men signed a contract with a foreman to build a bus for a fixed price, 
which was always substantially less than the price allowed to the foreman 
by the Company. Each of the men had a copy of the agreement, but when the 
job had been completed they had to return their copies, so that the only 
record of the transaction remained with the foreman, as sub-contractor.Ml~~ 
The systems described at Swindon, Derby and Wolverton were very 
.{r 
d1fferent<from those in private coachmaking. In the latter the piecemaster, 
as well -as t~nanc1ally benefitting from the system, tended to monopolise 
the mo;e skilled work, thus perpetuating a certain division of labour. But 
in the railway company carriage shops, the division of labour was dictated 
by the larger volume of output (building and repair), the sheer size of 
railway cariages, and the traditional method of a gang building a complete 
vehicle. The charge man or leading hand had a semi-managerial role, and 
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deflected criticism away from the overall employer by their increased share 
of the group reward and any ~pportunity they had to abuse that. 
The railway contract shops also used variations of the system, and 
Craven's have already been mentioned earlier in this section. At Ashbury's 
contract shop in Manchester, employing some 2,000 in 1866, "the work, as 
far as possible, is given aut to the foremen by contract or piecework, 
which is a well-known source of economy in every manufacture."IS7 As 
detailed above, there was a strike by bodymakers here in 1874 over the 
equitable distribution of the balance. The Metropolitan works at Saltley in 
Birmingham employed piecemen, who in turn employed "underhands". However, 
the piecemen had no power to engage labour without the foreman's 
permission, and only the foreman could discharge. When, in 1875, a pieceman 
left without paying an underhand, the latter, presumably with the support 
of the Birmingham UKSC branch, took the company to court for the payment. 
The pieceman claimed he had not been paid by the company, who in turn 
claimed that he was responsible for paying the man. Under the circumstances 
prevailing at the company, the court found the underhand to be the servant 
of the company and not the pieceman. The company decided to appeal, and the 
UKSC took a vote of its members on whether it should nationally raise funds 
.. 
to defend t~e action, given the importance of the issue. The vote of nearly 
10-1 to do so showed how seriously the members regarded it. lee 
At the Lancaster Railway Carriage & Wagon works, when the men complained 
in 1905 that they should be able to earn a 25~ balance when on piecework, 
it was decided that in future the pieceman should consult with the men 
before he fixed a price with the employer. This represented a democratising 
- 131 -
of the traditional relationship, which was also experienced in the early 
motor industry. 199 There were, however, still some blatant abuses of the 
system, as evidenced at the Gloucester Railway C~rriage and Wagon Company. 
Until 1911, "men were paid a weekly wage, and on top of that, piece-money 
was divided up each month among the foremen, who in turn divided it up 
among charge-hands known as "piece~bosses". The piece-bosses passed it on 
to their men at their own discretion, a florin here and a half-crown there, 
generally in the Railway Arms, beside the Company's offices. "For the 
piece-bosses themselves the system was an admirable onej they were the 
aristocracy of the Works. But the men also liked the old system, or at 
least they were not prepared to have it swept away by a new broom. They 
came out on strike for one day .... but were prepared to return, and on the 
first pay-day under the new system found their money so much increased that 
they went to talk the matter over with the former piece bosses. They, 
however, has made themselves scarce, and some did not reappear for several 
days."19Q 
The piecework systems described in this chapter allowed one group of 
craftsmen to substantially benefit from the labour of other craftsmen (and 
"unskilled- labour in the paint shops), whether it be as the "semi-
employer- type of piecemaster in London coachmaking up until the first 
world war, or the employees who controlled the allocation of pay in many 
railway shops in the third, and sometimes also the last, quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The piecemaster system was a major factor in the 
weakness of London coachmaking trade unionism; and it also made shop 
organisation in the railway side of the industry even more difficult in the 
hostile anti-union environment operating in those workplaces. 
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CHAPTER 3 RAILWAY CARRIAGE BUILDING 
A. EARLY RAILWAY CARRIAGES 
When the newly formed railway companies required carriages to transport 
passengers, the carriage bodies were invariably built by existing "private" 
coachbuilding firms. And when the companies embarked on their own carriage 
construction, their carriage department officers, as on the London and 
Birmingham Railway, were principally selected from those with experience in 
building horse-drawn vehicles. It was not surprising that "their efforts in 
carriage building resembled road coaches set up on a flat railway wagon" 
for "this is practically what they were". 1 
According to the historian of nineteenth century railway carriages, "it 
is fairly correct to state that the railway carriage was directly developed 
from the coach." By that he meant the glass-coach, rather than the stage-
coach. In addition to the droplight in each door, there was a quarter light 
on each side of the door, giving six windows to each compartment or body.~ 
Each r~ilway carriage was effectively the bodies of two or three horse 
coaches combined, the biggest difference with previous practice being in 
the frame,· whieh had to be made very strong to withstand the locomotive's 
. -
pull, the jolting when the train stopped, and the wear-and-tear produced by 
shunting. 3 
A Liverpool coachbuilder produced the early first-class carriages for 
the Liverpool & Manchester Railway, basically "two road coach bodies bolted 
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on legs of wood".4 Similarly, the original coaches of another early railway 
"were in reality composed of two distinct carriages, and were dowelled 
together at the headstocks and on the top side rails, with an elastic 
sUbstance between them in order to allow the carriages a slight amount of 
radiation in passing over curves." S 
There were many other continuities with private coachbuilding. Prints of 
early trains on the Liverpool & Manchester Railway show the first-class 
carriages painted yellow below the waist line and black above, which was a 
common stage-coach livery of the time. 6 Wellington's coach, buil~ in 1838 
by the firm of Joseph Wright for his use on the London & Croydon Railway, 
similarly had its upper exterior panels painted black.? Naming the first-
class cariages was another stage-coach custom common in the 1830s. e For a 
number of years there was even an arrangement whereby the wealthier railway 
passengers made the first part of a journey by coach, then had this same 
coach caried on a train, lashed to a match-truck, reverting to horse-drawn 
power to complete their journey. These carriage trucks were operating on 
the London & Southampton Railway in 1840; the GWR alone had 224 of them in 
1849i and the K,S&L still had 11 as late as 1863. 3 
When the Grand Junction Railway decided to make the "Travelling Post 
Office" a permanent feature in 1838, the conventional curved panelling of 
the road coach was used, even though, with the vehicle not being divided 
into compartments, this was completely pointless. Early Royal Mail 
carriages consisted of 2~ bodies plus a "boot" for the mails. By 1838 on 
the London & Birmingham Railway the boot was incorporated as leg room for a 
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"bed" carriage, while the mail was stored in boxes on the roof. On both 
types the guard sat on an open box-seat on the roof. 10 
There was, however, a tremendous class distinction between first- and 
second-class carriages, and with it a very different standard of finish. 
This had sUbstantial implications for the level of skill required of the 
workers building them, and the second-class carriage marks the beginning of 
the railway coach as a distinctive vehicle in its own right. For many 
years, most railway companies had open-sided carriages for their ·second-
class provision. These were similar to the three-compartment first-class 
carriages, but had a single unglazed opening replacing the usual three 
windows on each side of the compartment. 11 The earliest second-class 
carriages of the Manchester & Leeds had wooden shutters in place of 
windows, and holes in the floor to allow water to drain out. 1~ In 1840, the 
London & Birmingham Railway had 137 open second-class compared to only 36 
closed second-class carriages. 13 The London & Greenwich were unusual in the 
late 1830s in protecting most of their second-class passengers from the 
weather. They sat 24 inside one large saloon-type compartment, but they 
also had an outside seat for four passengers at each end of the carriage. 14 
The typical second-class carriage of the early Victorian period was also 
~ 
extremely cramped; The carriage generally had three compartments, but 
there was no padding or lining, and the compartment partitions only came up 
to shoulder-blade level. Following stage-coach custom, luggage rails were 
provided on the roofs, with box-seats for guards. 15 In the early 1870s new 
carriages were being constructed for the Kidland Railway from twenty year 
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old patterns, with luggage rails still on the roof, even though by then 
most other railways had dispensed with them. 1_ 
Such a spartan interior effectively cut out opportunities for the coach 
trimmer. The tiny Bodmin & Wadebridge Railway even had, in its three-
compartment first-class cariages in the 1830s, cushions stuffed with hay. 
When the number of first-class passengers proved extremely small, one 
carriage was changed into a "composite" - its two outer compartments being 
turned into second-class, by removing all the trimming, hay and 8011.17 At 
Crewe in 1848, Francis Head watched an old first-class carriage being 
converted into a second-class, by taking out the lining, and then changing 
"large, fashionable, oval windows into little vulgar square ones •• 1. 
In the late 1830s and early 1840s the Great Western Railway's open 
second class carriages had six compartments seating twelve passengers each 
on wooden seats fifteen inches deep. These were extremely draughty at the 
best of times, a coroner's jury once returning a verdict that "the deceased 
died from cold and exposure travelling in a second-class carriage on the 
Great Western Railway". After 1844, with the passing of Gladstone's Act 
.... J • 
(see below>',· glass. windows were provided. 19 
'"': 
At this time, first-class railway travel was equivalent to travelling 
inside stage coaches, while second-class was similar to the conditions 
experienced by travellers on the outside of a stage coach. Initially, 
however, many railways made no provision for those who could not afford to 
travel by road coach and who had used a carrier's waggon. When they did 
make provision, it was extremely primitive. Thus when the directors of the 
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Manchester & Leeds Railway decided in 1838 to provide three classes of 
carriages, the specifications were as follows: 
First-class - 6 inside, complete with everything conducive to comfort. 
Second-class - 24 passengers; divisions chair high; no cushionsj windows 
in door but none in panels. 
Third-class - open boxesj no roofsj no buffer springs.~o 
In April 1840, when the Glasgow, Paisley, Kilmarnock & Ayr Railway 
decided that their new third-class carriages should be made without seats, 
they also removed the seats from the existing "thirds".21 The Secretary of 
the GWR told a Parliamentary Committee in 1839 that his company would 
arrange to convey the lowest orders of passengers once a day in "carriages 
of an inferior description, at very slow speed .•... at a very low pricej 
perhaps, too, it may only be done at night."~2 In fact, GWR third-class 
accommodation consisted of planks laid across open goods wagons. There was 
nothing to prevent people from falling out, and on Christmas Eve 1841, some 
did, and "were k1lied when a night goods train ran into an earth slip. While 
the Manchester & Leeds provided glazed droplights from the beginning in 
their "thirds·, most companies made these carriages as unpleasant as 
possible. The South Eastern Railway even had a definite policy of driving 
third-class passengers into the second-class. 23 There were some exceptions, 
and the Sheffield, Ashton-under-Lyne and Manchester Railway ordered some 
"thirds" in 1843, specifying seats and covered topS.24 
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In 1844, however, Gladstone brought in a Bill obliging the railway 
companies to operate a daily train which should convey third-class 
passengers at a penny a mile in vehicles which should be provided with 
seats and fully protected from the weather -as far as consistent with the 
necessary admission of light and air". These became known as 
-Parliamentary" carriages, and were almost uniformly grim. Early GWR 
versions had ten plank seats, without any backs, the full width of the 
cariage, but had only one door each side. The London & South Western 
Railway had something like the traditional cattle wagon, with the sides 
open between the pillars above a waistline about four feet high. Tarpaulin 
curtains kept bad weather at bay. 
Gladstone's Act did not kill the old open-sided third-class carriage. 
The law merely obliged the railway companies to run one train daily to 
convey passengers in more or less weatherproof carriages at a penny a mile. 
Nothing stopped inferior third-class carriages being marshalled in other 
trains. And open-Sided thirds continued to be built for excursion traffic. 
Carriages built for Brighton excursion trains as late as 1864 were 
re~rkab1y similar to the GWR open second-class of 1838, except they were 
sma11er. 2 • 
But, at a fairly early date, rather than build or order too many new 
carriages, railway companies stripped out and converted old second-class 
carriages into thirds. In the same way, "Parliamentary· cariages ended up 
as milk vans or goods brakes. 26 The number of third-class passengers 
increased by nearly six times between 1849 and 1870, while first- and 
second-class rose only fourfold. Passenger traffic receipts from third-
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class tickets increased from 32.5% of the total revenue in 1849 to 43% in 
1870. 27 Whether this was because of, or despite, the marginal increase in 
comfort, is not clear. 
The Midland Railway led the way in 1875 in abolishing second class 
compartments, and upholstering the third class. The better second class 
compartments were upgraded and retrimmed as "firsts", while the majority 
were redesignated "thirds", the existing carriage linings being removed. A 
large number of ancient vehicles were scrapped entirely. The new third 
class carriages, whether formerly seconds or thirds, had padded seats, each 
compartment requiring 50 pounds of horsehair and 250 leather buttons. But 
there were no padded seat backs (until 1878) or curtains as the old seconds 
had hadj and there was a new minimum standard of 6 feet between the third 
class partitions, compared to the 7~ feet for "firsts".2~ 
This "revolutionary" move by the Midland provoked strong reaction. "It 
was said to be an unfair attack on the second class of other companies, and 
an undue pampering of the working classes and of the third-class passengers 
generally". But the Midland's chairman retorted by saying the third class 
. -
were'~is railway~s best paying customers, and were entitled to some 
consideration. By the end of the century this change had been almost 
universally adopted by other railway companies in Britain.29 
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B. NINETEENTH CENTURY RAILWAY CARRIAGE BUILDERS 
The large number of small railway companies set up in the 1830s meant a 
large demand for railway carriages. While a few companies did build their 
own carriages almost from the very start, they invariably had to supplement 
their own efforts from outside suppliers. The majority probably bought the 
whole of their early needs of railway carriage bodies from outside. 3 ,J 
While problems of transportation, and the need for coordination with the 
railway companies, would suggest that most of the latter got their initial 
rolling stock from local coachbuilders, there seems to have been a national 
market from a very early date. 31 To begin with, no doubt, local 
coachbuilders were favoured, and many firms thus shared in the trade 
generated by the rapid expansion of the railway network and the ever 
expanding number of passenger carrying vehicles required. One writer has 
commented - "Coachbuilders did not suffer from the railway revolution like 
some other interests, such as the inns. With the new and magnificent scale 
of railway coachbuilding, many of them made a lot of money."~2 
Xost coachbu11ders of any size shared in this bonanza of bUilding. The 
Great, Western Railway had many of its early carriage bodies built by David 
, ~ 
Davies of London, including the first of their royal saloons, made in 1840 
and decorated by Webb of Old Bond Street. Another one built for royals by 
Davies in 1848 or 1850 was married to an iron frame built at the company's 
Swindon workshops. When, in 1852, the GWR introduced the first 8-wheel 
carriages to be employed in regular express passenger service by a British 
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railway, the bodies were built by Shacleford, and the iron frames at 
Swindon. Another leading London firm, Hoopers, built the London & 
Birmingham Railway carriage for the Dowager Queen Adelaide in 1842. 33 
On a larger scale, Atkinson & Philipson of Newcastle had, within a few 
years of 1838, supplied over 20 railway companies, including thirteen of 
the companies which later formed the North Eastern Railway. As early as 
1841, their accounts with the Edinburgh & Glasgow Railway alone showed an 
expenditure equivalent to 70 2nd class carriages. 34 The coachbuilder~ 
Joseph Wright, who built Wellington's coach in 1838 for the Croydon line of 
what later became the South Eastern and Chatham Railway, was reported in 
1842 to have produced all the carriages for the Northern & Eastern Railway, 
and the London & Blackwall. By 1849 his premises in the City had also built 
most of the new carriages for the southern division of the LNWR, and as 
well as supplying other English railways, he was producing "a great number" 
for Germany.36 
Some builders of railway carriages also produced freight rolling stock. 
For example, Richard Helling of Chorlton-on-Hedlock built double-tiered 
sheep wagons and a carriage truck for the SA&H in 1843, and 7 1st class 
carriages for them 1n 1845; similarly, S. & T. Bowler built 15 coal wagons 
in 1842 and a number of cattle wagons and 3 second class carriages in 1843 
for the same company. Bowler'S 1843 carriages were also bought under the 
stipulation that the builder keep them in good repair for 12 months after 
delivery.3~ This was not uncommon at a time when most railway companies had 
very little workshop capacity.~7 
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It is clear that most coachbuilders at the time produced only the 
carriage bodies, and not the underframes and wheels; hence Adams's comments 
that the branches of the art of coachbuilding had been separated, and "the 
carriage builder for railroads has become a mere wooden box maker".3e 
However, Adams built 8-wheeled carriages from 1847 at his Bow works for the 
Eastern Counties Railways, the South Eastern Railway, and others. He had 
set up his works to produce locomotives, and in 1848 and 1849 also built 
the earliest examples of what is now called the "railcar", with the engine 
and carriage combined on a single frame. These were bought by the Bristol & 
Exeter Railway, and the Eastern Counties. While Adams's railway work had to 
be abandoned, Joseph Wright was more successful. As early as 1844 he had 
patents for "multiple axle" railway carriages carried on 4-, 6-, or 8-
wheeled bogies.3~ 
Railway contract shops 
According to Timmins in 1866, the railway rolling stock trade was 
initially entirely in the hands of a few private firms, but these were 
·soon quite,unequal to procure the large amount of capital to meet the 
pressing demands ot the railway companies, who, year after year, were 
constantly finding themselves short of stock to work their rapidly-
expanding traffic. This led to the establishment of works by the railway 
companies themselves, with the view of meeting the difficulty by becoming 
their own manufacturers, and, for a time, the plan succeeded; but, as the 
mileage increased, and, consequently, also the stock required to work it, 
they found that the principal part of their business would consist in 
keeping their existing stock in repair, and that they had but little time 
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for building new vehicles. The old system of employing contractors was 
again resorted to."40 
Just before the above account was published, however, the GWR had 
decided on building a huge carriage works at Swindon, which produced its 
first new stock in 1871, and the LNWR had set in motion the transfers of 
machinery that led to Wolverton becoming a major carriage works by 1877. 
The Midland Railway then built a huge carriage facility at Derby in the 
18705, and the NER opened a larger carriage works at York in 1884 (see 
Appendix 1 for details>. But, once again, all these new facilities were 
unable to build all the new stock required by these companies. 
Much later, Lord Aberconway noted, "No doubt for ordinary maintenance 
and repairs a great outlay was necessary, but it is generally agreed that 
the construction of locomotives, and probably of rolling stock, and 
certainly the rolling of steel rails, have been a financial mistake from 
the beginning. All these products could have been bought outside at less 
than it has cost the railway companies to make them."41 Whatever the 
financial consequences for the railway companies, one important result of 
the relatively large number of sites for railway carriage production was 
that production techniques in the railway company workshops were bound to 
be less advanced than in the railway contract shops. Even the latter were 
somewhat fettered by the railway companies' differing specifications for 
any new work contracted out. 
The railway carriage contract industry was soon dominated by a small 
number of very large firms, some of which had originally been only wagon 
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works before branching out. Whatever their origins, these firms were not 
solely dependent on British trade, but operated on the world market. 
Birmingham was undoubtedly the centre of this industry, railway carriage 
and wagon building reputedly starting there in 1838. The area was well 
suited for their manufacture, being in close proximity to coal and iron 
districts, and equally distant from the ports of London, Bristol, and 
Liverpool for their timber supplies. 42 
The most important firm, which has dominated the industry to the present 
day, was the Metropolitan Railway Carriage and Wagon Co. Joseph Wright & 
Sons, the London coachbui1ders, started making railway vehicles in Salt1ey 
in 1845, (the firm adopting its new title in 1862), and rapidly built up a 
world-wide export market. 4:3 Also in Sa1t1ey, Brown & Marshalls, a local 
coachbuilder, started to get large orders for railway carriages in the 
1840s, from companies including the Midland and the London & Birmingham. By 
the late nineteenth century, this company, then known as Brown, Marshalls & 
Co, were selling substantially more rolling stock abroad, especially to 
India and Argentina, than they sold in Britain. 44 
A third ~lt1ey~based company, the Midland Waggon Co, began building 
wagons-there.in 1864. It produced some carriages there for the Midland 
Railway in the mid-1870s, but following its take-over of the Abbey Works at 
Shrewsbury in 1877 (and a change of name to the Midland Railway Carriage & 
Wagon Co), it did not build any carriages in Birmingham until 1912. The 
Shrewsbury plant built all its passenger vehicles until then when both the 
Shrewsbury and the original Sa1t1ey works were closed and all work 
transferred to a new plant in Washwood Heath, near Sa1t1ey.4. 
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There were also two other contract shops in Birmingham. The Birmingham 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Co. initially known as the Birmingham Wagon Co. 
took over works either side of the Birmingham. Wolverhampton & Dudley 
Railway (later owned by the GWR). on the border between Handsworth and 
Smethwick in 1854. Much of its nineteenth century business was with 
railways in Argentina. 46 The other was the Oldbury Railway Carriage & Wagon 
Co. known for many years as "The Railway Carriage Company". This was 
established by Bromsgrove Station in 1847. moving to Oldbury in 1853-54. 
The bulk of its export trade was with India. 47 
Outside of Birmingham. the longest established firm was the Ashbury 
Railway Carriage & Iron Co. founded in 1837. and building rolling stock for 
the Liverpool & Manchester. the Manchester & Leeds. the East Lancs. and 
other early lines. In 1846 it moved to Openshaw. alongside the new S.A&K 
Railway. though it kept open its Ardwick works for another 20 years. Its 
most important customer was the local Xanchester. Sheffield & Lincs Railway 
(the later Great Central Railway>, and its export trade was less extensive 
than the Birmingham firms. 48 Also in the north west was the Lancaster Wagon 
Co, in~orpora~_ed in 1863, which grew out of an amalgamation of several 
smaU-Urms. 'Its first railway cariage was built in 1866, and its name 
.' changed to the-Lancaster Railway Carriage & Wagon Co in 1692.4~ 
Elsewhere there were probably only six other firms worthy of note. some 
entering the industry very late in the century. The Gloucester Railway 
Carriage & Wagon Co was established in 1860 as the Gloucester Wagon Co, and 
started building railway carriages in the 1860s. Its main business was the 
supply of wagons to industries in south Wales, though it also maintained a 
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thriving business in all types of horse-drawn vehicle. so The Bristol Wagon 
and Carriage Company's original premises dated back to at least 1851 as a 
road vehicle business, moving into rolling stock manufacture in 1866. 51 
Cravens of Darnall near Sheffield was established in 1867,52 while the 
Leeds Forge did not take up rolling stock manufacture until 1887, initally 
concentra~ing on underframes. It is not clear when it produced its first 
complete vehicle, but it built a separate carriage works in 1908. 53 
Like many other rolling stock firms, the Scottish company of Hurst 
Nelson concentrated on wagons, building its first passenger rolling stock 
at its new Kotherwell works in 1896. By 1914 it was reckoned to be the 
second largest rolling stock manufacturer in Britain.54 Brush of 
Loughborough also built some railway rolling stock at its Falcon works in 
the 1890s, but this took second place to tramcar building for a number of 
years, with Brush re-entering the railway market in 1905. 56 
These firms were all very large employers of labour. In 1866 it was 
estimated that the five Birmingham firms employed at least 3,000, and this 
was alleged to have quadrupled by 1908. 66 Figures for individual firms are 
not easily available, and obviously reflect fluctuations in trade, but they 
give us some indication. Thus Ashbury's employed about 2,000 in 1866, 1,500 
in 1890, 1,600-1,800 in 1898, and nearly 1,800 in 1902; Oldbury about 1,000 
in 1869, 700-800 in 1891, but only 261 in 1892; the Gloucester works 360 in 
1861, and about 1,000 in 1892; the Bristol Wagon and Carriage Company about 
1,000 in 1908; while the Ketropolitan works at Saltley employed about 800 
in 1853, 1,000 in 1892, and 3,000 in 1910. 57 
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As well as the railway carriage body side, these firms were generally 
engaged in wagon manufacture, and also produced a substantial amount of 
iron work for underframes. The forge at Oldbury's alone had 84 fires in 
1869, with one smith and 2 strikers operating each onej while Ashbury's is 
credited with about 200 smiths' fires in operation in 1866, and 150 in 
1890. The Bristol works had 200 fires in the smiths' shop in 1902, but less 
than 100 some six years later. S & Those workers who would have been eligible 
for the UKSC would have been a relatively small proportion of the total 
workforcej but given the huge size of these factories. they were 
undoubtedly major employers of coachmakers in their own right. 
The first major rationalisation in the railway contract industry 
occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century. when. in 1902, an 
amalgamation of 5 rolling stock firms along with one major supplier took 
place to form the Metropolitan Amalgamated. The firms in question were the 
Metropolitan, Olbury, and Brown, Xarshalls of Birmingham, along with the 
Lancaster and Ashbury's, as well as the Wednesbury supplier firm of Patent 
Shaft & Axeltree Co, which alone employed some 4,000 men on three rail-
connected sites.·~, 
At the time" according to J.H.Price, British firms were supplying two 
thirds of the world market in railway carriages, and were at the height of 
their power. But a gradual decline then set in, as various overseas 
railways started to build their own rolling stock. The 1902 merger was a 
farSighted move, inspired by Frank Dudley Docker. to cut capacity in the 
industry; this would keep keep profit levels from falling as a result of a 
price cutting war caused by future falling demand (something that happened 
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in the electric tram industry>. A number of the larger firms refused to 
Join this scheme, and, in the short run, at least, capacity actually rose 
in the industry when Metropolitan took over the Castle Car Works, the 
former Milnes tramcar factory, at Hadley in Shropshire in 1905. 
However, at the same time the Britannia works of Brown, Marshalls was 
run down. The Hadley works built both carriages and wagons until 1908 when 
a general falling off of trade led to its closure, the works later being 
bought by Joseph Sankey. A good number of Hadley employees were, however, 
offered jobs at the various Birmingham factories. In the same year Brown, 
Marshalls works were closed, later being sold to Wolseley; and the 
Lancaster factory, which had already had its carriage work moved elsewhere, 
was also shut, with some men and machinery being transferred to the 
OpenShaw and Saltley factories. SO 
The railway company workshops 
The expansion of the railway network was continuous from the 1830s until 
the first world war. Over 500 miles of track opened by 1838 had increased 
to some 2,400 by the end of 1845. The most rapid period of expansion saw 
the route,mileage expand to about 5,800 four years later, and 6,700 in 
another two years. This doubled to somewhere between 13,500 and 15,500 
miles by 1870, after which, while the system grew to over 23,000 miles by 
1914, this was now mainly through the construction of branch and feeder 
lines. s1 
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While the average route mileage of companies which were members of the 
Railway Clearing House in 1846 was only 41 miles, already large-scale 
amalgamations were taking place. By 1848, 159 older companies had been 
unified into 22 undertakings, and this process continued. The Great Western 
Railway alone was, before the 1921 Act, the product of 115 separate 
companies, while six of the major railways had taken over more than 300 
companies. 62 
The bigger railway companies inherited many workshops along with their 
acquisitions. These would be kept open initially, but eventually decisions 
were made to centralise workshop capacity, and new carriage construction 
would be restricted usually to one site in each company. Quite often the 
smaller workshops were retained as repair shops, or even only for running 
repairs, if they were suitably geographically situated. Given the 
variegated nature of the inherited rolling stock, which would be kept in 
service for as long as pOSSible, the workshops staff had to be capable of 
dealing with almost anything in their trade. 
Coachmakers were oblfged to take employment wherever workshops were 
established. With the constant round of company amalgamations, coachmakers, 
like the other necessary workshop trades, experienced a fair degree of 
insecurity in their employment. For coachmakers, this was particularly 
severe in the period until the end of the 1870s, by which time most of the 
large carriage workshops had been established. The main workshop sites 
reflected the needs of the railway companies. Thus, Crewe, where 
coachmakers worked from the 1840s, was effectively a creation of the 
railwaysi Ashford in the 1850s was not a great deal biggeri and Wolverton 
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and Swindon, where carriage works were established in the late 1860s and 
early 1870s, were pure and simple "railway towns", which were eventually to 
become the home of the two largest railway branches in the union. (For 
further details on the spread of railway workshops, see Appendix 1.> 
However, while UKSC members may have found the combination of hostile 
employers and rural isolation difficult to cope with in the mid-nineteenth 
century, urban Manchester, with strong coachmaking union traditions, was 
also a major railway centre. The national scatter of railway workshops 
consolidated the existing pattern of dispersed coachmaking employment, but 
brought at least three new features - firstly, the establishment of a 
number of very large (in relation to "private" coachmaking>, and, in some 
cases, enormous, factoriesj secondly, the creation of a number of 
alternative major centres of employment to London, with its very weak trade 
unionismj and, thirdly, (and not without some initial problems) it 
broadened out the scope of the coachmaking trade. The UKSC's attempts to 
grapple with both the railway company workshops and the contract shops will 
be explored in the next section. 
".,-& 
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C. THE UKSC AND RAILWAY SHOPS 
The delegate meeting which re-established the UKSC in April 1848 sent 
out a circular cataloguing a programme of action. It included the 
suggestion that a committee be formed in Manchester to draw up a petition 
to present to the directors of all the railways in the UK "to show them the 
injustice of employing men who are not coachmakers" and "to request them to 
employ none but legal coachmakers". The circular stated that the 
"withholding from us of Railway work" was a "great injustice", and 
highlighted "the fearful sacrifice of life and limb which may occur by the 
imperfect construction of railway carriages."&~ 
Many coachmakers were already employed by railway companies - for 
example, 146 coachbuilders in the London & Birmingham Railway coach repair 
department <probably at Euston) signed a round robin in 1846.&4 But cognate 
trades, such as joiners, wheelwrights and wagon makers were probably also 
used to some extent. Further, in both the railway companies' workshops and 
the railway contract shops, the UKSC faced antagonism to any form of trade 
union activity, which meant that grievances could not usually be resolved. 
Brown & Xarsballs, 'in Birmingham, was blacked during the 1850s, but in 1860 
the Ee used their discretion to lift the blacking, arguing that "the evil 
we struck against, cannot by our own abilities, at present be remedied. 
They have shown what they can do without USi therefore, by withholding our 
men, we are not hurting them, but ourselves."6S 
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The skill level of railway shop members also caused concern. When the 
Chester branch proposed an unsuccessful motion in 1857 that the Society be 
open for 6 months to anyone having spent 7 years in a coachmaking shop and 
"who may be considered capable of earning his living by the trade", the 
rider "but in no case shall this proposition apply to Railway shops" was 
added. 66 This proposal obviously touched a raw nerve, and the next 
surviving quaterly report, fifteen months later, carried the notice "For 
the information of some members who have doubts, an Apprentice serving his 
time exclusively to any branch in a Railway Carriage department (7 years 
according to Rule 2) is eligible to become a member." This was still 
inserted over a year later. 67 
The EC then pronounced in 1863 that "we know by experience that it is 
useless attempting to remedy any alleged grievances that may exist" in 
railway shops. They also argued that a large proportion of the men recently 
on travel had been based in railway shops and were "incompetent" to take a 
situation in a "gentleman's" shop when offered to them. They therefore 
proposed a rule change that any grievance "in any shop or place where 
railway carriages are built, but where no ordinary coach building 
<gentlemenrs work) is carried on·, should not be recognised and, in return, 
members working" in these shops should not pay strike levy for others. 
Additionally, apprentices who had ·wholly served their time" in railway 
shops, could not join the Society <present members excepted).6Q 
Not surprisingly this drew an immediate reaction from the Birmingham 
branch, the largest centre of contract railway carriage works, and they 
circularised all branches advising against the proposed rule changes. The 
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EC countered in their own circular that if railway shops were acknowledged, 
"a reckless EC may at any time throwaway hundreds of pounds for no 
purpose", and that, "better have 2,000 good members, than 5,000, and one 
half bad ones". This argument prefigures those that were to arise in the 
19205 and 19305, regarding the recruitment of members who would be a drain 
on society unemployment benefit because they did not have the all round 
skills to take employment in any section of the trade. 
The executive did concede one point to Birmingham, and amended their 
proposed rule change to add "All sons of coachmakers who are serving their 
time in any Railway shop previous to this proposition becoming law, shall 
be allowed the privilege of joining the United Kingdom Society of 
Coachmakers, when they are of proper age to do so; but any son being placed 
in a Railway shop after such becoming law shall not be allowed to join this 
Society."6~ These proposals were passed, and in 1866, when a rule was 
introduced on the fining and expulsion of piecemasters who employed non-
society men, it specifically excluded piecemasters in railway shOps. This 
last rule change was questioned, and soon afterwards all the exemptions for 
railway shop members were dropped, without any significant explanation. 70 
In practice, the UKSC remained fairly impotent in the railway shops. In 
1869 there were 27 "blacks" working at Brown & Marshalls (there having been 
30 in 1859), and 26 at HcNaughts of Worcester, another railway contract 
Shop. These were coachmakers who had worked in a "black" shop and not 
subsequently made peace with the Society by paying the necessary fines. As 
both shops' blacking had been lifted in the early 1860s, the majority of 
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these "blacks" presumably dated from at least then, and demonstrated the 
Society's weakness.?' 
It is difficult to estimate the UKSC membership in the railway shops, 
except' for the more obvious railway town branches. As pointed out earlier 
in this chapter, many of the big carriage workshops were not built until 
the 1870s, and it is only then that we can chart the Society's progress in 
the railway field with any confidence. Enough evidence does exist to build 
up a picture of UKSC membership in five towns where there was substantial 
railway carriage building - Derby, Birmingham and Manchester, and the two 
"railway towns" of Swindon and Wolverton. 
While the Swindon and Wolverton works were based in rural areas with 
little alternative coachmaking employment, Derby had one of the largest 
private coachmaking shops in the country, Holmes. 72 Derby branch membership 
was over 100 in the late 1850s, 150 ten years later, and grew rapidly from 
some 200 in 1875 to 350 in 1878, along with the big increase in work at the 
Midland Railway works at the time; the last figure waS reckoned to be 
nearly all of the trade in Derby. 73 Reports by the Carriage & Wagon 
Superintendent at Derby in 1876 and 1871 show that, with the expansion of 
work, the Xidland Railway came up against a general shortage of skilled and 
unskilled labour, especially among coach bodymakers. Labour turnover at the 
carriage and wagon works was over 50~ in 1874, and significantly higher the 
next year. One bone of contention was the increasing amount of piecework, 
as a result of which many men left rather than work it. 
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The Company unsuccessfully advertised for labour through UKSC channels 
at the beginning of 1877. Very few were obtained by the Outdoor Foremen at 
the railway's principal stations in Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol and 
Gloucester, which towns all had railway contract shops. The Superintendent 
recognised that men in these shops were generally reluctant to leave new 
work and come to Derby to do "very dirty" repair work. There was also the 
problem of paying attractive enough wages, especially after a dispute led 
to a 2s per week increase in the Birmingham carriage building firms in the 
mid-1870s. Eventually, two wage increases in two years, and "direct letters 
to the employees of nearly every Railway Carriage Building Firm and to 
several of the Railway Companies" about 27 men were recruited.?· 
The rapid rise in membership at Derby in the late 18709 was shattered by 
the 1879 strike in Lancashire and Yorkshire and its accompanying high 
levies and increased subscriptions. Membership dropped by over 200 in 1879 
alone, and after the mid-1880s it settled below 100, fluctuating between 
about 65 and 100 members until a big surge of membership from 1917 onwards. 
This figure made little impact on the 500-600 coachmakers reckoned to be 
working in the town in the early 1890s. Many of the non-unionists at that 
. - , 
time had',been members before 1879 but were by then too old to rejoinj some 
were too old to qualify for superannuation benefit and objected to paying 
for itj while others, already members of friendly societies, thought the 1s 
per week subscription too high. The Derby branch even sent a representative 
to two Delegate Meetings with instructions to try to get a 6d per week 
contribution, with superannuation and sick benefit as optional extras. 7S 
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There were no major railway company workshops in Birmingham, though, as 
detailed in Appendix 1, the LNWR leased workshop space at Saltley in the 
1850s and 1860s, and the Midland Railway's Bromsgrove repair shops employed 
some 600 men in the late 1870s. The major employers were the contract 
shops, all five of which were building carriages during the 1870s. 
Birmingham was always one of the largest centres of UKSC membership 
after Manchester and Liverpool, and the local branch had more than 300 
members during most of the 1860s and 1870s. While membership fluctuated 
regularly, the peak was the 440 recorded at the end of 1876. The majority 
of these probably worked in the contract shops, though there were at least 
17 coachmaking shops in the area in the mid-1860s.7~ From 1872 there was 
also a separate branch for Oldbury, 77 presumably based on the railway 
carriage works there, with around 40 to 50 members in the late 1870s. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, there was a movement of the trade in Birmingham for 
the 54 hour week in 1871-72. Finishers at the Metropolitan, Oldbury, and 
Brown, Marshalls works met together soon afterwards and claimed a 2s rise. 
Whether this was under UKSC auspices is not clear, but it was eventually 
settled when after conferences between representatives of the directors and 
the meu's' representatives, the companies agreed to increase contract prices 
by .. 10f, ir'om· August 1st 1872. 7. 
" :'\' 
In September that year, a society known as the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Carriage and Wagon Operatives was formed from workers at the 5 
contract shops; and soon afterwards, a mass meeting of the railway carriage 
smiths voted to cease overtime and work daywork from the beginning of 
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October in pursuit of their demand for a 10% piecework increase. The smiths 
worked daywork for a period before agreeing to a compromise settlement. 73 
Birmingham, which had also won the 54 hours in 1872, was pushed back to 
57 hours in the general depression of 1879, though there does not appear to 
have been a strike or lock out on the issue. Like Derby, in the wake of a 
long period of UKSC levies, raised subscriptions and reduced benefits, 
Birmingham branch membership fell. A loss of about 100 members occurred 
during 1879, with membership dipping below 200 in 1881. This was followed 
by a slow decline to about 150, before membership started to pick up again 
in 1889. A strike in 1891 for the 54 hours by 300 men was successful after 
two weeks. though the UKSC membership in Birmingham and Oldbury (which had 
been hit relatively much harder) only totalled 215 at the end of 1892. 
There was an estimated minimum of 300 skilled coachmakers outside of the 
Society in the area, of whom not more than 100 were eligible to join, the 
others being older men who had mainly been members before 1879, but were 
too old to be re-admttted. 
The railway carriage works in Birmingham were very poorly organised in 
the early 1890s, there being large numbers of unskilled men making parts of 
coaches in shops full of bays. The wagon shops were almost entirely 
unorganised except for a few in the railway carpenters' society. The sub-
contract system was also still in operation, though there are no details.~o 
In Manchester, it was not until the amalgamation with the "Independents" 
in 1866 (see chapter 1) that the UKSC branch was established as 
significantly the largest in the union, although the seat of government 
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remained in Liverpool. Figures are easier to come by here, for separate 
branches were eventually formed for the two major concentrations of railway 
members. In 1870, members working at the Gorton rail workshops and 
Ashbury's contract shop applied to start their own (Openshaw> branch,sl 
which initially had 90 members, but fairly rapidly stabilised around the 
150 mark, until 1878, when membership dropped by 30 in the first six months 
of the year.~2 The Lancs & Yorks Railway workshops were transferred to 
Newton Heath in the mid-1870s, the Manchester branch claiming nearly 200 
members there in 1878, with only 3 non-unionist coachmakers in the works. 
A three week strike by members at Ashbury's in October 1878 successfully 
resisted wage reductions before lock-outs and strikes occurred at Gorton 
and Newton Heath at the end of November over the same issue. 63 No union 
records survive of the length of these disputes, but they were both 
swallowed up in the much bigger 1879 dispute. The Gorton and Newton Heath 
coachmakers would have been subject to levies when they returned to work, 
to support the others on strike or locked out. But the OpenShaw and 
Manchester branches did not decline to nearly the same extent as Derby. 
Obviously. the proximity of the wider dispute was a factor in sustaining 
membership, but-the more established nature of coachmaking trade unionism 
in Manchester must also have contributed. Openshaw branch, already down to 
121 before the disputes started, fell to 91 by December 1879, and apart 
from a brief dip below this, maintained roughly that number for the next 2 
years. By 1886, if not before, it had recovered to its pre-strike figure, 
and, with fluctuations, reached 200 members by the turn of the century. 
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The Manchester branch did lose over 200 members, about a quarter of its 
membership, in the three years after the end of 1878, and it had far from 
fully recovered by the time the Newton Heath members formed their own 
branch in 1892 with some 253 members at the end of that year, out of an 
estimated 2-300 coachmakers in the works. e4 This branch grew rapidly to 
nearly double that figure by the end of the century, and the two major 
concentrations of UKSC railway members in Manchester had thus survived the 
1879 disaster and grown. 
Both Swindon and Wolverton had long established locomotive workshops 
before carriage shops were started in the late 1860s. As early as 1851, the 
Wolverton workshops accounted for 85% of all employed people in the town, 
while in New Swindon the figure was 92%.8& Despite their remoteness from 
major centres of industrial population, a core of trade union membership 
was established early. The ASH, for example, had an average of over 200 
members at Swindon from 1853 until at least 1868, while their Wolverton 
branch was over 300 strong from 1861 to 1866. 86 
With the building of the GWR carriage works, Swindon branch was opened 
in May 1869, there being at that time only 12 members working there, paying 
to eight different branches. By the middle of 1871, membership had grown to 
.' . 
133, but a year later the branch secretary was discharged when his name 
appeared officially on a memorial soliciting a wage increase, despite his 
24 years in GWR service.~7 Whether or not connected with this event, 
membership slumped to 64 by early 1873. However, this did not last long and 
membership was soon over the 100 mark, steadily increasing to 160 in Karch 
1878. Fluctuations in activity in the works mask the true extent of the 
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impact of the 1879 dispute. 35 members lost in the middle six months of 
1878 compared with 4 members acutally gained in 1879, followed by 48 lost 
in 1880. After this, the branch stabilised, and a surge of growth in the 
late 1880s led to it maintaining over 200 members right through the 1890s. 
From at least 1884 the branch regularly elected shop secretaries for the 
four main areas - new work, repairs, paint, and trim. And, apart from a gap 
from 1885 to 1890, "shop delegates" were also elected "to cooperate with 
the shop secretaries", though it is not entirely clear what they did. And, 
during the 1890's, two members went round the works each quarter to try to 
persuade non-unionist coachmakers to join the UKSC. In the winter of 
1895/96, the branch claimed there was only one non-unionist in the body 
shop. But, early in the twentieth century, Alfred Williams recalled the 
painters and finishers being put on piecework during a slack period of 
short time and suspensions - "Few of the men belonged to a trade union, or 
they might have opposed the terms and made a better bargain; as it was they 
were completely at the mercy of the managers and foremen".~8 
Wolverton was hit much harder than Swindon by the events of 1879. The 
LKYR works there had started carriage building in 1865, and a UKSC branch 
;. 
set up immediately, with 65 members at the end of the first quarter. 89 
[These members do not appear to have come from the Crewe carriage shops, 
which had a solid core of between 60 and 90 members from the early 1850s to 
late 1860, when the branch more than halved, with work going to Saltley; 
when Wolverton carriage works were set up, there was no discernible change 
in the remaining Crewe branch membership.] Within a year there were over 
100 members, and for most of the 1870s membership fluctuated around the 200 
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mark. 1879 was catastrophic with membership down from 191 to 91. and 
although it had picked up to .the 120-130 mark within less than a year, this 
remained the average figure until the end of the century. Wolverton branch, 
like Derby, sent out a circular in the mid-1880's, propagandising for a 
reduction in contributions. 90 
Outside of the above five towns, the UKSC fared relatively badly in 
railway centres. This was particularly so in the south of England. While a 
separate branch was set up at Ashford in the early 1850s,91 its membership 
was small, being in the 30-40 range for most of the third quarter of the 
century. An accredited 53 members in August 1879 dropped to 16 by December, 
and this steadily declined to a mere 6 by 1900. An attempt to recruit 
members at both Ashford and Brighton in 1904 was a complete failure. In 
both towns, only existing members attended a meeting, and it was thought 
that this was because the workforce considered their jobs secure and, 
importantly, had a good pension scheme. The ASE secretary said his union 
had often tried to organise the Ashford works, but unsuccessfully.92 When 
the Nine Elms carriage and wagon works were transferred to Eastleigh in the 
early f890s, a. nucleus of craftsmen also moved. The Eastleigh branch 
membership of 46 at the end of 1892 had increased to 83 five years later. 
In London, it is possible to hazard a guess at the membership only in 
the Stratford works. One member was recorded in the Stratford branch in the 
early 1850s, and this increased to only 20 by the beginning of the 1870s, 
after which it rapidly exceeded 50. The year 1879 saw it slump from 61 to 
14, and it is likely that subsequent increases which took it back to 60 in 
1898 were more related to West Ham and East Ham trams than the railway 
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works. Generally, the low overall UKSC membership in London almost 
certainly included low membership at the various other railway workshops 
and depots at Longhedge, Nine Elms, Bow, New Cross, and so on. 
In the north of England the railway carriage shops at Doncaster and York 
also had few UKSC members. Both towns had other coachmaking employment, 
though York was generally larger, reaching nearly 100 members in the mid-
1860s, but few of these were at the railway works. In 1899 it was estimated 
that only 7 of approximately 200 coachmakers at the NER works there were in 
the UKSC though this increased slightly in the next few months with an 
increase in the labour force.~~ Scotland was no better, with, in 1878, a 
combined total of only 60 members in the two big Glasgow shops of St.Rollox 
and Cowlairs, and only one at each of the St. Xargarets (Edinburgh) and 
Perth shops.~4 Eventually, in 1913, the Glasgow railway members formed 
their own branch at Springburn, with over 200 members.~s 
Elsewhere there were small pockets of members at the smaller carriage 
workshops, in the locomotive paint shops, and at the contract shops not 
mentioned so far, but given the size of many of the workshops, it is clear 
that the UKSC entered the twentieth century with significant railway 
membership only in Xanchester, but with useful bases in Birmingham, Swindon 
and Wolverton. While their railway membership was small in relation to 
railway coachmaking employment, it was an important component of the UKSC's 
overall membership. 
- 162 -
D. THE CHALLENGE OF THE GRVU 
Like many other craft unions, the UKSC's potential area of recruitment 
in the railway company workshops was limited by its definition of a 
craftsman, and its inability to recruit workers over a certain age, because 
of the need to fund its superannuation benefit. As a result, the vast 
majority of railway shopmen were in no union at all. But this situation was 
to change fundamentally a quarter of a century after the formation of the 
General Railway Workers Union in 1889. This Mnew unionM was open to Mthe 
workers of all grades employed on or in connection with the Railways of the 
United Kingdo~'. In practice its membership was generally confined to 
grades largely untouched by the ASRS, among them being the shopmen. 96 
An initial burst of recruitment reputedly took the GRVU to 14,000 
members during 1889, though it claimed only 10,287 at the end of the year, 
over half of which were concentrated in London and Kiddlesex.~7 Its 1892 
Congress claimed 9,983 members, but this figure was down to 7,412 by the 
end of that year; and from 1894 to 1905 its membership fluctuated between 
three and five thousand. ge It is difficult to find out much about its early 
activities, but it does appear to have had membership at, or contact with, 
~ 
workshops at Swindon, Newton Abbot, and Kensal Green on the GWR; Derby and 
Bromsgrove on the Midlandj and Crewe, Ipswich, and Bow. 59 
In the winter of 1890-91, it recruited very heavily in Swindon. From 
some 24 members there early in 1890, during 6 weeks in September and 
October that year they enrolled nearly 2,000. The GRWU took the initiative 
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in organising a demonstration in the town during this period, inviting 
other unions, including the Coachmakers, to participate. 100 By February 
1891 the claimed Swindon membership was up to nearly 3,000, and a month 
later there were even suggestions of 4,000. Why it should have grown 50 
quickly there is not clear. Of course, these membership claims could have 
been inflated, as obviously were the 20-25,000 claimed nationally in their 
organ, the Railway Express, in mid-1891. 101 And, given the union's fairly 
rapid membership decline in the early 1890s, most of the Swindon gains 
evaporated quickly. But the rapidity of such recruitment was a warning sign 
the craft unions ignored at their peril. 
The shopmen formed a sizeable minority within the GRVU, and proved to be 
a very significant factor in the future shape of the NUR. A 1906 GRVU 
membership figure of 5,831 included some 800 shopmen, while at an 
amalgamation conference in February 1906, the union's general secretary 
claimed that they had recruited some 1,500 shopmen. 102 The GRVU general 
secretary had told the 1892 Royal Commission that they only took as members 
"those who are not eligible for their respective trade organisations", and 
that they would ~ot take engineers, builders, joiners etc, as "that would 
be poaching on the-other trade unions". 103 Similarly, in 1906, Richard Bell 
of the ASRs. admitted that hundreds of applications for membership of his 
. 
union'came each year from carpenters, joiners, coach builders, boilermakers 
and others. These were refused as "they were not railwaymen" according to 
the ASRS definition of the term. At the 1906 amalgamation conference an 
ASRS delegate pointed out that the ASRS maximum subscription was 5d per 
week compared to the ASE's one shilling and that they could for this reason 
have a large influx, but this would mean "poaching" craft union members. 104 
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Two schemes for amalgamation with the ASRS fell through in the 1890's. 
And in 1906, the GRWU had to abandon amalgamation talks because their 
growing proportion of shopmen members would have been excluded, and they 
feared the possibility of another trade union being established exclusively 
for that grade. 105 At a conference in October 1907 dealing with a proposed 
federation of railway unions, a GRWU delegate from Brighton, representing 
450 shopmen there, demonstrated that union's continuing reluctance to 
recruit craftsmen. "We, in Brighton, do not take the mechanics in our 
union, we say that mechanics should join their own trade unions, but how 
about mechanics who will not join their own trade unions? They come before 
our branch and ask to be made members, and nine times out of ten we vote 
against them, because we say 'you ought to join what you belong to'·. 106 
The union had a number of branches of shopmen, mainly on the North 
Eastern Railway, whose 1908 membership was as follows: 107 
Table 3:1 GRVU selected shopmen branch membership. 1908, 
OR: Darlington 10.1 288 
Darlington 10.2 103 
Gateshead 136 
lew Shildon 261 
- • ~t , 
York 81 
and elsewhere: Brighton 288 
Newton Heath 268 
At a further conference with the ASRS in December 1909, the GRWU claimed 
2,749 shopmen out of a total membership of 6,061. 108 This conference 
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removed the workshop stumbling block when the ASRS delegates agreed to 
admit existing shopmen members of the GRWU, and all shopmen who had not 
served an apprenticeship to qualify them as craftsmen. This latter point 
was important as the character of workshop employment had been changing. 
According to one GRWU delegate, "They did not want joiners so much in the 
shops now as they did handymen, who could knock together the parts made by 
machinery". Another delegate declared that it would be difficult to find 
out where the skilled man left off and the unskilled man began. These 
"unqualified handymen" were ineligible for membership of the various craft 
unions and would remain unorganised unless specifically catered for. 
A GRWU delegate from the HER Heaton workshop argued that too much 
consideration had been given to the craft unions, as these unions were 
largely responsible for the low rate of wages in the railway shops. For 
example, one society had allowed blacksmiths to work for 12 shillings a 
week less than they would have allowed in an ordinary engineering works, on 
the grounds of regularity of employment in railway shops. But, the delegate 
claimed, the workshops were being run on similar lines to contract shops. 
On the JER, engineers, turners or fitters, when they had finished their 
piece jobs had to go home until there was another piece job for them. 
At Heaton;" they made sure whether any man was eligible for a trade 
society before they entertained their application for GRWU memberShip. But 
"they had men engaged as fitters who could not work as fitters in a proper 
engineers shop, and were not eligible for the engineers society ..... Again, 
the blacksmiths' society did not recognise the striker at all ... The same 
difficulty arose in regard to men who were known as wagon-wrights, and men 
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who made railway barrows. These men were not skilled joiners and could not 
join the trade society ... ". The Brighton delegate stated that they refused 
to take in men who were eligible for the ASE. 
However, the approximately 6,250-strong GRWU membership voted in May 
1910 against amalgamation with the ASRS under the terms offered despite 
heavy votes in favour in the workshop centres of Brighton, Eastleigh, and 
Newton Heath. 109 A further meeting on amalgamation took place at the end of 
1911 and beginning of 1912, by which time the GRWU had 10,000 shopmen 
members, 2,700 of them in York alone. The ASRS delegation finally removed 
the clause excluding skilled workmen from membership in the amalgamated 
union. The then 23,OOO-stron~ GRWU voted the necessary two-thirds majority 
early in 1912, and the NUR formally dated from Karch 1913. 110 
By this time the GRWU was aggreSSively recruiting shopmen. In December 
1912 they estimated that just over half their approximately 25,000 members 
were workshop staff. They recruited craftsmen and labourers alike. In the 
workshops of the North Eastern Railway they had very high levels of 
membership, including a large proportion of the skilled mechanics. They 
estimated 95~membership at Gateshead and Heaton; more than 75% at Shildon, 
including about"l,150 of the 1,200 employed at the wagon worksj about 75% 
at York; and 50~ at Darlington. This was despite there being no method of 
settling disputes by negotiation, as the workshops were not covered by the 
Horth Eastern conciliation scheme. The union also claimed considerable 
memberShip at the LBSeR works at Ashford, where the UKSC were almost non-
existent. 111 Its membership was, however, subject to a high turnover in 
1912, as the following table demonstrates. 
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Table 3:2 GRWU membership. 1910-1912 "2 
Membership Joined Membership 
Start cf :lear End cf :lea::: 
1910 6,008 2,701 1,425 7,284 
1911 7,284 18,607 2,832 23,059 
1912 23,059 7,002 9,743 20,318 
According to Bagwell, at the time of the NUR's formation, only 20% of 
the railway companies' workshop staff of 73,000 had been organised by the 
more than 80 craft unions. Within 6 months the NUR organizers had enrolled 
30,000 workshop staff, and by the end of 1916 had more than 50,000 in 
memberShip. 1 1::i 
The most important encroachments on UKSC territory occurred at York, 
with perhaps over 200 coachmaker members at the time of the NUR's 
formation, plus numbers of others the UKSC/NUVB would have later seen as 
potential recruits (see Appendix 2). The GRVU had generally had more impact 
on the NER than elsewhere, and York was the company's major carriage shops. 
It was here that a William Dobbie changed his union from the UKSC to the 
. . 
·t' 
GRVU, to the. grea~ consternation of the former. Dobbie, a coach painter by 
trade, had joined'the UKSC about 1891, was elected on the York branch 
commdttee"by 1904, was branch president in 1906, and secretary from 1907. 
In 1910 he was nominated by York branch for the union's vacant assistant 
secretary post, the executive, and the TUC delegation. By 1912 he was also 
secretary of York Trades Council, and a York town councillor. The 
circumstances of his transfer seem rather mysterious. 114 
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According to the York UKSC minute book, he resigned from the union 
sometime in June or July 1912. But, according to GRWU records he seems to 
have been on their executive in 1911i and an NUR official later referred to 
him as the President of the GRWU at the time of its fusion, having been a 
member for many years. He was certainly at a special NUR executive meeting 
in April 1913, and was elected to the NUR EC in December that year. 11S His 
public defection was a blow to the UKSC, but occurred after the mass 
recruitment into the GRWU at York in 1911. The GRWU seems to have generally 
recruited non-unionist coachmakers at York, rather than "poached" UKSC 
members. The dates of joining the GRWU of a number of coach painters at 
York show a spread from 1906 onwards, though more joined in 1911 than any 
other single year. 116 By contrast, York UKSC membership shows a significant 
dip in 1909 <possibly the end of the burst of new carriage construction), 
followed by a decade of less than 50 members. 
GRWU membership, at the time of the HUR's formation, shows the inroads 
made into UKSC "territory· at York. Apart from ten workshops with less than 
ten GRWU coachmakers/painters/trimmers/finishers, there were substantial 
pockets of membership at Ashford, Brighton, Derby, Wolverton, Gorton, and 
Newton Heath •. <Interestingly Swindon had only 2 coach finishers and 1 
leather trimmer in GRWU membership, despite the earlier 1890-91 upsurge in 
GRWU memberShip there.) The figures are given in Appendix 2. 
GRVU craft membership in other workshops also dated back some years. 
Thus of the five coach painters in Doncaster branch at the time of the NUR 
fUSion, 2 had joined in 1903, and 3 in 1904. A number of Newton Heath 
coachmakers dated their membership back to 1904, 1905, and 1907. At the 
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West Brompton works of the City & South London Railway, one coach trimmer 
dated his GRWU membership from 1898. In most centres where the information 
is available, it appears that there was a definite small core of long-
standing GRWU coachmakers, while the majority of their coachmaker members 
joined in 1911-12. Why did coachmakers join? In some cases it may have been 
their age disqualifying them from UKSC membership: in others it was 
probably the cheapness of the subscription - many did not want to pay the 
UKSC superannuation benefit if perhaps the railway company paid a pension; 
similarly, others, recognising that railway shop workers rarely, if ever, 
went on strike, were reluctant to pay toward other members' strike benefitj 
and again, the supposed regularity of employment meant they felt less need 
for the UKSC's unemployment benefit scheme. 
Before the NUR was formed, some local UKSC branches were having to come 
to terms with the presence of another union representing coachmakers. At 
York, the local UKSC branch felt the need in Karch 1912 to form a joint 
deputation of trimmers with GRWU trimmers over an outstanding pay award. 117 
Though, later that year, the UKSC general secretary wrote to the Brighton 
branch secretary, •. regarding a proposed Joint deputation of skilled unions 
with the GRVU, objecting strongly to that union "voicing the claims of 
skilled workers., 11. 
The GRWU appeared little threat to the UKSC outside of York, but once 
the NUR was formed, its whirlwind recruitment in the railway company 
workshops had profound implications for the UKSC/JUVB. The NUR recruited 
not only craftsmen who refused to join the UKSC, but also effectively 
undermined in the railway workshops the later moves of the NUVB, 
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horizontally into cognate trades and occupations, and vertically downward 
into the semi- and un-skilled. The NUR's recruitment of the relatively 
small number of women in the carriage ShOpSll~ was, as with T&GWU 
recruitment of female trim shop workers in the motor industry many years 
later, a sideshow to the main issue facing the UKSC/NUVB. 
Branch membership figures show that in most railway branches, UKSC 
membership seemed neither to fall as a result of defections to the 
GRWU/NUR, nor rise due to th~ increased interest in trade unionism the 
presence of the BUR instilled. There were some rises, such as Wolverton in 
1913, Swindon in 1915, and Springburn in 1915 and 1916, which might be 
explained by the latter factor. But rises and falls of membership were 
probably more generally related to the recruitment or laying off of 
craftsmen. There was, however, a general growth of UKSCIBUVB membership in 
the railway branches from 1917-18 until 1920-21, including both York and 
the previously minute Ashford branch which had been disbanded during the 
war. The growth at the end of the war occurred possibly partly as a result 
of increased carriage building activity, though the general upsurge in 
trade union membership in 1919-20, which affected most BUVB branches, must 
also have spilt over into the railway workshops. (See Appendix 2 for 
membership figures of selected GRWU/BUR and UKSC/BUVB workshop branches. ) 
The GRWU/BUR were not the only non-craft union to recruit in the railway 
company workshops. The Workers' Union also did, with a fairly stable core 
of membership in a number of branches, notably Derby and, in particular, 
Swindon. 12c~ But it is very likely that the Workers' Union membership was 
- 171 -
concentrated on the engineering side of the workshops. The real challenge 
to the UKSC/NUVB came from the GRWU/NUR. 
By the beginning of the 1920s, the HUR's growth in the workshops had 
left the NUVB with only limited scope for future recruitment. And with the 
rationalisation brought about by the 1921 Act (see chapter 5>, workshop 
employment was destined to decline. The future of vehicle building, and its 
related employment opportunities, had already shifted to motor transport. 
How clear this was to the collective leadership of the union in the 1920s 
1s difficult to assess. 
However, whereas the railway workshops experienced a surge of UKSC/lUVB 
me~bership growth in the first world war and immediately after it, the 
infant motor industry had already, in the decade before 1914, given the 
UKSC a highly strategic position in its production process. While the 
railways had revolutionised transport in the nineteenth century, motor 
vehicles did the same for the twentieth. The impact of the early motor 
industry on coachmaking employment and trade unionism is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE EARLY MOTOR CAR INDUSTRY 
A. THE HORSELESS CARRIAGE 
The speed of the change-aver from horse-drawn to motorised passenger 
transport at the beginning of the twentieth century was phenomenal. Figures 
for Landon in the decade before the first world war give same idea. In 
1904, 585 new horse-drawn cabs, but only 1 motor cab, were licensed. Only 
six years later, in 1910, the figures were a total of 8 new horse-drawn 
cabs, and 2,481 new motor cabs. Between 1903 and 1908 alane, about 2,700 2-
wheel cabs were taken aut of use. Similarly, while in 1905 78 new horse-
drawn omnibuses were licensed, compared to 20 motor omnibuses, only 2 years 
later, in 1907, the last 2 new horse-drawn buses were licensed. By 1910, 
there were 1,200 licensed motor omnibuses an the streets of London. 1 
An annual traffic census of Fleet Street by "Motor Traction" revealed 
that in 1907, 3,236 omnibuses used it, of which 995 were motor propelled. 
By 1912, of the 2,770 omnibuses, none were horse-drawn. The horse-drawn cab 
trade lingered on a little longer. In 1908 the same census revealed 48 
motor cabs, and 1,902 horse-drawn; while in 1914, there were 1,652 motor 
cabs, ~ompa~ed'to only 74 of the horse variety. 
At this stage, however, the revolution in the means of propulsion had 
only affected the passenger-carrying side of transport. A Board of Trade 
traffic census for London revealed very little inroads into commercial 
traffic, as shown in table 4:1 overleaf. 
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Table 4:1 Proportipn of hprse-drawn traffic, London 1911-13, 
Horse-drawn as % of total passenger vehicles 
Horse-drawn as % of total trade vehicles 
13% 
94% 
6% 
88% 
At the time most horse-drawn commercial vehicles were more economical 
than their motorised counterparts, Often they operated within a short 
distance of their base, covering a small mileage and standing stationary 
much of the time while delivering, Consequently the horse vehicle 
represented smaller capital lying idle. 2 
Early Kotor Car Bodies 
The earliest motor cars were in effect coaches "equipped with a 
stationary motor and a speed-changing mechanism of the simplest type". 
These were the real "horseless carriages", as they had all the features of 
the coach, minus the horse, Only when the motor was placed in front of the 
body, was the car for the first time structurally different from the 
coach.3 The major innovations in motor car design were almost all concerned 
with engineering. For many years there was a reliance on more traditional 
methodaof coachbu1lding as far as the bodywork of the new motor cars was 
concerned. Thus, as with early railway carriages, a number of horse-drawn 
carriage features were initially incorporated that were not functional for 
motor carSj for example, the rear wheels were larger in diameter than the 
front ones,4 Carriage nomenclature was also taken over wholesalej& however, 
some early changes were made, such as transforming the traditional carriage 
"steps" into "running boards".6 
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It seemed that the first motor car producers also relied entirely on 
outside coachbui1ders to meet their body requirements. As early as 1888, 
Hollick, a Coventry coachbuilder, produced the body for the electrically-
driven tricar of J.K.Starley. The same firm made the earliest bodies for 
the Daimler, and then later also for Swift, Singer, Humber, and others.? 
Mulliners of Northampton had built over 150 car bodies by the beginning of 
1899, mainly for Daimler. a By that year, many other coachbui1ders had 
entered the industry, including Salmons of Newport Pagnell, Atkinson & 
Phillipson of Newcastle, and the London firms of Thrupp & Maberley, Laurie 
& Marner, and H.J.Mulliner.9 By 1902, even a small coachbuilder like John 
Joice of Basingstoke and Staines was advertising car bodies "in the wood, 
or finished complete ready for mounting". 10 
Although Oliver argues that the general attitude of coachbuilders to 
taking up car bodies was cautious, by only 1904 H.J.Mul1iner of London was 
claiming to be the first carriage builder in Great Britain to have entirely 
abandoned the manufacture of horse-drawn vehicles. 11 The entry of 
coachbuilders into motor body production was not, however, without its 
difficulties. In 1901 De Dian cut off its supply of chassis to customers 
~ 
because so many complained about the poor quality of bodies. The firm 
. . 
arranged.to either 6upply cars complete, or to send out chassis only to 
coachbui1ders acknowledged to be good. 12 
One major problem was that it took a number of years before mast car 
manufacturers realised that chassis and body design and building were not 
unrelated activities, and needed to be considered together. Lanchester was 
perhaps the first firm to tackle this. The earliest Lanchester motor cars 
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had bodies supplied by outside firms but, according to F.W.Lanchester: "The 
difficulty of getting bodywork made on an interchangeable basis was due to 
the fact that the body builders would not work to instructions. In those 
days when a body builder was asked to work to drawings, gauges, or 
templates he gave a sullen look such as one might expect from a Royal 
Academician if asked to colour an engineering drawing ... When the bodywork 
came it would not fit the chassis, and we had to cut the chassis about and 
adapt the bodywork in each individual case." 
The result was that each body would fit only one chaSSiS, and if the 
chassis needed further attention after its test run, the body could not be 
switched to another already tested chassis. On top of this, deliveries from 
the coachbuilder were often erratic. At one stage, nearly t10,OOO worth of 
Lanchester stock was tied up in this way. Despite the reluctance of the 
company's directors, F.W.Lanchester was allowed to establish his own body-
building department in about 1901. 1~ 
There were also criticisms about the excessive weight of car bodies. One 
engine,er estimated that about 30 per cent of the weight of most car bodies 
" 
were unnec~6sary.' He had had bodies built by five different coachbullders, 
. 
including the prestigious Hoopers, and not one of them had any means of 
', .. 
weighing their work on the premises. Rolls-Royce, to save a few ounces in 
the weight of the chassis, were using pressed steel footstep irons, instead 
of solid irons. Other chassis manufacturers similarly went to great expense 
to save weight, but it seemed pointless while the body weight was left to 
coachbuilders "whose soul can never rise above chunks of wrought iron". 14 
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On their side, coachbuilders complained that it was ridiculous for car 
manufacturers to build chassis in such a way that "it is impossible to put 
any proper doors and other fittings without making parts of the body of 
solid wood and iron, and of unnecessary size." However, the apparent 
"silence" of most cars was due to the substantial nature of the upholstery 
and the solidity of the bodywork. When Lanchester cut the weight of his own 
early bodies to the limit, this caused unpleasant reverberation or 
"drumming", and within eight years the body weight was much greater. 1& 
The obvious need for closer coordination between coachbuilding and 
chassis manufacture led one contemporary observer to note: "Kotor car firms 
were driven to take up the coachbuilding part of the trade by the 
impossibility of getting the coachbuilders to supply what they desired, or 
to realise that a new era in vehicle construction had dawned."lG However, 
the interchangeability that Lanchester achieved was far from the norm due 
to the proliferation of body styles offered by most car manufacturers. 
Thus, one of the largest, Austin, was, in 1911, still adopting the 
following procedure: each chassis was road-tested; a body was then fitted 
to it,'. before being removed again, to allow the chassis to be painted, and 
the body painted, trimmed and varnished before the mounting operation took 
place. 1.7 And the largest producer, Wolseley, also adjusted each body to its 
own chassis before separate painting operations took place. 18 
Car manufacturers' attitudes towards building their own bodies varied. 
Daimler already had in 1897 its own shops for body-building, painting and 
finishing, although it had only produced 20 cars by the middle of that 
year. But the majority of bodies were built outside until a fire in April 
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1903 necessitated the erection of a new paint and finishing shop. From that 
time Daimler built and finished the majority of bodies on its cars. 13 
Another Coventry company, Deasy, started producing cars in 1906, 
including bodywork. But by 1910, under the new management of John Siddeley, 
it had given up making bodies, Siddeley deciding that "this is a branch of 
the trade that is better left to specialists", It involved the company in a 
great deal of extra shop space as well as locking up a lot of extra 
capital. In fact, this company only managed to expand its output by also 
buying in engines from 1910, as there was a desperate shortage of 
accommodation. 20 
The Rover Company first started producing cars in 1904, and its bodies 
were supplied from the local Coventry coachbuilding firm of Hawkins & 
Peake. Rover very quickly accounted for most of that firm's output, and in 
1907 took them over. Looking for ways to cut costs, the Rover Company soon 
decided to buyout components that could be made more cheaply than in the 
firm (for example, in 1910 they marketed a car with a Daimler engine). 
However they confirmed in 1909 that bought out bodies were more expensive. 
Because of the growing demands on factory floor space that all motor 
~ 
companies faced,. by 1912 Rover car body production was taking place on two 
separate sites. At Parkside, in the body erecting department "every 
available foot of space is occupied". After the bodies were built, they 
were primed and filled, and then trimmed, before going to the Victoria Road 
works, where they were painted and varnished, and where most of the iron 
fittings used on the body were produced. It was noted at the time that the 
company were "in the enviable position of having to refuse orders".~1 
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Vauxhall produced its first car in 1903j with its move to Luton in 1905 
it built its own coachbuilding factory.22 The Star Company of Wolverhampton 
boasted in 1899 that its cars were "all of our own manufacture, except for 
chains and tyres"j and by 1904 had a large staff of coachbuilders 
employed. 23 Wolseley bodies were also, by 1904, being produced by the 
firm's own "experienced carriage makers".24 
In general, it seemed to be commercially necessary for most car 
manufacturers at "the lower-priced end of the trade" to produce their own 
bodies fairly soon after they engaged in serious production. 2 & But while 
most car manufacturers had set up their own body-building shops before the 
first world war, the situation anticipated by one contemporary did not 
occur for many decades. He argued in 1911 that in a few years, "with the 
exception of the orders placed with one or two celebrated coachbuilders by 
clients to whom money is no object, there will be no bodies built outside 
the works of the car builders or repairers".2& 
Car Production 
Some 34,000 cars are estimated to have been built in Britain in 1913, 
with ~leven firms each producing 1,000 or more - Rover, Singer, Humber, and 
Daimler in CoventrYi Austin and Wolseley in Birminghamj Star and Sunbeam in 
Wolverhamptonj Ford and Belsize in Manchesterj and Arrol-Johnston in 
Scotland.~7 Annual production levels for three firms are given in table 4:2 
below, and further demonstrate that in the pre-1914 era, the level of 
production of individual firms, apart from Ford, was generally extremely 
low compared to the growth that took place in the interwar period. 
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Table 4: 2 Annual production levels for 3 motor car firms up to 1914~'" 
Vauxhall Rover A1Jstin 
1903 43 
1904 76 
1905 n.a. 
1906 20 754 31 
1907 69 1,211 180 
1908 94 869 216 
1909 197 663 198 
1910 246 705 579 
1911 269 n.a. 781 
1912 306 791 1,107 
1913 411 1,563 882 
1914 529 1,943 545 
The low levels of production, exacerbated by the variation in body 
styles, meant that skilled coachbuilding labour was a necessary component 
of the early motor car industry. However, with the accompanying decline of 
horse-drawn passenger transport, there were important changes in the demand 
for particular skills, a question which will be addressed in the next 
section. 
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B. NEW SKILLS AND OLD 
As early as 1906, ten years after Daimler had started producing motor 
vehicles in Britain, UKSC General President Kinggate declared that "we 
have to recognise that the horse drawn vehicle seems likely to become 
extinct, especially with regard to public conveyances". This was 
particularly noticeable in London, with a large number of motor 
omnibuses on the streets within a very short space of time. But horse-
drawn passenger conveyances were also threatened by the electric 
tramcarj this latter vehicle was mainly responsible for a decline in the 
number of horse-drawn cabs plying for hire in Liverpool from 860 to 540 
in the ten years from 1892. 
This dual challenge, from motor vehicles and electric tramcars. to 
the centuries-old domination of the horse as the means of traction for 
road transport led Kinggate to declare, "Our members must be alive to 
this development, and adapt themselves as readily as possible to the 
changing conditions of our trade". But while the "general improvement in 
trade" caused by the transition from horse drawn to motor vehicles 
caused ,"an exceptional demand for bodymakers", it had more serious 
consequences for the employment prospects of some of the other branches 
of the coachmaki ng trade. 2'~ 
The early motor car industry further accelerated the changing range 
of coachbuilding skills that had already been affected by the rise of 
railway carriage building, and, to some extent, by the emergence of 
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electric tramcars. The woodworking skills of carriagemaking and wheeling 
went further into decline, while "coach finishing" became further 
entrenched as an important section of the trade. 
Coach Finishing 
Railway carriage building had brought with it the new trade of "coach 
finishers" who did all the coach joinery and interior fittings. 
According to one union official, it was equivalent to house or ship 
joinery, and also compared to cabinet making.~o In private carriage 
building there was a separate trade of coach joinery in the larger 
establishments. These men made the glass frames, blinds, seat boxes, 
trunks, and other internal work. Their numbers were never very large, 
and while Adams claimed that the required skill was "not very 
considerable", another source suggested they were "so nearly allied to 
the bodymakers as hardly to form a different branch".·~l It is not clear 
at what point coach finishing became a separate trade from railway 
carriage bodymaking or when the term "coach finishers" began to be used, 
but they were noted in the Birmingham railway contract shops by at least 
1880, if not earlier.~~ 
TheUKSC did not cater for the separate trade of coach joinery or 
finishing, and it appears that as this expanded in railway work the men 
performing it were not bodymakers, but joiners and cabinet makers. 
However, their growing numbers made them an increasingly important 
section of the trade, a 76~ return of railway carriage and wagon 
builders in 1906 finding some 1,431 coach finishers employed, compared 
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to 2,998 coachmakers (ie bodymakers) and 784 trimmers.H While in 1892 
the Swindon branch carried a resolution that it was "detrimental to the 
interests of our Society to admit Finishers as members",~4 in 1895 "duly 
qualified" coach finishers were allowed admission to the Society. By 
then, they were also becoming important in the new electric tramcar 
industry. 
However, the UKSC were faced with competition from rival unions. The 
two Cabinet Makers' societies claimed they had accepted coach finishers 
into membership before the UKSC did, and as a result had members 
employed in all the railway carriage shops and the tramcar building 
works. A number of joiners were also employed on the same work. 
Following a dispute in 1906 over who should do the finishing work on 
trams for Manchester Corporation, the UKSC EC contacted their branch 
secretaries to discover the numbers of cabinet makers and joiners 
employed on coach finishing work. "We were not prepared to find the 
large proportion that are employed on this work" they reported. 35 
An earlier dispute with a Cabinet Makers' society at the tramcar 
building'.worka at Hadley was resolved by the TUC arbitrating, as a 
result, of W~:irch a large number of coach finishers joined the UKSC ..... A 
later dispute· at Hurst Nelson saw the Amalgamated Furnishing Trades 
Association claiming that the UKSC had caused the discharge of two of 
their coach finisher members, and this time the GFTU conciliated.~7 
The claim of the UKSC to this work was made more urgent with the 
growth of the infant motor industry, as it was noted in 1906 that "the 
- 183 -
coach joiner has revived, and found more work in the motor car than he 
ever had in the old days of travelling carriagesH.~$ Coach finishers' 
work on motor cars was to do the glazing, padding the windows in putty, 
to fit floorboards, fit and fix wooden fillets, fit window lifts, and 
fit instruments into the wooden instrument panel. By the early 1920s 
they were also often performing what traditionally might have been coach 
fitters' work - fitting locks and door handles, and so on. In Coventry 
in late 1919 there were already 162 finishers in the branch, compared to 
593 bodymakers and 220 trimmers.39 
Carriagemaking and wheeling 
The carriagemaker's skills, which were not needed in the railway and 
electric tramcar industries, were dealt their death-blow by the rise of 
the motor vehicle. Any work on the very different chassis of motor 
vehicles was effectively denied as, in Britain, steel chassis frames 
were rapidly introduced. When the first Deasy car was produced in 1906 
its armoured-wood frame was already considered old-fashioned, being 
superseded by steel within a couple of years; and Sunbeam of 
WolverhamptoD abandoned their armoured-wood frames after 1908. 40 In this 
respect, British firms were more advanced than American, as Franklin 
r 
cars had wooden chassis as standard until 1927.41 
Similarly, with wheels, British firms moved away from wooden wheels 
much faster than their American and European counterparts. One est1mate, 
published in 1915, gives the relat1ve sbares of tbe different types of 
wheel used in four countries: 42 
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Table 4;3 Types of motor vehicle wheel used, 1915, 
~ ~ Steel 
Britain 44.1% 36.9% 18.4% 
Germany 16.2% 8.9% 15.2% 
France 18.2% 16.71. 5.1% 
U.S. A. 98.2% 1. 8% 
Generally speaking, woodworking machinery would probably have been 
used for producing any wooden components for chassis frames and wheels, 
limiting the opportunities for skilled carriagemakers and coach 
wheelers. Wooden wheels, though, were still generally used for heavy 
commercial motor vehicles, but this work, along with the continuing 
demand for horse-drawn commercial vehicles, was generally the province 
of the wheelwright and not the coachmaker. 
One destination for carriagemakers was to become motor body 
"mounters", this being the nearest equivalent to their former work. The 
mounter had to accurately mount the body on the chassis, and sometimes 
fit the scuttles, as well as ensuring the doors did not jam after 
mounting had taken place. This movement of skilled labour was probably a 
major factor in the NUVB's later claim that the motor industry operation 
of body mounting reqUired skilled workmen."~ 
At the same time that carriagemakers and wheelers were being 
displaced by motor vehicles, bodymaking was becoming more accessible to 
other trades. The standardisation of some body production allowed the 
use of woodworking machinery. The latest English and American 
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woodworking machinery was reported at Austin in 1910. At Daimler in 1912 
it was claimed that no handwork was involved, and at Rover in the same 
year, while the machining of wooden components was "not carried on to 
the same extent" as at Daimler, "the amount left to do by hand is 
comparatively trifling". At Wolseley in 1914 there were twelve standard 
types of body, as well as special coachwork ordered by customers. For 
the standard work, wooden components were prepared in the sawmill, and 
sets issued to bodymakers when required. 44 Even in London, the heart of 
the traditional coachbuilding industry, the methods of production were 
also being changed, the unions claiming that the "increasing use of 
machinery is eliminating much of the skill which was formerly required 
of us in the production of our work".45 
The extent to which machinery was operated by specialist machinists 
or by bodymakers seemed to vary from shop to shop during this period. 
Problems arose at Rover in Coventry early in the first world war when 
the Woodcutting Machinists' union complained of the extensive use of 
machines made by bodymakers. The latter used all the machines except 
spindles and cross-cutting, while the former objected to them using any 
but the. band-saw.·a The use of machinery was a mixed bleSSing. While 
"the new planing machines didn't tear the guts out of a man like 
the jackplane", they made "fingers fill the air like snowflakes". When 
the UKSC took one Coventry employer to court claiming compensation for a 
member who had lost three fingers in a planing machine, the employer's 
key evidence was "It is ridiculous for this man to say he can't work 
because he has fingers missingi I have twenty men in my shop, and every 
one of them has fingers missing, but they still work".·7 
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Because of "the extensive use of woodworking machinery in the 
production of railway, tram and motor vehicles", one prominent UKSC 
member could argue in 1905 that trades such as "wheelers, wheelwrights, 
waggon makers etc, having a certain amount of knowledge of the 
construction of vehicles, can, and do readily adapt themselves to this 
class of work". But there was more at stake than just the fact that 
private coachmaking was "fast departing", with the consequent need to 
find work for those whose traditional skills were now increasingly 
redundant. Much work was "being filched from us by all classes of 
woodworkers, such as Joiners, Cabinet Makers, and others, for which we 
are to a large extent to blame on account of that paltry pride that has 
influenced us in thinking the work beneath US".4~ 
The same problems faced the NUVB nearly twenty years later, when the 
executive attempted to force unemployed woodworking members into the car 
industry. "In many of the shops now requiring men, the work is on the 
mass production system, sectionalised and built up from jigs and 
templets. Bodymakers, finishers, carriagemakers or wheelers, being 
skilled in the use of woodworking tools, can rapidly qualify and we 
urge all unemployed men to make an effort in this direction .... 
Carpenters and joiners do not hesitate to get into this work at the 
first available opening, and such should be an incentive to make an 
effort in their own interest to hold the shops for our members. Branch 
officers are urged to press this upon any members out of employment, 
even to the extent of stopping benefit where they are satisfied members 
are qualified to give such openings a trial".4~ 
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Bodymaking 
One problem facing the UKSC before the first world war was that there 
were periodic shortages of skilled bodymakers for the expanding motor 
car body demand. This meant that they were sometimes unable to supply 
labour to employers requesting it, as happened in 1912, for example. so 
To avoid more joiners coming into the trade, one solution was to "show a 
preference to a kindred trade", and that meant mainly wheelwrights. But 
this also sometimes ran up against the same difficulty, and UKSC General 
Secretary complained bitterly in 1914, "if I could only find 20 
wheelwrights now that could do bodywork I could put them into jobs to 
keep joiners out. I have been scouring the country for bodymakers and 
cannot get them, till at last we have told a big firm - employ joiners 
because we cannot find men for them".sl 
The UKSC, however, were not prepared to pay any price to get their 
members building motor car bodies. In 1905 the coacbbuilders Lawton of 
Liverpool desperately needed bodymakers on motor car work, and 
circularised most UKSC branch secretaries, enquiring for men. According 
.-
to Kinggate .. :"some of the members applying for jobs had never been used 
to this class of work, or to the private trade at all", but owing to 
"the difficulty of getting qualified men" the firm had started them and 
operated a policy of paying the men what they were worth. But the local 
Liverpool branch stopped this, insisting on the Liverpool minimum rate 
for bOdymakers. The employer appealed to the union's executive, and an 
agreement was reached between the three parties that the men were paid 
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their worth for one month; after this, they would either be dismissed, 
or retained on at least the minimum rate. 
Kinggate argued that "in the present transition in the form and 
character of vehicles, there were many men who were excellent workmen at 
the branch of our industry they had been used to, who would experience 
considerable difficulty in adapting themselves to this new development, 
but if he was anything of a workman and able to use his tools he would 
soon acquire proficiency". He justified the agreement with Lawton by 
contending "we have a duty .... to keep as far as possible the bu1lding 
of cars 1n the hands of coachbuilders. There will be less likelihood of 
other trades encroaching upon our work, as we are experiencing with the 
engineering and other companies who are taking up motor car build1ng".s2 
A few years later, the union showed their flex1bility when Sunbeam of 
Wolverhampton had difficulty in obtaining bodymakers and employed 
"several nondescripts". "It was deemed advisable to fix a minimum rate 
that would have the effect of stopping the employment of these men".s~ 
The employment of joiners on motor car body work, however, was a very 
real problem, and:1a addressed in more detail in section C. At the same 
time, .th& UKSC"had to fight against joiners taking coachmaking work on 
the new el~ctr1c tramcars. 
As Corporations, around the turn of the century, largely took in hand 
the repair, and sometimes the building, of their own electric tramcars, 
the UKSC Journal requested members to "endeavour to keep out of the 
coachmaking department, men who are not entitled nor eligible to work at 
- 189 -
our trade".s4 Union officers raised the issue with a number of 
Corporations but found "an inclination on the part of such bodies to 
employ joiners and house-painters to do the repairs to the cars" - for 
example, at Bradford, though joiners were successfully removed at 
Cork. 55 
EC delegates were then sent specifically to Oldham, Hull, Newcastle, 
Bradford, and Sunderland, in 1902, asking them to employ only 
coachmakers. At Newcastle, their efforts were successful, and within a 
very short period, only coachmakers were employed, all becoming UKSC 
members - 34 bodymakers and finishers, plus some coach painters and 
coach sm1ths.s~ However, Hull & Sunderland continued to cause problema, 
and "interlopers" were also reported at Nottingham in 1904. 57 "The 
difficulty has mainly arisen where Corporations or Town Councils have 
initiated or taken over the tram service. These bodies generally employ 
a staff of joiners and painters, and when any repairs to their cars have 
been needed they have employed them to do it."5$ In Bradford, joiners 
claimed that tramcar building was a new industry, winning Trades Council 
support for their position, which the Corporation then accepted.-g 
In 1905 the UKSC claimed that determined attempts were being made by 
cabinet makers and joiners to obtain work in those corporations that 
already employed only coachmakers,60 but by then the storm had probably 
been weathered. Employment statistics from most local authorities in 
1906 show that the direct labour employed by them on tramway and omnibus 
services included 630 painters (whether house or coach not specified), 
447 bodybuilders, and 243 carpenters and joiners. 61 
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Many Corporation Tramways Departments were to become significant 
employers of vehicle building labour. Already in 1904, over 100 
coachmakers were employed on Liverpool tramcars, other trades being 
excluded. 62 In the Belfast tram depot, 40 members were reported in 1906, 
and 45 in 1911, while in the latter year there were 35 members and 7 
non-members at the Inchicore works of the Dublin Tramway Company.G3 Just 
before the first world war, nearly 200 were employed by Manchester 
Corporation Tramways, while Glasgow Corporation Tramways employed no 
less than 40 painters, of whom 34 were UKSC members and 6 non-
unionists. 64 
Motor car panel work 
One major change in motor car bodymaking before the first world war 
was the adoption of metal panels in place of the traditional wooden, 
usually mahogany, ones. An American Source listed three particular 
advantages of metal-panelled bodies over all-wooden ones. Firstly, the 
high-grade timber needed for body panels was becoming scarce. Secondly, 
there was a tendency for such wooden panels to check or split on account 
of extremes of.heat and cold - "many a manufacturer has spent several 
days in finishing and varnishing wooden bodies in rooms of high 
temperature, only to see panels split or check upon being exposed to the 
cold when loading on freight cars for shipment". And, finally, metal-
panelled bodies required less than one thirds of the paint of a wooden 
body to obtain the same finish, fewer coats being used as "filler" was 
not necessary.6S 
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In Britain, also, there was a move away from all-wooden car bodies, 
but like many other early changes, it was uneven between different 
factories. In 1903 Belsize of Manchester were using panels of compressed 
Russian block, made in thin layers, which was very pliable and easier to 
repair than aluminium. 66 Daimler were still using mahogany for body 
panels in 1906, but within four years they had changed over to tinned 
steel. 67 It was not to everyone's liking. A Xr.Hobley, head of Coventry 
Motor Bodies, as late as 1912 did not believe in metal-panelled bodies: 
"A properly built wood body 15 a coachmaker's job, and cannot be made by 
a combination of glorified joiners and t1nkers".·~ However, one source 
suggests that by 1912, wooden panels were effectively "obsolescent", 
aluminium being used for the highest grade work.·~ 
One factor in the change-over in Britain seemed to be fashion. By 
1905, reverse curves were much in evidence, as on, for example, Arrol-
Johnston cars, but could not be made in wood. It was also reckoned that 
sheet metal was lighter and cheaper than wood, and took on a higher 
finish when painted."70 The disadvantage was that the slightest dent was 
very expensive to repair compared to wooden panels. 71 However, many 
coachbuilders transferred fairly quickly. Harrison & Son of Euston Road, 
London. was using aluminium panels in 1903, while Cockshoot of 
Manchester was manufacturing its own panels by 1907. However, in 1912, 
Hollick & Pratt of Coventry were reputedly one of only a few 
bodybuilding firms actually making their own panels.7~ 
Metal panels generally required the employment of panel beaters, as 
were reported at Daimler in 1912. 73 But it was a difficult trade to 
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master. In one.panel beating shop the men had great trouble obtaining 
the right shape and the necessary smoothnessj dozens of capable 
tinsmiths and coppersmiths passed through the shop, staying only a day 
or two before giving Up.?4 One problem facing employers was that in 
those shops where unionised tinsmiths were in the majority, only men who 
had served a general tinsmithing apprenticeship were allowed in the 
shopj and "improvers" had to be paid the full rate, even though they 
still had to learn coach tinsmithing at the employers' expense. 75 One 
way around this problem was through using steel pressings, but these 
were fairly rare at this stage in Britain, though they were used at 
Ford's Manchester plant, it being specifically noted there that "the 
panel beater has been entirely eliminated".76 
Bodymakers had lost the work of making the panels, but because panel-
beating was a new branch of sheet metal work, without any established 
trade practices, the bodymaker retained the job of fixing the panels on 
to the wooden body frame. With the early demise of wooden panels on 
motor car bodies, IUVB officials later estimated that by about 1908 or 
1909. many of the~r members were only working with metal panels, and 
this undermined the employers' later argument that bodymakers were 
solely woodworkers.?? 
. . 
Smiths and fitters/vicemen 
Coach smiths were initially less affected by the introduction of the 
motor car body than some other coachmaking trades. A variety of wrought 
iron fitting were still needed in the production of car bodies, a 
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visitor to the works of Regent Carriage Company in 1912 declaring "the 
amount of smith's work required in the body work of an automobile may 
have surprised some".79 Coachsmlths' shops were noted, for example, at 
Daimler, Austin, Rover, and Wolseley, and would have existed in all 
coachbuilders and car firms' bodybuilding departments. 79 
Coach fitters (or vicemen) were, however, up against the much larger 
presence of engineering fitters in car factories, which was avoided in 
pure coachbuilding premises. But, even in car factories, they did not 
disappear overnight.ao In late 1919 66 smiths and fitters were still on 
the books of the Coventry NUVB branch.~l The major problem facing both 
these trades was the changes in material and technique. Before the first 
world war the coachsmiths' work was no longer exclusively forging, but 
included oxy-acetylene welding. which was considered in 1910 to be "an 
absolute necessity to the metal world", its use being reported, for 
example. at Daimler that year.~2 Pressed steel was also being used for a 
number of previously wrought iron fi tttngs .... :3 
The demarcation line between engineering and coach fitters was the 
subject "of'arbitration at the Manchester Corporation Tramways as early 
as 1903. Th& ASE claimed that "coach fitters could not work machines, 
and that"they were not fitters at all, but called vicemen". However, the 
arbitrator ruled that "the mere fact that the material is metal and has 
a mechanical action does not necessarily make it engineering work; a 
simple instance of this can be seen in the hinges of a door". The result 
was a division of the work between the two groups,&4 but such a solution 
was less feasible in the rapidly changing world of motor cars. 
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At the Beardmore car factory in Scotland, vicemen found in 1920 that, 
as bodies were becoming standardised, many remaining wrought iron 
fittings were being superseded by malleable castings, and engineering 
fitters were also encroaching on their work. In response the NUVB 
claimed for vicemen the "fitting of canopy rods, lamp sockets and 
brackets, platforms, wings, and all iron work on wheels, and all body 
fittings". Shortly afterwards they were again in conflict as engineering 
fitters started putting on aluminium beading on bodies.e~ 
Coach smith work did survive in the inter-war period, as the 
production of individual and small-batch coachwork by specialist 
coachbuilders required custom-made hand-forged work, as noted, for 
example, at the London firm of Vanden Plas.e~ Along with these coach 
smiths, there would be the accompanying coach fitters. In the car firms 
themselves, the two trades effectively died out, with coach smiths 
probably being absorbed in other general smith or welding work, while 
the remains of the fitter's job was taken over by coach finishers and 
workers on the engineering side of car production. But commercial 
vehicle production, with a continuing market for custom-made bodies, 
could also absorb any smiths or fitters/vicemen whose skills were 
redundant in the car industry.S? 
. . 
Conclusion 
The twenty years before the first world war, therefore, accelerated 
the changes that had been going on in the coachmaking trade since the 
introduction of railway carriages. They further affected the internal 
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composition of the coachmaking labour force, finally bringing the trade 
of "coach finishing" into prominence, while sounding the death-knell for 
carriagemaking and wheeling. The traditional metal trades of smithing 
and fitting were on the brink of being excluded from the new car 
industry, to be ghettoised in the purely bodybuilding shops, but the 
bodymaker (whose trade had always involved some work with metal) was 
embracing metal panel fixing as a new feature of his work. The painters 
and trimmers were not affected by these changes. Their work was confined 
to the body (though painters also took up chassis painting> and the 
techniques still remained fundamentally similar to horse-drawn work. 
Of course, these developments were uneven across the country. The 
coachmaker's work covered past as well as present means of transport. 
Horse-drawn vehicles remained an important feature in commercial 
transport for decades to come. as The NUVB's amalgamation with the 
Wheelwrights and Smiths in 1925 further cemented their involvement in 
this area. In general, however, those whose trades were in terminal 
decline, could probably still find work in their own trade or move into 
a related area. But the available statistics make it clear that the UKSC 
was still very much a multi-craft society in the years just before the 
first world war,·' 
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C. UNION ACTIVITY IN THE EARLY CAR INDUSTRY 
The motor industry sprang up often in areas where there had been 
little tradition of coachmaking employment. Coventry was one such place. 
The other main centres were Birmingham with Wolseley, Austin, and 
Lanchesterj Wolverhampton with Sunbeam and Starj Scotland with Argyll 
and Arrol Johnston; and Manchester with Belsize and Ford. In all of 
these areas the UKSC, and the LPCTU to a much lesser extent, had a 
certain degree of union penetration, sometimes very high. Table 4:4 
overleaf shows UKSC membership growth in certain branches. Alexandria 
branch seems to have been exclusively based around the Argyll factory,. 
while Coventry and Wolverhampton probably both had about 90% or more of 
their members working in car or motor body building factories by 1914. 
It is more difficult to disentangle car industry membership in the 
Birmingham area. At least 80 members were noted at Wolseley in 1907-08, 
being allowed to join either the Birmingham or Saltley branch (the 
latter having been set up in 1906, and including all the MMetropolitan-
members)j while Austin members were in the Birmingham branch. The LPCTU 
also claimed 80 members in Birmingham at the end of 1913, having 
established town secretaries there and in Wolverhampton in 1911.90 While 
the expansion of UKSC membership in 1913 may have been partly due to the 
wave of strikes in the Birmingham railway contract shops, much of the 
pre-war growth must have been associated with the car industry.~1 
- 197 -
Table 4;4 UKSC membership in certain car indystry areas. 1900-1914 . 
E1[m1ng.b.am 
CcYen:t[y ~clye[.b.amp:tcn Alel!:.and.[1~ &.. Salt ley 
1900 57 24 254 
1901 80 24 234 
1902 115 26 255 
1903 176 28 286 
1904 188 37 321 
1905 202 47 357 
1906 269 63 475 
1907 436 98 141 552 
1908 324 96 63 470 
1909 361 85 57 388 
1910 381 100 115 379 
1911 400 129 160 432 
19121 544 269 206 635 
1913 838 347 248 863 
1914 878 354 110 925 
• October membership for Coventry, Alexandria and Birmingham. All other 
figures are end-year. 
Coventry 
Well before the first world war, a large number of firms that 
survived until at least 1930 had become established in the Coventry car 
industry, being <roughly in chronological order of their first car) 
Daimler, Riley, Humber, Swift, Standard, Lea & Francis, Rover, Singer, 
Siddeley-Deasy, and Hillman. A number of firms established just before 
the war survived well into the 1920s - Coventry Premier, BuCkingham, 
Stoneleigh, Calcott, and Crouch. As well as these there were perhaps 
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another thirty firms producing cars in Coventry at same stage before the 
first world war. 92 
# 
The UKSC, and the LPCTU (especially after 1907-08), would have had 
members working at mast of these firms. Some firms did not produce their 
awn bodies, but there were a number of local coachbuilders, the most 
prominent of which were Charlesworth, Pass, and Hollick & Pratt. There 
were members also in at least three ather small local coachbuilders, 
among them being Hewers. There were probably UKSC painters and liners at 
most of the cycle firms, as members were reported variously at Singer. 
the Premier Cycle Company, Rudge-Whitworth, and Calcotti and there were-
members at Triumph, building motor-cycle side-cars as well as cycle 
painting, the Bramble Side Car Company, and a small number at the 
Coventry Ordnance works, and Dunlop.9~ 
The twa major problems facing the Coventry UKSC branch in the 1900s 
were the loss of membership due to their attitude to the premium bonus 
system at Daimler, and the difficulty of getting established at Humber. 
These will be discussed before a look is taken at the consolidation of 
the uniou,in Coventry in 1913. 
" "", 
Daimler 
Early in 1904 the Daimler company proposed a bonus system which was 
unanimously rejected by a large meeting of the Coventry UKSC branch, on 
the recommendation of EC members. This meeting agreed that all those 
affected should hand in their notice, but the company withdrew the 
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initial scheme and replaced it with a very similar one. While the EC was 
still opposed, several Daimler members wanted to try it, so the EC 
instructed branch officers to take a vote of the whole branch, which 
decided to give the system a three month trial. When the three months 
had elapsed the majority on the scheme wanted to abolish it, but the 
company said that men would still be credited with bonus, whether or not 
they drew it. A number of members did continue to draw bonus, but the EC 
were cautious - "our desire is to gain members and their confidence, not 
to lose either". Nevertheless they decided to expel any members still 
working the system after a one month pertod, and one bodymaker and three 
painters were reported excluded at the end of 1904.~4 
By the middle of 1905, the Daimler situation was causing problems. 
Members claimed that while they had 80 of the 100 men employed in the 
carriage department some 12 months previously, they now only had some 70 
out of an expanded workforce of about 200. They claimed that at least 20 
had been expelled (not the 4 the EC had reported), another 20 had left, 
and at least 20 of the remaining 70 members were threatening to leave if 
the society did not accept the bonus. As a result of not being allowed 
to pick up the bonus, smiths were earning less than their strikers, 
painters less than .. their labourers, and trimmers less than non-society 
men. It was clear that in some areas the UKSC had been very hard hit -
while they still had 29 bodymakers, and 19 trimmers, only 6 painters 
were members at the Daimler. An appeal to the UKSC's General Council 
found favour, and the opposition was dropped.~5 The UKSC were not the 
only union to experience problems with the premium bonus. The Sheet 
Metal Workers refused to work it, but a number of their members and 
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Coppersmiths later did; the Sheet Metal Workers withdrew their other 
members in 1907, and the dispute was not finally resolved until ten 
years later.~6 
Humber 
Coventry-based Humber first produced a tricar in 1898, then a 
motorised quadricycle the following year, and in 1900 began to 
manufacture the "Humberette". In 1903 Humber opened a new factory at 
Beeston to build larger models, while light car manufacture continued at 
Coventry.97 Early the next year, Nottingham UKSC members complained to 
the EC that joiners were making bodies at the Beeston factory. The 
management then agreed to employ only bodymakers on a new car. Soon 
afterwards, that June, the UKSC opened a branch at Beeston with an 
initial membership of 49. They were sufficiently organised to resist a 
price reduction in July, and again a few months later. However, early in 
1905, the company started employing non-society men at lower rates.~~ 
Meanwhile, the ASE and Steam Engine Makers found themselves in 
dispute with Humber at Beeston. An interview with the company in 
February 1905 had been followed by about 30 discharges, all of ASE 
members. Further discharges of members had occurred, and in May, 
following another interview, the company decided to form a committee of 
the men on the engineering side, including union and non-union members, 
to discuss piecework prices with the manager <though this was claimed by 
union officials to have been ineffective). However, union men continued 
to be dismissed and non-unionists started in their place. At the end of 
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August. almost the entire workforce was suspended, and numbers of 
unionists were sent notices telling them not to restart, at the same 
time as the company was advertising for and filling vacancies with non-
unionists. When an ASE member applied for a job as an engine fitter, the 
company replied asking if he was a society or non-society mani if the 
latter he could start, though "it must be understood that if you start 
as a Non-Society man that you remain the same". If the former, then 
there was no vacancy as the company were trying to "balance" the numbers 
of society and non-society men in the works.99 
When the company started dismissing unionists again in early 
December, the membership of both engineering unions gave the necessary 
one hour's notice and came out on strike. Initially 48 fitters, 38 
turners and 1 blacksmith came out. followed by another 4 turners and 2 
fitters, making 93 in alIi at least 70 of these were union members, with 
the rest non-unionists. The company fairly quickly filled the strikers' 
places up with other non-unionists. 100 A local newspaper noted similar 
complaints in the coachbuilding department, and feared the strike would 
spread to the UKSC. The two unions in dispute did ask for UKSC support, 
but the latter's executive suggested that they would only withdraw UKSC 
members at Beeston, if the other unions would withdraw their members at 
the Coventry works where the UKSC were having its own severe problems 
(see below). This proposal came to nothing. and the engineering unions 
were still picketing the Beeston factory in March 1906. '0' 
Soon afterwards, the UKSC had its own cause for complaint at Beeston, 
with joiners and non-society improvers being employed on coachmaking. 
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Pullinger, the manager, refused to remove any of them, though claimed he 
would employ onlY'coachmakers in future. However, he would make no 
distinction between society and non-society men, and would not 
countenance any "intimidation" to force men to join. Rumours circulated 
that the company wanted a non-society shop, but the works manager. less 
hostile than Pullinger, approached the UKSC head office to supply him 
with bodymakers, which Kinggate had "some difficulty" in doing. 11;'2 
Pullinger continued his vendetta against trade unions, and in January 
1907 posted a notice in the Beeston works declaring that the company had 
found out that ASE officials had sanctioned members applying to the firm 
under false pretences. "This is a mean despicable action", he wrote, 
asking all workers to report to him anyone they knew to be an ASE or SEM 
member. "If you do not, this is the thin end of the wedge whereby you 
will be ousted by trade unions and the lucrative employment you have 
will be ended. I therefore appeal to you to cooperate with me in doing 
everything in your power to help us to keep this shop free from all 
taint of trade unionism". 103 
By this.time ali employees had to sign the following form: "I hereby 
declare that I am'not connected with any Trades Union in any form 
whatever, andl agree to remain disconnected with the same whilst in 
your employ." But it went further than the traditional "document" of the 
nineteenth century by continuing: "Further I agree to forfeit any wages 
due to me at such time as it shall be found that I do belong to any 
Trades Union."104 Later in the year the Beeston UKSC branch asked the 
executive's advice concerning a member who had been asked to sign this 
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paper. And a few weeks later the branch applied for dispute benefit for 
two members who had been discharged from the Humber because they were 
UKSC members. lOS Despite these problems, Beeston UKSC branch membership 
held up, with year end figures being: 1905 - 65; 1906 - 99; 1907 - 76. 
In 1908 the Beeston factory was closed down and all production 
concentrated in Coventry. 106 
Before the Humber Cycle Company extended their Coventry works to 
include motor car building in 1903, they had employed a number of 
joiners. These men were then transferred to building the new motor 
bodies, and a UKSC delegation in July 1904 found 5 joiners so engaged. 
There was, however, little woodwork in these Humberettes - a platform 
and a seat, the other parts being metal. The EC delegates had to be 
satisfied with a promise that if more men were wanted, then coachmakers 
would be taken on, and that only coachmakers would be employed when they 
started building a larger car. 107 
Following this, the firm employed 3 coachmakers in January 1905, and 
when they started to make "superior cars" about 12 UKSC members were 
engaged.'But thetoreman was a joiner, and gradually drafted joiners on 
to this work until there were as many jOiners as coachmakers employed on 
them. Jegotiations with the local branches of the carpenters' and 
joiners' societies were opened, but the matter was continually 
postponed, with the UKSC members believing "this was being done 
purposely to give their members an opportunity to get used to the work" 
as the UKSC members were "acting practically as instructors to them". By 
October 1905 there were 16 bodymakers and 20 joiners employed. A UKSC 
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delegation interviewed the firm, who refused to dismiss the joiners but 
promised to gradually weed them out and replace them with coachmakers. 
In the light of the earlier broken promises this was unacceptable, and 
the union withdrew its members - 16 bodymakers, and 4 painters. The firm 
advertised for non-society bodymakers, but failed to get them, and the 
vacant places were taken by joiners, who left other jobs in the town. 
While the joiners in question were members of the ASCJ and GUCJ, 
these unions claimed they took no part in obtaining this employment, and 
refused to call their members out. Within a few months there were some 
30-40 joiners employed at Humber, and the joiners' unions argued it was 
a new industry, where they had as much right as the Coachmakers. The 
UKSC got the support of both the Coventry Trades Council, and the newly 
formed Allied Trades Committee in the town, and took the dispute to the 
TUC Parliamentary Committee, which declared it a demarcation issue to be 
settled directly between the unions. 10'iI 
In 1907 the Coventry UKSC branch contacted the EC about reopening the 
Humber works to members. While the EC unanimously declared there was no 
good purpose served by keeping the shop black any longer, a special 
branch meeting voted 32-124 against opening it, because -If we 
acknowledge the right of joiners to work at coachmaking in Coventry, it 
will be detrimental to coachmaking throughout the country.- The EC, 
however, argued that opening the shop would not mean recognising the 
right of joiners to do coachmakers' work - -our fight against them 
should be sufficient proof of that-. The EC believed the problem had 
been caused by members of the Coventry branch -working mates with 
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joiners for six months without raising any objection when we had the 
promise that joiners should not be employed upon these cars". As Humber 
was expanding, and taking on more labour, it was becoming a "training 
ground" for more joiners. At the same time, as the shop was blacked to 
other branches of the trade, especially painters and trimmers, "all 
sorts of nondescripts" had been doing coachmakers' work. As a result of 
requests from other UKSC branch towns, the EC sanctioned all members 
other than bOdymakers accepting work there, and then got the union's 
General Council to vote on whether or not to open the shop totally. 10. 
It is not clear what happened, though when the UKSC members from 
Beeston transferred to the Coventry factory late in 1908 they had to 
sign notes declaring themselves non-union before they could be accepted 
for employment. 110 They got round this by paying their subscriptions 
directly to the union's head office, and not through the Coventry 
branch. When Pullinger, the manager, left early in 1909 to go to Arrol-
Johnston, it was felt that the situation would improve. 111 
Consolidation of Coventry UKSC 
1913 was an important year for Coventry coachmakers, as not only did 
UKSC membership expand by about 50~, but an agreement was reached with 
local employers, and a full-time branch secretary was established. A 
partial breakdown of union membership for June 1913 reveals 477 UKSC 
members at named firms, plus an estimated 150 more at others. 
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Table 4:5 Trade ynion breakdown of coachbuilding employees at a 
nYmber of Coventry firms in Jyne 1913. 114 
Daimler: Body 
Humber: 
Rover: 
Swift 
Standard 
Singer 
Paint. 
Trim 
Finishing 
Smiths & Fitters 
[ sub-total 
Body 
Paint 
Trim 
Smiths & Fitters 
[sub-total 
Park Side 
Paint shop etc 
[ sub-total 
Charlesworth 
Pasa 
Hollick & Pratt . 
Bramble 
Triumph 
TOTAL 
, . 
ll.K.S.C. 
41 
[ 48] 
60 
28 
20 
197 
26 
24 
28 
9 
87 
17 
52 
69 
50 
39 
5 
32 
18 
7 
8 
13 
LPCTU 
35 
1 
36 
9 
9 
9 
9 
7 
20 
3 
477+C 48] 93 
W 
2 
13 
13 
28 
5 
1 
1 
7 
37 
8 
2 
82 
lliel:. 
1 
10 
1 
12 
12 
H.cn. 
12 
5 
17} 
32 
26 
581 
61 
24 
85} 
21 
31 
12 
40 
14 
30 
20 
327 
• The Daimler paint shop figure was omitted from the June 1913 survey, 
but at least 48 members worked there in Karch 1914. 115 
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While the overall total is only a snapshot of the position in mid-
year, it is revealing as to the extent of other union involvement and 
non-unionism at the time. Whether the increase in UKSC membership in the 
second half of 1913 was at the expense of nan-unionism is not known. 
The ather twa unions of significance were the LPCTU and the Workers' 
Union. The former's Coventry membership, 120 at the end of 1913, was 
concentrated in the body shops. The Workers' Union had members among the 
smiths' strikers at Daimler, and were involved in the May 1913 strike at 
Daimler, Humber, and the Ordnance works. 112 The large number of W.U. 
members at Swift seem to have been based in the paint shop.113 
Generally, though, there was relatively little scope for W.U. 
penetration in coachbuilding compared to the engineering side, which was 
more machine-based. It is nat possible to know exactly the number of 
non-unionists, especially in the unnamed firms, but it was significant, 
except at Daimler. Humber, of course, was still suffering from the 
legacy of the earlier management's very hostile anti-unionism. 
In Kay 1913 the Coventry UKSC branch committee recommended the branch 
to ask the employers for an increase in minimum rates, but required at 
least 400 members to attend a branch meeting, and proposals only to be 
accepted if voted for by a minimum of 75~ of those present. In the event 
410 members attended, and were unanimous for an advance, also passing 
resolutions for the abolition of the piece bass system, and a guaranteed 
hourly rate paid to all those on piecework. 116 A Joint Committee of the 
UKSC, LPCTU, Woodcutting Machinists, and NAFTA <representing french 
polishers) was established in June and drew up final proposals. 
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Negotiations took place in July and August and a settlement was reached 
in September. The final agreement, which was to last for two years, was 
a victory for the unions. They got most of the minimum rates they 
demandedj a claim for 5% on all piecework prices was settled at 2~%j a 
demand for a halfpenny increase for those already in receipt of the 
minimum rates was settled at a farthing; and guaranteed hourly piecework 
rates, along with overtime paid apart from the piecework price were, 
also won. 117 
But the unions did not have it all their own way. Edward Buckle, the 
Coventry branch secretary, who became the Joint Committee secretary in 
July 1913, was discharged from Daimler at the end of that month (soon 
after the negotiations started), and was then victimised by other 
employers. Having been offered the first trimmer's vacancy at Humber, he 
was passed over, and then told by the foreman that the manager would not 
allow him to be started. One of the UKSC's shop secretaries at Daimler, 
who was also discharged at the same time, found it impossible to get a 
job back at the company, though he subsequently found work elsewhere. 11S 
Following Buckle's victimisation, the branch approached the executive 
fore~ra funding to finance a full-time secretary. Funding was not 
possible within the rules, but a local arrangement was allowed whereby 
Buckle's victimisation benefit was temporarily made up. In the longer 
term the secretary's salary was partly recovered by his claiming any 
necessary deputation expenses from the General Fund. A special branch 
meeting attended by over 350 members agreed to Buckle starting full-time 
at the beginning of 1914. 11~ 
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Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Scotland 
Very little useful information survives of the pre-first world war 
period in Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Scotland. At Wolseley in 1912 
the UKSC EC approved a joint shop committee with the LPCTU, which seemed 
to function satisfactorily. The LPCTU was active in maintaining the shop 
earnings limit of time and a quarter, which was breached on a number of 
occasions, mainly by "a lot of non-union railway hands" (a reference, no 
doubt to workers from the local contract shops). At one stage a strike 
was threatened when Wolseley management tried to restart an LPCTU member 
who had broken the limit, but the man was persuaded to leave by the 
union. Another threatened strike over piecework reductions was also 
averted. 120 There appears to have been a strike at Austin in 1913; but 
the Lanchester factory had a large number of non-unionists, and the 
local Allied Trades Committee decided not to strike the firm in 1908 to 
obtain the minimum rate they had already secured at Austin. 121 
In Wolverhampton there was significant union organisation at both 
Sunbeam and Star. At the former there was a strike of the whole 
engineering side in 1908 over the amount of overtime working (which at 
the time went on to 9.30.pm every night> and the penalties attached to 
lateness in the morning, which was over before the UKSC members could 
get their EC's sanction to join it. Later in the year when the motor 
trade had slumped, UKSC members at Sunbeam, with management agreement, 
organised short-time working of 32 hours per week rather than have 
anyone dismissed. 122 In 1912, union and non-union bodymakers struck at 
Sunbeam over the company's attempt to increase from 2 to 6 the number of 
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days' wages kept in hand, compromising at 3. The UKSC EC were against 
any strike without their sanction but this time they were ignored. 123 
An agreement was reached by the UKSC, LPCTU and the Woodcutting 
Machinists with the "Wolverhampton Coachmaking Employers" in February 
1914 to pay a schedule of standard rates identical with those agreed in 
Coventry the previous September. 124 But when the men at the Star wanted 
to increase piecework prices, the company insisted they go through the 
new procedure, agreed in conjunction with the wage settlement. Some two 
months later the men decided to strike, with or without union support, 
and were out for four days, gaining some concessions. But the UKSC 
General Secretary wrote to the LPCTU urging them not to pay dispute pay 
as no sanction to strike had been given by either of the unions. 125 
In Scotland, well over 100 members were working at Argyll Motors of 
Alexandria in 1906, and a UKSC branch was set up in May 1907. Membership 
fell in 1908, due to suspensions and discharges as the company went into 
temporary liqUidation, but picked up again in 1910. The next year there 
were nearly 200 UKSC members, and 10 from the LPCTU, it being claimed by 
the latter union that "no man can come into the works without a ticket 
or join at. once-, But, in 1914, the company went into liquidation again 
and'theAle~~ndr1a works were sold. 12s 
Two short strikes took place at Argyll in 1907 over the introduction 
of a premium bonus system. At least 64 members took part in the first; 
then when two painters, prominent in complaints that the bonus system 
was not working according to the agreement, were dismissed, all 39 
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painters came out for 3 days before they were reinstated. 127 A further 
strike in 1912 was not supported by the UKSC EC, who felt the men were 
not justified in ceasing work without their consent, though the LPCTU 
paid its members dispute pay.12Q The UKSC Alexandria branch then had to 
be restrained by the EC from pursuing an immediate wage claim, the EC 
insisting they honour the agreement with the company not to raise the 
matter before the July Fair. 12'31 
The other main car manufacturer in Scotland was Arrol-Johnston, for 
whom T.C.Pullinger, fresh from his battles with the unions at Humber, 
became the General Manager in 1909. The UKSC claimed some 85 members at 
their works in Paisley early in 1913, being "fully organised". When the 
firm then decided to move most of their work to Dumfries, they intimated 
they would not employ union labour there. Later in the year, the 
Dumfries Trades and Labour Council were active in organising a 
demonstration against the firm. What transpired is unclear, though 
membership in the Dumfries branch held up in the next few years. 130 
Manchester 
Manchester car factories also had high levels of union membership, 
Belsize (organised by the Openshaw UKSC branch> claiming 100% membership 
on the coachmaking side in 1913. 131 Ford built an assembly plant at 
Trafford Park in Manchester that was ready for operation by October 
1911, and acquired an outside body works, referred to as the 
"Woodworking Company", in July 1913. By December 1912 the UKSC had over 
100 members in the factory, including foremen, and were attempting to 
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get other members in to displace joiners. The union had even done its 
best to supply men when they were urgently needed by the firm. 13~ 
Ford management claimed there were a series of strikes from September 
1912, culminating in mid-February 1913 in the sheet metal workers 
walking out of both the Ford plant and the outside body works. 1~;3 But 
the UKSC did not appear affected, and the managing director of Ford in 
Britain, Percival Perry, even met UKSC General Secretary in May 1913 at 
the union's offices about the foreman painter, a Salford branch member, 
who had attempted to use his position to solicit a secret commission 
from a paint manufacturer. The man was discharged, and the UKSC's 
General Secretary and Assistant General Secretary being "quite convinced 
of the honesty of Mr.Perry in this matter", decided not to pursue a 
court case against the firm. 1~4 
A much bigger dispute then broke out in September 1913. The firm 
started to discharge coachmakers, replacing them with joiners and 
labourers, who they put "to work mates" with bodymakersj they supplied 
the labourers with a new kit of tools and expected the bodymakers to 
instruct them in their use. Whether this policy applied with the other 
trades-is not.to~ally clear, but all the unions met together and, when 
told' that the firm refused to recognise unions and would run the shop in 
their own way, declared a strike. Kinggate wrote that the trade 
societies "hope to convince the Ford company that they have come to the 
wrong place to smash Trade Unionism", 135 but they failed. 
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The UKSC continued its strike for 22 weeks, ending it in February 
1914. Blacklegging was a major problem, and there were reports that 
other unions offered to supply labour. Some patternmakers were 
transferred to making car body jigs, previously done by UKSC members and 
possibly also by carpenters and joiners. They were instructed by their 
union to stop, but refused to come out, and it is suggested they left 
their union. 1 :36 Some 13 UKSC members also blacklegged and were expelled. 
It is not known how many members were on strike, but it could have been 
considerable. Salford branch seemed to have the bulk of the UKSC members 
at the plant, and its (end-year) membership rose and fell as follows: 
1910 - 85; 1911 - 103; 1912 - 224; 1913 - 290; 1914 - 202. The LPCTU, 
which described Ford as "this well-known firm of American hustlers· had 
6 members working there at the time of the strike, all of whom came out. 
Two other members came from Wolverhampton to start work but stopped 
almost immediately they realised the strike was still on. 137 
Trade union officials met Ford management at the end of November 1913 
and the beginning of January 1914, 13a but following a Trades Council 
meeting with Ford management at the beginning of February, the UKSC EC 
decided to·negot~~te with the firm on their own, and a few days later 
closed. the. str1ke~., Kinggate claimed that the management were willing to 
recognise the union, but refused to re-employ those members ·who held 
responsible positions· (which included at least one foreman), or 
withdraw the blacklegs who had replaced them. There was no bar against 
other members, and the shop was not blacked. It is not known how many 
members ever got back, though some LPCTU members were working there 
again in 1915. However, despite Kinggate's gloss on the situation, the 
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unions collectively had been decisively beaten. Any problem Ford had 
experienced in the quantity and quality of bodies produced during the 
strike had been surmounted by importing those necessary from their 
American factory. 1~9 As top U.S. Ford manager, Sorenson, reported in 
April 1914: "in the past six months there has been no sign of labor 
trouble. The unionism which has always been cropping up heretofore has 
been absolutely broken up". This was a major achievement as he boasted 
that Ford was the only firm in the Trafford Park area "who is not 
obligated in some manner to labor organisations. "140 
Conclusion 
The UKSC were flushed out of at least two other factories in the pre-
war period. At Vulcan in Southport, an upholsterer was appointed trim 
shop foreman in 1908 and started to discharge UKSC trimmers, threatening 
to replace them with upholsterers. The EC agreed to support a strike if 
the threat was carried out, and, soon afterwards, 41 members were forced 
to strike. After three months, the shop was opened to members, but none 
were taken back, and Southport branch membership plummetted from 65 to 
~ . 
19 during 1908-1909. 141 
An attempt to establish a UKSC branch in Newport Pagnell led the 
local coachbuilder Salmons to decide to discharge all the unionists in 
January 1914. After the first two dismissals, including the newly 
elected shop secr~tary, 45 UKSC members were withdrawn, with six LPCTU 
members also coming out. About another 20 members remained at work 
including many who had mortgages (from a local building society financed 
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by Salmons> "hanging like a millstone round their necks". In June the 
UKSC and LPCTU agreed to leave a small picket at the factory while the 
rest of the strikers tried to get work elsewherej but the dispute was 
closed from the end of August, when the firm started discharging men 
because of the war. The shop, however, unlike Ford and Vulcan, remained 
unrecognised by the union. 142 The situation in the London coachbuilding 
shops is covered in the next section. 
Despite some very hostile employers, coachmaking union membership and 
shop organisation received a general boost from the expansion of 
employment opportunities brought about by the early motor car industry. 
Most sizeable motor car manufacturers found themselves obliged to 
negotiate with the UKSC, because of the problem of finding alternative 
supplies of labour for all the different departments in which UKSC 
members worked. Only Ford, with a completely new system of manufacture, 
was able to totally de-unionise its factories. 
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D. THE DEMISE OF THE PIECEKASTER SYSTEM 
As explained in chapter 2, the piecemaster system was particularly 
widespread in London up to the first world war, and operated in some other 
parts of the country. When many coachbuilding firms moved into the 
production of motor car bodies, the system continued in operation. It is 
the aim of this section to investigate it in the years immediately before 
the first world war, and then to look at its eventual demise. 
London 
One of the factors elaborated in chapter 2 was that the piecemaster 
often employed his own labour. Thus, for example, when in 1911 a UKSC 
member left Youngs of Bromley, taking nearly all his mates with him, a 
"London" member took over the shop, the majority of the men working with 
him being in the LPCTU. 143 Being employers, piecemasters could dismiss 
their "mates", as at Barkers where an LPCTU member who had worked with 
another for 4~ years was given a week's notice because he was too slow on a 
particular_job.-This led the body shop workers to send a resolution to the 
LPCTU executive d~Danding joint action by them and the UKSC to get rid of 
the piecem4$ter system. 144 
Who actually employed the men, the piecemaster or the overall employer, 
became more significant with the introduction of National Insurance 
contributions in 1912, as coachbuilding was one of the industries covered 
by the initial scheme. At Gills of Paddington in 1914 an LPCTU member had 
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been stamping insurance cards and paying the employer's share; he agreed 
with his union that he should not pay the insurance, but a month later the 
firm were still insisting that he was liable to pay the contributions, and 
not them. 145 At Mulliners in Birmingham, when the firm agreed to alter the 
piecemaster system in 1915, complaints came in a few months later that 
insurance cards were not being stamped by the company. 146 
The piecemaster as sub-contractor paid the men himself; they were not 
paid direct from the firm's office. Thus they might not get paid at all -
as at Maddox in Huntingdon in 1912, where a piece-boss defaulted on paying 
wages, and the LPCTU took the firm to court to successfully claim wage 
arrears for two members. 147 The next year the UKSC EC agreed to legal 
support for a member's claim for wages against a pieceman working at Cunard 
in London. 14e The UKSC rules from 1907 had specified "all wages and 
balances to be paid through the office", but the union was usually 
powerless to enforce it. When an LPCTU member at Lawton's in Cricklewood 
was not paid by either his piece-boss or the firm, his executive tackled 
the pieceman who was also in the union. He claimed that the balance on the 
job had not been paid by the firm, so the executive told him to pay the 
. . 
member working for him, and they would help him to obtain his own account 
from the firm.149 
The system of not paying the men through the office, but by the 
piecemen, generally met with favour from the latter. And at Cunard in 1915 
the piecemen rejected a proposal to pay wages through the office. 1S0 This 
control of wages had its implications. Thus at Mann Egerton in Norwich, 
mates were found working at the very low rates of 4d, 5d, and 6d per hour. 
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The company denie~ putting on cheap men, and an agreement was made on 
guaranteed rates of 9d for leading men, and 8d for their mates. This 
agreement was initially ignored, however, by the sub-contractors, as it 
would have eaten into their profits, and the LPCTU's secretary had to 
instruct their piecemaster members to pay the agreed rate to their 
mates. lSI Low rates were also found at H.J.Kulliners of Chiswick in 1913, 
when two LPCTU members were accused of employing cheap labour at 6~d and 7d 
per hour. Their defence was that these men were not used to motor car work, 
and had only been taken on because no union members were available. 1&2 
The issue of sharing the balance at the end of a piecework job was one 
for which the LPCTU had specific rules, but these had to be policed. In 
1914, for example, at Kulliners of Chiswick, a pieceman claimed that the 
other leading men in the shop had agreed to his retaining 50% and sharing 
the other half of the balance on a contract which produced over £28 balance 
as a result of 5 weeks work. The LPCTU executive intervened and got a 
further distribution. 153 At Xaythorns in Biggleswade, during the next year, 
LPCTU members objected to sharing out the balances as per rule. Several 
months later the executive were insisting that members shared balances in 
relation to wages paid, and endorsed a lOs fine on a member for refusing. 
But nearly 3 months further on, the member was still not complying, and was 
threatened with another fine of lOs. 154 How the NbalanceN was divided 
seriously affected the state of union organisation in any shop where 
piecemasters operated. If the balance went overwhelmingly into one man's 
pocket, that person, although often a trade unionist himself, gained 
greatly, while his actions affected the pace of work and earnings of 
others, usually union members themselves. 
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But the piecemasters did not have it all their own way. At Lawtons in 
1911, when the men were unable to make the prices on jobs, the company 
stated that in future the piecemen would be held responsible for the 
production of work at the stipulated price. This led to a strike and a 
revised price list. The LPCTU executive advised members to contact them 
before entering any bargaining with employers, and that "before accepting 
any responsibility they should have a written agreement" on prices and 
conditions. ISS Two years later at the same firm, the management cut job 
prices dramatically. A meeting of the LPCTU members, and other unionists 
and non-unionists, took place. A joint committee of the UKSC and LPCTU 
appealed to the piecemen to resist any reduction. When a deputation failed 
to shift the company, the men held a meeting and stopped work at once, 
being out for about a month, before coming to a compromise settlement. 155 
A threatened reduction of piecework prices at Barkers, also in 1913, led 
the LPCTU executive to summon all 8 LPCTU piecemen there and urge them to 
maintain their prices. Shortly afterwards, when a deputation of men asked 
the firm for a wage advance, they were told to approach the piecemen. 1S7 
Meanwhile, at the Chelsea Carriage Company in 1915, when the firm tried to 
" get extra work for' ,the same money, a shop meeting of the LPCTU and UKSC 
members along-with a large number of non-unionists, were told that owing to 
"the signed agreements of the piecemen" very little could be done. ISS 
The piecemaster system was still deeply entrenched in London in this 
period. The LPCTU proposal books show at least 4 more piecemasters joining 
the union between 1908 and 1913, in addition to those union members who 
became piecemasters. lS~ Other coachmaking unions were involved as well; the 
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Hoods and Bodies factory was under UKSC and WCOU piecemasters in 1914, for 
example. I~O But there was resistance to the system, and the LPCTU 
eventually came out forcefully against it. Along with three other unions, 
exluding the UKSC, the LPCTU was a member of the "London Coachmakers and 
Wheelwrights' Alliance", whose rules included one that "Members who are, or 
may become, piecemen, to employ none but Society men, and at not less than 
the trade union rate of wages". 161 However, along with the other Alliance 
unions, and the UKSC and the London Federal Union (who operated together as 
the "Operative Coachmakers and Wheelwrights' Federation"), they condemned 
all forms of piecework at a joint conference in early 1912. 162 In 1914, the 
LPCTU were even more definite, declaring "every form of piecework is bad, 
but our worst struggle at present is to get rid of the piecemaster and 
institute in his place collective piecework with minimum rates of wages, 
and allow the full balance earned to be divided by every man concerned". 163 
In late 1913, joint meetings of the LPCTU executive and the UKSC London 
District Committee had discussed the situation in the mounting shop at 
Barkers where the men did not want piecework, and had resolved that 
piecework be accepted with a 20% increase, that there be a minimum rate, 
that every man share proportionately from the balance, and that all money 
was to be paid direct from the office. 164 What came of this immediately is 
unknown, but it reflected an obvious groundswell. There was then the 
incident in July 1914 cited above, where the Barkers' body shop demanded 
joint action from the UKSC and LPCTU to get rid of piecemasters. Meanwhile 
at Hoopers, where rates for bodymakers varied from 4d to 10~d per hour, 
Joint union meetings also took place in 1914 to consider action. A meeting 
of all Hoopers' men was then called to discuss a minimum rate and the 
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abolition of piecework. When the piecemen's participation in the meeting 
was queried, one of them said they were prepared to leave, but this was 
thought to be against "the solid feeling which should prevail". The meeting 
then carried proposals for new minimum rates, and all money to be paid 
through the office. 16s Later that year at both Hoopers and Barkers a 
minimum rate of 10d per hour was conceded, and piecemasters became charge-
hands an an hourly rate. This was a major breakthrough, the organlser 
commenting that in London "the piece-boss system has taken such deep root 
that it has come to be regarded as impossible to remove it". 166 
Daracq had already moved over to individual piecework at the end of 
1913, but there was no guaranteed day rate, the manager set the piece-
prices, and the 7 former piecemen were given work an daywork to see the 
cost. Joint meetings of the UKSC, LPCTU, and the WCOU eventually decided to 
order their members not to make a balance over time and a quarter of their 
wage rate. The painters then refused piecework in any farm, and the body 
shop came out an strike in February 1914 over a price reduction. In March 
the LPCTU had to fine members for earning excessive balancesj as well as 
dealing with the more serious charge against a member who had built a 
cabriolet body at home and had offered to take torpedo bodies home to 
build. In July the firm tried to introduce piecework across all 
departments. The body shop, by now on collective piecework, decided to stay 
on this rather than press for daywork. But the members here approached the 
firm "to ensure that piecemasters be entirely abolished", suggesting that 
they were either experiencing or anticipating trouble. 167 
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The struggle for minimum rates and the abolition of the piecemaster 
system went hand in hand. UKSC organiser MacKay reported early in 1915 
that, following the establishment of a minimum rate at Hoopers and Barkers, 
the union had then secured it at Alford & Alders, Kulliners, and Killion-
Guiet. But at the last named firm, the LPCTU soon found that its members 
were not acting to maintain their new hourly rates. 169 Elsewhere in London, 
Harrisons tried to reintroduce piecework in August 1915, but the LPCTU 
executive firmly opposed it. About the same time, another long-established 
London employer, Peters, decided to abolish piecemasters and pay agreed 
minimum rates. 169 At Cunard, as detailed above, the firm refused to pay 
wages through the office after the piecemen had rejected the idea, so the 
LPCTU retaliated by informing the firm they would not allow their members 
to work under piecemen as formerly. 170 
Finally. an agreement was reached early in 1917 between the National 
Federation of Vehicle Trades and the "London Joint Committee of 
Coachmakers, Wheelwrights, and Kotor Builders' Trade Unions" which, as well 
as fixing rates for firms within a twenty mile radius of Charing Cross, 
also stipulated "The piecemaster system shall be abolished". 171 
Coventry 
It was in Coventry that the first organised blow appears to have been 
struck against the piecemaster system. Early in 1913 at Swift, an LPCTU 
member offered to take on a job at a rate that a UKSC member had refused, 
and to employ cheap labour - two at 3d per hour, one at 7d, and one at 8d. 
A shop meeting overruled him, though at a union investigation he denied 
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wanting to introduce the piece-boss system. 172 Shortly after this, the 
Coventry UKSC branch set in motion the train of events that led to the 
abol i tion of the .. notorious" piecemaster system. 17:3 
But despite the September 1913 agreement with the Coventry employers 
(see section C above), piece-bosses did not disappear overnight. In October 
1913 they were believed to be operating in at least two departments at 
Charlesworth; and in July 1914 at least one was proved to be functioning 
there. 174 The charge hand in the Rover paint shop was also believed to be 
one, refusing to show his book; though eventually the piecework balance 
above time and a quarter was shared out. 17~ Four UKSC members from Swift 
were summoned to the branch in Kay 1914 under suspicion of the system 
operating in that firm. It later transpired that a round robin in the paint 
shop had decided to return to the old system, though a meeting of all Swift 
workers decided the painters should not tolerate the piece-boss system. 176 
A few weeks later there was a complaint that a charge hand at one firm 
had got £90 for work done, and that his supervising money came out of the 
job price, and not from the firm. 177 There were other occasional 
accusations of the piecemaster system in Coventry in the next couple of 
years. For example. a non-union man at Humber, who was also a shareholder 
in the firm, having one man working for him at 9d per hour, with a boy at 
5d per hour, another boy at 5s per week Mand what they call a shop boy who 
spends most of his time with him." 17s 
When the joint union committee considered suggestions for a new 
agreement with the employers in 1915, they were unhappy with 'the gang 
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system and the system "where several are working together". The committee 
proposed replacing this by working in pairs where possible "in order to 
prevent a certain amount of twisting which unfortunately takes place in 
certain shops." This was seen as "a deep question", though the "pairs" 
system did operate among bodymakers in Coventry in the 1920s. ' 7'!3 
Final disappearance of the system 
The first NUVB rule book in 1919 declared "no member sball be permitted 
to become a piecemaster or sub-contractor" or in any way be in a position 
of "exploiting the labour of his fellow-workers", such as a charge-hand 
paid a bonus for increased output by the men under his charge. Members 
acting in defiance of this rule could be expelled at a second offence. But 
while an inter-war survey of London industry claimed that by the first 
world war the piece-boss system "had been virtually displaced" in 
coachmaking, leo it lingered on in the 1920s, despite union rules and the 
collective agreements with the NFVT initially in London, and then 
nationally. One reason, no doubt, was that not all piece masters were union 
members and not all coachbuilding firms were party to the agreements. The 
IUVB Londen District Committee noted sub-contracting in 1921, and 
complained that a ·flying" trimmer had control at the Victoria 
Coachwerks;'·' In 1922 the piecemaster system was found in the Kotor Bodies 
Corporation, Whitlock's, and in the Regent Carriage Company, where the two 
piecemasters were both NUVB members. le2 
In Reading in 1923 an attempt to introduce a piecemaster system failed 
and the NUVB was able to get the employer to make a complete repayment of 
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health and unemployment insurance stamps to members. 193 In 1924, it was 
again operating among bodymakers at the Regent Carriage Company, and there 
were complaints of the apathy of members concerning it. 194 During the next 
year, a member who had refused to work for a piece-boss at H.J.Mulliners 
had his state benefit stopped, but successfully appealed. The system was 
reported to be "in full blast" at the Chelsea Carriage Company, also in 
1925, and a delegate to the London Shop Stewards' Conference reported the 
prevalence of the system in the London area. les However, in November of 
that year, the NUVB got Alford & Alder to operate national piecework terms, 
the men to share the balance as per rate, and no piecemasters.
'
&· 
Interestingly, the Chelsea Carriage Company, the Regent Carriage 
Company, and Alford & Alder were not members of the NFVT during the inter-
war period, and H.J.Mulliners resigned in June 1925. Other problems were 
reported as late as 1928, though Halliwell claimed that where cases came to 
I ight the London District Committee had successfully put them down. l'i17 
There were even some difficulties in Coventry, at Cross & Ellis in 1926, 
which led the branch to propose an amendment of the existing rule on 
piecemasters in 1928. HIS 
However, these problems were minor compared to the past. The general 
remcival of the piecemaster system from the coachbuilding industry by the 
end of the first world war gave London coachmaking trade unionism a 
tremendous boost. With its rapid membership expansion in London, the NUVB's 
formation in 1919 signified that, for the first time, there was a genuinely 
national union in the industry. 
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PART II 
THE INTERWAR YEARS. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Union 
The NUVB was formally constituted in 1919 when the UKSC merged with 
the approximately 2,000 strong London & Provincial Coachmakers' Trade 
Union' and two tiny London societies with less than 100 members each.2 
In a burst of growth, the new union numbered nearly 24,000 by the end of 
the year. Five years later the mainly northern-based Amalgamated 
Wheelwrights, Smiths and Kindred Trades Union brought in another 4,400 
members,3 while in 1947 the London-based Wheelwrights and Coachmakers 
Operatives Union joined with just over 1,000 members.4 
Although this thesis is not an institutional history, it does require 
some knowledge of the union's governmental structure, so a few comments 
are in order now. Throughout most of the interwar period, the union had 
two full-time officials in the Manchester Head Office, two in London, 
and organisers based in Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow and Dublin. As 
* 
well as these, one'of the union's Assistant General Secretaries, Joe 
Compton,~was an X;P. for most of the period, and generally concentrated 
.", ,. 
his union work. on the railway workshops. The executive committee was lay 
in composition, and regionally basedj its numbers in the 1920s reflected 
the amalgamations but settled at eleven, with an "emergency" committee 
of three meeting as and when necessary. "Delegate Meetings" were called 
for revision of rules, but this only happened four times in the twenty 
years after 1919. Policy was decided nationally, by the executive or 
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specially convened ad hoc conferences, or locally, by branch or district 
comndttees. The variegated nature of the membership and the differing 
collective agreements often made nationally uniform policies 
inappropriate. 
Every quarter there was a conference of branches in each EC district, 
known usually as an "Area Council", though these bodies did not have any 
significant powers. There was the opportunity in any town with more than 
one branch to set up a "District Committee" which did have some local 
powers, and these operated especially in London and Birmingham. While 
branches met monthly, with fines levied for non-attendance at quarterly 
meetings, the real branch power, especially in the larger branches, was 
the branch committee which effectively decided the branch's policy, 
either directly or by recommendation. Branch officers normally dealt 
with local disputes with employers, and a number of the larger branches 
sustained full-time branch secretaries who could deal with issues as 
they arose, only involving the full-time organiser when necessary. 
The industry 
While the car industry is the main focus of Part II of this thesis, 
the NUVB's policies in the interwar years cannot be understood without a 
clear knowledge of the other sectors organised by the union. Hence a few 
points need to be made about employment in the various vehicle building 
sectors. Figures from the census returns for England and Wales in 1921 
and 1931 are detailed in Appendix 3. Their analysis leads to two 
conclusions. 
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The first is that the bulk of vehicle building in 1931 was still 
outside the car industry, although there had been a definite shift in 
the 1920s. In 1921 the number of coachbuilders and painters <either 
vehicle painters or including all categories) in the car industry, both 
represented about one fifth of their overall total in the vehicle 
building industry, while trimmers were higher at about one third. By 
1931, the proportions had increased to about one quarter for both 
coachbuilders and painters, and to two fifths for trimmers. 
Secondly, given that, in 1931, most vehicle building work outside the 
car industry, and some work inside the car industry, was performed by 
skilled workers, then in that year the potential membership of the union 
was still one that was predominantly skilled. If comparable figures for 
Scotland and Ireland had been added in, these conclusions would be even 
further reinforced. 
The Employers 
Finally, a note on the employers. While many NUVB members were 
employed in firms affiliated to the Engineering Employers Federation and 
in the 4 railway companies, the union always considered its agreement 
with the National Federation of Vehicle Trades as the one that set the 
standards for the trade. Appendix 4 gives information on this employers' 
organisation and on the NUVB's collective agreements with it. 
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CHAPTER 5. VEHICLE BUILDING BETWEEN THE WARS. 
PART 1. CARMAKERS AND COACHBUILDERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The British car industry underwent a fundamental change in the interwar 
period. The rise of mass production, coupled with flow production 
techniques, marked a total break with the low production pre-1914 industry. 
There were three distinct phases in this transition, delineated by changes 
in the size of the market. 
The estimated 1913 output level of 34,000 of cars and commercial 
vehicles was surpassed by cars alone in 1920, before the depressed market 
saw car production fall back substantially in 1921, but from 1922 through 
to 1927 there was continuous growth. The period 1928-1932 saw a relatively 
static market, before rapid expansion more than doubled the 1932 output 
figure by 1937. Most of the output increase in the early 1920s was due to 
Austin and Morris,' though the latter's rise was more spectacular. The 
second period of expansion saw four other firms join them - Ford, Vauxhall, 
Standard', and Rootes - to form the "Big Six", accounting for 901. of annual 
car production in Britain from about 1935 onwards. 1 
The mass producers concentrated on the "cheaper end" of the market, and 
once they were established, other firms could only survive in the longer 
term by imitiating them or cultivating an up-market niche. In the mid to 
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late 1920's, both Clyn~ and Singer made the breakthrough above the annual 
production figure of 10,000, below which all, except the mass producers, 
Morris, Austin, and Ford, were stucki but they were unable to sustain this, 
even though Singer reputedly reached 28,000 one year.~ 
Relatively few production figures are easily accessible for the inter-
war period, but from some that do exist, it is possible to contrast the 
rise of Morris and Austin with the production figures of the medium-scale 
producer, Rover, and the small-scale Vauxhall, in the 1920'S.3 
Iatll~ ~i1 Annual P[cd.u~Uen f1gU[~5. Merr15. AU5:tin. ECYli:r. :iauxhall. 
1919-1929. 
Merr1s Austin Reyer ~a!.l~hl211 
1919 360 c.200 576 
1920 1,932 4,319 1,400 691 
1921 3,077 2,246 4,603 482 
1922 6,956 2,559 6,466 659 
1923 20,048 6,417 5,217 1,444 
1924 32,918 9,673 6,746 1,444 
1925 53,582 16,429 5,977 1,398 
1926 48,330 24,900 5,363 1,527 
" 192'1 61,632 37,520 4,183 751 
1928 55,480 44,654 3,766 2,560 
1929 63,522 46,029 7,225 1,668 
The key development of the 1930s was, as mentioned above, the rise and 
consolidation of the "Big Six" car firms. However, existing accounts give 
the impression that this occurred earlier than it actually did. A table 
produced by Maxcy & Silberston, and its subsequent modification by Rhys, is 
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the basis for this.4 In fact, Ford wa~ an even more neglible car producer 
in the years 1928-31 than has been suggested, and Vauxhall's breakthrough 
from being a tiny car producer did not occur until 1933, not 1930. 
The significance of a later date for the emergence of the Big Six is 
that, in 1931, when the NUVB opened its ranks to all men and women in 
vehicle building, the car industry was still a "duopoly", with all the 
other companies small or medium-sized. This situation had obtained for a 
number of years, and at that stage the union could not have anticipated any 
rapid Change. The union's introduction of the "Industrial Section" (see 
chapter 7), therefore, was not a response to a sudden change in market 
domination. An estimate of the annual production totals of the Big Six is 
given below. This is subject to a number of qualifications which are fully 
explained in Appendix 5. 
Table 5:2 Estimated Big Six car production 1929-39. 
AlJ~t1n Mcrr15 E..o..D1. :llal.lxhall Rccte5 S:taDilar!.i 
1929 46,029 63,522 nla 1,668 5,500 6,000 
1930 39,251 58,436 nla 1,277 8,100 7,500 
1931 39,676 43,582 n/a 3,492 7,600 11,900 
1932 43,802 50,337 11,900 2,136 11,000 17,400 
1933 57,741 44,049 36,400 9,949 14,100 13,750 
1934 68,291 58,248 34,500 20,227 17,200 17,000 
1935 73,562 96,512 48,500 22,118 24,300 22,800 
1936 71,855 100,200 74,900 17,640 31,600 32,700 
1937 89,175 95,900 77,800 30,616 33,000 33,750 
1938 60,224 80,500 59,900 32,224 34,800 33,750 
1939 57,367 73,800 48,000 34,367 29,900 35, 100 
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The table shows that it was not until 1935 that all of the Big Six were 
producing over 20,000 cars a year. Their success did not significantly 
affect the production from the smaller companies which was in the region of 
35,000-45,000 cars per annum throughout the 1930's. However, with the big 
shake-out of companies in the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, the smaller 
companies' share was a decline from the 60,000-80,000 cars a year produced 
by companies outside the "Big Two" <Austin and Morris> in the smaller 
market of 1924-30. 
The survival of smaller companies in the 1930s (including Wolseley and 
M.G. which were part of the Nuffield Group, and the low volume Humber (part 
of Rootes]), with more craft-based production methods, meant that 
employment in the industry remained higher than it would have done had the 
industry totally gone over to mass production. Further, car manufacturers 
continued to use outside coachbuilders to produce special bodies, which 
also kept alive bodymaking skills and sustained employment in the industry. 
This practice will be explored in section A, while section B concentrates 
on the development of the assembly line and other processes affecting the 
division of labour; 
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A. COACHBUILDERS' ~ORK FOR CAR MANUFACTURERS 
Although throughout the inter-war period, the majority of car bodies 
produced were built by chassis manufacturers, there was always a 
substantial volume of trade for independent bodybuilding firms. But once 
the technology of steel body production had got over its initial teething 
problems, the large number of traditional coachbuilding concerns with their 
ash-framed and panel-beaten car bodies found powerful new rivals in a very 
small number of firms with press shops and spot welding technology. 
While the rise of the steel body producers will be charted in chapter 6, 
there will be some mention of them in this section, which otherwise 
concentrates on the traditional coachbuilders. Pressed Steel, followed by 
Briggs, and then Fisher & Ludlow, were responsible for a big increase in 
the output of independent bodybuilding firms in the 1930s, as well as 
squeezing many smaller traditional firms out of the market. While the 
census of production picked up 212 car body builders in 1930, five years 
later, only 98 produced a much bigger absolute and relative total. 
Table 5:3 Car and car body production. 1930-37. 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Total cars, taxis & chassis (169,669) (256,866) 349,316 402,159 
Bodies produced separately est.46,500 93,116 134,143 171,581 
Percentage of separate bodies 27.5% 36.3% 38.4% 42.7% 
<The figures in brackets are for the year to September from SKKT sources, 
while all the other figures are for calendar years). 
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Employment figures for firms supplying car and commercial vehicle bodies 
grew much slower than output, though they rose significantly in the early 
1930s due to the growth of Pressed Steel and the establishment of Briggs: 
Table 5:4 Employment in bodybuilding firms. 1924-35. 
l.92.4. 
26,475 
l..9.3..Q. 
26,251 
l!.U.5.. 
32,466 
The 1935 employment figure compares with 75,267 employed in firms 
producing complete cars and chassis, 20,238 producing complete commercial 
vehicles and chassis, and 74,013 producing parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles, motor cycles, and cycles. With firms producing commercial vehicle 
bodies including omnibuses being responsible for about a quarter of total 
commercial vehicle body production by volume in 1930,s it is clear that 
independent body builders, outside of the steel body producers, still 
formed an important part of the industry in their own right. 
The market that independent car body builders served was formed of at 
least f1ved1st1nct components. Firstly, there was the demand for 
individual coachbuilt bodies which straddled all sections of the market, 
where customers would order a chassis from a manufacturer and order the 
body separately. This was very common at the luxury end of the market, 
where a number of firms, of which Rolls Royce was the most prominent, did 
not make any bodies at all themselves. Then there were a few car firms, in 
particular Alvis, who had no bodybuilding facilities and in the main 
ordered batches of standardised bodies from a small number of 
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coachbuilders. Thirdly, some car companies took advantage of the variety of 
different bodies available to augment their range by contracting out 
particular bodywork to "approved" coachbuilders and then selling these 
products through their own distributors. This practice was very important 
for a number of medium-sized car producers at different periods. Fourthly, 
the increased demand for fabric bodies at the end of the 1920s, led most 
companies, including the biggest, to contract out part of this work to 
coachbuilders. Finally, some coachbuilders developed a reputation for 
bodies on certain chassis, so that the end result was almost a separate 
product, such as Swallow and Avon bodies on Standard chassis, and Swallow 
on the Austin 7. 
The existence of a large number of firms supplying bodies to vehicle 
manufacturers also affected the level of potential NUVB membership. Before 
the rise of the steel body builders, and, after their rise, outside of 
them, the vast majority of employees in the coachbuilding firms were 
potential NUVB members. At around perhaps 20,000, the potential membership 
in these firms probably outnumbered the potential membership in the vehicle 
manufacturers themselves (see Appendix 3>. 
It took a number of years before the technique of building pressed steel 
bodies was viable as an economic replacement for the traditional composite 
body, but by the early 1930s most of the Big 6 were building, or having 
built, their standard models in this way.G There was, however, still a 
substantial market for traditional coachbullding firms. Most model ranges 
offered tourers, convertibles, and coupes, as well as their standard 
saloons; and, unless demand for these was above 1,000 or 2,000 a year, the 
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large producers rarely built their own special coachwork. This meant a 
continuing flow of work for the batch-production producers. 
But once unitary construction was first adopted for new body shells in 
the late 1930s, the writing was definitely on the wall for these 
coachbuilders. Their trade was producing special shells on separate chassis 
frames, not doing major re-builds of stress-bearing unit construction 
shells. The war, followed by the continuation of pre-war models in the 
immediate post-war period, delayed the start of their rapid decline until 
the end of the 1940s. 7 
No writer on the inter-war car industry has analysed in any detail the 
overall relationship between the car manufacturers and the coachbuilders. 
Consequently, it has been necessary to make use of a variety of sources to 
build up a picture which shows how necessary the coachbuilders were to the 
car manufacturers. This will further demonstrate that, even in the car 
industry, NUVB claims to being a union of "vehicle builders" were rooted in 
the material reality of the inter-war period, which was not immediately 
destroyed by the rise of mass production in the 1920s. 
The Big Six 
<i) Austin 
Austin were an important user of outside coachbuilding firms in the 
inter-war period. The Austin 7, produced from 1922 to 1937, was responsible 
for most of this trade and detailed figures exist for 1928-1932.~ 
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Table 5:5 Austin 7 body sourcing. 1928-1932. 
Startin 
Mulliner 
Gordon England 
other separate chassis 
total bodies not built by Austin 
Total Austin 7 production 
m.a 
316 
2881 
2033 
2719 
7949 
22709 
l.929. 
391 
2667 
1281 
4430 
8769 
26447 
~ 
631 
1309 
234 
1528 
3702 
23826 
lNl. 
50 
516 
752 
1318 
21282 
18 
620 
638 
20121 
Of the bodybuilders mentioned in the table, Kulliner produced fabric 
saloons, vans, sports, twa-seaters, and some War Office vehicles; the 
fabric saloon appearing in August 1927, and accounting for over 90~ of 
Mulliner's work for Austin. 3 Gordon England built "Super-Sports" cars, as 
well as saloons, a fabric 2-seater, milk vans, and vans. Over 2,000 Austin 
7s had passed through their works before the end of 1927. 10 Finally, 
Startin produced vans from August 1925. 11 
The first Swallow Austin 7 was produced in April 1927; the more famous 
Swallow saloon was ready for the 1928 Kotor Shaw, and Austin Swallows 
continued in production until October 1932.12 Among the firms offering 
special bodywork on the Austin 7 chassis were Duple in the late 1920s, and 
Hoyal in 1931. But apart from the firms mentioned, and Avon of Warwick, 
most of them were very small concerns. 1:3 Where special bodywork was 
successful, Austin would later produce their own version. The success of 
• 
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coachbuilders' 2-seater Austin 7 bodies led the company to offer a stand3rd 
works coupe from 1928. though less than 600 were made in the next 4 
years. 14 Mulliner bodied over 150 Austin chassis for the War Of ice in 1929-
30. before Austin took over the bodywork during 1932-37. 1 & More 
significantly, because the Startin-bodied van was popular. Austin 
introduced its own, with more than 10,000 being produced between 1931 and 
1935. 1G 
The peak period for outside bodybuilders on the Austin 7 chassis was the 
late 19209, but separate chassis were still produced after this date: in 
1933 - 789; 1934 - 713; and in 1935, the peak year of Austin 7 production, 
when 27.280 were built. 1,392 of these were in the form of chassis as that 
year saw an upsurge of interest in the sports chassis. 17 
Austin's other models also generated work for outside coachbuilders. 1'~ 
Overall. the Birmingham coachbuilding firms of Mulliner. Gordon and Startin 
had the biggest spin-off from Austin - Startin. as well as its vans on the 
"7". produced the last body on the big Austin 20-4 in 1929; and there were 
no less than 8 different types of Gordon Austins in 1932, sold through 
Austin dealers. 19,1 substantial amount of work was also generated by 
chassis produced"for taxis. Taxicab versions of the Austin 12-4 chassis had 
been operating in provincial centres such as Manchester and Liverpool in 
the 1920s, but their turning circle was too great to be allowed in London. 
Austin were persuaded to rectify this and their cabs started plying for 
hire in London streets in June 1930. They soon dominated the London taxi 
market, some 5.800 being delivered in the period 1930-37 compared to just 
over 2,000 other makes. The bodies all appear to have been built by outside 
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coachbuilders, mainly London firms, such as Strachan, the Chelsea Carriage 
Company, and Birch Bros.20 In 1948, the Austin FX3 taxicab was brought out, 
with a steel body produced solely by Carbodies, being superseded in 1958 by 
the familiar shape of the current FX4, also bodied by Carbodies.~l 
Late in 1929, Sir Herbert Austin voiced his concern at a directors' 
meeting concerning the fact that over one million pounds worth of bodies 
had been made for Austin by outside coachbuilders in the previous 2 years, 
and proposed that the company should make all the bodies inside the 
Longbridge factory in order to reduce costs. This was countered by another 
director who explained, "Two years ago when fabric bodies became 
fashionable certain bodies were made by coachbuilders when we were not 
ready or could not prepare models in time for the demand". He continued by 
arguing that anyway there was a definite demand by a section of the public 
for special bodies "and by refusing to supply these we should definitely 
lose a substantial sale of chassis". As well as selling chassis direct to 
those customers who arranged their own bodywork, the company made a profit 
on all bodies it contracted directly to coachbuildersj and he believed the 
factory should concentrate on standard products. Austin himself became 
reconciled to this'view and some three years later argued that the firm 
should'cult1!ateextra trade by getting outside coachbuilders to build 
special bodies on Austin chassis. 22 
(ii) Nuffield 
Austin's big rival, Morris, did not use outside coachbuilders to the 
same extent for the products of its Cowley factory. This was partly, if not 
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mainly, because it bought its main body supplier, Hollick & Pratt, and used 
the latter's Coventry factory for non-standard products. Of course, there 
were a number of special bodies on Morris chassis that were built by other 
coachbuilders. Stewart & Ardern, their London distributors, supplied 
special bodies on Morris chassis from 1916, sub-contracting the work to 
coachbuilders. "Many Stewart & Ardern designs appear to have inspired 
Morris to produce similar standard models later". For example, before 
Morris included a fabric saloon as a standard model in the Morris Oxford 
range in 1929, fabric bodies were available on their chassis from such 
concerns as Gordon England. 2:3 This firm, along with Hoyal, were the most 
prominent coachbuilders used in the late 1920s, while Cunard, which was 
taken over by Stewart & Ardern, was widely used in the 1930s, doing most of 
its work for Morris.24 The Morris subsidiaries of M.G. and Wolseley also 
used coachbuilders. 
The Wolseley Hornet did much to preserve the tradition of custom 
coachwork. In 1931 and 1932, 19 different variants were offered by 10 
coachbuilders on the standard chassis alone. Whittingham & Mitchell were 
one firm whose output was largely made up of sporting styles commissioned 
by Wolseley's London distributor, until the Hornet finished in 1935. 25 
X.G., starting up in 1922, used Carbodies of Coventry for most of its early 
bodies, and Gordon England, a sports car body specialist, made some in the 
late 1920s. But from this date and throughout the 1930s, as the firm 
expanded its output, most X.G. bodywork seems to have come from the Morris 
Bodies factory in Coventry (which also produced Post Office and other 
commercial van bodies, and Morris Commercial taxicabs>, though some bodies 
were made by Tickfords and Charlesworth in the late 1930s.~· 
- 242 -
(11i> Rootes 
There is a relative dearth of published material on the Rootes Group and 
its constituent companies, but it is clear that they also used outside 
coachbuilders. While Hillman were noted in 1924 of making "a special p01nt 
of building their own bodies", they were certainly using the local Holbrook 
Bodies three years later j 27 and Humber used some small Coventry 
coachbuilders and Avon of Warwick in the early 1920s.2~ However, both 
Hillman and Humber were fairly low volume producers in the 1920s, and the 
big expansion of output in the 1930s was centred on the Hillman Kinx, for 
which a large number of bodies were produced at Pressed Steel at Cowley. 
Humber, though, continued producing big cars in the 1930s, and these were 
ideal for coachbuilders such as Carbodies and Kulliners and Rootes's own 
subsidiary, the London coachbuilder Thrupp & Kaberley.29 
(iv) Standard 
Standard Kotors in Coventry, like Austin, also wrestled with the issue 
of whether it should build all its own bodies or contract some out. Avon of 
," 
Warwick were doing Standard work at least as early as 1922, as was another 
Coventry coac::hbu 11 der. :30 In June 1924 the directors sanctioned 960 bodies 
, ~'" 
for the V3 chassis in the following proportions: of 710 4-seaters, Standard 
would build 460 and the Avon Body Company the other 250j while Midland 
Light Bodies of Coventry would build all 250 2-seaters.~1 But a year later 
the directors decided that "wherever possible" bodies should be made in the 
company's own shops, though sanctions for bodies in January 1926 showed 
some 300 scheduled to be built by Avon, and 100 by other coachbuilders. n 
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Like Austin and other firms, Standard also found itself using at least 
one outside firm, Hoyal of Veybridge, to build fabric bodies, this being a 
contract for 250 saloons in 1927, while Gordon England were contracted to 
build 150 of their special bodies on Standard chassis in 1928.~~ With 
Standard's expansion from the early 1930s onward, the traditional 
coachbuilders' share of Standard body output became increasingly less 
important (though, as will be detailed in chapter 6, the suppliers of all-
steel bodies rapidly took over much of the company's body production). 
Table 5;6 Standard body and chassis prodyction 1931/32-1932/33, 
19~1L~2~4 19~2L:3~:n ' 
Standard bodies and chassis complete 16,807 17,887 
Cha.55i5 Qllly.: SS 775 1,525 
Swallow R7 5 
Arrow 30 
Avon 380 305 
Mulliner 200 
Holbrook 51 
Arnold 60 7 
direct to customers 36 41 
van chassis 4 
unassembled for export 525 975 
TOTAL CHASSIS 16.Z0Q 2Q.60Q 
The Standard Swallow was now giving way to Standard chassis being 
marketed under the SS name. The Standard Avon, available from 1929, was, 
like the Standard Swallow, almost a separate make. Avon continued to 
produce special bodies in quantity for Standard, though it fell into 
financial difficulties late in 1936, producing its last body for them in 
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1937.~~ Mulliner, which had been negotiating orders with Standard in the 
mid-1930s, then secured a substantial order for a coupe body in 1938. ~7 
(v) Vauxhall 
Vauxhall was a traditionally large user of coachbuilding firms. Until 
the first world war "there was almost no such thing as a 'standard' 
Vauxhall car." Throughout the 1920s, Vauxhall remained a small producer, 
mainly producing cars with a high price-tag, competing with Rolls-Royce, 
Bentley and Sunbeam. Consequently "the little Luton factory concentrated 
mainly an building chassisj mast bodywork was farmed out to specialist 
firms, with Grosvenor [the Grosvenor Carriage Company] probably taking the 
lion's share". 3~ 
It was not until 1930 that there was the first visible sign of the 
General Motors takeover of 1925. The Vauxhall Cadet of 1930-33 was aimed at 
the low-priced popular family car market. Soon after its launch, though, a 
variety of bodywork was being offered by outside coachbuilders, many being 
included in official Vauxhall catalogues - for example, Martin Walter of 
Folkestone, Duple, Grose of Northampton, Salmans, and Hoyal. When the 
Cadet's successor, the Light Six, was launched in mid-1933, apart from the 
standard saloon, there were sports tourers, coupes, a doctor's coupe, 
fabric saloons, roadsters and others from firms such as Whittingham & 
Mitchell, Crass & Ellis, and a number of those listed above. Similarly, 
with the launch of the Big "6" at the end of the year, there were also soon 
special bodies on this - including a 7-seater luxury limousine from 
Grosvenor. 
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Vauxhall production expanded rapidly - nearly 10,000 cars in 1933, and 
20,000 in 1934. And in 1935, with the new D-type models, over 26,000 were 
produced. The 1935-36 Vauxhall came with three basic chassis, but there 
were well over 20 different body options available. However, it is clear 
that the coachbullders' days were numbered. "".;J In 1936-37 Vauxhall spent a 
million pounds developing a new 10hp car with the chassis integral with the 
body, the Vauxhall "10-4" being launched in October 1937. By January 1938 
it was making 70 a day of these compared to 47 a day of those models with 
separate chassis. 40 
Later in 1938 unit construction versions of the "12" and then the "14" 
were introduced, and the only model with a separate chassis, the 25hp, 
produced at the rate of 12 a day in early 1938, was phased out during 1939. 
As a consequence, coachbuilders Martin Walter switched to the production of 
utility versions of the Vauxhall-based Bedford light van. This firm did not 
totally sever its connection with Vauxhall, producing an estate car 
conversion of the Vauxhall Crest a in 1963, but this was a very different 
relationship to the pre-war days. Other coachbuilders also did specialist 
conversions, sometimes only involving interior finishing. Grosvenor's post-
war work ~or Vauxhall was similarly very limited, producing, for example, a 
"woody· estate car version of the Wyvern. 41 
(vi) Ford 
The remaining member of the "Big Six", Ford, generally built or 
assembled its own bodies at Trafford Park. Some coachbuilders made special 
bodies before the first world war,42 and, given the versatility of the 
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Model T chassis, produced up until 1927, many special commercial vehicle 
bodies were built on it. With Ford's move south to Dagenham in 1931, body 
production was taken over by its new neighbour Briggs Bodies. 
The medium-sized producers 
Clyno, one of the biggest producers in the mid to late 1920s, bought in 
all its bodywork. Taylors made most of the bodies until Hayward Motor 
bodies, an A.J.S. subsidiary, built the fabric coachwork for the Clyno 9 in 
1928-29. 43 
Rover, a medium-sized producer throughout the inter-war period, reached 
an agreement in 1920 that Midland Light Bodies of Coventry should supply 
them with bodies, giving them first calIon their output. In return, Rover 
helped to finance that company's investment programme. It is not clear what 
proportion of Rover's bodywork this firm produced during the 1920s, but 
Rover decided in 1929 to produce these bodies themselves and acquired a new 
site for that purpose. The cost of car bodies was reduced from the "bought-
out" price of tS5 to t55, the savings on 4,000 bodies being equal to the 
.,.. ..... 
firm's'prot!ts'"for 1928-29. 44 But in the late 1920s and early 1930s Rover 
had "too ~n'i' body options for economical production". The 2-11 tre model, 
for example, had no fewer than 11 body styles in the 1930 range. As Autocar 
commented "It is a well-known fact that no factory can profitably produce a 
range of bodies, on all chassis, sufficiently comprehensive to meet the 
requirements of every purchaser". For the 1932 season, therefore, Rover 
made an arrangement whereby an agent handled all specialised bodies. Nine 
different coachbuilders produced 34 different bodies - Carbodies, Swallow, 
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and Charlesworth of Coventry, and Weymann, Maddox, Salmons, Whittingham & 
Mitchell, Grose, and Pressed Steel which finished and equipped its existing 
Rover body shell in an exclusive manner.45 
This policy was soon reversed, and while special bodies were still 
available from coachbuilders, financial constraints forced the company to 
rationalise its range. By 1937 they were down to two basic body styles and 
while the 1937 season models were offered in chassis-only form, this was a 
dying practice, and very few of Rover's cars in the 1939-47 period were 
fitted with non-standard coachwork. "By the mid-1930s, the professional man 
no longer bought a coachbuilt body for his chosen chassis as a matter of 
course; he settled for the body offered by the chassis manufacturer".4. 
Riley, another medium-sized Coventry company, had many of its bodies 
made by an associated body factory, known from 1919 to 1931 as the Midland 
Motor Body Company.47 The small Coventry firm of Hancock & Warman also 
produced a wide range of Riley bodies including many fabric ones until a 
fire forced it to close down in 1930. 4$ Riley gradually embraced pressed 
steel bodywork in the mid to late 1930s, though there were still special 
bodies from firms such as Arthur Mulliner and Grose, both of Northampton.4~ 
Little is known about Armstrong-Siddeley, though the Bristol Aeroplane Co 
were building some bodies for them in the early 1920s, and Holbrook Bodies 
produced quite a number later in the decade; while Mulliner had a 
substantial order in the late 1930s. 50 
Alvis was a Coventry company with no bodybuilding facility, and all 
their chassis went to outside coachbuilders - nearly 14,500 in the whole 
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inter-war period. Morgan of Leighton Buzzard built some 770 open tourer 
bodies for the first model between 1920-22. After that, local coachbuilders 
dominated Alvis work, building perhaps 90% of the subsequent inter-war 
bodies. Cross & Ellis were involved on most of the models throughout the 
period; the other 3 tended to follow each other roughly chronologically, 
with Carbodies building for the earlier models, Holbrook for the middle, 
and Charlesworth for the later. sl The other significant coachbuilder for 
Alvis was Vanden Plas. s2 
On a number of occasions, Alvis directors seriously contemplated 
building their own coachwork. Right throughout the period there were 
problems with outside coachbuilders - defective coachwork, bodies not 
supplied on time, and so on. In 1928 the company considered a closer 
relationship with Carbodies, on the opposite side of Holyhead Road. 
Although in 1930 the Board decided against undertaking their own coachwork, 
they considered buying up either Swift or Holbrook Bodies in the early 
1930s. But, for a variety of reasons, these plans went no further, and in 
about 1932 Alvis appOinted its first Body Engineer, during whose time of 
office, the company employed resident inspectors at each coachbuilder 
used.5~ Alvis's failure to supply its own bodywork was to become a 
contributory" factor to its downfall as a car producer in the 1960s. 54 
Lea Francis, another Coventry firm with no body shop, was a much smaller 
producer, making perhaps less than a thousand cars in the inter-war years. 
This company, not surprisingly, relied mainly on local coachbuilders, such 
as Robinsons and Cross & Ellis of Coventry, and Avon of Warwick. ss 
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The luxury car producers 
In the luxury car market, a number of firms concentrated on the chassis 
only. Napier had produced only 187 cars, all bodied by Cunard, before 
production discontinued in 1924.s~ Bentley, based in Cricklewood in north 
west London, produced just over 3,000 chassis from the end of the first war 
until 1931, when it closed down and was absorbed by Rolls-Royce. It had no 
body shop and used most of the high class London coachbuilders for body 
supplies, Vanden Plas producing the largest number, especially open 
coachwork, (most of their bodies in the 1920s were for Bentley) along with 
H.J.Mulliner, Thrupp & Xaberly, Park Ward, and Freestone & Webb. S ? 
Rolls-Royce similarly had no bodybuilding facilities of its own, and 
between 1923 and 1929, for example, almost 3,000 Rolls-Royce 20's went to 
coachbuilders, generating a tremendous amount of work.S~ It has been 
estimated that those firms specialising in coachwork on the Rolls-Royce 
class of chassis averaged, at most, an aggregate of 1,500 bodies annually 
in the years before the second world war <Park Ward, for example, building 
most of the 1930s' Bentleys).s9 
,. 
Lancheeter, however, usually made its own bodies until its takeover by 
Daimler in 1931. 50 Daimler, similarly, made most of its own bodies in the 
1920s, offering, for example, no less than 54 different body styles in 
1923. For their larger chassis, they supplied to coachbuilders a separate 
steel body frame which fitted the chassis, and enabled coachwork to be 
started before a chassis was delivered. s1 But, in 1930, Daimler closed down 
its own coachwork department (see chapter 8>, and for a number of years 
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Daimler and Lanchester shipped out all their chassis to coachbuilders. As 
well as firms like Hoopers, who always built the Daimlers for the Royal 
Family, and other high-class firms, the beneficiaries included firms like 
Holbrooks, Mulliners, and Charlesworth. G2 In the late 1930s, Daimler took 
over the London coachbuilding firms of Hooper and Barker, while Rolls-Royce 
took over Park Ward. ",:3 
Early in 1933 Daimler placed an order with Kulliner of Birmingham for 
3,000 Daimler and Lanchester saloons for the 1934 season, and later that 
year reached an agreement that Kulliner would supply a minimum of 80% of 
the total requirement of bodies for Daimler and Lanchester chassis for the 
next 3 years. 64 Within a year the agreement had been modified. Daimler 
would only build a maximum of 400 Lanchesters for the 1935 season, but up 
to 25% of its total body requirements for the 1936 season. Kulliners, in 
order to discourage this trend, offered an increasing rebate on turnover 
placed with them by Daimler, and started negotiating for the production of 
bodies for BSA, which was part of the same group as Daimler."'" 
In practice, some 1,500 bodies were carried forward into the 1935 season 
from the 1934 stock; and the initial 1935 season contract for 7,200 BSA, 
Daimler, and Lanchester bodies was scaled down to about 4,000 halfway 
through the season. While Kulliners could claim some compensation, they did 
not put in the large claim to which they were entitled "as a large claim 
for compensation would alarm them and result in their making arrangements 
to build their own bodies at Coventry". At the same time Kulliners secured 
a contract to supply all bodies for the 10 and 12hp Lanchesters and the 
15hp Daimler for the 1936 season. "In order to secure the whole of this 
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business and to ensure that they did not themselves commence production of 
these bodies it had been necessary to make some concessions in prices".G~ 
Once again, though, halfway through the season, the balance of the contract 
was cancelled, with Daimler coming to a financial understanding with 
Mulliner, who were left with a certain amount of unsold stock. At the same 
time Mulliners retained the Daimler contract for the 1937 season.67 
The relationship between Daimler and Mulliner was probably not untypical 
for the component industry generally, and exemplified the situation of 
those car manufacturers who contracted out all or most of their bodywork to 
batch production coachbuilders (as opposed to the more specialist one-off 
coachbuilders). Further substantial Daimler orders were placed for the 1938 
season, and Mulliner opent t2,OOO on paint drying ovens to ensure 
conformity with Daimler's own products. Despite this investment, Mulliner 
again experienced delay in Daimler taking their bodies.G~ Early in 1938 the 
Mulliner board agreed to negotiate with Daimler to stop them building their 
own bodies and to place the whole of their business with Mulliner, even 
though they recognised this would mean the extension of their own 
factories. Later that year when Daimler put out to tender the supply of 
10,000 10hpLanchester bodies, Mulliner "in the face of keen competition" 
quoted Na very low price", which was based on the cost of labour, 
'".if., ' 
materials, and overheads only. Despite this, the contract went to Briggs. '~'3 
While traditional coachbuilders' work for motor car companies started to 
decline from the mid-1930s, it was, until then, a very important and 
relatively labour-intensive component of the inter-war car industry. 
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B. DIVISION OF LABOUR AND THE ASSEMBLY LINE 
The motor car industry is often seen as the epitome of the moving 
assembly line, the ultimate logic of flow production techniques. Once Henry 
Ford had introduced the moving assembly line in Detroit for final assembly 
operations in 1914,7CI he had combined mass production with the most 
advanced form of flow production, and all other car manufacturers were 
forced eventually to emulate him because of the cost savings involved. Yet 
the introduction of the moving assembly line into British car factories was 
a very uneven process, both across the industry, and within individual 
factories. This had consequences for the relative sub-division of labour 
within different departments of car factories. 
Assembly lines were adopted an chassis erection before they were on body 
building, for a number of reasons. Most cars were wood-framed until the 
early 1930s and these frames were generally put together in a stationary 
main assembly jig to ensure accuracy, while the parts that were assembled 
together during chassis erection did nat require the intervention of any 
jigs .. Chassis parts were also standardised at a fairly early date in the 
century, while body standardisation had to wait until the 1930s. As the 
, • t,: 
technalogy~~f body-building, based around wooden frames, was relatively 
simple, a wide variety of body styles could be, and were, offered to the 
public. Changes in body styles could be effected fairly quickly, and were 
not very costly; and the practice of offering new models every "season" 
helped perpetuate this situation. A related factor was that in the late 
1920s and early 1930s there were several different types of body 
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construction available - coachbuilt, fabric, pressed metal composite, and 
all-steel, which further fragmented the production facilities. 
It was different in the paint, trim, and finishing areas. The 
replacement of paint by cellulose in the mid-1920s, and the developing 
practice of drying it in long ovens by pulling the bodies through, 
necessitated a moving line through the ovens, and a system of flow 
production before and after (though whether this was mechanised depended on 
the money available>. Body trimming was not inherently different from the 
production of chassis, in that parts were fixed to the body in a certain 
order; and many finish'ing operations took place after the body had been 
mounted on the chassis, and did not require any specialised equipment. 
While chassis assembly lines were adopted in many factories in the early 
1920s, it was not until the late 1920s or early 19305 that these were 
mechanised in the larger factories. Until then they were primitive push 
tracks, relying on wheels or trOlleys to allow easy movement forward. 
Consequently, work was performed with the chassis stationary, it being 
pushed between work stations. As with mechanised conveyors, the length of 
the assembly line dictated the number of chassis that could be put on it, 
and this'in turn t . along with the number of operatives employed, dictated 
the division of labour. The mechanised line did not alter this, though it 
had a number of extra advantages for the employer - for example, it avoided 
hourly variations in output, could pack vehicles much more closely 
together, and reduced material handling so that operators worked solely on 
the job in hand, not also as labourers. 
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Not surprisingly, the British plants of the big foreign car producers 
tended to copy their parent company's more advanced practice. Ford was the 
classic example, and was generally much more advanced in this sphere than 
any British company. Pressed Steel also brought in American technology with 
moving conveyors for its body assembly, paint and trim shops from its 
establishment in 1926. ·71 At the General Motors plant at Hendon, which was 
mainly producing Chevrolet trucks at the end of the 1920s, it was reported 
"the travelling conveyor line is used for assembly".72 The Citroen plant at 
Slough was also equipped with moving conveyors from the beginning of its 
operation there in the mid-1920s.7~ 
Chassis lines 
Ford's works in Trafford Park had already by 1915 an endless chain 
conveyor in the chassis erection shop.74 Apart from Ford, unmechanised 
chassis assembly lines developed in the industry generally in the early 
1920s, even among the smaller mass producers. Thus, at Standard the company 
had built a small U-shaped chassis assembly line by 1921, on which each 
chassis was pushed by the assemblers to the next work station. A complete 
chassis was erected every 40 minutes, taking 8 hours to progress along the 
track,· . which held 10-12 at anyone time. 75 
In 1925 Vauxhall were producing 3 different models, one of which was 
erected progressively, taking 9 hours to move through 9 work stations, with 
only 25-30 being produced each week. The other two models had too few built 
to justify significant progressive assembly, and were erected at two 
stations only.76 Hillman chassis were already moving forward by 1922, and 
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by 1929 the chassis line took advantage of "the natural gradient of the 
site, so that chassis are easily propelled along the line without the need 
for mechanical operation." It appears that on the "14" assembly line the 
cars were moved along in batches of 4.77 
Practice among other small-scale producers varied. Sunbeam had already 
established a system of flow production for chassis erection before the 
first world war. The chassis frame was delivered to a small gang of men, 
responsible for only one operationj it would then be hoisted along a girder 
tramway above and delivered to the next gang, who would do the following 
operation, and this was repeated right the way up the shop. In the mid-
1920s, with an output of about 50 cars per week, the firm still had no 
assembly track as such, but wheels with tyres were bolted in position at an 
early stage so that the chassis could be moved easily along the shop as it 
neared completion. 7a Vulcan of Southport did have chassis erecting tracks, 
which were arranged on a slight gradient. Trolleys were placed under the 
axles and moved forward by hand until the wheels were fitted. 7'3 
Crosaley, producing about 60 cars, lorries, and tractors a week in 
early 1926'; assembled all the chassis in situ right through the 1920s, and 
probably· later. eo At Daimler, until 1929 chassis were built on one spot 
. -, 
. , 
"like the laying down of the keel of a ship" according to the works manager 
of the time. In that year, the chassis assembly was put on a progressive 
line basis, though it was not mechanised. a1 Riley also had a chassis 
assembly line in the early 1930s,e2 but little is known of many other small 
to medium Coventry car manufacturers.a~ 
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At Morris Motors, 1919 saw the Cowley factory laid out for line 
production - "the chassis, as soon as it had its wheels on, moved from 
station to station, and the jobs were subdivided so as to synchronize with 
one another". By 1924, the one assembly line held 32 chassisj the time 
cycle at each work station was 2~ minutes, each chassis being completed in 
80 minutes. These were propelled along a wooden track by hand once the 
wheels and tyres had been fitted. Thirty an hour came off this line in 
1926. 94 When the Morris Minor was introduced in 1928, a separate line was 
laid down for Minor chassis, but still unmechanisedj and temporary wheels 
were fitted on the axles until the regular wheels with tyres were fitted 
after the chassis had been spray-painted and oven-dried. While other 
factors dictated reorganisation in the trim and finish areas which was 
accompanied by mechanised lines (see below), the slump delayed the major 
reorganisation of chassis assembly, for which money had been set aside, 
until 1934. Then five separate mechanically propelled chassis lines were 
laid down, each chassis spending about 2~ hours on the assembly line, 
receiving attention from no fewer than 200 men. as 
A number of British manufacturers preceded Morris in this development, 
though not that much earlier. Some writers, eg Fridenson, have suggested 
that Austin had brought in moving lines in or by 1925. This is based on a 
misunderstanding of Austin's biographers' commentsj while it is clear that 
moving conveyors had been introduced to shift certain components between 
shops, this was a far cry from wholesale mechanised assembly lines.·3~ With 
the expansion of production, between 1924 and 1927 the whole Austin factory 
was reorganised, and practically every machine tool and process 
repositioned on a flow production basis. As a result, front and rear axles 
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were assembled on separate mechanical conveyors; gear boxes were assembled 
on a track, "being pushed on .by hand from operation to operation"j and 
while a number of conveyors brought the major parts of engines together, it 
is unclear whether their "assembly was on a moving track.a7 
In 1925, though, Austin's 3 tracks for chassis erection were still 
unmechanised, and in 1928 the 20hp model, being produced in "comparatively 
smaller numbers" could not even be "arranged in the same progressive 
systew'. But in the latter year the company ordered mechanised tracks to be 
laid down as "production" has now increased to a stage that warrants its 
application", and they were in operation within a year. By 1934 the 3 main 
chassis assembly lines, 330ft long, were moving at 2 or 3 ft per minute, 
with 65 men performing 40 major operations on each line,as 
Singer, a large producer in the late 1920s, could not introduce assembly 
lines into its cramped Coventry factories,'ilg but installed a track system 
in a Birmingham factory bought in June 1927. Initially, the Singer Junior 
chassis was assembled on a track down which they were rolled as each 
operation was completed, with the result that the number of cars coming 
.t •. 
from the track varied from hour to hour. By the middle of 1930, however, a 
power-driven conveyor had been installed, assuring a uniform rate of 
output. The old track had taken up 50% mare space, but only turned out 75% 
of the number of cars. ·~o The ather major producer in the mid to late 1920s, 
Clyno, built a new works in about 1926, and installed conveyors for chassis 
erection, but it is unlikely that these were mechanised. 91 
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Mechanised tracks were brought in at three small to medium-sized 
producers at the beginning of the 1930s. The Standard Motor Company 
introduced moving conveyors into most parts of the Canley factory in the 
summer of 1931. A Standard chassis then passed through 12 6-minute 
stations, taking in all 72 minutes. These tracks were geared to producing 
ten complete cars every hour when the programme was launched in July 1931 
(this figure being reached in October), increasing to 12 in the winter of 
1931/32 and 16 by July 1932 (actually producing 15 during the following 
winter). The maximum line speed was further inceased to 20 per hour in the 
summer of 1935, and during the next year, hourly production capacity was 
increased to 30. (Whether this involved laying down a duplicate chassis 
track, as well as the new engine assembly track, is not clear.)~2, 
Tiny Vauxhall Motors, through the financial backing of its parent 
company General Motors brought in a mechanised chassis assembly line in 
1930. This would not have been justified by their output of cars in the 
early 1930s, but, from the start, commercial vehicle chassis were assembled 
on the same line in much larger quantities - initially Chevrolet models 
until Bedford trucks were introduced in 1931. ... :a The success of the Hillman 
company, (by then merged with Humber) at the 1929 Motor Show made it 
imperative for Rootes to reorganise the factories, so that very quickly 
there were conveyor lines in almost every department. 94 
Therefore, Morris, the largest producer of the interwar period, not only 
mechanised its chassis lines after its six largest rivals, but also at a 
much greater level of annual output. '3S Mechanised lines, especially in 
conjunction with synchronised overhead conveyors for the movement of 
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components, clearly led to significant cost savings in material handling 
and storage. But the piecework system. operating in all car factories 
(except Ford). gave managements sufficient flexibility over their direct 
labour produ~tion costs to partly compensate for this. 
Chassis assembly lines were also not confined just to the car factories. 
Apart from Vauxhall, the AEC bus and commercial vehicle chassis factory had 
been an early user of assembly lines. though their moving chassis conveyor 
was not in constant motion, only operating to release a chassis when 
required.9~ The Morris Commercial Cars factory in Birmingham was, like its 
parent Cowley factory, given a mechanised chassis line in the mid-1930s, 
replacing 2 earlier unmechanised lines. This line took chassis for vehicles 
of 15cwt to 3 ton capacity, while those for larger goods vehicles and 
passenger models were built on separate <probably unmechanised) lines.7I7' 
Fridenson cites a number of strikes in French car factories in the 1920s 
against the introduction of moving assembly lines. There do not appear to 
have been any in the British factories, despite Jefferys's comment that 
"methods such as the assembly line were regarded with suspicion and 
vigorously opposed by the workers" .. ,. ... There was no particular reason why 
there should have been strikes. given the payment by results systems in 
operationj·though strikes were just as likely over piecework rates. 
Bodymaking 
The major change in bodymaking in the 19205 was not the assembly line, 
but the increased use of specialised woodworking machinery coupled with the 
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extension of the "jig" system for putting the various wooden components 
together. Sunbeam had apparen~ly used jigs before 1914, in line with their 
advanced techniques of chassis production, but they continued to employ 
skilled labour on them. <Austin also claimed to have brought jigs in by 
1914, though the NUVB disputed this.) Wolseley introduced them in 1919, 
retaining skilled labour for a period; but when Austin brought them in 
extenSively at the same time, they used semi-skilled labour,~~ which the 
union saw as a major threat (see chapter 7). 
Once again, Ford had pOinted the way to the future with their widespread 
use of non-skilled labour before the war. As early as 1915, all wooden 
components in Ford's Manchester plant were machine cut to jigs or 
templates, and in their assembly, machine screwdrivers were used wherever 
possible. The "Automobile Engineer" believed that "the cult of the 
individual is far too strong in England to make it worth while a 
manufacturer laying out extremely expensive plant for repetition work". But 
where large numbers of standard bodies were produced, "there is much to be 
said in favour of the use of jigs and fixtures in connection with 
bodywork"~ At Ford,. most of these had been made of hard wood, and "in no 
~ 
case do they' approach in cost the jigs and fixtures that have to be 
.... 
employed .1n automobile engineering". 100 
The use of jigs, therefore, depended on the scale of production of each 
body. In the early 1920s, when car firms were producing a variety of 
different bodies and were unclear about the size of the potential market, 
then some models would be built up directly on a trestle. One NUVB member 
remembers doing this at Daimler, working in pairs, the senior man doing the 
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nearside <which was more valuable) and the junior the offside. As small 
batches were often executed by coachbuilding firms, the latter would be 
even more likely to employ this technique on more of their work, and for a 
longer period. Another NUVB member remembered building from the trestle at 
the Coventry coachbuilders Charlesworth in about 1925. He read the drawing, 
then marked everything out on a sheet of ply, like a datum board; for all 
subsequent bodies of the same type, he had all the measurements and 
markings. He also worked in a pair, working on the front of the body while 
his "mate" built the rear. In 1926, he was working in the same manner at 
the Coventry coachbuilder, Hancock & Warman. 
It is not clear in these cases how much handwork was still involved, and 
where the division lay between the woodcutting machinist and the bodymaker, 
in shaping and preparing the wooden members. In the Daimler case, the 
bodymaker did the job right from the "plank"; and the Charlesworth example 
suggests a similar practice. 101 Another example from Coventry in the 1920s 
notes "the men would collect wood from the stores on a Monday morning and 
it had to be cut, shaped and assembled into the frame for a car by the 
following Saturday morning". 102 
In the late' 1920s at Hoopers, a "high-class" London firm specialising in 
indlvldualcoachwork, patterns would be cut in a light wood, such as pine, 
and their form traced on planks of ash, which were then roughly cut to the 
desired shape. Woodworking machines would then be used to do the necessary 
shaping, boxing, boring, mortiSing, slotting, etc. The body framework would 
then be built up.'o~ This situation continued in coachbuilding firms for 
individual body orders throughout the inter-war period. At Salmons of 
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Newport Pagnell in the 1930s, there was some wood mill equipment in one of 
the body shops which was used for the shaping of body members for 
individual bodywork orders. The centre of the shop was occupied by several 
full-sized drawing-boards, arranged opposite the bays in which the 
individual bodies were built Up.l04 
In the special body shop for small orders at Hoyal of Weybridge, 
components were produced by the direct application of the templates to the 
wood stock. The men worked in pairs, each man responsible for some sub-
assembly work, while both did the final assembly. When only one body was 
required, the components and sub-assemblies were checked against the full-
sized drawing. lOS This method was used for commercial and public service 
vehicle bodies, by such coachbuilders as Hoyal, and Vickers of Crayford, 
the end product being largely a result of "individual skill and effort". lOG 
Almost all car firms adopted the jig system for some of their models in 
the early 1920s. Arrol-Johnston, Belsize, AC, and Crossley were among the 
smaller manufacturers using them, AC producing about 50 cars per week, and 
the others probably less. 107 In AC's case, excess material was quickly 
removed after fixing together, eliminating the need for preliminary shaping 
of tha wooden components; and this system was still in operation at the end 
of the 1920s. 1 0 8 A similar procedure was being used at Jowett in 1930. 1 ':>'3 
However, Crossley's output of car bodies was sufficiently varied for one 
observer to note in 1930 that "despite a well-equipped wood mill the 
mai n characteristic of handwork prevails". 1 1 0 
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As the market expanded, and the size of orders for coachbuilders 
increased, then they too built and used jigs for the bigger orders. When 
Hoyal and Vickers executed large contracts, a complete body was built; once 
approved, it was dismantled and special forming jigs and templates were 
manufactured from the actual components for use in the wood mill. Jigs and 
fixtures required for the assembly stage were also built. 111 One NUVB 
member working at Armstrong-Siddeley in the mld-1920s, was "loaned" out to 
Holbrook Bodies, who were taking on Armstrong-Slddeley work, and worked on 
jigging up for what he called "repetition production". Another worked at 
Cross & Ellis and Midland Light Bodies in 1927-28 where they were operating 
"semi-mass product ion" . 1 1 ;;;: 
Under a jig system, a much lower level of skill was required. Thus at 
Standard Motors, the main bodybuilding jig was arranged in such a way that 
it was impossible to set any wooden member in the wrong position. 12 bodies 
a day were being erected on this in 1923. 113 It was claimed at Crossley 
that "semi-skilled operators can frame up an entire body with the 
assistance of a screw-driver and glue pot only". 114 At Daracq in London, 
the main obje9t was "to reduce handwork to a minimum" and thus the assembly 
of the body units did "not entail the employment of skilled labour". 1 IS 
One consequence was that "lads" often did this work, rather than semi-
skilled male labour. This was a problem for the NUVB in Coventry, for 
example, right through the 19205. "Boys" working on jigs in the Standard 
body shop were only earning 3d per hour in 1921.116 The worst problem was 
at Hollick & Pratt (Morris Bodies> in the summer of 1924, when more than 40 
boys and youths were engaged, or transferred from the body shop, and put 
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into the jig-body shop; more jigs were being constructed, and none of the 
150 men discharged from the body shop at the time were given the 
opportuni ty to work on these jigs. 117 "Lads" were also recalled assembl1 ng 
on jigs at Swift in the late 1920s before the firm closed. lla 
When the Swallow coachbuilding works moved to Coventry from Blackpool in 
late 1928, the owner, William Lyons, wanted to quickly raise the weekly 
output from 12 to 50 bodies. In his words, "We knew we could only do this 
by adopting a new method of coachbuilt construction ... Whereas in 
Blackpool each bodymaker had been responsible for the complete framing-up 
of the body, the latest method used for volume production was the machining 
of the wooden parts in specially constructed jigs, so that they could be 
assembled rather like a jigsaw puzzle. This saved a tremendous amount of 
labour, but the introduction of the method caused us many headaches. In 
fact, we were in such trouble at one time that the bOdymakers approached me 
en bloc and told me that the whole thing was too complicated and doomed to 
failure, and that we should resort to the old method. We persevered, 
knowing that the economies could be very considerable, and before Christmas 
we had achieved our 50 bodies a week." Just over two years later, two 
NladsN wer~ w?rklng at each of 4 erecting jigs. The machined pieces of wood 
.... 
were glued and screwed together to form the body frame in just over an 
hour, eight NladsM erecting over 30 saloon body frames a day.119 
Given the complex shape and the size of some bodies, jigs were often 
used to build sub-assemblies, which were put together in a stationary main 
jig. Sub-assembly jigs were also introduced when the volume of output of 
particular bodies grew beyond a certain size. The Morris body shops at 
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Cowley and Coventry, Austin, and Singer were all definitely using them by 
the mid-1920s, 122 and probably a lot earlier. At Humber the jig system did 
not work very satisfactorily to begin with, in 1919, and jig-built doors 
were offered to bodymakers to use free of charge on any job. By 1928, 
simple jigs were used for building sub-assemblies which were all inspected 
before being assembled into the complete body frame. Some nine years later, 
the smaller Humber Vogue and Snipe saloon bodies were built up from sub-
assemblies such as Sills, rear framework, quarters, roof, scuttle, cant 
rails, doors and sub-dash, in a main jig. (Interestingly, even then, the 
coachwork for the large Humber Pullman limousine and landaulette was still 
not done in this manner, considerably more handwork being entailed.)!~3 
Normally only 2 men (or "lads") would work on a body frame at a time, 
and given the relatively small size of many car bodies in the 1920s, there 
was not a great deal of room for more than two. But where the scale of 
production and the particular operation warranted it, several men could 
work togetherj thus, five operators assembled the wooden roof frame for a 
Singer body in the late 1920s. 124 The skilled bodymaker, however, did not 
disappear when jigs were used. Someone had to make the prototype bodies and 
wooden jigs. and each season usually saw new bodies introduced. Some men 
.. 
could ?e on jigmaking full time; for example, two NUVB members in the mid-
--
1930s had been employed as jigmakers at Carbodies for eight years. 1~(~ And 
at Humber, the NUVB secured an undertaking that "any mounting and fixing of 
special wooden parts to (any] jigs calling for accuracy and skill" should 
be done by "skilled coachmakers". 121 Further, while car doors would be made 
in Jigs, "hanging" them required experiencej and fixing the metal panels 
would also generally be skilled bodymakers' work. 
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Body Assembly Lines 
Because of the variety of body types available, along with different 
types of construction often being used in the same factory, there was 
little sense in investing in moving assembly lines for body erection until 
a company had decided its long-term model policy. Morris Motors at Cowley, 
for example, built its own composite saloon bodies, while its Coventry 
factory built open tourer bodies, and Pressed Steel later supplied its 
requirements of all-steel bodies. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
Morris produced many new models, and the number of bodywork options 
expanded rapidly. Thus, despite its extensive use of outside suppliers, 
Morris also had "several" lines for bodybuilding at Cowley, which it made 
little sense to mechanise. 125 
Vauxhall also experienced problems in bodybuilding in 1933 when its 
production expanded consequent on the introduction of the new Light Six 
car: "In the body-building department production is made a 11 ttle more 
difficult by the different types of bodies that are being produced. Not 
only are there alternative bodies available for the new passenger models, 
but there are, of course, several van and truck bodies in the commercial 
vehicle class". The similarly-bodied Vauxhall Cadet car was still in 
production, and later that year the company also produced a new large car, 
the Big Six, with its own range of coachwork. 1~~ 
"Composite" body erection can be divided into two stages - firstly the 
erection of the wooden frame, and secondly the panelling and door hanging 
operations. 127 Panelling was normally secured by "pins" in the 1920sj but, 
- 267 -
in the early 1930s, forms of "composite" construction were developed where 
the wooden framing provided less and less of the body's structural 
strength. Pressed steel panels, welded together in different ways, 
increasingly took over this function. Whether or nat moving line systems 
were introduced for the panelling operation depended an the exact method of 
construction, but the larger employers invariably brought them in for the 
subsequent operations of door-hanging, and lead loading and levelling off 
the surface of any pin fixings or welding. When Standard introduced power 
driven conveyors in the summer of 1931, it included one for body erection. 
It is nat clear whether panels were fixed on this line, but oral evidence 
suggests that doors were hung an a moving conveyor. 1~~ 
Ford bodies built by Briggs in the early 1930s were built up from a 
series of pressed steel sub-assemblies with their own wooden framing (see 
chapter 6). The main frame sub-assembly was panelled, then the front and 
rear end sub-assemblies riveted and spot welded in place on the chassis 
frame by 6 men. Different main jigs were used for the four chassis types, 
the body then being put on a conveyor for finishing. 123 The bodybuilding 
section.of the Korris factory at Cowley was reorganised in 1934 to bring 
the works "into line with modern ideas of body construction to produce 
steel bodies· .. As at Briggs, the bodies were built up and panelled before 
being put on conveyors. Their system of construction was different, 
however, as the wooden sub-assemblies were screwed and bolted together in a 
·skeleton structure", then moved forward "on a cradle into another skeleton 
jig, in which the steel panelling is secured to the wooden framing". Only 
then did the body go on a conveyor where the panel jOints were electrically 
welded, the doors hung and fitted, and the body inspected. l~a 
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Apparently, the main assembly jigs for this type of composite bodywork 
were "invariably made of wood", and were not complex structures. 'Jolseley 
were unusual in building a "very elaborate" assembly jig constructed mainly 
of steel when producing a new composite-bodied model in 1939. Sub-assembled 
timber frames were inserted into the various portions of the metal 
bodyworki the whole assembly was then accurately positioned, the panel 
joints were gas welded, and the body then moved along a track for door 
hanging and loading of the welded joints. 1"31 
Some factories did have moving panel assembly lines. Singer bodies were 
coachbuilt in situ with aluminium panels until the mid-1930s when'steel 
panels were added to a wooden framing and welded together on a moving 
assembly line. (When Singer introduced a Roadster model in the late 1930s, 
its coachbuilt body of ash and aluminium was again assembled away from the 
track system. )1~2 At Humber, by 1937, the wooden body frame was placed on a 
rigid steel frame on a mechanically operated track, where the steel panels 
were pinned, and a small amount of spot welding carried out. The bodies 
were then transferred to another track, and the boot lids hung, door 
clearances adjusted, and the pin fixings lead loaded. The Hillman body 
t" 
lines, .apart from the Minx which was built at Pressed Steel, were also 
conveyorised. 133 
It was the coming of the pressed steel body that made body assembly 
lines more feasible, though initially, much work was still done before the 
body was strong enough to be let loose on a moving track. Even in the 
massive River Rouge plant of Ford in Detroit in 1930, "Jigs known as body 
bucks are situated at the commencement of conveyors, the purpose being to 
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locate and hold all important dimensions while riveting and welding are 
completed to a point at which it is safe to send the skeleton body along 
the conveyors for completion."134 At Ford's Manchester factory in 1929, the 
steel panels for the Model A Tudor saloon were welded together in a steel 
jig to produce a shell complete with dash and scuttle, after which the body 
shell was put on to a conveyor. 13S 
It is not clear at what stage the all-steel bodies produced at Pressed 
Steel started to be built up on conveyors. Probably the early to mid-1930s, 
as it was only then that they were produced in any volume. In the mid-1930s 
the Morris 8, the new Hillman Minx, and the Flying Standards (see chapter 
6), were all produced in sufficient numbers to make this worthwhile. One 
former worker says the Morris 8 <produced from the end of 1934) was built 
on a conveyor, he himself working on the side-panel 1ine. 13G 
The introduction of unitary construction techniques at the end of the 
1930s increased the scope for body assembly lines. The Vauxhall Ten-Four 
body was built up in three sub-assemblies - rear end, including roof and 
side panels,front end, and underbody. At each principal stage in the 
.... - "'. 
product..i~n of:' these, fixtures were provided, where two to four or more 
operators would. be involved in spot welding. These main sub-assemblies were 
then located in a master jig, temporarily secured by tack-welding, and then 
put on a short "merry-go-round" for the final spot welding. The bodies were 
then transferred to three "fettling and finishing" lines where door hanging 
was also carried out. Just over half the operators were on line work, with 
"specially trained operators" employed on the "skilled operation" of door 
hanging, which took up "a considerable length of the line".137 
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At Pressed Steel, the unitary-constructed Morris Ten had its side panels 
built up on their own oval-s~aped conveyor. "A generous provision of 
locating pins, fixtures and clamps on the conveyor trucks" enabled the body 
to be spot welded together on the moving conveyor, without the intervention 
of a stationary main assembly jig. On the same conveyor, the doors were 
hung, and then final "straightening" and finishing operations perfor~d. 13S 
As with door hanging, many of the finishing operations on all-steel bodies 
could not be significantly broken down - a metal finisher at the Briggs 
Highland Park plant in Detroit in 1932 remembers having to finish the roof 
rail on one side of every tenth body. 1~9 
Paint Shop Conveyors 
The major change in interwar practice in the paint shops was the 
introduction of cellulose, which is dealt with in detail in chapter 6. 
Written and pictorial evidence of paint shops suggests that certainly after 
the introduction of cellulose, the preparation of the bodies before 
spraying was done with the bodies on movable trolleys. Whether or not these 
were attached to conveyors, all plants14c~ seemed to have had a moving 
conveyor to take "the bodies through the drying ovens, as the length of time 
spent in them was critical. 
The other paint shop operations were usually the last major line process 
to be conveyorised. Austin brought in extensive mechanisation in the paint 
shops in 1932, and estimated that these new tracks would save the company 
on average 35 shillings per body in labour and materials. 141 The 1934 
chassis reorganisation at Morris also brought in four separate conveyorised 
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paint lines. 14~ During 1935, Standard brought in a new continuous track, 
where bodies travelled over half a mile. 14~ And by 1936, if not before, the 
Humber-Hillman paint shops were completely conveyorised. 144 
Trim Shop Practice 
The traditional practice in trimming had been that the body would be 
trimmed by one man, most of the work being built up directly in the body. 
The first major change in trimming came when the scale of production 
justified dividing trimmers into two groups - those who made up trimming 
items at the bench, and those who fitted them in the body, occurring before 
the first world war in some factories. 
Cutting out the material had traditionally been a hand job, with some 
skill necessary to leave the minimum of waste. A number of railway works 
established the principle of cutting out material to patterns or 
templates,14S in some instances these also marked the exact pOSitions for 
the buttons; 14_ while electrically operated cutters were sometimes used, 
the one at Wolverton in 1897, for example, being capable of cutting 10 
~ .. ' .... 
thicknesses of material at a time. 147 Templates and electric cutters were 
; . 
then, brought in to" the car industry. In Ford's Manchester plant, 25 
thicknesses could be done at a time in 1915. 148 
Another time and skill-saving innovation was the introduction of cushion 
presses, which compressed the horsehair filling as well as buttoning the 
cushion to hold it together, though this still left the lengthy process of 
finishing off and then attaching the spring-case. Similar machines were 
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already being used for seat-cushions and "squabs" (back-cushions) at 
Daimlers by 1912, if not before, and two men produced enough for the 75 
trimmers employed in the factory. 149 Fords at Manchester had them by 1915, 
following practice in the Detroit factory, 150 and they were noted at Rover 
and Wolseley before the war, and even in the small Arrol-Johnston factory 
during the war and in the early 1920s. '5' As one inter-war coachbuilding 
manual put it: "This method of constructing a cushion or squab is, of 
course, only suitable for large quantities of exactly the same pattern, 
but, if these conditions are present, then the labour cost of making up a 
large cushion is only a matter of a few pence". 15~ While it is an important 
issue, it has not been possible to discover the extent of the use of these 
machines. They were in use for "buttoned" trimming at Vickers in 1924, and 
at Rover in 1926. '53 But oral evidence suggests they were not generally 
used even by large firms in the inter-war period, as "buttoning" was little 
used in mass production shops after the early 1920s. 1S4 
Ford's Detroit factory, producing on a massive scale even in 1915, had 
installed chain conveyors in place of benches, the cushion conveyor having 
a capacity of 134 per hour, while 120 back cushions could be made every 
hour on another conveyor. ISS The Manchester factory, with a much lower 
production, merely assembled the cushions "progressivelyM, eleven men 
producing 93 a day. 156 Fairly quickly after the first world war, British 
firms engaging in mass production (which, at that stage, only meant a few 
thousand cars a year - ie around 100 a week), subdivided the trimming 
operations so that all the work was made up on the bench. One former NUVB 
member claimed that Austin was the first Midlands firm to do this.'57 
However, the practice became fairly common in the early 1920s, even among 
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London coachbuilding firms. lS~ But an NUVB member at Charlesworth 
remembered men having to trim a whole body, and that when he was trim shop 
foreman, less than one man in six applying could be started because of the 
high level of skill required. lS~ 
Body trimming, the fixing of the trimmings in the body, was a time-
consuming process, even in "mass production" shops. In Ford's Detroit 
factory, despite the already extensive mechanisation in 1915, the side 
paddings were still being stuffed with horsehair directly in the car, on a 
moving line; the "burlap" (ie canvas) interior was then sewn in place, 
further stuffing added to form a roll at the top, and the leather then 
tacked in place. Though, being Ford, this work on the line was subdivided. 
Interestingly, at this stage, the "top" and curtains had to be built on to 
each Model T Ford, being individually fitted rather than pre-assembled. I~O 
Similarly, at Austin, the only trimming that was not prepared on the bench 
was the "head" leather for the landaulette body. 1~1 
In British factories, the squabs and elbow pieces were traditionally 
tacked on to special "trimming rails", and these, in turn, had to be 
covered up by the use of metal beading. 162 Later, squabs would be more 
quickly fitted using metal fastenings, so that they could be easily 
removed, and"the rear seat cushion would rest in the seat well without any 
attachment. Practices varied, and door pads, attached by spring clips at 
Morris Bodies in Coventry, were screwed into place at Cowley. 163 
Most bodies in the early 1920s were "open", and the trend away from open 
bodies in the 1920s was accompanied by complex moving "heads" (ie hoods) in 
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the more expensive cars; while the increasing numbers of "closed" bodies 
brought with them the "headlining". 164 The attachment of this was by far 
the most complicated piece of body trimming, requiring the use of adhesives 
as well as tacks.16s One attempt to circumvent the difficulties was made 
when the all-steel Morris Oxford, made at Pressed Steel in the late 1920s, 
had its roof painted and trimmed separately before being screwed on to the 
body in the Korris factory. 166 
Also, separate front seats (usually known as "bucket" seats) became 
nearly universal in Britain, unlike the United States where the "one-piece" 
front seat continued. '167 This entailed the new process of seat-building, 
similar to, but more skilled than, squab and cushion-making. It appears 
that at Korris Kotors at Cowley and Korris Bodies in Coventry, individual 
trimmers would still make up seats complete in the early 1930'sj though by 
the late 1930's in the Coventry factory a "preparatory gang" would cover 
the spring cases with hessian, felt roll and hair or fibre mat, before 
passing the work on to skilled trimmers in the "cushion gang" and "squab 
gang", who would finish the work with leather or rexine. 16~ Seat-building 
conveyors were feasible, and one was brought in at Singer in 1938. '6 ';' 
Howe~e~t technical developments very quickly became available that would 
.... ,', '., 
eventually undermine the trimmer's newly acqUired seat-building skills. In 
the early 1930s, spring cases and padding started giving way to various 
pneumatic or cellular rubber fillings, especially in smaller bodies needing 
lower seats. In particular, "Dunlopillo" cushions came on to the market in 
1931. 170 It is difficult to assess how much of the market they took in the 
1930s, but seat construction was made much easier - "the trimming of these 
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seats is simple, as it consists of an envelope of leather which is fixed 
over the seat". 171 But the main move away from horsehair to latex-type 
padding was probably an early post-second world war development. 
While apprenticeships were very rare in trimming, many boys learnt the 
trade by going into trim shops straight after leaving school. Of course, 
the expertise gained depended entirely on how many different jobs the boy 
was allowed to do during these years. This might well depend on the boy's 
father having influence with the foreman, for example. However. during the 
inter-war years, it appeared to be in most car manufacturers' interest that 
there should be a supply of all-round competent trimmers. even if their 
skills were not adequate for the more specialist coachbuilding firms. 
A Morris worker at Cowley remembers that boys would begin by creasing 
the rexine after it had been cut out into seat shapes. Female sewing 
machinists would then machine down these creases, to produce "flutes". 
Stuffing the flutes with wadding. using a special implement, was the job 
done by the next age-group of boys in the trim shop. At age 18. they would 
start ma~ing up door pads - a shaped piece of plywood with a layer of 
, 
wadding. covered with rexine, and usually with a door pocket (which also 
had to be trimmed> attached. Finally they went on to seat making. 172 
At Morris Bodies in Coventry. the progression would start in the cutting 
room. where the boy would become familiar with the various trimming 
materials - canvas. hessian. horsehair. felts. and rexines and leathers. He 
might then work on sticking canvas on the various trimming rails. A spell 
on trimming sunshine roofs would then precede the final move into trimming 
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squabs, cushions, and bucket seats. Practice varied widely between 
factories. While boys spent a long time creasing and stuffing flutes at 
Cowley, this job was done by female sewing machinists at Morris's Coventry 
factory, and also at Standard. 17~ 
Two other major changes occurred which speeded up the trimming process 
during these years. One was the replacement of the traditional trimmer's 
hammer by a magnetic hammer in many mass production shops by the early 
19308, if not before, <which one former trimmer reckoned halved the time 
spent on hammering tacks>. 174 The other was the introduction of all-steel 
bodies, with no internal wooden fillets to attach trimming rails; and this 
necessitated the development of simpler methods of attachment. 17& During 
the inter-war period, trimming moved a long way from Automobile Engineer's 
somewhat sneering description in 1915 of "the trimmer with his tacks and 
irons, needles and scissors, buttons etc, and all the obscure impedimenta 
of a peculiar handicraft". 176 But in 1939, the trimming process in the car 
factories still retained an important core of handwork skills. 
Trim and Finishing Lines 
The body trimming operations (prior to mounting on the chassis> and body 
finishing (after mounting) were more amenable than body erection to moving 
line production. How this actually operated varied from plant to plant. 
Arrol-Johnston had a primitive conveyor track for body trimming and 
finishing in the early 1920s, on which bodies were pushed forward after 
each operation, but, because of the relatively low scale of production. 
there were very long work-cycles for the operators. 177 Stationary line 
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systems were also noted in the mid-1920s at Austin and Morris; one Morris 
worker, starting in 1927, remembers fitting door pads on a trim line, and 
working five or six cars up the line at a time. 17'3 As finishing dealt with 
the body already mounted on the chassis, it can be surmised that flow 
production here was relatively easy as the car could be propelled forward 
on its own wheels while the final operations were completed. Jowett, for 
example, producing less than 100 cars per week in the mid-1930s, used 
"modified line methods", to not only finish but also trim the body (of 
which there were 6 different types) after it had been mounted on the 
wheeled chassis. 179 Many coachbuilders adopted similar practices, Salmons 
of Newport Pagnell facilitating the movement of bodies from one shop to 
another, by mounting the body frame on the supplied chassis before 
panelling, painting, trimming and finishing. 190 
In the mid-1920s Morris used separate shops for mounting and finishing 
closed and open bodies. But, with the addition of the newall-steel Morris 
Oxford (built, painted and trimmed at Pressed Steel from 1927-28), which 
would require different techniques, and the new Morris Minor launched in 
1928 (with the open tourer version already painted and trimmed in 
,~ Coventry>" "an extensive rearrangement ... [was] ... carried out to enable 
all classes of chassis and body to be dealt with on different lines without 
undue handlin8"~ Consequently the body trimming and finishing lines were 
chain-propelled from about the su~r of 1928. Six separate lines were 
noted in 1934, probably dating from this 1928 reorganisation, 1~1 which bas 
been obscured by the later mechanisation of the chassis tracks. 
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It seems likely that Austin. engaged on a much more thorough 
reorganisation of his factory. mechanised the trimming and finishing tracks 
at the same time as the chassis lines. in 1928. The Austin body trimming 
lines were noted in 1934 as being 290ft long. and moving at 2ft per 
minute. 1,a2 Standard followed suit, bringing in a single mechanised trim 
line and a body mounting and finishing line simultaneously with their 
chassis track in 1931.193 During 1936 Standard went even further and 
introduced moving assembly lines into the newly expanded Final Finish 
Department. where the cars were carefuily inspected. faults rectified, and 
minor painting and finishing operations performed. 194 
Humber had four separate tracks for trimming operations on car bodies, 
while vans were also trimmed in the same shop. Although body panelling and 
painting operations were conveyorised, it is not clear that trimming 
was. 185 But, in any event, given the relatively low volume of Humber 
production, and the fragmentation of trimming work, there must have been 
fairly long work cycles in this area; and it is interesting to note that in 
the late 1930s the IUVB's only real area of strength at Humber was in the 
trim shop, (see chapter 8). Si nger, with a much lower overall volume than 
the Big 'Six;' had to wait until 1938 for the paint shop. the trim shops. 
, " 
body mount1ng,.~ and final finishing to be conveyorised, wi tb all models 
going down the one line in these shops. 196 
Use of power tools 
While moving assembly lines increased the intensity of work, the use of 
power tools further reinforced this. But the latter's introduction tended 
- 279 -
to wait until the former (except in the case of paint spraying equipment), 
even though the capital outlay necessary was generally low. Not 
surprisingly Ford's Manchester plant were in the forefront; on the main 
body-building conveyors, in the mid-1920s, "the use of hand drills and 
screwdrivers has been entirely eliminated, the shop .... equipped ..... with 
pneumatic drills, screwdrivers and speed wrenches". 197 But visitors to the 
Cowley works of Morris in 1924 were surprised at the extent to which hand 
tools such as hand drills and screwdrivers were used <though pump 
screwdrivers were used on the trim line in 1927), and the little use made 
of electrically driven or compressed air tools. And in 1929 in the 
factory's bodybuilding shops there was an "almost complete absence of 
power-driven tools", which could have been used in drilling, screwdriving, 
turning over the edges of panels, driving nails, etc. lee 
At Austin, however, there were air lines in every shop in the late 
1920s, lS3 and when the Standard works were completely reorganised in 1931, 
and power driven conveyors installed, "wherever possible, power-driven 
equipment superseded the old-fashioned spanner, drill or screwdriver". Such 
power tools were suspended above the employees' work "so that there is no 
" ~, 
' .. 
time lost~-in picking them up". According to Captain John Black, the General 
Xanager,~ ~;;aa~ we reduced time [to build a carl so we had to reduce physical 
energy·, 190-Power-driven tools were installed at Singer's Birmingham 
factory. Singer being reputed by one contemporary source to be "definitely 
the first" to equip their workmen with electrically operated spanners. 191 
The time saving involved, with little capital outlay, waS also 
attractive to coachbuilders. By 1930, the Hoyal bodybuilding works at 
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Weybridge made extensive use of electric drills and screwdrivers in its 
body shop devoted to large contracts. 1~2 Salmons of Newport Pagnell, with 
an output of 50 bodies a week in the mid-1930s, plus its conversions of 
other manufacturers' standard saloons to transformable bodies with folding-
head bodywork, were using air lines for pneumatic drills, sanders, and 
other tools in its body shops. 19~ 
Conclusion 
Assembly lines expressed the increasing division of labour that had come 
about because of the growth of output from individual factories. They were 
the logical application of flow production principles to assembly, rather 
than fitting, processes; and were therefore inappropriate for certain 
aspects of motor car production. Mechanisation of the lines did not alter 
these basic points. The main advantage to the employer of moving lines was, 
assuming the necessary infrastructure, a tremendous saving in material 
handling. Under a payment by results system (as in all car factories except 
Ford), the worker was tied to the group, rather than to the line. 
It was almost impossible to break down a number of jobs beyond a certain 
pOint, and this gave some groups a strategiC position in the production 
process, irrespective of whether or not they worked on assembly lines. A 
number of bodymaking and trimming jobs came in this category; far from 
being marginalised by mass production, if the IUVB were organised, their 
members had great power. 
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PART 2. RAILWAYS 
A. RATIONALISATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
The Railways Act of 1921 amalgamated nearly all the railway companies 
into 4 big groupings. "The scheme of grouping was designed to produce 
geographically compact systems which would eliminate as far as possible 
conflict between the groups". But "the amalgamations were not 
scientifically planned on a geographical basis since one of the principal 
objectives was to leave the old companies intact". 1~4 Consequently, the 
territories covered overlapped to some extent. 
The LMS resulted from 35 former companies, the LNER and GWR from 33 
each, and the Southern Railway from 19. l'.,S This massive reorganisation, 
effective from the beginning of 1923, had a number of implications for NUVB 
its members. Most of the larger amalgamating companies had sizeable 
workshop facilities, with some building new stock, while all had engaged in 
repair work. With the grouping, new construction was concentrated on 
certain sites,with specialisation where pOSSible; other shops were 
designated for repair work only, again with some specialisation. 
The least affected grouping was the GWR, dominated by its previous 
namesake company, the Swindon works being virtually the only manufacturing 
site in the new group. Repair work continued at shops such as Worcester, 
Oswestry, Cardiff /Caerphi 11y, Newton Abbot and Bridgwater. "~,,, The Southern 
Railway inherited the workshops at Eastleigh, Ashford, and Brighton and 
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Lancing, and from 1925 to 1928 concentrated all carriage construction at 
Eastleigh, transferring some men from Lancing, which was confined to repair 
work on central section stock. In the process a number of NUVB members last 
their jobs. In 1930, further rationalisation led to Ashford concentrating 
on locomotives and wagons, with Lancing doing repairs to all Southern 
Railway steam and electric bogie carriage stock. This meant a transfer of 
some 150 men, mainly NUR members, from Ashford to Lancing. 1 ',n 
The LMS was probably the most affected group, as the 8 major constituent 
companies each had their own carriage and wagon works. On the LNWR, the 
L&Y, and the Midland alone, the dimensions of passenger carrying vehicles 
varied from under 40ft. long by 8ft. wide to over 65ft. long by 9ft. wide. 
In the majority of cases the component parts were not interchangeable. The 
LM3 rapidly instituted a policy of having new stock built to 4 standard 
lengths only. 1 '';';''iiI New carriages and wagons were to be built at 4 works 
Earlestown building wooden framed mineral wagons; Wolverton 1st and 3rd 
class carriage stock, and, a new departure for this previously exclusively 
carriage works, all covered wagon stock; Derby high class carriage stock -
dining, restaurant and sleeping cars, and corridor stock - plus special 
wagon stock; and Newton Heath compartment carriages and steel frame 
merchandise·wag~ns. The workshop building a particular type of vehicle also 
supplied the components for maintenance and repairs to the other workshops 
and out-station shops. 199 
The Scottish factories of St.Rollox, Barassie, and Inverness were 
reorganised for dealing with heavy repairs, and the other workshops dealt 
with ordinary repairs. In 1929 it was decided that Barassie should 
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concentrate on wagon repairs, and St.Rollox on carriage repairs.~~o But 
more drastic rationalisation took place. In 1927 the Stoke locomotive, 
carriage, and wagon works was closed, and its workforce transferred to 
Crewe, 15 miles away, and Derby, 36 miles away.~Ql The Crewe carriage 
department was then closed in the early 1930s, and the workforce 
transferred to other centres. 202 
Other small carriage works closed down were Inverness, Barrow, and 
Tilbury, with men moved, in some cases from Tilbury to Glasgow,203 but by 
far the most serious closure was of the whole Newton Heath carriage and 
wagon works in 1932. The increased productivity of the other 3 main works, 
and the drop in traffic in the early 1930s were given as the reasons. 204 
Newton Heath normally employed about 4,000, but this had been reduced prior 
to closure to 1,500. Of these, 800 were to be transferred, and the rest 
discharged. 600 NUVB members were involved, with a number going to Derby 
and Wolverton, and a few to Horwich for running repairs to electric trains 
in the district, but the majority were discharged. 20s 
The four~h railway company, the LNER, also inherited a large number of 
workshops, the main carriage shops being at York, Doncaster, Stratford, 
Dukinfield·~nd.Cowlairs. The smaller Inverurie works stopped building 
carriages in 1923, as did Cowlairs. At Stratford, no new passenger-carrying 
vehicles were built after 1927, and the last new vans were built in 1929, 
the works being re-equipped in 1931 as a major repair centre. Dukinfield 
carried on building until 1939, but was re-equipped after 1928 for the 
progreSSive repair of coaches. York and Doncaster became the two main 
carriage-building works for the LNER.206 
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While the LMS seems to have experienced the greatest upheaval, the 
inter-war period saw regular short-time working and dismissals at most of 
the major shops around the country. While Floyd could report that the 
railway shops in his organising district were taking on additional men, as 
well as giving new work out to contractors late in 1923, a few months later 
the LMS shops started short-time which lasted much of 1924. St.Rollox was 
noted as being back on a short week, with Saturdays off, in mid-1925. And, 
after the General Strike, many shopmen returned to face a 4 day week.207 
Again, early in 1928 the LMS group experienced suspensions and dismissals 
at all centres, in particular those with the most advanced production 
methods. Wolverton was noted as one suffering particularly severely from 
dismissals at that time, though most of those dismissed got fixed up 
elsewhere, many qUite possibly going to the Oxford car factories.2'~~ 
A return to full-time working early in 1930 in many of the major centres 
was quickly followed by renewed short-time. 209 One continuing complaint was 
that while the craft unions preferred short-time to dismissals, because of 
the strain of unemployment benefit on their funds, the NUR was in favour of 
the opposite, and this prevented a united front being presented to the 
respective managements. 210 One result was that at York, which reputedly had 
, . 
the large~~NUR shopmen's branch, there were some 400 dismissed from the 
carriage and wagon works in mid-1930.~11 Substantial dismissals also 
occurred at St.Rollox and Dukinfield 1n 1932, though from m1d-1933 onwards, 
the various workshops started taking men on again, and by early 1934 Derby, 
Doncaster, Dukinfield and York had practically absorbed all those NUVB 
branches' unemployed members, York branch even having to apply to Head 
Office to secure more men for the carriage works.~12 
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Despite these difficulties, the railway shops continued to employ 
several thousand NUVB members. Apart from the big carriage workshops, 
members were employed as painters in the locomotive workshops, including 
those without attached carriage workshops, or only small carriage 
departments, such as at Crewe,21~ Gorton, and Horwich. And there were 
hundreds of small workshops and out-stations. In London for example, there 
were small main line workshops at Willesden, Neasden, Plaistow, and Bow, 
depots like Clapham Junction, New Cross Gate, and Wimbledon,214 as well as 
the underground railways' workshops. Across the country, outside the bigger 
towns, there were a variety of places members might be employed in very 
small numbers, though some of them were rationalised during the inter-war 
years. Examples are Warrington, the workshop of the former Cheshire Lines 
Railway, Birkenhead of the old Wirral Railway, and Melton Constable, where 
the union had a branch in the 1920's.21. 
The Railway Contract Shops 
The inter-war history of the contract shops is one of rationalisation 
due to depressed demand. Once again, as in 1902, this centred around a 
merger involving the Metropolitan company. However, prior to the big 
amalgamation of 1927, there had already been some merger activity. Leeds 
Forge, which had moved into the rolling stock industry in 1887, making 
underframes initially before building a separate cariage works in 1908, 
took over the Bristol Wagon & Carriage Company in 1920 and closed it down 
in 1923.21~ Camme11 Laird, which only started building rolling stock in a 
Nottingham factory after the first world war, took control of the Midland 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company in 1919 and Leeds Forge in 1923. 
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In 1927, the Cammell Laird and Metropolitan groups merged their rolling 
stock activities to close redundant capacity, and from 1929 the new group 
was known as the Metropolitan-Cammell Carriage, Wagon & Finance Company 
(Metro-Cammell, for short).21? A substantial closure programme then took 
place. The first casualties were survivors from the 1902 amalgamation, with 
the Ashbury works at Openshaw closing about 1928, and the Oldbury works 
stopping building rolling stock in 1929; Leeds Forge was then closed in 
1930, and Cammell Laird in 1931. 210;;0 
This left Metro-Cammell with its Saltley works, along with the nearby 
Washwood Heath works of its subsidiary, the Midland Railway Carriage & 
Wagon Company, and the steelworks of another subsidiary, Patent Shaft & 
Axeltree company, which made occasional rolling stock at its Old Park, 
Wednesbury works.219 A number of independents survived, such as the 
Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company of Handsworth, the Gloucester 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company, Cravens of Sheffield, as well as the 
Scottish firms of Hurst Nelson, and R.Y.Pickering. Most of these firms were 
also involved in tram and/or bus bUilding. 
The rationalisation in the industry had, however, confirmed Birmingham 
as the<centre of the railway carriage contract industry, compensating for 
that city's lack of railway company workshop employment. But the contract 
shops' employment was, by nature, related to manufacturing orders, with men 
being laid off when contracts were completed. This became particularly 
grave in the early 1930s when all of the centres suffered, with its related 
effects on NUVB branch organisation in Saltley, Handswortb, Gloucester, and 
Motherwell (see chapter 7). 
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Trade Union Organisation 
Trade union organisation in the railway workshops was bedevilled by the 
rivalry between the various craft unions and the NUR. It is difficult, 
however, to quantify whether this resulted in a lower or a higher level of 
trade union membership and organisation. In those carriage shops, where the 
UKSC had established itself before the expansion of the GRWU in 1910, the 
NUVB maintained a high level of organisationj elsewhere its membership was 
usually relatively low, and the NUR correspondingly high. 
The NUVB's main strongholds in the 1920s were at Swindon and Wolverton, 
and the Manchester shops of Newton Heath, Dukinfield, and Gorton. During 
that decade a number of organising campaigns were held, often in 
conjunction with other unions. Fallowing the implementation of the grouping 
at the beginning of 1923, the union was involved with the Federation of 
Engineering & Shipbuilding Trades in a series of organising meetings in 
Scotland, where it was reported that the NUR were very firmly entrenched in 
the north of Scotland workshops.22') Organisers Floyd and Halliwell then 
addressed many organising meetings in English railway centres that 
summer,2~1 before separate conferences were held of NUVB branch 
representatives from the four groupings in the autumn. As well as dealing 
with the various grading issues <of work and towns), these meetings also 
considered the level of organisation. The LNER conference called for an 
intensive organiSing campaign, as did the LKS, which highlighted "the badly 
organised districts", while the Southern group wanted an immediate campaign 
in Ashford.2~~ 
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Following this, meetings were held in Derby, Ashford, and also in 
Brighton, where it was noted that, while most workers were in trade unions, 
the organisation was not very good.:';;:;;;;:3 In comparison, the craft unions at 
Gorton and Dukinfield were reputed to be 100% organised. 224 But in the next 
few years, much attention was focussed by all unions on reaching an 
agreement with the four railway companies on negotiating machinery at 
national and local level, and settling their own differences through a 
"Membership Agreement". Agreement with the railway companies in 1927 
included the constitution of shop and works committees to take up cases on 
behalf of individuals or groups of employees. It was estimated that if the 
agreement was followed to the letter, the LMB would have 25 Works 
Committees and 237 Shop Committees.:.2';'s 
The "Membership Agreement" resulted from recommendations made by a sub-
committee of the TUC General Council early in 1925. The initial proposals 
made clear that no union member could join another union without proper 
inquiry, but gave freedom of choice to non-unionist craftsmen to join the 
union of their choice. The AEU and the Boilermakers objected to this, 
believing that the HUR should be prohibited from recruiting skilled men. 
NUVB Assistant General Secretary Compton argued "while we are quarelling 
the horse 1s starving". He thought that a suggested scheme for the 
unification of trade benefit subscriptions might solve "the vexed question 
of membership". "A few craftsmen conscientiously believe in 'industrial 
unionism', but the majority of those in the ranks of the NUR are there 
because the contribution is less than that paid to the craft union".2~6 
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A year later, no progress had been made on this particular clause, but 
further consideration soon led to agreement that non-unionist craftsmen 
would first be approached by the union "catering for their occupation". It 
was also agreed that all unions should make efforts toward the "elimination 
of non-unionists". Joint Committees were to be set up to supervise these 
arrangements, and the NUR accepted the NUVB's interpretation of the clause 
that any non-unionist coachmaker having a grievance against the NUVB or 
wishing to join "an Industrial Union", would have his case referred to the 
Works Joint Committee. If they were satisfied, then he could join the other 
union.~27 
Membership committees ceased to operate after a few years because of 
continuing inter-union difficulties,22'~ but NUR records show that many 
functioned in the first few years. At Ashford, on the Southern Railway, the 
committee was still functioning in 1929 when it was estimated that 1,420 
were in various unions out of about 2,000 employed. While the NUVB were 
represented, their local branch membership still remained below 100. Some 
departments in the Brighton works were 99% organised; at the associated 
Lancing works, the NUR had about 400 members, while the craft unions had 
less than 100 between them (the NUVB only having "a few"). A joint 
committee between the two works had led to recruitment at Brighton, but 
little progress at Lancing. 
In 1929, it was estimated that at Cowlairs some 75% of the 2,400 workers 
were in unions, and 80% at St.Rollox. At the latter, the NUVB had 
representation on the Membership Agreement Committee from the trim shop and 
carriage shop (both along with the NUR> and the paint shop (with the NUR, 
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NAFTA. and the Scottish Painters). The NUVB were much weaker at Cowlairs 
with representation only from the carriage shop (with the NUR), while the 
NUR represented the trim shop, and the paint shop (with the Scottish 
Painters).229 This tallies with earlier NUVB reports that their 
organisation at St. Rollox was in a strong position. '::;":' 
At Swindon, the joint committee held a campaign in late 1927 to recruit 
non-unionists, with dinner-hour meetings at the various entrances over a 
fourteen day period. 231 However, it was suggested by an NUR member that 
there were still about 3,000 non-members there out of 13,000 employed in 
1930. The TGWU, which brought in 7 organi~ers for an organising campaign in 
Swindon in February 1930, suggested that the number of unionists was more 
like 3,000. 232 Wolverton received the attention of a fortnight's organising 
campaign run by the local trades council in the summer of 1929,23:i while a 
few months later, the Newton Heath works (where there was no membership 
committee. and all trade unions were losing members.2:i14) was one of the 
targets of a trade union week in Manchester.2~s 
The IUVB in practice confined itself to recruiting craftsmen in its 
traditional crafts; with a strang presence at the big carriage works at 
Swindell' '(GW), Wolverton and Newton Heath (LMS) , and Dukinfie1d (LNER). At 
. , 
York and Doncaster (LIER) and Derby (LMS) , the IUR were dominant, while at 
Eastleigh (SR) and Stratford <LIER) the indications are that the NUVB had a 
resonable level of membership in the relevant departments. At the other 
shops, membership likewise varied from fairly high, as at the St.Rollox 
repair shops to very law, as at the Lanc~ng repair Shops. The main problem 
for the union was not that the IUR recruited unskilled and semi-skilled 
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employees, but that they had made great inroads among the skilled workers 
by the time of the 1926 Membership Agreement. This was a problem for all 
craft unions, but the NUVB were affected more than most. Their potential 
membership in the railway workshops was a higher proportion of their 
existing overall membership than was the case for unions like the AEU and 
BOilermakers, which also had significant railway membership. 
In the contract shops, NUVB membership was high, for a variety of 
factors. Most of the shops had been operating for a long time, and their 
need to recruit a skilled labour force at short notice when embarking upon 
contracts, often meant a relationship with the local UKSC/NUVB branch. In 
addition, these shops usually also built trams (especially in the 1920s) 
and buses (usually in the 1930s), and were subject to fair wage clauses 
imposed by local corporations. At the beginning of 1925, Cravens' 
membership was reported as "something like 100%", and the Gloucester 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company were 100%.24~ During a strike at Brush in 
late 1924 when about 250 members were out, it was reported after four weeks 
that it had "not been found necessary to have pickets".237 Organisation in 
the Birmingham contract shops was reported as 100% in 1927, but, of course, 
this had to be maintained. A few months later at the Metropolitan works in 
Saltley, ~ number of meetings were held to tighten up organisation, and 
several-members heavily in arrears paid off their debts, while a number of 
others rejoined. But a few refused, and a mass meeting decided that after a 
certain date they would not work with non-unionists. When the day came, the 
men in question had joined up, and the manager "expressed his pleasure that 
no stoppage had taken place as the firm were very busy".23~ 
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B. DEVELOPMENTS IN RAILWAY CARRIAGE BUILDING PRACTICE 
Substantial changes took place in the methods of building and repairing 
railway carriages in the railway company shops during the inter-war period. 
While the changes varied from company to company. and works to works. it 
was a period in which certainly as far as carriage body-building was 
concerned, there was a significantly increased division of labour. 
Railway carriage building had already progressed far from its early 
beginnings. one important nineteenth century development being the 
machining of the wooden components. It was claimed. at the Cowlairs works 
in the late 1860s. that every piece of wood in the building of a carriage 
was fashioned according to a standard pattern. being "planed. moulded. 
mortised. tenoned, and bored by machines". The workmen reputedly needed 
"little skill" as "they have scarcely to make a single measurement or 
calculation, but simply to mark the wood according to the [standard] 
patterns and place it on the machines". But there was still little division 
of labour in actual carriage erection. as "generally two or four work 
together and contract to build a carriage or wagon for a certain sum."2~~ 
This relatively simple division of labour was in line with the practice in 
locomot1v8,erect1on. 240 However. compared to the days before extensive 
woodworking machinery. it might appear. as it did to a Swindon foreman some 
twenty years later. that "a man only wants a hammer and a glue-pot to build 
a railway carriage nowadays."241 
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The Derby works of the new LM3 group saw the first major change in 
carriage building practice. By the end of 1922 these works were re-equipped 
and reorganised. Two main factors were involved - accurate machining of 
component parts to produce interchangeability, and "unit assembly". The old 
practice of leaving tenons "on the full side" to ensure that they were big 
enough for the mortice hole, leaving the workman to make the necessary 
adjustments was abandoned. The objections to this new practice was that the 
timber would shrink or swell, and that it was impossible to assemble the 
parts without hand fitting.242 When the NUVB executive went round the works 
in September 1923 they raised this but were told that that well seasoned 
timber showed very little shrinking after machining. In fact the JUVB 
visitors saw ninety mortices on the roof register with ninety tenons on the 
side framing with only one joint requiring a little manual adjustment. 
Before the adoption of the new system at Derby a skilled coach bodymaker 
would mark out every piece of timber used in a carriage. Now, only cne of 
each part needed to be marked out.:::':43 As, however, a very large proportion 
of the cost of machinery was the time involved in setting up the machines, 
components were re-designed to allow for large batches of standard parts. 
"Unit assembly" was a method where instead of building carriages as in 
the past "by assembling them in the same way as houses .... ie on one spot", 
the construction was divided into several units which were assembled 
separately such as roofs, ends, and doors.244 Doors, for example, were 
assembled by dropping the components parts into a localising jig, using 
compressed air cylinders to squeeze them together, and a screw driving 
machine to force the screws in. 
- 294 -
By the NUVB executive visit, the building time of a carriage body had 
been reduced from 6 weeks to 6 days. This included the bodymakers taking 
eight hours to put the floor boards on the carriage underframe and screw 
them down, followed by an erection gang taking 75 minutes to finish 
erecting the framework of the coach.24s Visitors in 1927 reported that the 
actual erection time on the underframe was as quick as 22 minutes,~46 while 
by 1930 the floor was taking a little over 5 hours, out of a total erection 
time of the whole carriage of six hours.~47 Although the erection had been 
speeded up, the carriage body still needed to be panelled and internally 
fitted out. Partition frames, sliding doors, and door lights were put 
together in cramps, and screw driving machines used wherever practicable. 
By 1927, a system of progressive assembly had also been introduced, with 
nineteen positions for erection, finishing, and painting. All vehicles were 
moved to the next position according to a strict timetable. 241;;0 
Similar unit assembly techniques were developed in the 1920s at the LMS 
carriage works at Newton Heath. The use of compressed air for driving home 
the tenons, and pneumatic screw-driving machines, showed that the Derby 
principles were. being implemented. Such techniques were also later 
introduced at the LXS Wolverton carriage worksj~4~ it is not clear whether 
pro~essive assembly of carriages had been introduced here, but Wolverton 
(in common with Earlestown> had installed a system of progressive 
construction of new wagons.::':sc:> 
Kajar changes also took place in the LIER carriage building shops during 
the inter-war period, with the York works at the forefont. Until 1926 each 
gang in the York building shop would work on a single vehicle, assembling 
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all the woodwork and carrying out all the fitting. After reorganisation, 
sectionalised construction was introduced and separate gangs were allocated 
to particular tasks. Different gangs put together doors, partitions, body 
ends, quarters (ie body sides), floors, seat frames, and seat-frame backs. 
The erecting gang would then erect them on the coach underframe. 
The time taken to build a 60ft corridor coach from the laying of the 
floor on the underframe to the body leaving the building shop was reduced 
by this method from 5~ weeks to 2~ weeks. Time was saved in a variety of 
ways. Investment in extensive woodworking machinery meant that 1nstead of 
every piece of wood being marked out by hand, only one of each part was 
marked out to form a template for the rest. The hundreds of screws for the 
floor boards were screwed down by high-speed turbine air drills, instead of 
by hand. The old method of "cramping" work together by hand was abandoned 
and powerful cramps worked by compressed air were used for forCing the 
tenons into the mortices on the various sub-assemblies, while the erection 
of the ends and the quarters on the underframe was achieved by lifting them 
into position by overhead crane and then pulling home the tenons on to 
their shoulders by,. means of simple racks and levers operated by hand. In 
~ . 
. ' - '"'\ 
the cabinet shop~,,~oor lights and photograph frames were assembled in Jigs 
and cramped·together by compressed air. Hand-sand1ng, to make the wooden 
components ready for varnishing, was eliminated by means of several belt-
driven sanding machines and a three-drum sander. The latter was used for 
panels, corridor sliding doors, and even body door light frames which were 
put through the sander complete with the glass in position. 
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The erecting gang would fix the ends, quarters, and partitions to the 
floor, panel up the ends, board the roof, and panel and hang the doors.~~' 
One erecting gang was assigned to each coach, and several coaches would be 
built at anyone time. But this entailed all the component parts having to 
be transferred to the various erecting gangs; temporary scaffolding having 
to be set up for every roof that was made; and the coach then having to go 
to the cabinet shop, the brake shop, and the plumbing shop before it was 
ready for the paint shop. 
In order to economise both time and labour, a further reorganisation 
took place at York in 1931. The "Progressive System of Building" was, 
introduced, whereby the principle of "Sectional Building" already in 
operation was extended to the work of assembling the body, building the 
Toof, and hanging the doors. Instead of having several erecting gangs each 
building a separate body, there were now several gangs each performing the 
same specific operation on each body. The building operation was spread 
over 7 stages - dictated by the length of the building road. 
The steel underframes were lifted on to the road with their own bogies, 
so that the coaches could be moved forward on their own wheels, at regular 
intervals of' time. At the first stage, the floor was laid down, with the 
workmen standing on platforms situated at a convenient working height. At 
the second, the body ends and quarters were erected, the ends having 
already been panelled and moulded. The quarters were secured in position to 
the floors by wrought iron "knees ll , cantrails placed in position on top of 
the quarters, and the compartment partitions fixed. The erectors then fixed 
and moulded the body side bottom quarter panels, which had been left out to 
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enable the wrought iron knees to be secured. And while the erectors were 
engaged on this assembly work, the cabinet-men (ie finishers) were busy 
fixing the corridor plinths, boarding up the corridor, and hanging the 
gangway vestibule doors. 
The roof irons and oak ribs were fixed on to the body cantrails at the 
third stage. The roof was then boarded and fixed to the ribs, bp.fore, on 
the outside, being painted, stopped with putty, and made ready for 
covering. At the same time, the inside ribs and packings for the ceilings 
and roof fittings were fixed to the roof, and fitters fixed the supporting 
irons and roof tanks for the lavatory water supply. At stage four, a thick 
coat of jointing paste was applied to the outside of the roof, before a 
canvas was tightly stretched and nailed down to the cantrails. A second 
coat of paste was then applied; when this had dried, various roof fittings 
were then fixed on. Meanwhile, pre-panelled and glazed corridor screens 
were fixed inside, electricians put the lighting wires in, and then the 
compartment and corridor ceilings, and partition panels above the luggage 
racks, were put up. 
At thee next stage, a gang of erectors hung the outside doors, which were 
already fully assembled. In the interior further work was done on the 
corridors; and the lavatory plumbing was fixed. Underneath, in a full-
length pit, the steam-heater fitters worked on the heating. and 
electricians did further wiring work. At stage 6, the exterior was 
varnished, the component parts already having received 2 coats. In the 
interior various fittings were added. At stage 7 the exterior varnishing 
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continued, while the heating and plumbing were tested inside. The coach was 
now ready to go to the paint shop for the final varnish coat.2S~ 
While there is little information on practice at the LNER's Doncaster 
works, Dukinfield were building carriages on a progreSSive basis by 1929, 
the coach being built at four different work stations.3s~ By contrast, at 
the GWR works in Swindon, there was "no dramatic replanning of the works in 
the interests of mass production", merely a number of small improvements 
which facilitated a steady increase in output. 2S4 
At Swindon, the full machining of wood did not even take place until 
1930, when the company bought in a machine to deal with all the operations 
necessary on the long "bottomsides" - the timber upon which the framework 
of the coach was actually built up. These timbers were 57ft long, made with 
one or two splices. The purpose-built machine had a 48ft long cast-iron 
bed, but with sets of rollers at each end, took up 190ft, and was known as 
"The Loch Ness Monster". Before its advent, the bottomsides were marked off 
by hand, and taken to various machines, in turn, to be sawn, tenoned, 
mortised, bored, recessed, grooved, etc. Not only did this mean a great 
deal of h~ndling,~ but even then the timbers were only partially finished, 
as the existing machines were incapable of doing all the required work. 
Consequently a large amount of handwork was still necessary.2SS 
On the Southern Railway, the Eastleigh works, had introduced "mass 
production" methods by 1925, with union complaints of work being timed.~S~ 
Coach bodies were erected on the underframe in six stages. While sides, 
ends, doors, corridor and compartment partitions were all previously 
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assembled in jigs, roofs were built directly on to the coach, as at York, 
though Derby's were jig-built.~s7 At the Lancing repair works, it was the 
practice until the late 1920s for gangs to carry out the whole of the work 
pertaining to their trade on a vehicle. Vhen progressive repairs were 
introduced, "men are kept constantly employed on one class of work at one 
particular place". A red light would go up when the time allowance was up, 
and the job would pass on to the next work station. This system reduced the 
time occupied in the general overhaul of a carriage from 52 to 28 days.~SQ 
"Progressive" repairs were also introduced in the LMS and LIER shops. 
Newton Heath, on the LMS, appear to have been the first to have brought 
this in, by at least 1927.~s9 An early description of the system found that 
it worked according to a number of definite principles. "The transporting 
of the material stripped from the coaches is done by labourers, thus 
enabling the skilled artisan to remain at his allotted position". The man-
handling of new materials was eliminated as far as possible, with the 
supply of materials anticipated. Ken were allocated to specified 
operations, which were done at given positions, with the job moving to the 
man and not vice versa. The first operation had to balance with the last, 
with the. carriage bodies moving after definite intervals of time. The 
system also required a constant supply of carriages for repair, as well as 
work being carried out in comfortable positions. 26o 
By 1930 the LMS carriage repair shops at St.Rollox had bodies on their 
own bogies moving up the shop, "the bogey being attached to a slow moving 
chain travelling along the floor between the rails".2~1 About the same time 
a system of progressive repair was instituted at the Stratford works of the 
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tNER, the bodies being moved at regular intervals (movements taking place 
after working hours).~~2 At the Dukinfield LNER works, the carriage repair 
shop work was divided into six distinct stages <each accommodating two 
vehicles), with a definite number of men allocated to each. By 
proportioning the number of men employed to the repairs required at each 
stage, it was found possible to get the necessary work completed on time. 
At the first stage, compartments were stripped and washed throughout, the 
outside body paintwork be~g burned off or washed down as required. All 
loose fittings such as seats and drop lights were also removed for 
necessary cleaning and repairs. The second and third stages were devoted to 
outside body repairs and general renovation of interiors. The fourth stage 
was mainly roof repairs and painting, high movable trestles being provided. 
At the fifth stage, the interiors were varnished in readiness for fitting 
up, while the outsides were varnished or painted and filled according to 
type of coach. The final stage saw the refitting of the interiors.~~~ 
The NUVB journal reported a similar system of repairs being introduced 
at the LNER Cowlairs works in 1935, referring to it variously as the "belt 
system", the "chain system", and the "Chain Progress Sys~em".";'';;4 These 
,., :.J.' ;,.:h 
systems prod~ced a,;', Dlassi ve saving of time, and no doubt, to a lesser 
ext~n~; also at labour. At Stratford it was calculated that the percentage 
of coaching stock under, and awaiting, repairs had been reduced to less 
than half the old figure,2~s while at Dukinfield, carriage repair output 
was up 42 %, the average time that vehicles were out of traffic duty being 
down to 371. of the previous figure. 266 
- 301 -
Although all these developments significantly changed previous practice 
in the railway workshops, the sectionalisation of labour was on nothing 
like the scale that occurred in the car factories. Apart from the limited 
scale of production, another reason was that while the 4 railway companies 
introduced standardisation into their building of new stock, by far the 
greatest activity in the workshops was repair work. With a heritage of 
different types of vehicle from all the amalgamating companies, let alone 
the variations within each of these, the repair work was multi-faceted. 
Bodymakers and finishers, in particular, even if confined to a smaller area 
of work, still needed to have wide all-round skills. 
Information is less easily available on the railway contract shops, but 
as they were almost entirely manufacturing enterprises, with few repair 
contracts, they would be expected to have the most up-to-date production 
facilities. For example, it was reported in 1927 of the Metropolitan 
company's Saltley works that "to meet world-wide competition, the works 
have concentrated on speed of production".~~7 In line with this was the 
company's policy of sub-contracting much trimming and finishing work to 
furnishing and upholstery companies, as well as the more long-established 
practice' ,of sub-<::ontracting cushion work to female homeworkers. :.:.;,;e 
However, because the contract shops had to produce to specifications 
drawn up by railway companies around the world, they were not necessarily 
able to reap total economies of scale, because of varying designs. But 
their development of all-steel carriages enabled inroads to be made into 
skilled labour. As with wooden-framed carriages, there were two basic 
methods of assembly - direct erection on the underframe, and unit assembly 
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in jigs. The Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company favoured the 
former method, as different jigs were required for each individual 
contract, and the cost of making them was prohibitive if only a small 
number of carriages of one type was built. This company, along with the 
Metropolitan, as will be discussed in chapter 6, employed a special class 
of semi-skilled steel coachbuilders on all-steel carriages. 
Cammell Laird, which favoured the jig method, was also able to reduce 
the proportion of skilled workers used. Not only could steel parts "be 
machined on an interchangeable basis with a cheaper form of labour than is 
employed for woodwork", but the riveting of panels was done by one man 
operating a pneumatic riveting hammer with a youth "holding up" on the 
underside, and a boy heating the rivets. The panels were riveted in jigs, 
and the erection of the whole coach was a very simple operation, taking 
sometimes as 11 ttle as three hours. 26'~ 
The inter-war period witnessed great changes in railway carriage 
building and repair. The railway company workshops, however, were still 
basically repair factories, and the workforce needed a number of all-round 
skills. However, there was a definite and irreversible increase in the 
diVision of labour. caused by the adoption of flow production principles. 
The workshops stood somewhere between the extremes of the high volume car 
producer and the "one-off" coachbuilder. To the extent that the latter was 
now in long-term decline, the old hierarchy in the union, where the 
"private" coachmaker was a more skilled worker than.his railway 
counterpart, was to some extent reversed. 
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PART 3. BUSES AND TRAMS 
A. BUS AND COACH BUILDERS 
London Coachbuilders 
There were bus building firms in all parts of the country, including 
most railway and tram contract shops. But the building of buses, and saloon 
coaches, was a highly seasonal industry, with inevitable consequences for 
union organisation. The experience of London coach and bus builders 
highlights many of the problems the union faced nationally. 
The workforce at Hall Lewis, where charabancs formed a high proportion 
of the business, would be expanded considerably between Christmas and 
Easter. But as soon as orders were completed for the summer season, lay-
offs started, "often at a moment's notice". Most of the labour force would 
be paid off from Whitsun until Christmas, though "rushed jobs resulted in 
sacked staff being re-engaged only to be sacked once more".27'~ In the early 
19305, after Park Royal had taken over the firm, short time was rife: "Rush 
orders wOuld be taken and, particularly in the case of overseas orders, 
round-the-clock working would replace short time to meet deadlines for 
shipping."271 
Duple of Hendon was another firm experiencing extreme seasonality for 
its main product - luxury coaches. "The effect of this was to create 
enormous demands on the workforce up to Easter each year, whereupon the 
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workload would tail off dramatically." This inevitably led to lay-offs, 
with a high proportion of the workforce laid off until orders built up 
again in the autumn, when shift work was necessary. Though as the firm, 
which had started up in 1919, expanded, it got a series of large contracts 
for the GPO which gave it some work in the off-season.-:t72 
In 1929, London-based NUVB Assistant General Secretary Halliwell 
reported "the boom season in bus building has ended, most of the contract 
shops in the district that have been so exceptionally busy, completed their 
orders in early August. Three shops alone stood off several hundred, 
breaking up the little organisation that we had been able, after much 
effort, to build Up."~7~ 
Strachans. in North Acton. had been blacked in 1919. When they stood a 
chance of an order for Manchester double-deck buses in 1929, Floyd. the 
Manchester-based northern organiser. also being a local councillor. opposed 
it. The firm agreed to conform to national agreement rates (see below for 
comments on the fair wage clause>. though they did not join the NFVT until 
1934.274 This opened the shop to NUVB members, anmd within a few months the 
union was making good progress in organising the shop. A Works Committee 
was set ~P. along with representatives of other unions. But at Whitsun 1930 
about 150 men of all grades were discharged. London organiser. Penn. musing 
that it meant "when they get busy again starting all over afresh". Almost 
Simultaneously. about the same number were dismissed in another shop. and 
Halliwell painted out "the tendency now is to crowd all this class of work 
into three or four months of the year. working at high speed with excessive 
overt i me" . .2-}'S 
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The union's general weakness in these shops was illustrated by a dispute 
at Duple in February 1930. Owing to the dismissal of several members of the 
shop committee, the union contacted the firm asking for recognition of the 
committee under the union's agreement with the NFVT. The agreement, 
however, merely stated that employers "may" recognise such committees. 
Other actions by the manager led to 80 NUVB members at a lunch hour meetin~ 
being ordered off the premises. The firm later stated that they would only 
take one third of the men back, and all employees were to apply for their 
jobs. Although the union's London District Committee supported the demand 
that all be taken back, intervention by the NFVT led to NUVB General 
Secretary Nicholson conceding that the management were in the right 
concerning shop committees, and pickets were withdrawn.27~ 
In late 1930, Halliwell reported that the union had endeavoured "in the 
few bus shops that show signs of life to see that none other than members 
secure employment, and with some success". Strachans, for one, had been 
taking on labour, but shortage of material prevented them from getting into 
full sWing. 277 But, once again, firms that had a push on before the 1931 
Whitsun holidays to get coaches built, considerably reduced their st~ff 
immediately after, "now an annual event in the trade".~?~ In 1932 "the road 
passenger. section of the trade had only a short run this year, as usual 
Whitsunt1de saw the end of it". Penn argued "quite a number of the 
commercial shops three months ago were in full SWing, working not only full 
time but some overtime; this 1s a condition which we should all try and 
avoid, as I am afraid we are getting to the stage now where our members 
will be in work for 3 months and out for 9 months, therefore draining the 
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funds of our own Society". In October that year Halliwell reported the 
saloon coach and omnibus sections of the trade as "being quite dead" .. ;;,7''';' 
1933 was no different - "Whitsuntide reveals the usual crack-up, 
especially in the saloon coach section".~~o In 1934 "there has .... been 
more activity on the commercial side of the trade, but not such that we 
experienced 2 or 3 years ago. There is bound .... soon to be further 
development on this side of the industry. The Bill that is now promoted to 
replace tramcars by trolley buses in various parts of London is certain to 
cause many orders to be placed".;;!'.!Il 
The supply of buses to the LGOC, which built many of its own buses, and 
other London bus operators was an important source of trade for the London 
bus builders. In the late 1920s, Hoyal of Weybridge, and Vickers of 
Crayford were among the minor suppliers of bodywork for the smaller 
operators, but Vickers stopped building bus bodies in 1929,2~2 and Hoyal 
went out of business in 1931.2Q~ The formation of London Transport in 1933 
then totally destroyed the market among independent London bus operators 
that had beeu largely shared by Dodsons of Willesden, which went out of 
". .1 
businese~ and Birch Bros of Kentish Town, which henceforth built only for 
its own fleet. Short Bros of Rochester, another supplier, reverted to 
flying boat manufacture, while several other small firms disappeared. ",,;04 
The Fair Wage Clause 
Although a few municipal corporations built their own buses, most 
supplies came from outside contractors, and NUVB officials used the fair 
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wage clause to try to enforce union rates among them. Innumerable cases of 
this are recorded in the NUVB Journal, especially in the 1930s, affecting 
builders of commercial or public service vehicles. Local councils, 
corporation bus and tram departments, as well as government departments, 
such as the War Office and the Post Office, .were the affected customersj 
and, similarly, local cooperative societies would also respect this clause 
when brought to their attention. Those companies specialising 1n bus 
production could be brought into line with national agreements, if only 
temporarily. 
For example, in 1931, Guy Motors of Wolverhampton were forced to pay 
minimum piecework earnings on a bus contract for Wolverhampton 
Corporationi~as the next year, Weymanns of Weybridge, a new firm in the 
industry, agreed to pay overtime rates when necessarYi~~~ and Shorts of 
Rochester was brought temporarily on to national agreement rates in 1931 
over a bus contract for Birmingham Corporation, and in 1934 over an order 
for coaches for the Royal Arsenal Cooperative Society.26? Even EEF-member 
firms could be brought to heelj thus when Ransomes, Sims, & Jefferies of 
Ipswich, an agricultural machinery maker, started building buses, they paid 
the rate specified.in the EEF woodworkers' agreement for agricultural 
implement. making. As this was lower than for coach and motor body work, an 
IUVB EC officer, who was also a Lincoln councillor, opposed a contract for 
them to build buses for Lincoln until the matter was righted.~~'· 
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B. PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS 
In the inter-war period there were four distinct groups of bus operators 
- the municipal authorities, the "associated" companies, the railway 
companies, and the independents. The municipal authorities were slow to 
introduce motor buses, mainly because they had invested heavily in 
tramways, and, before 1930, they each needed a special Act of Parliament to 
grant them the necessary powers. The 18 municipalities operating such 
services had, however, increased to 90 by 1928. The size of the bus fleets 
was relatively large. averaging 53.9 vehicles in 1931.~Q~ Birmingham 
Corporation, for example, running 612 buses in 1936. ;';;;'30 These fleets had to 
be maintained, but only some half a dozen authorities also built their own 
buses, as their Acts did not contain the clause "but shall not 
manufacture". :2';'011 Manchester was one of those that buil tits own bus bodies, 
at its Hyde Road depot where trams were also built. but it is not clear how 
many were made, and after 1936 these were purchased from outside 
manufacturers who could mass produce them more cheaply.~92 
The "associated" companies were controlled by a number of big holding 
companies. of which the most important were British Electric Traction, 
Thomas Tilling.' and Scottish Motor Traction. These three companies had 
extensive interests in about 50 of the largest bus operators in the mid-
1930s. and, excluding London Transport, they eventually controlled about 
40% of all buses operated, and 50-60% of all bus journeys. Nearly all of 
the "associated" companies owned over one hundred vehicles, with Midland 
Red <part of the BET group) alone possessing 1,224 vehicles in 1938.~9~ 
This company, whose official name was the Birmingham & Midland Motor 
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Omnibus Company, built almost all its own vehicles from 1924 onwards, its 
Central Works at Carlyle Road employing over 700 workers on major overhauls 
and vehicle production in 1954. 294 One problem unions faced here was that 
each new employee had to sign an undertaking that all questions between the 
firm and its employees had to be settled without a third party (ie union 
officials) being brought in.2~s 
Scotland's bus services were dominated by the SMT Company, which 
acquired a substantial number of smaller firms in the decade from the late 
1920s onward. Most of Scotland was covered by its various operating 
companies. The parent company was based in Edinburgh and operated in the 
south east of Scotland. "Western SMT" was the name given to the Scottish 
General Transport Company of Kilmarnock in 1932 following its acquisition; 
merged with same existing SMT services, this group operated in the south 
west of Scotland. The Western SMT also ran buses on behalf of the 
Corporations of Ayr and Kilmarnock. "Central SMT" also came into being in 
1932, covering the Lanarkshire and Dunbartonshire areas. The other main 
subSidiary was V.Alexander, which was acqUired in 1929, becoming the SMT's 
operating company for north east and mid-Scotland (including operating bus 
services on behalf, of Perth Corporation). :.0:'". 
The initial result of this take-over activity was that by mid-1932, the 
SMT were operating, according to the NUVB, some 95% of Scottish public 
service vehicles, excluding Corporation buses.4~7 The SMT group had become 
the largest employer of vehicle building labour in Scotland,Z~~ and, 
consequently, the NUVB's relationship with it was critical. Early 
advantages and disadvantages accrued from the take-over activity. 
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Initially, the Scottish General, with workshops in Stirling, absorbed by 
the Falkirk-based Alexanders in 1930, was brought onto a 47 hour week from 
their existing 52~ hours, and some progress was made in unionisation, which 
had previously proved very difficult.299 But problems continued over 
Alexanders' interpretation of the Scottish coach trade agreement, 
especially at their Falkirk workshops.~oo 
A rationalisation and centralisation of workshop capacity took place in 
two of the areas. In the Western SMT area, employees from the Midland Bus 
Services workshops at Aidrie were transferred to Kilmarnock. While the 
latter was fully unionised, the former appears to have been very weak, and 
the management had not recognised the Scottish coach trade agreement, the 
net result being to undermine the organisation at Kilmarnock. The "Central 
SMT" firm of Stewart & MacDonald, with workshops at Carluke (south east of 
Motherwell> had also traditionally refused to operate the Scottish 
agreement, but with the employees transferred to the former Lanarkshire 
Traction Company workshops in Kotherwell, union rates were generally 
enforced.~Ol 
While some progress was made in unionising the Kotherwell and Kilmarnock 
workshops, this was counterbalanced by the alleged victimisation of shop 
" 
stewards at both shops, without any resistance.30~ Eventually, the union, 
having failed to persuade the Central SKT to observe their agreement in 
full, reported them to the Traffic Commissioners under clause 93 of the 
1930 Road Traffic Act. The Fair Wage Clause in this Act proved of great 
value, and the company conceded most of the points before a hearing took 
place in June 1933.~o~ However, this was not without its drawbacks. Because 
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of its sheer size as a bus operator, the SM!'s purchasing decisions for new 
vehicles had substantial implications. With Scottish vehicle building firms 
paying a higher wage rate than in England, the SM! companies (apart from 
Alexanders which had its own bus-building shop in Stirling, producing an 
average of 160 single-deckers a year from 1932 to 1940 304 ) ordered very 
little from Scottish firms in 1932, and practically nothing in 1933; the 
Scottish NUVB organiser called it "an organised and calculated boycott". 30~ 
While the parent SM! Company, based in Edinburgh, seems to have been a 
member (and, not surprisingly, the dominant one) of the Scottish employers' 
association, the SNVBA, the subsidiaries appear not to have been. The 
parent company threatened that unless the clauses (dating from 1924) in the 
Scottish agreement, giving full time officials access to members and non-
members during working hours, were removed, there might not be a future 
Scottish agreement. Their position soon mellowed slightly, and NUVB 
relations with the Central SM! improved, while permission was given for a 
lunch-time meeting at the Western 8M! Kilmarnock workshops. 306 But the 
boycott of local bus-builders continued, with an order for 180 double-
deckers;l~:aced wi~.h Leyland at the end of 1934, and a reiteration of the 
4"" 
need for'~'Wages to come down to the Leyland level. However, the union 
. 
interviewed the Commissioner for the newly-deSignated "Distressed Area" of 
the West of Scotland, which led to an SMT order for 200 buses from Scottish 
firms. 307 
This appears to have been the turning-point in relations with the 
company, and was consolidated by a successful 3-week strike at the Central 
8M! Kotherwell workshops early in 1935, winning recognition of the union, 
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and the right of bodymakers to repair metal bodies. However, a non-union 
block remained at Xotherwellj:..oa and at the Kirkcaldy and Falkirk workshops 
of Alexanders, the maj ori ty were non-unionists."':'>'''' 
While the Scottish experience was extreme, it showed the power of the 
large private bus operating groups. Apart from the municipal corporations 
and the "associated companies", the other groups of bus operators were the 
independents (or "pirates"), with the majority owning 5 vehicles or less, 
and the railway companies. Before their amalgamation into four groups in 
1923, most railway companies ran bus services, usually as feeder services 
to railway stations. The GWR, for example, had 300 vehicles by 1928; but 
after this date, when they were granted general powers to enter road 
transport, the railway companies mainly invested in the larger "associated 
companies" .. :ill 0 
Corporation bus workshops were not usually particularly big employers of 
NUVB members, but the union could usually persuade them to follow the coach 
trade agreement, a task which was much harder with the privately-owned 
operators~ Not only reliant on corporations applying the fair wage clause 
.. , 
to their bus suppliers, the NUVB were also generally dependent on these 
public ~die~ to set standards in the bus-operating industry. 
" l~~·"· 
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C. LONDON BUSES 
The London General Omnibus Company dominated the operation of London 
buses until the creation of London Transport in 1933. From 1923 to 1932, 
this company operated between 4,000 and 5,000 buses, including those 
belonging to a number of companies who had agreed before the first world 
war to lease their bus fleets to the LGOC to operate. Thomas Tilling, which 
had made its own agreement with the LGOe in 1911-12 to limit its bus fleet 
to no more than 150 and to not compete directly, retained their 
independence. Otherwise, the post-war independents could only muster a few 
hundred buses in competition with the LGOC in the 1920s. which. after 
further take-overs, fell to about 200 in the five years prior to 
nationalisation. 311 The history of London buses before 1933 is, therefore, 
largely a history of the LGOC. 
Until 1921 the annual overhaul of LGOC buses was carried out at thirty 
different garages. while the renovation and repainting of bodies was 
undertaken at three separate coach factories - at the North Road. Holloway. 
coachbul1ding factory, and the two susidiary works at Olaf Street. 
Hammersmith, and Seagrave Road, Fulham. In 1921 a central overhaul works 
was opened at Chlswlck, starting coachbuilding repairs in Karch, and 
engineering repairs in August. The body shop could hold 104 bodies at a 
time, and the paint shop 57. There seem to have been between 2,000 and 
3.000 employees there in the early 1920s. divided roughly equally between 
the coachbuilding and engineering sides. 314 
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The LGGe bus fleet underwent great changes in the interwar years. In 
August 1919, the LGGe started running its new 46-seater K type buses, which 
eliminated the last remnant of horse-bus design, in particular the through 
longitudinal seat on the lower deck. In December 1920 the 54-seat 8 type 
went into service, and by mid-1922, half the LGGe fleet consisted of new 
post-war buses. However, even these still had open tops, and consequently 
no upholstery on the top deck. It was not until 1926 that the police gave 
the LGGe permission to convert its fleet of post-1922 N8 buses to covered 
tops; though, because of its low platform, this was the only type so 
licensed. However, it was only another year before the larger double-deck 
buses could also sport covered topS.~13 With covered tops came upholstered 
seats on the upper deck, and more work for trimmers. 314 
In 1925, the Metropolitan police at last permitted single-deck buses to 
use pneumatic instead of the traditional solid tyres, and this extended to 
double-deckers in 1927. No doubt the elimination of the "bone-shaker" 
helped reduce the amount of maintenance necessary, and hence the number of 
workers employed on repair. But the conversion of the existing fleets to 
covered tops, and the 1929 reform of allowing drivers to have windscreens 
in front of them, would have generated a lot of work. 315 As the historians 
of Londo~ Tra~sport note, the technical improvements on London buses in the 
1920s were piecemeal, and "the alteration of existing buses was an 
expensive and unsatisfactory procedure".~16 
In 1929 all remaining K types were withdrawn, so that the LT bus 
(without an enclosed staircase> introduced in 1929, and the 8T bus (with an 
enclosed staircase> introduced in 1930, provided the standard vehicles of 
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the LGOC fleet. Throughout the 1920s there had been several bus types in 
operation, and with over 200 buses acquired by takeovers of independent 
operators up to 1927, there was plenty of variation in the work at 
Chiswick.317 
The Chiswick works were slow in introducing metal construction, bringing 
in some metal-framed units in 1936, and producing 150 bodies in 1939-40 
with flitched-timber pillars and steel box-section waist rail (see chapter 
6). But these were the last bodies to be built at Chiswick, so the overhaul 
and repair shops dealt mainly with timber-framed bodies.~l'~ However, the 
sheer volume of overhaul work required some innovation, and in 1926 a 
conveyor belt system was introduced. As a result, the time for a complete 
body overhaul was reduced from 4-7 days to 8 hours, excluding painting. 3 ,g 
Trade Union Organisation 
When Chiswick opened, most of the employees were apparently non-
unionists, but within two years the shop was reputedly 100%, and the 
management were advising new employees to join unions.3~o In August 1922, 
the LGOC'made three separate wage agreements with unions at the Chiswick 
works - one for skilled engineering staff (AEU, Sheet Metal Workers, ETU, 
and Associated Blacksmiths), one for semi-skilled and unskilled adult 
engineering grades (TGWU, National Union of General Workers, and Associated 
Blacksmiths), and one for skilled and semi-skilled coachmaking staff (NUVB, 
Woodcutting Machinists, and the Wheelwrights & Smiths). The London District 
Engineering Employers' Association, for one, protested at the high wage 
rates agreed, which, for most skilled coachmaking grades, would be, from 
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November 1922, 3d per hour higher than the district rate in the vehicle 
building industry. 321 
In 1923 the union could claim that there were more than 1400 NUVB 
members at Chiswick, and only about two dozen non-members.~~~ Late in 1924 
the union forced the removal of a non-unionist, but soon afterwards, in 
December, there was a number of dismissals, and the proposed transfer of 
the shop secretary to a garage. A stoppage took place, and the dismissals 
became suspensions pending an inquiry by the union. The shop secretary was 
retained, a committeeman and two other prominent members restarted, but the 
union was forced to accept the other dismissals, mainly due to shortage of 
work. A pledge was given that 48 hours notice of dismissal would in future 
be given to commi tteemen.:1I;2:11 
In November 1925 when some 12 members were dismissed at Chiswick, mainly 
on charges of restriction of output, the union's Assistant General 
secretary advised a mass meeting to stay at work. In the next few days, the 
whole of the committee were closely watched, and then told they would not 
be allowed to, function. A paint shop steward was also ordered to report to 
the chassis ,blacking section in the engineering department, thereby losing 
-.. , .. , ,"-:t '" 
his, right to represent the paint shop. A mass meeting agreed to strike, as 
't;" ' 
the transfer broke the agreement of 48 hours notice of transfer of 
stewards, with the result the steward was restored to his own section. A 
joint hearing then investigated the charges against the 12, leading to the 
reemployment of some. In the next month there was a large number of 
dismissals.:;';;::4 
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Meanwhile, in the LGOC garages, trade union organisation had also built 
up since the first war. By 1927 there were about 5,000 garage men on 
running repairs, of whom about 500 were in craft unions, including the 
NUVB. When in 1927, the garage workers asked for a similar wage increase to 
one given at Chiswick, the LGOC proposed a scheme that would displace 
approximately two-thirds of the garage bodymakers, and replace them with a 
new grade of "assistant-craftsman". These latter would be made up from the 
general hands in the garages, and the displaced bodymakers would be 
transferred to Chiswick. 
As other unions conceded similar proposals, the NUVB had to give some 
ground. The final agreement in August 1927 was that no one was 
transferred, and the NUVB kept all its work, but while all the painters 
were put on the Chiswick rate, only one quarter of the bodymakers were, 
leaving about 90 on the old rate. The company claimed that this grading of 
labour would not be applied at Chiswick, and was only possible in the 
garages because of the increasing standardisation of the work. In 1930 
there were still 70 craftsmen members on the lower rate, but the management 
agreed to uprate them by the end of that year.~2S 
This 1927-agreement in the garages conceded the right of the union to 
supply all the necessary labour for the garages. Until the General Strike 
the procedure for engaging labour at Chiswick had been to inform the NUVB 
office when men were required. This practice fell away until in late 1929 
NUVB officials saw the Chief Engineer, who gave an undertaking that the 
NUVB's London office would be informed in future, though he claimed that it 
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had still been policy to tell all new entrants that there were agreements 
with unions, and the management desired them to be union members.J~6 
But the union could do very little about redundancy, and when an order 
for new double-deck buses was completed in August 1927, 90 men were stood 
off. With a new bus construction programme starting in mid-1930, a few 
members were placed at Chiswick, but in September 1931, with the near-
completion of the programme, the management wanted to dismiss 120 BUVB 
members, but agreed to short-time working of a 42~ hour week (ie no 
Saturday> for a three month period.~27 However, by mid-1932 there had been 
200 discharges, and by the summer some 600 in total had been given notice. 
What exacerbated the employment situation was that on the repair side where 
buses had historically had to be overhauled and painted every 12 months, 
Scotland Yard ruled that, with improved vehicles, the LGGC only had to do 
this now every 18 months. While the Chief Engineer accepted a proposal for 
a 41~ hour week to save the last 250 from going, a majority of the members 
were against this, and the discharges went ahead.34~ 
Wi~h the London Transport Bill, one of the main concerns of the union 
was that the newly-constituted London Passenger Transport Board should 
retain the power to manufacture its own bus bodies. The original clause 
gave the new Board full manufacturing rights, but this was altered to 
giving the Chiswick works the right to manufacture bus bodies, but no more 
in anyone year than the annual average of 1926-30. As this did not take 
into account the big building programme in 1931, the NUVB successfully 
lobbied the Chiswick Conservative MP to get this amended to 1927-31, which 
gave an added 100 bodies per annum, bringing it up to an annual total of 
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527 bodies. While the NFVT, representing many bus-builders, were far from 
satisfied, they took pleasure from the fact that the figure was well below 
the Chiswick's capacity of 1,250.~~9 
There was the inevitable rationalisation of facilities, but given the 
relative monopoly position of the LODC in London bus services, the 
situation was probably not as bad as on the trams (see section D below). In 
late 1933 employees from Tillings were transferred to Chiswick, but got 
substantial wage rises into the bargain - from 1s6~d to 1s11d for 
crafts~n, and a rise for brush hands from 1s1d or 1s2d to 1s8d.~~g 
Another source of recruitment into Chiswick was the former central 
overhaul depot of the London General Country Services at Reigate. ~hen the 
Reigate works were enlarged in 1932 the NUVB started recruiting, and along 
with the AEU and ETU, attempted to establish an agreement. Initially there 
were problems with the TGWU which wanted to pursue independent 
negotiations, including fixing conditions for craftsmen, but Deakin gave 
the NUVB an assurance that they would not negotiate independently. In mid-
1934 an agreement was reached with the LPTB, and in a supplementary 
agreement the union got inserted the clause "no assistant craftsmen 
trimmers ~r.bodymakers·. However, because in the body shop there were so 
many non-craftsmen, there was an arrangement to let a percentage continue 
for a period, with only craftsmen being recruited in the future. 
As a number of the non-craftsmen were in the TGWU, it was agreed 
between the TGWU and the NUVB that the TGWU had an exclusive agreement 
covering garage employees, and in return they undertook not to recruit in 
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the coachbuilding section, and further informed their members there they 
had to join the NUVB.331 Not long after 100% trade unionism had been 
obtained at Reigate, the decision was made to close the depot and transfer 
employees to Chiswick. Over 100 men moved in February 1935, and the rest in 
November. Craftsmen increased their hourly rate as a result from the 
recently negotiated Is7d to lslld. 332 
Because of a building programme the transfers under the London Transport 
Act do not appear to have led to redundancies, and in mid-1935 there was 
even a demand from Chiswick for a large number of extra bodymakers. The STL 
double-deck bus first came into service in London in 1933, and by the time 
the last one was built in 1937, some 2,625 had been delivered. Bodies were 
built at Weymann, Park Royal (175 all-metal bodies> and at Chiswick itself, 
partly to find employment for ex-Tilling men there, according to Barker & 
Robbins. 333 According to London organiser Penn, the various transfers of 
labour had the effect of putting new life into the union organisation at 
Chiswick. Later, in 1936, when more men were required, the LPTB gave the 
NUVB the opportunity of sending half the number. And in the autumn of 1938 
the NUVB claimed it had a higher number of members at Chiswick than at any 
time since.1926.3~~ In 1949 there were still 1,200 NUVB members there aut 
of a total workforce of more than 5,OOO.'3:l1'S 
While there was periodic uncertainty of employment connected with the 
fluctuations of new building and conversion programmes, the LGOe and then 
the LPTB was generally an important source of stable NUVB employment in 
London during a period marked by major changes, not least among the 
traditional London coachbuilding firms. 
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D. TRAM OPERATORS 
London Trams 
London also had a huge system of publicly owned tramways. The fourteen 
undertakings operating in 1914 are shown below in table 5:7, with the LCC 
alone owning more than 60% of the tramcars in the capital. London did not 
participate in the decline of the tramway system general in Britain from 
the mid-1920s, and therefore the tramways played a bigger role in BUVB 
employment than in many other towns. Barker & Robbins suggest three reasons 
for the tram's longer survival in London. Firstly the trams disappeared 
from the smallest systems first, and the biggest systems last. Secondly, 
there was the "restricted streets" legislation of 1924 which prevented 
excessive numbers of buses from running on main highways. Lastly, the Lee, 
by far the biggest of the London tramway networks, did not have the power 
to run buses, unlike other municipal authorities which could, and usually 
did, change over.":a3" The result of this 1s that the number of tramcaro 
operating in London roughly held up at it~ pre-first world war level until 
, . 
the mid-1930s. when.they started being rapidly replaced by trolleybuses (see 
ta bt"e·, "5: a below) •. 
'. . ~ ~ 
, .... 
~ .. 
.. t.f. ... 
Each of the tramway operators had its own depots where repairs to 
rolling stock were effected. The largest was the Central Repair Depot of 
the LCC at Charlton, while the MET had sizeable works at Hendon. As well as 
routine maintenance and overhaul, the depots sometimes were engaged in 
updating the stock. The LeC's El cars downstairs had two rows of 16 seats 
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facing each other - "wooden benches which made the minimum necessary 
concession to the shape of the human sitting apparatusN.:;'~7 Charlton 
rehabilitated these old El cars from 1926 onward, repainting them, and 
uphOlstering the wooden seats. 100 cars were converted in 1926/27, 250 in 
1927/28, and 500 in 1928/29.33~ 
An attempt was made at Charlton to speed up production by the 
introduction of a rope conveyor in 1928. This was installed initially in 
the under-frame section, and produced a surplus of labour. The IUVB 
believed it would be impracticable on the coach section, as there was a 
vast difference in the amount of work necessary between one tramcar body 
and another. But in 1929 it was attempted, though in the paint shop the 
results were worse than previOUS, and it had to be abandoned.:;Oilg, 
Apart from the odd experimental car, the tram car works in London did 
not build their own stock, though the Union Construction & Finance Company 
at Feltham (an Underground subsidiary> built 100 all-metal cars in total 
for the MET and LUT which went into service in 1931. 3140 The level of 
employment at the depots therefore fluctuated with conversion programmes 
.. 
, .. , .... ":., .. 
and the·'l1ke\. and its absolute minimum was dictated by the repair and 
repainting. work necessary to meet Metropolitan Police scrutiny. This latter 
.... , " 
point was a bone of contention for the union, as it regularly complained 
about the standards. Commenting in early 1930 on the fact that the bodywork 
of many cars was a disgrace, and that the paintwork "has dropped to that 
paint where it is neither useful nor artistic", Halliwell questioned how 
these tramcars passed the Scotland Yard test.:lI41 There were regular reports 
in the late 1920s of dismissals at Charlton in particular and other LCC 
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depots. In mid-1929 there were about 350 skilled NUVB members working at 
LCC Trams, though a year later 55 bodymakers were dismissed from Charlton, 
presumably with the end of the reconversion work ... 4 ";: 
Two major developments affected tramway members from the mid-l930s 
onward. One was the replacement of tramcars by trolleybuses; LUT had 
started a trOlleybus operation on its south-western routes in 1931, and 
brought with it to the LPTB some 60 trolleybuses, based at its Fulwell 
depot.:;'4:;' The other was the centralisation of repair work resulting from 
the creation of London Transport. "Within a few hours of the taking over by 
the LPTB, decisions to close various depots on the tramway system were put 
into operation." All the municipal undertakings were merged into the 
Central Repair Depot of the LCC at Charlton, and men from West Ham, East 
Ham, Walthamstow, Ilford, Barking, Erith, and Dartford were transferred to 
Charlton. This led to a large number of dismissals, mostly from existing 
CharI ton workers. The West Ham depot was kept on as a paint shop. :,,44 
In 1935 the Board announced it was to close West Ham and the former MET 
depot at Hendon the next year. Tramcars were being replaced by trolleybuses 
on certain.routes in north west London, and the Board intended to develop 
.. , 
the Fulwell depot for this work. The Hendon closure meant transferring 
approximately 300 men to Charlton on the other side of London, though in 
fact a number went to the Chiswick bus depot and to the Fulwell trolleybus 
depot. :;'45 By mid-1940, all tram routes operating wholly north of the River 
Thames were worked by trolleybuses, as were a number of outlying southern 
systems. ·:;'46 While this rationalisation led to a drop in employment 
opportunities for NUVB members, it had one saving grace. From 1935 the old 
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LCC Charlton hourly rates became standard across the London tram system; 
these were the highest in the tramway section, and had been based since 
1923 on 3d per hour above the national agreement rate. ~", 7 
Other municipal tram undertakings 
Elsewhere, some large corporations built most of their own tramcar 
bodies. Glasgow bought out its first 80 electric tramcars, converted 
another 120 from horse trams, and acquired another 83 from other tramways. 
But, apart from another 50 bought from outside in 1927-28, its own 
workforce built the rest. In 1933 the Corporation had some 1100 cars, and, 
with another 100 built in 1937-8, some 1200 by 1948. "4'ii In 1930 the car 
works at Coplawhill employed some 800, though this was about 200 over the 
normal strength, due to a reconditioning programme. Jl49 A good number of 
these would have been NUVB members. 50 NUVB bodymakers were laid off at the 
end of 1930 with the partial completion of the work, and another 50 a year 
later when the programme was complete. In mid-1935, Glasgow Corporation 
Transport Department employed a total of 120 bodymakers and 5 bodymaker 
apprentices at their tram and bus workshops~~o (the latter being solely a 
repair 'shop, and the former being engaged only on repairs at the time); to 
this figur'e should be added numbers of painters and brush hands, as well as 
a few trimmers, fitters and smiths. 
The Hyde Road car works of Manchester Corporation at one stage was 
building new tramcars at the rate of one per week, though this slackened 
off after 1928, and ended in October 1932 when the last new tram entered 
service.",sl Liverpool Corporation, which had laid off 120 bodymakers early 
- 325 -
in 1932, gradually reemployed them all and built over 300 new cars between 
1935 and 1942.~5~ Edinburgh was the other major British corporation to 
build its own stock. Being late in transferring to electric traction, in 
1919, after an interim period of cable traction, the Corporation's 
Shrubhi1l workshops built a number of new cars each year to replace 
existing stock, continuing to build them for several years after the second 
world war until a decision was taken in 1952 to replace the system by motor 
buses. ::.s;:;, Finally, Dublin built many of its own tramcars at its Inchicore 
works, including a major building programme in 1931.,"54 
A number of smaller corporations also built new stock, including 
Sheffield, Plymouth, Halifax and Sunderland. Brighton, for example, built 
all the 80 4-wheeled cars it had in service in 1935, and continued building 
new cars until 1937. 355 
As tramcar bodies were almost indestructib1e,:ils" there was probably 
proportionately less necessary repair work on them than on buses. The 
services of trimmers, in particular, were little reqUired. "Upholstery, 
always found inside British buses, was almost unknown in the tram until 
someone proved positively that more money was taken by cars with cushioned 
seats".3!i7 As mentioned above, the LCe did not upholster their seats until 
the late 19205. In Manchester, upholstery did not arrive until 1929 when 
the Corporation started to fit some trams with sprung seat-cushions stuffed 
with horsehair. This was stopped in 1934, after the decision to run down 
the tram service. But, even then, the upstairs seats always remained 
wooden, the rule book stating "that 'artisans and dally labourers whose 
clothing might soil the cushioned seats' could be directed by the conductor 
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to travel on the upper deck".;;'s~ However, regular repainting was necessary, 
as were conversion programmes to periodically upnate the stock. 
In Britain, electric trams were a historically transitory form of 
transport, though in many big cities they were in operation for decades, 
but their maintenance and up-dating kept a significant number of NUVB 
members in relatively stable employment. Public passenger road transport, 
both tram (horse-drawn and electric> and bus (horse-drawn, trolley and 
motor), gave the UKSC, and then the NUVB, the opportunity to establish and 
sustain a bedrock of membership in most towns and cities in Britain and 
Ireland. 
Table 5;7 Public tram undertakings in Londpn, 1914, 
with numbers pf tramcars."S9 
L.C.C. 
L.U.T. 
X.E.T. 
West Ham Corporation 
Croydon Corporation 
Ley ton UDC 
S.X.E.T. 
East Ham Corporation 
Walthamstaw UDC 
!lfard UDC 
Erith UDC 
Bexley UDC 
Dartfard UDC 
Barking UDC 
1,778 
340 
312 
118 
75 
60 
51 
45 
38 
26 
17 
16 
12 
10 
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Table 5:8 Tramcars and trolleybuses operating in London. 1914-1940. 360 
1914 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
No. "of tramcars 
2,898 
2,886 
2,984 
3,007 
2,971 
2,814 
2,806 
2,760 
2,747 
2,768 
2,748 
2,790 
2,630 
2,630 
2,630 
2,560 
2,473 
2,323 
2,060 
1,668 
1,316 
1,077 
NO, of trolleybuses 
60 
60 
60 
61 
63 
300 
494 
1,026 
1,411 
1,699 
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CHAPTER 6: TECHNICAL CHANGE - PAINTING AND THE ALL-METAL BODY. 
"Steel bodywork and cellulose finish are undoubtedly the outstanding 
developments of the post-War period." - Sir Herbert Austin, 1929. 1 
PART 1. THE PAINTING REVOLUTION 
A. FROM PAINT BRUSH TO CELLULOSE SPRAY. 
Introduction 
The painting process, as described in chapter 2, required a lot of time 
and space. Both were at a premium as the scale of production of motor cars 
increased. If the time taken to prepare, paint, and varnish car bodies 
could be cut, then not only could more bodies be processed in any given 
time, but space could also be released. Essentially, there were two main 
problems facing motor car m.~nufacturers in the paint shop. One was the 
method o~ application of the paints - up to the end of the nineteenth 
; 
century this had a1ways been done manually, by brush, and was a time-
. . ': ~ . 
consuming process. Secondly there was the long period necessary for drying 
after every coat. 
Faster methods of aoclication than the brush would cut labour costs an~ 
•• 
make significant savings on the time actually spent painting the body, but 
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could not affect the drying time, which meant that large amounts of factory 
space were tied up. Various methods were devised to speed up the 
application of the paint, mainly the "flowing-on" technique and the 
pneumatic spray. Oven drying was used to some extent to shorten drying 
time, but this was dependent on paints and varnishes being available which 
could withstand a rapid rate of drying. It was not until the introduction 
of cellulose in the mid-1920s that both problems could be successfully 
tackled. 
Cellulose wrought a total revolution in those sections of the painting 
process that had been the preserve of the skilled painter, and, as a 
consequence, the NUVB within a short period lost all claim to be the union 
that organised motor car painters. While the introduction of cellulose h~d 
very important immediate implications for the union, it had been preceded 
by a variety of other changes over a period of years. It is necessary to 
look at these earlier changes before it is possible to appreciate the 
position the union's membership and leadership found themselves in, when 
confronted with cellulose. 
, Early alternatives to brush painting 
There is so~ evidence of paint sprays around the turn of the century. 
While the spraying of paint by the use of compressed air was introduced in 
the USA in about 1890,~ the earliest British reference seems to be in 1900 
when it was reported that a pneumatic painter was being used for painting 
wagons at the Newton Heath railway workshops. Wagon painting did not 
require such a perfect finish as carriages, and paint spraying was 
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therefore practicable. It was estimated in 1908 that this spraying machine 
saved 30% of the paint required by traditional brush methods, and where 
there were large surfaces, was five to six times quicker. ~ 
But there were problems. In one railway carriage works, quite probably 
Newton Heath, factory inspectors reported that prior to the autumn of 1909 
lead paint had been applied to goods waggons by aerograph, and was 
responsible for several cases of plumbism. The sprayers had not been 
affected, but other men in the shop breathing in the air. Consequently, the 
aerograph was then limited to stencilling letters on goods waggons. 4 The 
problem of fume extraction was to dog the efforts of railway companies in 
Britain to introduce paint spraying over the next half century. 
In Britain there was only limited use of such new inventions before the 
first world war. When the manager of the Brush Company's tram works at 
Loughborough was asked in 1911 about the aerograph, he could reply in all 
honesty "I have never heard of it."5> The major early developments took 
place in the USA, where the scale of motor car production was much larger 
than in any European country. A sudden shortage of skilled brush painters 
in 1909 caused.:a production crisis; 130,000 cars were produced in th8 
lJ:S. A. that year, with many thousands delivered late because of the skill 
........ ~. 
Shortage. This speeded up the introduction of the practical spray gun and 
the drying oven, although it was not until 1917 that the spray came into 
general use in America. G 
In some American factories in 1913, the filling coats were also applied 
by a compressed air spray. The body was mounted on a turntable, and the 
- 331 -
operator stayed in a fixed position while th~ work revolved. An extra 25% 
filler was wasted compared to hand work, but this was more than compensated 
by the time saved. Heated roams were also being used to enable paint and 
varnish dry in a matter of hours, even minutes.? A very comprehensive 
account of the new techniques comes from a study of Ford's Highland Park 
works in Detroit in 1915. 
A workman, wearing a mask, used a giant atomizer, with a pressure of 80 
p.s.i., to spray bodies with a brown primer. This was then smoothed out and 
touched up by brush. The primer was dried for 24 hours before sanding, and 
then a blue-black coat of primer was "flowed-on". Two operators stood on 
opposite sides of the track, eqUipped with hoses with fanlike vacuum 
cleaner nozzles. The ends of the nozzles, instead of being entirely open, 
were perforated, the holes extending in a line at right angles to the 
direction of the flow. Using gravity only, a large tank with a sufficient 
head ensured a flow of about 6 gallons per minute. Again, points missed 
were touched up by brush. 
About 2 gallons were flowed on to each body. Tanks underneath caught all 
, ~ 
surplus paint which was recycled; one gallon actually being sufficient far 
11 bodies. Two coats of colour varnish and one of finishing varnish were 
also applied by flowing-on, with touching up by brush. After each of these 
coats the body had to be thoroughly dried. Although we are not told the 
drying times, massive storage facilities were obviously necessary. 
After the final varnish coat had been flowed on, it was "carefully 
retouched by hand, in order to insure a perfect surface free from air 
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bubbles, dry spots, bits of hair, and dust." Even in Henry Ford's factory 
there was a need for same skilled men. '" By 1915, at Ford's Trafford Park 
factory in Manchester, the flawing-on technique had similarly superseded 
the brush. Here, between each coat, the bodies were stacked an top of each 
other in threes, and nine bodies put into each stoving oven, one man 
tending 4 ovens at a time.· ... The Ford method, however, being based an an 
enamel paint that could be baked at high temperatures, was very limited in 
its colour range; hence Henry Ford's famous comment that you could buy one 
of his cars in any colour as lang as it was black. 10 
In Britain, it has been estimated that "only a few large factories 
making vehicles or bodywork had compressed-air apparatus installed before 
1914", but that it was extensively used for painting army lorrip.s during 
the war.11 Vulcan of Southport were credited by one source as being the 
first British automobile concern to adopt spray painting, I~ while the 
Arrol-Johnston factory near Dumfries was noted in 1916 as spray painting 
its wheels. 1.", There was, after the war, evidence of the flow-on method in 
Britain, Angus-Sanderson in Newcastle using it in 1919-20,14 and the 
General Motors plant at Hendon in the early 19205. IS Arrol-Johnston used 
the syst~m to paint its bodies, with a tank containing paint or varnish 
~laced_h1gh enough to gravity feed through a tube to a nozzle which sprayed 
the paint "on to the body. They claimed that every coat of varnish an their 
cars at the 1921 Kotor Show had been applied by this method. One drawback, 
of course, was that a car could nat be painted more than one colour by this 
method. 16 In early 1926 Singer was still using flowing-on apparatus for 
paint and varnish. 17 
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However, in practice, there may have been little difference between 
spraying and flowing-on machines at this time, and both were fairly 
widespread outside of the specialist coachbuilding concerns. A 1921 British 
manual recorded that "In the more modern shops, various paint-spraying 
machines are installed, as also are the baking ovens, all of which are 
necessary for the reduction of high manufacturing costs". 1'3 One area of 
wide use was for painting chassis. AEC, the London bus chassis 
manufacturer, spray painted its chassis, it taking 2 men 18 minutes, 
compared to the old brush method which took 4 men one day. 13 At Morris 
Motors in Oxford, the much smaller car chassis were each spray-painted in 2 
minutes by 2 operators. 20 
Initial NUVB reaction 
The first references to the spray in NUVB records were in the north-
west, where its impending use at Leyland Motors was expected in late 
1918j21 it was being used at the Dick, Kerr tram contract shop in Preston 
in 1919j~2 and NUVB painters at Belsize Motors in Manchester were refusing 
to allow anything other than filling to be done by spray in 1920. The EC 
agreed to support them, and the Manchester DC decided to support the 
exeeut1ve,in any action taken to abolish the spray.z~ When the executive 
appealed·for'particulars about paint spraying early in 1920, it got little 
information from the branches, however.~4 
The engineering employers already had a definite policy on the use of 
the spray, when the issue was discussed in negotiations for the National 
Woodworkers' Agreement of 1920 (see chapter 7). In December 1919, the NUVB 
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successfully got the employers to delete "spraying" as part of the 
description of the brush hand's work. But while they argued that if a 
spraying-machine were used, it should be the painter's jab, the employers 
contended that spraying came outside their grading scheme.~S Two months 
later, when Assistant General Secretary Smith asked for "the preCise words 
which will cover who is to use the spraying machine", the employers could 
only repeat that "it is a labourer's job and therefore ought not to corne 
under any system of grading". 
'~Ien Smith contended that in federated shops, skilled men were doing 
spraying, the employers replied that if craftsmen were sometimes put on 
spraying, they would take their rate with them. However, some unskilled men 
and women did use the spray, and the NUVB were forced to argue that an 
unskilled operator would leave a fine mist in the shop which could be 
avoided if a tradesman were used. The union's continued insistence that 
spraying should be done by the skilled painter finally elicited the reply 
"It is a very big question you are raising, and I think you had better 
leave that with US".26 In fact, that is where it was left, the failure to 
agree leaving the union to fight its case shop by shop. At the local level 
NUVB policy was often to initially try to restrict the spray's use, rather 
than demand that their members used it on the skilled rate. 
London was one area affected by these developments, and, in 1920, the 
London South branch sent an anti-spray resolution to the executive.~7 In 
May of that year, the spray was reported at an LGOC worksj and the London 
District Committee supported the executive's view regarding its restriction 
wherever possible.~e However, by at least Xay 1922, the union had 
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negotiated a rate for LGOC sprayers as semi-skilled workers, but 2d per 
hour above the brush hand's rate.~~ In general, though, the spray was 
fairly rarely used outside of the car industry at the time. Here, however, 
it was making significant inroads into traditional coach painting practice. 
Austin started applying coach paint by spray in 1919. One coat could be 
applied in 20 minutes compared to the 3 hours necessary using the brush 
method."";' Austin works manager, Engel bach, reported in mid-1925 that a 11 
their bodies were spray-painted.::' 1 At the Vickers bodybuilding factory in 
Crayford, the NUVB complained in 1922 that some spraying operations were 
bei ng done by women. n 
In Coventry, it is not at all clear to what extent spray painting took 
place in the car factories in the early 1920s, but there was much 
discussion of it in the NUVB branch in late 1919 and early 1920. A special 
branch meeting agreed not to oppose the use of the spray and to claim the 
work as skilled painters' work.3~ A deputation of painters from the Humber 
told the branch committee they wanted all operations after rubbing down to 
be paid at the skilled rate. Delegates then met from Coventry, Birmingham 
and Wolverhampton districts, and communicated their views on spraying to 
the executive. A special sub-committee of the Coventry branch was formed to 
collect evidence on the extent of spraying. 34 Unfortunately, no record 
exists of its findings, and the issue disappeared from the branch minutes, 
apart from references in mid-1920 to chassis painting and spraying at 
Humber, and the operation of a spraying machine by a labourer at Swift. ~s 
Nothing further was recorded in Coventry until early 1925 when, at the 
Standard Motor Company, it was not possible to finish a particular saloon 
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body by use of a flowing machine, and some of the NUVB painters were 
reluctant to finish it off by brush. The manager asked them to see their 
branch officers, who advised them to do the work as long as they received 
their usual wases.~G Presumably the flowing machine operator was not paid 
the skilled rate. 
Spraying or flowing seemed to be quite widely used in the mass 
production shops on the higher volume models, Humber, for example, spraying 
about 100 bodies per week in mid-1925. 37 But some low volume models in 
these shops were probably still brush painted (see below for Humber), and 
thp.re would, no doubt, have been other employment for brush painters -
rectification work, pOSSibly final varnishing, any lining necessary, plus 
work in the coachbuilding concerns in the town. With the expansion, 
therefore, of car production in the early 1920s in Coventry, skilled brush 
painters would still have found work. Their main problem would have been 
spraying operations generally being paid at the semi-skilled rate, and that 
probably meant they either did not do that work, or did it in the knowledge 
that under piecework they could still earn a good wage. 
Generally, however, the union's position in the early 1920s was against 
the spray, because not only did it threaten cheap labour, but even where 
the skilled rate was paid, the spray generally meant fewer employment 
opportunities for skilled painters. Thus when the spray was introduced into 
one of the largest Manchester shops, there was strong objection to it, and 
organiser Floyd argued "if only we can get some evidence that its use is 
detrimental to the operators, then there is a possibility of getting it 
removed from the factories". The EC took this up in the Journal and once 
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again appealed for evidence. They were resolved to make every effort 
against it on health grounds, arguing that operators having to wear masks 
showed it was dangerous. ,,"3 But this was often difficult, and the Bristol 
branch's reaction in 1925 was to insist on the full rate. 3' 
One contemporary observer believed that skilled painters should have 
embraced the new painting methods, arguing "it might be said that these 
methods depend more upon the nature and quality of the materials us~d than 
upon any special skill of the operator, and yet in every case the 
experienceu painter should make the best operator, and we should probably 
see far less unskilled labour introduced into our painting shops if the 
mechanic would take more kindly to the introduction of new notions and go 
out of his way to master them."40 The union, however, never really came to 
grips with paint-spraying in the early 1920s. London-based Assistant 
General Secretary, A.E.Smith, surveying the many points facing the 1924 
Delegate Meeting, wrote "the increased use of the spray, dipping, and the 
stove process, are bringing about qUite a new condition of things. The 
chemist, too, is busy with new pigments, and together with the colour 
manufacturer, is constantly evolving new methods designed to reduce both 
time and skill."·1 The Delegate Meeting apparently had other priorities. 
The introduction of cellulose 
While the union's policy on the paint spray could muddle along in the 
early 19208, the situation became profoundly more serious with the change-
over from coach paint to cellulose. Once again, the American car industry 
led the way. While the move away from brush painting on mass produced c~rs 
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in America before the first world war, had eased the bottleneck situation 
in the paint shop, the increasing scale of production after the war 
accentuated the need for further development. At the same time there was a 
problem with the quality of finish. 
Some kinds of enamel, baked at very high temperatures, could be quickly 
applied and were reasonably durable, but their colour range was extremely 
limited. In the early 1920s, Ford, Dodge, Overland, and General Motors used 
only black enamel on high volume production cars, giving cause for 
complaint. Meanwhile, those cars still finished with traditional paint and 
varnish suffered paint peeling off due to the combination of the extremes 
of climate in the U.S.A. and the temperature changes caused by the 
engine. 42 As Alfred P. Sloan Jnr of General Motors later wrote: "We dreamed 
of what a wonderful thing it would be if a finish could be developed which 
would last even if the car stood out in all kinds of weather. We also began 
to realise that a good, fast-drying finish could revolutionize our time 
schedules and the consequent cost of production."4~ 
The need for a fast-drying finish was paramount. According to Sloan, the 
. . 
whole painting process could take two to four weeks, depending on 
tempefature and humidity. A daily production of 1,000 cars meant 18,000 
cars in progress, taking up twenty acres of covered indoor space. In July 
1920, the du Pont laboratories discovered the colour carrying properties of 
cellulose lacquer. The next year, General Motors, in cooperation with du 
Pont, initiated the research that led to the development of a 
nitrocellulose lacquer, known eventually as "Duco". This was first used in 
1923 in production of the Oakland range of GM cars for the 1924 season. 44 
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It was then standardised on all GM cars in 1924, including the top of the 
range Cadillac in 1925. 45 It was estimated that by early 1927, of 174 
models offered by American manufacturers, only 20 were finished in enamel 
and varnish, the rest being cellulosed. 46 
"Duco" was made available to the entire American motor industry in 
1925. 47 Within 2 years, more than 90% of American cars were finished in 
cellulose. 48 Accounts differ as to which was the first British car company 
to use cellulose - one suggesting AC Cars, 43 another Standard Xotors~O -
but it swept through the British motor car industry very quickly from mid 
to late 1925. Standard authorised the expenditure for the installation of 
the necessary plant in April 1925;51 Austin transferred to it early in 
1926jS2 by June 1926, Daracq was using cellulose for 90% of its work.s~ 
The saving in time waS the key factor in its widespread adoption. "The 
Autocar" reported in July 1925 that while there was little difference in 
the cost of an average car sprayed with cellulose, and one finished in 
ordinary paint and varnish, there was a considerable saving in time. 
Cellulose finishes needed careful cleaning and flatting, but dried much 
faster' than paint.and varnish. S4 In September 1925, "The Autocar" noted 
that "some" British manufacturers had adopted cellulose and similar 
finishes; and expected them to become extremely popular in the coming 
year. 5S By November, manufacturers of cellulose enamels were "finding 
difficulty in supplying the demands made upon them for the necessary 
materials" and were expanding their plant to increase production. 5 .. 
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At the 1926 Motor Shaw, a number of companies specified cellulose 
finish. They included not only a large producer like Austin, but also small 
to medium-sized ones like Armstrong-Siddeley, Sunbeam and Cluley; and 
coachbuilders' bodywork on other manufacturers' chassis also included 
cellulose finish by such small concerns as Beadle, Cadogan Motors, and 
Howes & Sons of Norwich. s7 Early in 1927, though, at least one Coventry car 
body producer was still sceptical of cellulose, finding that no cellulose 
filler had any appreciable body to it and all took a long time to applYi 
while the colour range of cellulose enamels was still not very wide. 
"Before we go on to cellulose we must be assured that it has as wide a 
range of colour as paint." Nat only this, but also "Body builders have a 
very serious problem to face in changing over from paint to cellulose owing 
to the long time which has to elapse before they can be satisfied as to the 
durability of the cellulose".s~ 
But the tide was running strongly in favour of cellulose. "The Autocar" 
report of the 1927 Motor Show found that the "high gloss and lustrous 
surface" obtained from cellulose was "equal to the best varnished 
surfaceN.6~ Some of the mare expensive cars were now finished off in this 
way, Van den Plas producing a cellulosed body an a Bentley chassis, while a 
small.StQck?ort firm produced one on a Daimler chassis,6e' and Salmons 
. ' 
produced a cellulase-finished Rolls-Royce saloon. 61 At the 1928 Show. 
however, there were still a number of cars displayed which had been coach-
painted, for example, a Hall Lewis body on a Daimler, and an Offord body on 
a Minerva chassis. But Rolls-Royce bodies by both Connaught and Barker were 
cellulosed, and coach paint was definitely on the way out even for the most 
expensive cars,62 "The Autocar" reporting that "Cellulose finish is almost 
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universally used for steel coachwork, and iS,frequently applied to even the 
highest class of coachbuilt body."63 
Of course, there were variations among the specialist coachbuilders. 
Late in 1924, the London car bodybuilders in the NFVT were seriously 
discussing the new system. "Anything that would reduce time and cost which 
the present method of painting entails was worth considering". But as it 
was still at the experimental stage at this time in Britain, many 
coachbuilders preferred the old method. 64 In mid-1926, the NFVT executive 
sent out a questionnaire to 199 member firms; of 38 replying, 11 were using 
cellulose. At that stage, the new method was still more expensive, but the 
NFVT were anxious to generalise experience, and organised a talk. s • 
Vanden Plas were one of the first coachbu1lders to introduce cellulose 
painting. Because of their involvement with aircraft manufacture in the 
first world war and their association with a manufacturer of "dope" (used 
in the treatment of fabric wings) they introduced a primitive cellulose 
spray shop in 1925. Paint and varnish were rendered almost obsolete except 
for repair and reconditioning work. G6 But at Hoopers factory in Chelsea, 
even in 1928, cellulose was used only "in some cases".67 
Bergers held a demonstration of cellulose painting at their works in 
mid-1926, at which many coachbuilding firms were represented. G1a Nobel 
Chemical Finishes opened a demonstration centre, fitted out with spray 
booths, in Chiswick High Road in 1926. "Free courses were given by a team 
of trained spray painters. It was estimated that some 80% of the paint shop 
staff of British car manufacturers received their first training at the 
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Chiswick Centre, which was closed in 1928."6. Other cellulose manufacturers 
also opened demonstration centres to instruct prospective users.7Q 
One writer has suggested that by 1930 all new British motor cars were 
finished in cellulose.?l Certainly in 1929 hand painting and varnishing was 
becoming rare, with one of the Crossley bodies being among the few still 
being done in this waYi 72 though in 1930, Weybridge bodybuilders Hoyal were 
still getting the occasional order for a carriage-varnished body.?~ 
Swallow, which started coachbuilding in 1927, experimented with cellulose 
in 1928, before finally abandoning coach paint and varnish early in 1930. 74 
Even mass producers did not experience a totally straightforward 
transition to cellulose. Until the 1929 season (ie late 1928), wood-framed 
Flatnose Morris cars at Cowley were spray painted with air drying paints, 
while the all-steel bodied Morrises were finished in cellulose and oven-
dried, suffering no ill-effects from the heat. From this date, however, 
both wood-framed and all-steel Morris bodies were finished in oven-dried 
cellulose. '7& In 1928, Humber were cellulosing open bodies, while closed 
cars were painted and varnished in the old way, with the final varnishing 
being done. by brush after the bodies had been trimmed. 7 ',i 
Vickers of Crayford, producing saloon and open bodies for Renault and 
Fiat in 1928, claimed that cellulose allowed them to handle the work 
without damaging or marking the finish, as well as eliminating the 
elaborate precautions necessary when varnishing. 77 But cellulose equipment 
was not cheap, Singer spending t70,OOO on the necessary plant. 7'~ But the 
time saved was very great. At Vanden Plas in the early 1920s traditional 
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brush painting and varnishing methods took at least 3 weeks to finish a 
body,7e while at Austin, even sprayed coach paint took ten days, which was 
reduced to five with cellulose. ea 
A paper delivered to the Institution of Automobile Engineers in late 
1925 suggested that with cellulose, total painting time was only 6 days."'1 
Of the several different types of material on the market, the manufacturers 
of "Proxcelin" claimed it took half as long again to finish a car with "the 
old style paint and varnish" as with Proxcel1n. The makers of "Cellusol" 
claimed that an eight-coat scheme would take 5 or 6 days, while a six-coat 
scheme took only 4. And "Celvalac"'s makers argued that changing the colour 
on a car could be done in "a few days" with its material, as opposed to the 
three weeks usually required for a varnish finish.~2 
While cellulose replaced the colour and varnish coats, priming and 
filling coats remained initially oil-based and thus constituted the bulk of 
the time the bodies remained in the paint shops. A description of the 
application of "Belco" to Vauxhall cars brings this out. Once the body has 
been cleaned free of grease, a primer coat was sprayed on. Then putty-glaze 
was applied with~ spatula or knife to fill in file marks and small 
depressions., This required at least 6 hours drying time. Following this, 
two or mor'e coats of "sanding surfaceI'M were applied, a hand-beaten and 
filed panel requiring more coats than a pressed panel. Each of these coats 
required from 7 to 14 hours to air dry, and the body would therefore be in 
this preparatory stage in the paint shop from 2 to 6 days depending on the 
quality of the panels. 
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After sanding down, the Vauxhall would receive 5 coats of Belco in about 
half an hour. While these coats were dry to the touch in about ten minutes, 
the bodies were usually left overnight for the cellulose to harden. Because 
Beleo dried so quickly, it could not be applied by brush or by the dipping 
processj it also had no time to collect foreign particles, and therefore 
did not need a heated or dust-proof atmosphere. With the subsequent 
polishing operation, the body would only spend some 2 days in the paint 
shop after the first application of Belco.~~ 
While NUVE members had apparently accommodated themselves to some extent 
to the new practices of spraying and flowing-on coach paint, cellulose 
wrought a total revolution in traditional paint shop practice. The IUVB's 
attempts to cope with it are dealt with in the next section. 
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B. IMPACT OF CELLULOSE ON THE NUVB. 
Before the introduction of cellulose into Britain, paint sprays wer@ 
generally confined to the larger factories. Whether the varnish coats were 
put on by brush or otherwise in these factories is not clear, though the 
final varnish coat would be brushed on if the trimming work had already 
been done. But in many establishments producing car bodies, brush paint1ng 
re~~ined the rule. As the industry was expanding rapidly in the early 
1920s, there was no special problem of unemployment among brush painters. 
While there was limited concern nationally in the union about the use of 
the paint spray in the early 1920s, the introduction of cellulose was of 
much greater importance to the union and its painter members. It 
immediately revolutionised the whole process of colour painting. Instead of 
the application of a number of colour coats of coach paint hy brush or 
spray, followe1 by varnishing ~nd flatting, there was the rapid application 
by spray of several coats of cellulose, followed by flatting and polishing. 
The varnishing process totally disappeared. The significance of this was 
summed up by a Vauxhall manager in 1927 - "A semi-skilled man can be 
trained to spray in a few weeks, whereas a varnish 'finisher' 1s a highly 
skilled operator requiring many years' experience." a4 
Of course, the introduction of the process was not totally smooth, as 
contributors to a discussion of automobile engineers pOinted out. One 
mentioned that the "foreman painter is afraid of the new process" i'iOS 
another that cellulose required very thorough stirring before application, 
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and that as most operators were on a piecework basis "the stirring often 
gets omitted". ';;"~ But whatever the teethi ng problems with cellulose, it rude 
brush painting redundant in the motor car industry almost overnight. In 
particular, after the application of colour, the "skill" of varnishing W3S 
replaced by the job of polishing, sometimes performed by women. 
There had been problems in the Rover paint shop in Coventry reg3rding 
female labour as early as May 1925. But when cellulose was brought in, a 2-
d3y strike ensued in February 1926 to get the women removed from the 
polishing operation. This was partly successful, as the company agreed to 
replace the women by unskilled adult male labour. Some men were soon 
engaged on factng at the semi-skilled rate, but the union had to keep·on 
pushing the company to remove all the women, which was accomplished about 
five weeks after the strike. 97 About the same time. women were reported 
doing the final polishing on open bodies at Standard, while male flatters 
were polishing at Armstrong-Siddeley.9'31 also in Coventry; and a meeting of 
all Coventry NUVB painters agreed to claim "that all operations after being 
rubbed down is a skilled job" and to ask that the skilled painters' rate of 
ls01d be paid for it."'·3 At Carbodies in Coventry, an organising meeting, 
held in Karch 1927. discussed the cellulose process and organiser Fran~is 
insisted members adapt themselves to this development .. ,)() 
An engineering employers' questionnaire in 1929 suggested that in 
Coventry. while spray painters had transferred from paint spraying to 
cellulose spraying, they h.:id. with the exception of 2 unnamed firms, all 
started on cellulose work at the appropriate semi-skilled rate. In the two 
exceptions the skilled rate was retained by paint sprayers when they 
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transferred to cellulose work. It is not clear which these firms were, as 
representatives from Standard, Daimler, Armstrong-Siddeley, Humber and 
Rover, all agreed in 1929 to act in conformity with the view that cellulose 
spraying should be recognised "on the whole" as a semi-skilled job.~l At 
Humber, when cellulose had been introduced, skilled rates had been dropp~d 
to semi-skilled and the men had accepted the position. By 1929 they WAre 
agitating about this, but did not formally complain to the management, and 
decided to await the outcome of a special conference with the engineering 
employers soon afterwards'~2 (see below). 
When Midland organiser Bowen reported early in 1926 that the semi-
skilled rate was paid on cellulose operations in Coventry, he was aware of 
the profound significance of cellulose for the union. He stated forcefully 
"we think it necessary to say to our painters that they must insist on 
doing these jobs, whether they like them or not, for, with the developments 
now taking place, it is likely in the near future that if the painters 
refuse the operations, semi-skilled and unskilled men will be drafted in, 
and the painters' job will be gone." 
" " . 
Going fur~her. he pointed out "The whole question of Mass Production 
work ousht to !eCeive the attention of all our members, and a definite 
policy decided upon for each of the trades - Bodymakers, Painters, 
Trimmers, etc." At the same time, Halliwell, reporting from London, 
referred to an attempt to put labourers on to cellulose polishing, saying 
that "we have claimed this work for body-painters, or at least brush 
hand~'. Having painted out that no general practice prevailed, he argued 
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"we have to urge that a definite line of policy must be taken up or the 
painters will find cheap labour introduced to their detriment".93 
The union, however, appeared initially to have no national policy on the 
subject of cellulose, or at least no strategy to implement any such policy. 
The engineering employers were only too aware of the implications of 
cellulase, and took a strong stand over cellulose polishing. In July 1926 
at a joint meeting of various sectional National Technical Committees, they 
recommended that this was a new operation and did not require skilled 
labour - "the principle involved is of such importance that ~ll firms 
should maintain this attitude even though it should involve a question of 
the union withdrawing other labour to enforce a claim for skilled 
workpeople to be employed on it". And they agreed that firms should be 
recommended that when at the experimental stage in the cellulose process 
they should safeguard their position by not employing any skilled labour on 
the final polishing. B • 
By this time the union had had at least two notable tangles with the 
engineering employers, apart from the Rover incident. At Daracq in London 
there had been discharges of a number of skilled coacbpainters in May 1926. 
and women had been put on cellulose polishing. NUVB Assistant General 
Secretary A.E.Smith wrote to Daracq threatening to withdraw all members if 
the firm did not remove the women, but at a Yorks Conference a few days 
later, he accepted management's right to select whoever they wanted for 
cellulose polishing, on the understanding that if vacancies arose on thiS. 
then men who might otherwise be discharged should be given a trlal.~~ 
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The union then took Austtn Motors to a Local Conference in July that 
year over the rates for cellulose work, with the employers claiming that 
cellulose operations were not covered by any existing agreement, and that 
they could employ who they liked, at what rate they liked. The conference 
had come about as a result of Austin laying off some men in June and then 
re-engaging 2 of them twelve days later at a lower rate on cellulose work, 
whereupon the NUVB instructed them to refuse to start work. The local or 
domestic argument centred around whether the men had originally been 
discharged or merely suspended, but underneath this particular argument lay 
the much more important principle of whether the two men who worked on 
flatting and facing were doing the same work on cellulose as they had been 
on paint and varnish before they had been laid off. 
Bowen, for the NUVB, claimed they were, while the employers disagreed, 
arguing that "under the cellulose process the operations are 50 elementary 
that they can be performed by people .... with practically no experience at 
all", and that there was plenty of evidence that men and youths "who have 
never seen the inside of a factory before ..... in about a fortnight's time 
.... were doing the job effectively". As far as the employers were 
concerned Mthe cellulose process does not come under the National Agreement 
at all .•.... there could not have been contemplated within the terms of this 
agreement an operation embodying new principles which in point of fact was 
not invented when the agreement was drafted". The employers claimed that at 
Austin every man who had moved over directly from paint and varnish had 
kept his old rate; the union argued that the higher-rated men bad been 
dismissed, and only the lower-rated moved over, but did not go for a 
central conference on the issue. 96 
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While the car manufacturers affiliated to the engineering employers 
generally succeeded in getting or keeping the semi-skilled rate for 
spraying operations, there was not a monolithic response, Thus Leyland 
Motors reached an agreement in September 1927 wi th its pai nters t.h,~t whi Ie 
polishing should be done by any labour the firm chose, other painting 
operations - spraying, flatting down, lining, and pencil-varnishing -
shou ld be done by ski lied coach painters at thei r norma I rate. ',n Some two 
years later they claimed this was a satisfactory arrangement, bearing in 
mind the high class nature of their work, though painted out "if our work 
was not of such a high quality we should probably have to adopt other 
methods". '",'iI (In fact, in 1932, there were complaints by the union that the 
company had attempted to introduce labourers on to colour spraying.~~) 
The quality issue was important. Of three federated London firms 
questioned in 1929, one had already used unskilled labour on spraying 
before cellulose came in; another paid semi-skilled rates, though very 
occaSionally transferred skilled men with their skilled rate to cellulose 
workj a third, however, insisted that men employed must be able to do both 
cellulose and coach painting, and paid the same rate for sprayers as it did 
for finishers & liners, which was higher than it paid for ordinary coach 
painters & liners. This was obviously a firm still doing coach painted 
jobs, and requiring men capable of this work. 100 
The issue of female cellulose polishers seems to have caused little 
difficulty, though the union had problems with it at two unfederated firms, 
Midland Light Bodies in Coventry in 1927, 1'~1 and in Singer'S Birmingham 
factory in 1928. In the latter plant, there were girls of 14 and 15 engaged 
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an flatting and polishing. A meeting of Singer members in Coventry voted to 
try to prevent their doing this work, but eventually had to accept them as 
part of a wider settlement of outstanding grievances. lu~ But fears of 
women taking over jabs in traditional NUVB paint shop territory tended to 
be confined to the mass production shops. Even here, though, female 
involvement was fairly low. 1<:13 Elsewhere the union was more concerned th,"\t 
its members took on the cellulase spraying itself. 
The NUVB did not include any reference to cellulose or paint spraying 
when it sent forward proposals in January 1926 for that year's UKJWB wages 
agreement. 104 Nicholson later suggested that same time during 1926-27 the 
vehicle building employers had told the NUVB that they would be paid the 
full painters' rate if they gave full recognition to cellulose spraying. At 
the time the union leadership was divided on this, and missed the 
opportunity. (There is no documentary evidence for this claim. )1.: .... In 1927, 
when the union did claim the painter's rate for all paint-spraying 
processes, it was to no avail, the employers argUing that such a move would 
drive the cellulase process into nan-union shops. lOG 
Midway through 1927 the NUVB executive reported that "Kany of the small 
shops are now laying in the plant for cellulose spraying, and putting it up 
to our painters to use; in a number of cases our members have objected, and 
unskilled or semi-skilled men have been trained for the work ..... We are 
convinced the policy of our members should be to take over this work." They 
added that cellulase was "nat so injurious to health as is sometimes 
thought", which was a significant change in attitude, for, like sprayed 
coach paint, they had initially emphasised the health risks. 
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Very importantly, the executive stressed that "Employers with wham we 
have had to negotiate do not put serious objections to the full painter's 
rate; in fact, most offer it quite unconditionally to secure practical 
sympathy for the innovation". However, the affected membership did not 
always take such a positive attitude. Halliwell reported from London that 
"Our painters, as a whale, will have to shaw less reluctance towards this 
process if they wish to hold their own". 10' Towards the end of 1927 
Halliwell visited the Dover works of the Connaught Carriage Company and 
admitted "I stand convinced, for the first time, that cellulose is a rival 
to varnish an first-class jobs". As a selling paint he reported that "the 
Director informed me that the secret of the success lay in the employment 
of first-class skilled labour". loe 
In Manchester, a well-attended special meeting of all the painters in 
the area was held to hear a lecture from the managing director of a 
cellulase manufacturer. Organiser Floyd commented, "The majority of 
painters now realise that it is up to them to get hold of the machine and 
control it". 10~ Within a very short time, the executive gave the Manchester 
branch the power to stop the benefit of any members refusing to accept jabs 
where the' spray was being used and Home Office regulations enforced. "0 At 
the beginning of 1929, the EC was still having to "urge our members where 
the old systems of the paint shop are denied to them, to adapt themselves 
to the new". Three months later, the general secretary, looking back over 
the previous few years, admitted that the executive had had "to drive quite 
a goad proportion" of the membership into recognising cellulase spraying, 
and apparently in only one district was there a total refusal. '" 
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In 1929 the union attempted a revision of-the EEF national woodworkers' 
agreement, including the skilled rate for cellulose work. A central 
conference referred this issue to a meeting of the engineering employers' 
various woodworking sectional technical committees, who were unanimous that 
skilled labour was nat required on any operations up to the first colour 
coat, or an final polishing. There was a difference of opinion as to 
whether on same high class jabs, a skilled painter should be employed an 
the colour coats, but overall it was decided to recommend the federation to 
resist any union claim for the skilled rate for any of these operations. 112 
NUVB Strategy 
The early forms of paint spray had been introduced piecemeal in 
sections of the industry by the mid-1920s and had not appeared too 
significant a threat to the union. The introduction of cellulose, by 
contrast, occurred almost simultaneously across the motor car industry, and 
was a much mare serious threat. It was only at this time that any 
systematic national strategy could have been implemented by the union to 
control the conditiorts under which it was used. A major factor militating 
against-any'successful strategy was the speed with which cellulose was 
, . 
,..'., .. 
introduced for,car painting. But even if the union had had more time to 
workout a strategy, there were a number of other factors which lessened 
the urgency with which the national union leadership, and the majority of 
the members, including the majority of painter members, faced the problem. 
To begin with, the issue was clouded to some extent by female labour. 
The executive talked about retaining the industry "for men's labour" e~rly 
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in 1926. 11~ They endorsed the above mentioned action of the Rover painters 
striking for the removal of female polishers, and threatened to initiate 
similar action at Daracq but backed down. 114 Attention was thus, perhaps 
inadvertently, diverted away from the more serious issues. 
Secondly, there was a mixed reaction on the part of the employers. As 
noted above, the engineering employers had, by the middle of 1926, worked 
out a national policy on cellulose polishing: while on cellulose spraying 
they benefitted from the fact that many employers had already established 
ordinary paint spraying at a semi-skilled rate. A few engineering 
employers, seemingly on high class work, allowed the skilled rate, however. 
Among the non-engineering coachbuilding concerns, it is difficult to 
generalise. The majority were prepared to, and many did, pay the skilled 
rate for cellulose spraying, but where NUVB members had initially resisted 
taking on the work, the semi-skilled (brush-band) rate would have been 
established. Facing this varied response, it was probably a matter of 
getting whatever was possible, at the time, employer by employer. But the 
union executive do not appear to have at any time given tbe promise of 
backing to any members thinking of striking to retain the skilled rate. 
Thirdly, and not mentioned so far, from roughly 1923 to 1933 almost all 
cars had fabric body options available, and these effectively cut out paint 
shop personnel completely (though some bad the fabric cellulosed>. This 
factor may well have appeared to many in the leadersbip and among the 
affected painter membership in the mid-1920s as overshadowing the cellulose 
threat. Thus, in the northern organising district covered by Floyd, in the 
autumn of 1928, it was reported that unemployment had hit the painters the 
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hardest due to "so many fabric bodies" and the use of the spray. 1 IS In 
Scotland, the same two factors were blamed for heavy unemployment among 
painters, with Symington arguing that a national and local rAsponse was 
necessary, including restricting the numbers entering the trade. I I~ 
Accordingly, the Edinburgh branch suggested a reduction in the number of 
painter apprentices from 1:4 to 1:6. This was put to the Scott.ish employers 
in 1929, who rejected it. 117 
But most important of all was the fact that the spraying of paint, let 
alone cellulose, was not practicable for much of the vehicle building 
industry at the time, and in some instances took decades to be introduced. 
It did not, therefore, affect all paint shop members. Even in the centres 
of car production in the mid-1920s, there was generally alternative vehicle 
building work available. Manchester had railway workshops and trams; London 
had railways, and substantial employment on bus and municipal tram 
maintenance and building, as well as a multitude of small coachbuilding 
concernsj Birmingham had railway carriage and bus contract shops. Only 
Coventry was unique as a significant centre of NUVB membership with 
effectively only the car industry as its potential employment. Elsewhere, 
in non-car industry areas, cellulose was by and large not an issue; brush 
painting. and the skilled brush painters ruled supreme (see section C 
below> . 
The Scottish experience 
The Changes in painting methods did, however, have some impact in the 
1920s in parts of the industry away from motor car production. One arp.d 
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where sufficient material on this is available is Scotland, and the 
experience there highlights a number of general points. 
Organlser Symington had already reported in the spring of 1926 that 
there was a "relatively large number of Painters who remain unemployed 
during the height of the busy season". He put this down to jobbing work .~t 
night, and "The introduction of the spray and the tendency towards 
employment of Brush Hands in preference to Painters". According to him, the 
spray was lowering the standard of quality desired, and consequently gave 
the brush hand a wider area of work. Brush hands were now performing 
operations done not very long ago by painters. Apart from the employers' 
desire for "cheap labour", there was also "some Painters' desire to escape 
the dirty and more laborious operations"; and the combination of these 
meant that "painting is developing into a condition whereby, eventually 
(unless an alteration is made> the mast of the work will be done at the 
Brush Hand rate of pay with a minority of Painters doing the highest 
skilled operations at the skilled Painters' rate". 
Symington saw the remedy as specifying what constituted the respective 
operations of brush hands and painters, and that painters should be paid 
the painter's rate irrespective of their work, while brush hands should be 
paid the painter's rate when engaged on painters' work. 11~ And in the next 
year, 1927, the union negotiated a clause with the Scottish employers' 
organisation, the SNVBA - "Brush Hands shall not be employed beyond the 
first coat of paint after the rubbing down of filling, and not beyond the 
ground coat on unprepared surfaces". This was to be on trial for a year, 
with the union agreeing to take a broad view regarding rough lorry work.119 
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In 1928 the Glasgow branch informed the executive of non-union m~n and 
members of other painting unions obtaining employment on the cellulose 
spraying of vehicles to the exclusion of NUVB coach painters. 120 The next 
year, Glasgow, Springburn and Edinburgh branches got the EC to withdraw nn 
Edinburgh member who was an instructor at a Springburn-based Ministry of 
Labour training class in coachpainting for ex-miners. The trainees received 
six months intensive instruction and were then placed in jobs in garages, 
where the union could not get at them, and were paid well below even the 
brush hand rate. The Scottish branches had about 600 painters in 
membership, and unemployment among them had fluctuated between 10 and 30% 
in the previous two years. The EC then took up the whole issue with the 
Ministry of Labour with a view to getting training stopped in the painting 
branch, but had to settle for a slight reduction in the numbers trained in 
Britain as a whole. 1~1 
In January 1930 a serious problem arose in Glasgow with an NUVB brush 
hand operating a cellulose spray at the bus builders Cowiesons, painter 
members there not being anxious to do the work. The Glasgow branch 
committee decided that the brush hand should be removed from the spraying 
operation and sent a delegation to the firm. Meanwhile the firm had started 
a non-union sprayer as well, but the branch committee refused to admit him 
to membership. 122 When the organiser interviewed the firm, they told him 
they were not prepared to payoff either the brush hand or the non-union 
sprayer. "Their reason for not doing so is that the union cannot ~upply 
them with sprayers." When a deputation from the shop agreed with the firm'~ 
attitude, the committee decided that the organlser should try to get the 
painter's rate for the brush hand sprayer. 123 
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Not surprisingly, Cowiesons refused to pay the full rate to the brush 
hand, and the branch committee ruled that the brush hand he stopped frnm 
spraying immediately. But painters in the shop did not carry this out .'lnd 
let the brush hand carryon until they got an EC ruling. The branch 
committee reconvened in the canteen at Cowiesons and informed the members 
that the committee was acting in line with EC decisions. The paint shop 
members then agreed to tell the manager the next morning to stop the brush 
hand from using the spray. The organiser reported the next day that he had 
visited the firm and told them to stop the man from spraying. 1~4 
Nothing further was minuted on this case, and it can only be assumed 
that the branch was successful here. But the issue does highlight the twin 
problems that the union had no national agreements with the employers on 
the rate for cellulose spraying, and that the union's own members were 
sometimes reluctant to take on the work, thus opening the path for non-
unionists or for brush hands who would invariably be paid at a semi-skilled 
rate. Once coach painters had refused the work, they did not usually get a 
second chance. 
Later Developments 
>r 
It was not"until 1934 that the union got an officially recognised rate 
for cellulose polishers in the coach trade. In the absence of a national 
agreement, a local wage agreement with the four main high class London 
coachbuilders - Barker, Hooper, Thrupp & Kaberly, and Park Ward - in 
January put the cellulose polishers on a par with brush hands, and a 
halfpence per hour above rubbers. l~S Later in the year, the NUVB pxtendAd 
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this to a belated national agreement for England and Wales, including 
putting cellulase polishers on the same rate as brush hands and a halfp~nny 
above labourers. 1~6 
These agreements caused some unrest among the London membership, centred 
around the question of who were the skilled men in the cellulose process, 
and a special meeting decided that the rubbers, facers, and flatters playe,j 
a most important part, with the finish of the job depending very much on 
them. 127 Elsewhere, the Yorks & North East District Council supported a 
resolution from Newcastle in 1935 that the EC should review the status of 
cellulose polishers and sprayers, with a view to improving their rates. '2S 
But the employers at this time saw no need to make any concessions. At 
an internal NFVT discussion, it was agreed that there was less skill in 
spraying than in brushing, and that the spraying of priming and filling 
coats should certainly not be paid at more than the brush hand's rate. 
Duples was already paying for spray filling at this rate, while Vanden Plas 
had done so, but had reverted to brushing on the filling coats. 1~~ 
In proposals put to the UKJVB for the next wage settlement in 1936, the 
NUVB EC unsuccessfully asked that brush hands and cellulose polishers be 
brought up from 4~d to 2d below the skilled man. 13'~ The next year they 
proposed that the skilled rate should apply to all painting operations 
after rubbing down; 131 and the following year claimed that sprayers should 
be on the skilled rate, that the brush hand demarcation line should he 
pushed back, and the "semi-skilled" differential reduced to 3~d. 1~~ All 
these demands also failed. 
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With the war, these issues temporarily faded into the background, but a 
special NUVB EC meeting, held in late 1944 to determine policy for the 
coming post-war period, decided to press for brush hands and cellulose 
polishers to be 2d below the skilled rate. 133 But no progress w,~s made on 
any issue connected with painting until a major breakthrough in 1949 when 
the coach trade employers agreed that the minimum rates of pay for 
sprayers, whether cellulose or paint, should be the same as those liitd down 
in the agreement for painters and brush hands, following the established 
line of demarcation for brush hand's work. 1:;04 
There was no comparable progress on the engineering side. A joint 
application was put forward in 1946 by the NUVB and TGWU to establish a 
district basic rate in Coventry for sprayers, polishers, rubbers, and 
flatters. The local employers turned down any suggestion of a district 
agreement at a conference in August, claiming it would cut across the 
national agreement. 1'",5 
A mass meeting of Coventry painters in November was addressed by 
national officials from both the unions involved and it was decided to 
pursue.~he.matter further. 136 However, the January 1947 NUVB executive 
meeting decided not to go ahead with a joint claim, as they felt the 
.. 
national woodworkers' agreement, to which the TGWU was not a party, ~overed 
the position. Adopting a utopian position the executive decided that the 
TGWU had no right to cater for vehicle building labour, including paint 
shop personnel. 1:;07 The Coventry branch cormnittee, however, favoured some 
concession to the TGWU regarding the organisation of lower grades of paint 
shop workers, providing the TGWU recognised the NUVB's sole right to 
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organise other sections of the trade. The NUVB executive moved toward this 
position, and tried to get an agreement with the TGWU that paint shop 
labour below the top grade was open for both unions to organise. 13~ 
Both unions were represented at a central conference in 1948, when the 
employers "flatly refused to agree to a rate for spray painting". Further 
efforts to raise the issue, including under the aircraft section of the 
national woodworkers' agreement in 1951, were similarly fruitless, with the 
employers insisting that spray painting was an engineering operation, and 
not covered by the 1920-22 agreements. 13'3 
In the process of all this, the weakness of the NUVB's position in the 
Coventry paint shops had been made very apparent, and the local branch sent 
a resolution to the 1949 Annual Delegate Meeting for the union to 
inaugurate a campaign for 100% membership in motor car factory paint shops. 
As the branch secretary explained to the Delegate Meeting, "if he were to 
tell them of the number of [paint] shops in Coventry in which they were 
severely outnumbered by the Transport and General Workers' Union, they 
would realise how serious the problem had become". The overwhelming 
majority of delegates, however, supported an amendment that the campaign 
should be directed at the whole vehicle building industry, and, in the 
process, took the spotlight off Coventry's attempt to pinpoint a major weak 
area in the union's organisation. 140 
In fact, whatever strength the NUVB possessed in the Coventry motor car 
paint shops had been fundamentally weakened by the mid-1930s, if not 
significantly before, while in the other mass production centres they were 
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even weaker or non-existent. Their main claim to speak on behalf of paint 
shop workers in the car factories rested on their agreement with the 
engineering employers and not on any strength of organisation. In this 
respect, the agreement was hollow. 
The general problem for the NUVB was, as has been discussed in chapter 
2, that where an extensive division of labour operated in paint shops, the 
union had only generally organised those workers at the final end of the 
process. There had been a reluctance to recruit brusb bands, even though 
many of them did almost every operation in the painting process. The 
union's "skilled painters" had traditionally accepted the employers' 
arguments, that those workers employed exclusively on operations prior to 
the final ones, should be paid a lower rate. They had also been only too 
happy to monopolise the "skilled" painting work, which was much less 
unpleasant as well as being better paid. When the "skilled" end of the work 
disappeared, NUVB painters were left high and dry, and had to make the best 
of the situation, shop by shop. 
The 1920s did not create a division of labour in the paint shops. It had 
~ 
been there for a. long time already. The UKSC's earlier failure to organise 
paint sbop. workers generally, rather than the top end of the trade, left 
the NUVB'w1th little defence when the top end was squeezed out. Fortunately 
for the union and its members, the motor car paint shop revolution did not 
have its parallels in other sections of the trade, and hardly affected 
other vehicle painting, which section C now analyses. 
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C. SPRAY PAINTING OUTSIDE OF THE CAR INDUSTRY. 
As discussed above, the union's overall response to the introduction of 
spray painting was significantly affected by its very slow diffusion to 
areas of vehicle building outside of motor car production. There were a 
series of practical problems which dictated this. 
When the paint spray (not cellulose> was introduced into the LCC 
Tramways Department in 1927, the organiser reported: "A tramcar is not a 
vehicle that lends itself to the spray: a very large portion of the surface 
is, of course, glass, and this renders it necessary in order to avoid 
painting the glass, that a brush shall be used around these parts." Despite 
agreement with the management on the provision of overalls, headgear, 
goggles and masks, problems remained, especially in the varnish chamber. 
The management agreed to withdraw the spray if an alternative economic 
system could be introduced. It was thus agreed that instead of thoroughly 
painting a tramcar one year, and then giving it a "wash and brush-up" the 
next, in future enough only would be done each year to carry the tramcar 
through~to the next. Immediately, 12 members who had been displaced by the 
spray were re-engaged. 141 
The paint spray was, however, introduced into the bus and tram depot of 
Coventry Corporation in 1934,142 and about the same time in the Birmingham 
Corporation Salvage Department. 143 It is not· clear when spraying was 
introduced in the LGOC workshops in London, but it was being used in the 
early 1920s, as mentioned earlier. One account of the Chiswick works in 
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February 1922 stated clearly that the whole of the body painting and 
varnishing was done by hand, 144 while another account in June of that year 
declared "Repainting is effected by means of air sprayers, .... surplus spray 
being drawn away through vacuum pipes". 145 Both spraying and flowing were 
noted to be in operation in 1925,146 though in 1927 the company only used 
cellulose to a limited degree 147 <probably confining it to some interior 
work). Whatever the extent of spraying, it is clear that in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s it was not used on external work at Chiswick. Double-decker 
bus bodies were painted largely by brush, with the external panels only up 
to the waist-line (ie up to the bottom of the lower-deck windows> being 
painted by the flow method "from something rather like a garden watering 
can". V-shaped troughs were placed on the floor to catch surplus paint. 1.8 
At some stage by the early 1950s London Transport did adopt spraying, 
and at the new overhaul works at Aldenham, exterior painting was carried 
out by spray. 149 The NUVB paint shop members. however. believed that buses 
should still be brush painted. but the management claimed that this was 
impossible. especially once the number of buses going through the works 
exceeded 100 per week. the necessary minimum to keep London buses up to the 
standards of cleanliness required. ISO 
, 
In general~ repair work on buses and trams would be hampered by glass. 
and this would account for the slow introduction of spraying into this 
area. Another factor was the economics. with Crosville the Chester bus 
builder. informing Leyland Kotors in 1927 that they had laid down cellulose 
plant. but were not satisfied it was a business proposition. 1&1 Leyland 
themselves experimented with it in the summer of 1927. eventually bringing 
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it in later that year. IS~ Some cellulose spraying has already been noted at 
the Glasgow bus builders Cowie sons in 1930, when it was also observed at 
the Larkfield Bus Garage of Glasgow Corporation, while the Corporation's 
Coplawhill tram car works was still engaged in brush painting. 15~ And, also 
in 1930, Weybridge bodybuilders Hoyal were still using traditional paint 
and varnish on bus bodies, while using cellulose on car bodies. 154 
From the mid-1930s, synthetic paints became available, 165 and were used 
at Metro-Cammell-Weymann in Addlestone in 1937, where all bus painting was 
done by brush except for interior roof panels which were sprayed; 1 •• and at 
Brush in Loughborough in 1939 where both brushing and spraying of synthetic 
paints were used on bus bodies. IS7 Brush painting remained common in the' 
bus building industry, and at Park Royal Vehicles in 1951 the primer was 
applied by spray while all the other coats were brushed. 16~ 
Among the factors explaining this adherence to the brush, apart from the 
cost of introducing spray equipment, were the scale of production, 
specifications from local transport authorities, and, of course, 
complicated livery. Thus, the livery for Manchester trams, painted at the 
Hyde Road Car Works, even after simplification in the 1930s, still involved 
·elabor~te go~d lining with corner transfers, and with mouldings picked out 
in brown-. 1 •• One further significant factor was the problem, especially in 
the railway shops, of fume and vapour extraction. 
At Acton works, the central overhaul shop for Landon Underground, it was 
reported in 1932 that "Extensive experiments have been carried aut with 
paint spraying, but apart from experimental cars, painted with cellulose 
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materials, we have now abandoned the process~ mainly owing to the 
difficulty of providing an efficient extractor apparatus for dealing with 
the objectionable vapours, and partly because it was found that sprayed 
cars did not stand up so well to the system of mechanical washing which is 
in use at our depots." Experiments were continuing, and some success was 
reported on "the modern type of steel car". 160 But in the mid-1960s it was 
still the case at Acton that "All painting, both interior and exterior, is 
carried out by brush, and where a car has to be stripped to bare steel and 
repainted, ten coats of paint are applied."161 
On the surface railways, the LNER had already made spraying experiments 
at Dukinfield in 1927, and by 1932 filling was being applied there in spray 
form, using 2 coats instead of the 4 needed by the brush method. 162 
Spraying was noted by the union at Doncaster in 1928163 and Cow1airs in 
1933 and 1936. In 1933 the spray was tried on inside work and engine work, 
leading to the dismissal of a number of members. 164 By 1931 it was almost 
general on the LNER that ceiling panels were painted or enamelled by spray 
gun in the paint spray room before being fitted. 16& As the union had· 
traditionally looked down on "inside painters", and had usually let other 
unions orga~ise ~hem, this development may not have bothered them. 166 While 
.cellulose interior. finishes became standard on LIER stock before the war, 
A..' 
the exterior carriage work remained brushed. All new teak LIER coaches 
after 1923 had no colour paint on them, and were varnished by traditional 
methods - "experiments with sprayed-on varnish were not a success". 167 
In 1937, 300 vehicles were painted at the LXS works at Derby with the 
aid of an automatic travelling spray unit. But it was abandoned on the 
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grounds that the capital expenditure, and operating costs, could not be 
justified. 16S With the introduction of steel-panelled coaches, some spray-
painting was introduced in 1938 on stock built at York. 16~ But the 
experiments were not very successful, as problems of fume extraction meant 
that it was too costly to introduce. After the war another travelling 
automatic spraying machine was tested at Swindon, this time using hot 
airless spraying, but it too failed to win support. 170 
As late as 1962 in the British Railways workshops "nearly all vehicle 
painting was by brush application". It was "still overwhelmingly a matter 
of transferring the paint by a brush from the pot to the job, and surface 
preparation largely a hand operation." Paint spraying did come in in the 
next few years, but as cost factors dictated the introduction of mobile 
paint booths with built-in extraction, even as late as 1967, in some low-
volume locomotive works, brush painting was still in operation. 171 
This slowness of technical change in the railway workshops is 
interesting when compared with other countries' experience. A 1926 letter 
in the EEF's archives from Danzig exclaimed "We are astonished to 
learn •••.• that in England one meets with all sorts of difficulties in 
connection with this new process and that one of the main difficulties 
seems to be the getting rid of the fumes". In Danzig, the practice on 
railway carriages and wagons was to close off the area with blinds, and 
have strong suction pipes every 1~ yards, as well as masks for the workmen. 
The German State Railways had a more primitive fumes extraction method. 172 
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Certainly, the tradition of brush painting died hard among those NUVB 
members still doing it in the post-war years. When the management of the 
Ketro-Cammell bus works at Elmdon in Birmingham introduced the spray in 
1954, NUVB members were initially reluctant to use it, and had to be 
persuaded by union officials, even though they were paid the skilled 
rate. 173 
Conclusion 
The cellulose revolution had totally transformed the section of the 
painting trade that the NUVB had traditionally organised, but only in the 
car and car body industries. Elsewhere, the persistence of the paint brush, 
often for decades, maintained the craft basis of other vehicle painting. As 
a result, the union found itself fulfilling three different roles in the 
1930s. It remained a craft union inside non-motor car paint shops; it 
organised sprayers and some other paint shop workers in the car body 
building shops, though usually not on the skilled rate; and, thirdly. it 
was almost totally excluded from the car manufacturers' paint shops. 
The union's general bifurcation into a skilled union in the non-mass 
production vehic~e industries and a wider-based operatives' union in the 
mass production sector was a post-1945 development. But the paint shops 
were generally exempt from the latter process. An extensive division of 
labour had developed before the rise of mass production. and the union had 
confined itself to the top end of the trade which was revolutionised by 
cellulose. Consequently, when car industry paint shops were unlonised, the 
NUVB more often than not found itself a poor relation to the TGVU. 
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PART 2. THE ALL-METAL BODY. 
INTRODUCTION 
The change from paint to cellulose as a material of production did 
not have an exact counterpart in bodymaking. However, there was, over a 
very long period of time, a change in the main material of construction 
from wood to metal, usually steel. This change generally took place in 
two distinct stages - firstly, wooden panels gave way to metal ones, 
though wooden framing was maintained; this stage of construction was 
normally referred to as "composite". Then, "composite" gave way to all-
metal or all-steel. 
But whereas cellulose had replaced coach paint in the car industry 
within a few years, the all-steel car body took much longer to supersede 
its "composite" counterpart. Initially, also, all-steel car bodies were 
built mainly in new non-union factories, while most existing car factory 
body shops were still producing composite bodies, though with decreasing 
numbers of wooden.components. Outside of the car industry, there was 
again a different experience; the new materials of construction were 
introduced in the interwar period, though practice varied widely. Here, 
when all-metal buses and railway carriages were produced, there were 
many similarities with previous methods, with external metal panels 
often screwed on to the metal framing, as they were on to wooden frames. 
The more evolutionary process of change outside the car industry gave 
HUVB bodymakers an opportunity to establish themselves as metalworkers. 
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A. THE ALL-METAL CAR 
"The greatest progress in body construction was as slow to be adopted as 
the change from varnish to lacquer was rapid. This was the very logical 
change from composite wood and steel construction to all-steel. N174 
The change from all-wooden to metal-panelled wood-framed car bodies 
before the first world war has been briefly covered in chapter 4. It 
brought few problems for NUVB bodymakers, but the rise, and eventual 
domination, of the all-steel car body, presented the union with a very 
different situation. 
All-metal car bodies were first produced in Britain before the first 
world war. BSA produced an open body of steel and aluminium in 1912, 17~ and 
Sankey was another firm which produced all-metal open bodywork. 176 However, 
the main developments came in the USA. Dodge Brothers approached the Edward 
G.Budd Manufacturing Company for pressed steel panels to use on their 
wooden-framed cars, but Budd persuaded them that an all-steel car was a 
possibility. In the-absence of large presses at that time it was necessary 
-,-
to join together- 1,200 separate pressings, though by 1916 an all-steel open 
tourer was being produced in SUbstantial numbers. Initially only open 
bodies were made, with Dodge Brothers being the leading user of this 
method. By 1917 Budd had developed a fully-enclosed all-steel 4-door 
saloon, but the USA's entry into the first world war delayed its commercial 
development. 
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Eventually closed bodies could be made in eight main sections, including 
single panels for the sides, roof, and floor. By 1922 Budd was selling its 
saloons in very large quantities, 177 making several hundred cars a day for 
Studebaker and Dodge at prices which Herbert Austin claimed "leave our 
efforts quite in the shade". 176 When Studebaker changed to pressed steel 
construction in 1923, they were able to mass produce closed bodies at a 
lower price than open bodies for the first time. 17~ From that time, other 
American car manufacturers rapidly moved toward pressed steel bodywork. 
Whereas in 1922 only one out of every 12 American cars had an all-steel 
body, by 1926 it was more than one-third. lao 
The initial expenditure was very high. The new dies and plant installed 
at Studebaker in 1922 cost some £60,000, and could not lightly be 
modified. leI One early drawback was that for the important pressings it 
required from six to eight months to cut the dies, but by 1928 this had 
been reduced to two months or less. 182 To begin with, this method involved 
riveting as well as welding, but as the welding process became more 
advanced, riveting was discarded. Riveting, while very useful when dealing 
with heavy-gauge material, was not very practical for the thin sheet steel 
~ .. 
used ·in' car .. ;bodies. Rivets tended to work loose and thus weaken the joints, 
which at·.~st were' only discontinuous. And it was a highly skilled, and 
.... ~.1. •• ,"~. 
therefore expensive, job to rivet thin sheet steel without affecting the 
contours of the panels. By the early 1930s, riveting was almost totally 
superseded by welding, of which there were four types used - oxy-acetylene, 
spot, flash, and arc. While all these methods were used, it was spot-
welding that proved to have the greatest all-round utility.183 
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The Pressed Steel Company 
The new techniques were not long in crossing the Atlantic, though they 
took a number of years before they achieved predominance in body 
production. Citroen acquired the rights to manufacture pressed steel bodies 
on the Budd principle in 1924, and offered their first steel bodies the 
following year. But all-steel bodies had to wait their turn, as in 1927, 
fabric bodies accounted for 85~ of all closed models sold in France. le~ 
Herbert Austin had visited the USA in late 1922 and was "much impressed 
with the wonderful results obtained by the Budd Manufacturing Company". Ie. 
But it was William Morris who was responsible for bringing pressed-steel 
body technology into Britain. After a visit to the USA in 1925, Morris 
decided that the all-steel body had come to stay. But, rather than 
following Citroen, Morris arranged that the Edward G.Budd Manufacturing 
Company, Morris Motors, and J.Henry Schroeder & Co. should finance and 
establish a separate company - the Pressed Steel Company. Morris put up 
£300,000 in shares and t200,OOO in debentures. Morris Motors was also 
issued £200,000 in ordinary shares, credited as fully paid, "in 
consideration for its goodwill, for advisory services, and a supply 
agreement on a cost-plus basis." Budd had the controlling interest in 
r 
Pressed Steel, which was given the sole right to operate the parent 
company's patents and processes in Great Britain. 186 
Work started on the Cowley site early in 1926. One of the greatest 
problems was transporting the very heavy presses, one of which, weighing 
245 tons, was the heaviest individual item ever carried to that date by the 
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Great Western Railway. By the end of the year the bUildings were finished 
and about 60 presses installed. Production started immediately. despite the 
fact that the 500 workers initially employed had to be trained to operate 
"types of machinery hitherto unknown over here". 1~7 Morris had bought a set 
of dies. jigs and designs for two types of steel body from Budds for 
£120.000 to get an early start. lee But. as Miles Thomas. a Morris manager. 
has written. things did not go smoothly at all. 
liThe programme for the production of the first car bodies from the 
Pressed Steel Company ran woefully late .... [butl the ... delay ... was nothing 
like so troublesome as the appallingly low standard of quality when the 
first output did begin to come off the line. The great dies that are put 
into the presses to shape the parts should be tried and fettled over a long 
period of time until they are exactly right. Mostly they have to be 
laboriously finished by hand to get the correct degree of stretch in the 
sheet metal. 
liThe Pressed Steel Company in 1926/27 were using raw dies. the labour 
was new and unpractised. the American techniques of welding and the method 
of attaching. the cloth upholstery to the steel bodies was new in Britain. 
When the, first MOrris Oxford bodies from Pressed Steel were mounted on 
chassis and pushed"through to my despatch department for examination by the 
Morris management all hell was let loose. The panels were rippled; the 
aperture in the windscreen was awry and would obviously leak in the first 
shower of rain; the doors only fitted where they touched. and although 
copious supplies of circular rubber tube filling had been sewn inside the 
uphOlstery to give the doors some semblance of fit. the whole thing was an 
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impossible product. To heighten the gloom. someone wryly said we ought to 
advertise it as an all-weather body - it would let all the weather 
through."'S9 
Morris had to then wait "during the long toilsome process" while the 
Pressed Steel management dealt with the problems "until they could produce 
some bodies worthy of the name". 190 The immediate result was that the 
majority of the 1927 type Morris Oxford tourers and saloons were built with 
conventional wooden frame bodies. One of the Pressed Steel Company's 
problems was the poor quality of the sheet steel it was uSing. It had a 
poor surface. which made finishing difficult, and its ductility was so low 
and so variable that designs had to be of limited draw. The quality of' 
sheet steel improved rapidly enough for the panels of the 1929 Korris 
Cowley to be much more deeply drawn. '9' 
An Autocar correspondent visiting Pressed Steel late in 1927 was told 
they were producing 100 bodies a day. and was impressed by "their 
appearance. fine finish, and luxurious interior", "2 Generally. the 1928 
Morris Oxford tourer and saloon had pressed steel bodies, ," but William 
Xorris did not put all his eggs in one basket, The 1929 range of Korris 
", 
Oxford cars introduced a fabric saloon, taking trade away from Pressed 
Steel;"· and the Xorris Kinor. officially unveiled in August 1928. had a 
fabric top - to save tooling costs and time, ". 
Pressed Steel, in theory, was not tied solely to Korris production, as 
its commercial freedom to trade elsewhere had been specifically retained. 
However, there were two directors of Korris Kotors on its board. making it 
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almost impossible to get business from other car firms, 1~_ though it did 
press body panels for at least one other British manufacturer for the 1929 
season. 1~7 Similarly, Korris found other pressings manufacturers unwilling 
to quote competitive tenders. One, for example, made it plain that there 
was no reason to make a serious quotation when Korris was probably only 
concerned to check the prices Pressed Steel were charging. The close 
connection of the two firms was in neither's interest, so in 1930 Korris 
Motors surrendered its shareholding and its two directors reSigned. l~a 
While Morris Motors probably remained the largest single customer of 
Pressed Steel through the 1930s, it made sure it was not totally dependent 
on that source. The Wolseley Messenger and the Korris Isis, introduced in 
1929-30, both had Pressed Steel bodies, the Isis being produced until 
1935. 1~9 For the Korris Kinor, however, while Pressed Steel built the 
chassis and did most of the drilling on it, they did not build the body. 
They supplied the large metal panels for the saloon version, and blanks for 
other irregularly shaped pressings. The Korris factory's own body shop 
made the smaller or lighter pressings, as well as making the bucket seats, 
petrol tanks etc. The body was built using a wooden frame 200 (see below for 
details on the changes in composite construction). In the early 1930s the 
Harris Commercial factory in Birmingham supplied Wolseley with a large 
number of pressings, giving it some independence from Pressed Steel. And in 
1939, the new Wolseley 10 hp saloon body was welded together in the 
Wolseley factory from fairly large pressings fixed on timber frames.~ol 
The Morris 8 of 1934-38 had a Pressed Steel body, as did the integrally 
constructed Morris 10 of 1938. 202 With the trend toward all-steel 
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construction now firmly established, especially with unitary construction, 
Morris found it necessary to secure its own sources of supply. 
Consequently, Morris Motors Pressings Branch was established in 1939 on 
land next to the Wolseley factory in Birmingham. In 1945 it became known as 
Nuffield Metal Products, and later built the post-war Morris Minor saloon 
from 1949 to 1970. 203 
A number of other companies started using Pressed Steel for all-steel 
and steel composite saloon bodies. For firms with small market shares, the 
cost of such bodies was relatively high, but could be reduced by shared 
pressings. The Rover Company got Pressed Steel to build, paint, and trim an 
all-steel body, the Raver 10, in 1930. The '10' SpeCial shared the same 
basic shell. 204 Meanwhile, Pressed Steel produced the Hillman Wizard body, 
launched in February 1931,205 and also started work an the new Hillman 
Minx, which was produced from early 1932. This had pressed steel panels on 
a hardwood frame. 206 One motoring historian has written: "if you think that 
Spencer Wilks [of Raver] might have done a deal with his old employers at 
Hillman, so that the '10' Special could share body panels from the Hillman 
Minx .... you would be right. He had pleaded poverty over the cost of unique 
press dies. Quite a bit of this sort of standardisation went on in the 
19306 to keep, ',down costs, but you could be sure that neither Rover nor 
~ , 
Hillman would ever admit to it. H20? 
Not only cost pressures forced this on firms, but also the nature of the 
market. Almost all of the quantity production car makers of the 1930s chase 
to improve their market position "by ensuring that their cars were as much 
alike as the opposition's products as possible .... Nowhere was this more 
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obvious than in styling trends and the fact that big companies like Pressed 
Steel were not above selling the same skin panels to more than one customer 
did not help.1I2oa Apart from the Rover 10 and the Hillman Minx of the early 
19305, the Singer 10 and the Hillman Minx of the late 1930s were uncannily 
similar. And lithe Singer Bantam might have had a different body shell from 
the Morris 8 of 1934-38, but it needed an expert to tell them apart at 20 
paces."20~ 
The development of Standard's body sourcing in the 1930s shows the 
importance of the big steel body producers. In the early 1930s, Standard 
coachbuilt most of their own bodies, producing three basic types - one for 
the Little "Nine" and Little "Twelve"; another for the Big "line", Big 
"Twelve", and 16hp chassis; and the third for the 20 hp car. The wooden 
body frames were built and assembled at Canley, while the steel pressings 
were bought in from outside. 210 Fisher & Ludlow in Birmingham were the 
initial supplier. with Standard negotiating for a minimum of 3.000 sets of 
panels for the 1930-31 season,211 though Pressed Steel was also probably 
used later. At some stage in the mid-1930s, Standard also used Briggs to 
supply bodies for one of their models "complete in the white". lot only did 
they later charge-Briggs for rectification work necessary on receipt of the 
bodies, but they claimed Briggs did not supply the numbers agreed and were 
successful in claiming some compensation from them. 212 
At the 1935 Motor Show the new "Flying" Standard range was announced, 
with all-steel bodies supplied complete from Pressed Steel. Initially, it 
appears there was only one body shell, but this was supplemented early in 
1937 by an alternative 4-window notchback touring saloon. In that year. 
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Fisher & Ludlow produced dies and duplicate assembly jigs for the 9hp and 
10hp models. And in 1938, a Flying 8 was added to the range, with a body 
supplied from a new Fisher & Ludlow factory built at Tile Hill, near 
Standard's Canley factory.213 (Interestingly. it was disclosed in 1937 that 
Standard's managing director, John Black, was, along with another director, 
a shareholder in Pressed Steel, while the works director was a shareholder 
in Fisher & Ludlow. 214 ) During the transition period between 1935 and 1938, 
after which all their new body requirements were met outside of Coventry. 
Standard presumably carried on coachbuilding some of the early 1930s models 
until they were completely displaced. Certa1nly, the 1935-36 factory 
reorganisation left it with a sawmill <which had been re-equipped in 1932), 
press shop, and body panel shop.215 In the early post war period, from 1946 
to 1949. some 4,500 Triumph Roadsters, with aluminium panels on an ash 
frame, were the last cars to be bodied in the Canley factory.21. 
The other Coventry large-scale mass-producer, the Rootes group, were, as 
noted above, reliant to some extent on Pressed Steel in the early 1930s. By 
the m1d-1930s, Pressed Steel were building, painting and trimming an all-
steel Hillman Kinx in very large quantities. While Humber continued its 
.. 
producti'on·of coachbuilt larger cars, and Hillman also produced bodies for 
... 
larger" chassis,a sizeable proportion of Rootes's bodywork had been 
., .. 
- . . 
contracted out to Pressed Steel. 217 
Even the relatively self-sufficient Austin factory was not immune from 
the need to use outside capacity to produce steel bodies. Austin had a long 
history of its own developments in this field. A very large press shop had 
been built at Longbridge before 1920,21~ and it had made its own all-steel 
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bodies as early as 1926 on the Austin 12 and 20 models. An all-steel frame 
was spot-welded and riveted together, side panels were riveted on. and 
other large panels were either riveted, bolted. or welded.21~ However. the 
company needed to use Pressed Steel to make the metal saloon for the new 
Austin 12/6, brought out early in 1931, though. of course. they still built 
other bodies on the 12/6 chassis. 220 and the new Austin 10 of 1932 was 
built entirely at Longbridge. 221 Late in 1932, Herbert Austin complained 
that the bought-out bodies from Pressed Steel "were not entirely 
satisfactory". and he wanted to terminate the contract with them. But. 
first of all, money had to be spent on more press plant.22~ A few months 
later, Engelbach was arguing that even more new presses were required to 
reduce the amount of handwork in the body shops, thereby reducing costs and 
improving the quality of the work turned out.22~ 
While Austin had been moving toward all-steel bodies for a long time, he 
had not entirely abandoned coachbuilt models, and in the early 1930s built 
a new timber store and sawmill.224 The 1934 strike at Pressed Steel (see 
chapter 8> forced Austin to evaluate his long-term body-building strategy. 
"1.000 bodies a week were lost to the industry just 4 weeks before show 
stocking· a! the new models" as a result of the 2 week strike. Within a few 
months· Aust1n decided to begin work on a new press shop at Longbridge. 445 
The original.'estimates for this had to be revised upwards by Engelbach, in 
order costing a further £50.000 to acquire 13 more presses.2~G Two years 
later, the firm took advantage of an expansion of tool room capacity to 
order 3 presses specifically for "try-out" purposes, thus relieving 
pressure on existing press shop capacity.227 
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Austin could not afford to entirely abandon Pressed Steel, and they were 
still producing bodies for him in 1939. 22e The new 8hp body of that year 
was designed in detail by Pressed Steel who manufactured the diesj it had 
as many common pressings as possible with the rest of the Austin range. 
Pressed Steel were contracted to build the body, and probably paint and 
trim it also. All Austin's other bodies in 1939 were built at Longbr1dge, 
the largest ones probably being of composite construct10n.22~ 
Pressed Steel was therefore building bodies in 1939 for four of the "Big 
Six" - Austin, Morris, Standard, and Hillman (as well as producing some 
pressings for both Ford Commercial and Vauxhall).230 Ford had its bodies 
built by Briggs, which avoided total dependence on Ford, and supplied 
bodies also to Standard, Riley, and Daimler. (After the war, Briggs' second 
biggest customer was Jowett of Bradford, for whom they supplied painted and 
trimmed body shells from a factory established in Doncaster during the 
war.)2:31 Vauxhall, therefore, appears to have been effectively the only 
volume car manufacturer to be a self-sufficient body producer. When they 
introduced unitary construction for the 1938 season, their new body shop 
was known as the "million pound shop", because the process was so 
expens1ve. 232 Generally the Pressed Steel Company was responsible for very 
b1g·shlftsln.the,location of body production in the 1930s, especially 
affecting"the body shops of Rootes and Standard 1n Coventry. Th1s was 
compounded by the fact that "from the outset, half the output" of bodies 
built at Pressed Steel were also painted and trimmed there. 2 .:. 
Among the medium-sized producers using Pressed Steel, Rover and Singer 
have already been mentioned. The Rover 10 body was supplied 1n ready 
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painted and trimmed form, and sent direct to the Tyseley factory in 
Birmingham, being the only pre-war Rover that had no work done on it in 
Coventry. In 1938-39 this was replaced by the P2, also with a Pressed Steel 
body.",,"4 After the war, as well as the P2 model, Rover's other basic body 
was assembled from bought-out panel sub-assemblies with wooden parts in its 
new Sol1hull factory.23s These remaining pre-war models were replaced 
briefly in 1948-49 by one model, the P3, whose panels were supplied by 
Pressed Steel but assembled by Rover.2"~ The P4 of 1949, Rover's only car 
until the late 1950s, had a Pressed Steel body shell, though aluminium' 
alloy doors, bonnet and boot lid were added at Solihull. ;;;:.~" 
Singer coachbuilt its own bodies until the Singer Bantam, introduced in 
1935, had steel bodywork combined with wooden framing, Pressed Steel 
supplying the pressings. 239 (From the late 1930s until after the war, 
Singer coachbuil t the" Roadster" with aluminium panelling. "''''''iI) In 1939, 
Pressed Steel was also producing pressings for X.G., Wolseley, and Morris 
Commercial in the Nuffield group, Humber, Talbot and Commer in the Rootes 
group, and Daimler. At the beginning of that year it claimed its average 
yearly output included 145,000 bodies, and 16,000 composite panel sets, 
compared with' the 1938 industry total of 341,000 cars produced.~40 
Composite bodies 
While this section has concentrated on the pressed steel body, a large 
number of steel-panelled "composite" bodies were also produced. In the 
inter-war period the three metal-panelled types of body construction were 
the coachbuilt, the composite, and the pressed steel. The coachbuilt method 
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continued traditional horse-drawn carriage techniques, whereby the strength 
of the body came from its ash framework. In the pressed steel method, the 
panels provided the strength. Between the two was the "composite", which 
combined features of each, but was in a state of evolution, away from the 
coachbuilt and towards the all-steel. 
In the mid-1920s, the traditional heavy wooden frame of the more 
expensive coachbuilt bodies was already changing. It had been the practice 
to use heavy timbers for the bottom of the body frame. These carried the 
flooring, and formed a connection between the body and the chassis, but 
accounted for about 25% of the total body weight. Many coachbuilding firms, 
including Hooper, Barker, and H.J.Xulliner, changed to a special light 
steel body frame which formed the connection between the main body framing 
and the chassis. 241 About the same time, there was, for different reasons, 
a change of material in the front screen pillars of the closed car. Instead 
of wooden pillars, sometimes 5-6 inches wide, they were replaced by metal 
up-rights about 1~" wide to reduce the "blind spots· on the car.242 
Initially, composite bodywork was seen as differing from its coachbuilt 
counterpart not in terms of construction, but in the fact that quantity 
product1onof wood-framed bodies necessitated pressed metal panels instead 
of hand-beaten ones. But by the late 1930s the composite body had moved 
toward the pressed steel type, in that the panels provided most of the 
strength, and where timber was used it was more to assist assembly and the 
attachment of fittings than to provide rigidity. Even where an extensive 
ash framework was used it was common practice for the assembled timber 
structure to be applied to the pressed steel panel rather than vice versa. 
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Thus, with the exception of a number of quantity-produced aluminium 
panelled bodies, composite bodywork was moving toward the elimination of 
wood as a structural material. In fact, complete pressed steel units, such 
as scuttles and boot lids, were found on so-called composite bodies. On 
some bodies in the 1930s the scuttle and doors of a standard all-steel body 
were used, but with mouldings to make them look different.;:!:43 
While Pressed Steel pioneered the pressed steel body in Britain, Fisher 
& Ludlow of Birmingham started to make panels and dies in 1929,2~~ and had 
by 1930 developed a method which fitted the circumstances of the British 
market, where bodies were built in comparatively small quantities, and 
where there was a desire to change design frequently. They assembled open 
or closed bodies over a light wooden frame, reducing the tooling time by 
60~. Compared to a panel-beaten body the wooden frame was simplified, and 
as the pressed steel panels were designed to take the place of many wooden 
members and were very strong, the frame could be made from cheaper wood 
than ash. 245 
When Ford introduced its Model A at its Manchester plant in the late 
19209.-, it. had a pressed steel body, 246 but with the move to Dagenham, and a 
new model.range J wood was reintroduced. The bodies were now built in the 
adjoining Briggs factorYi An extensive wood mill, comprising 138 machines, 
dealt with an average of 25,000 to 30,000 ft of timber a day in early 1934, 
there being a total of 47 different body variations of the model range. 
Wooden components from the mill were carried to the section for framing the 
doors and sub-sections of the main framei these sub-assemblies were 
completed with panels. Along with three all-metal sub-assemblies, which had 
- 384 -
previously been riveted up and welded, the various completed sub-assemblies 
were then united together in more elaborate jigs. It is clear that despite 
the extensive use of wood at Briggs, the bodies were not in any meaningful 
sense wooden-framed. 247 
Wood remained a body material on some models for a considerable period 
after the second world war, but by then it had been effectively eliminated 
from mass production models. A major factor in its continued use was that 
tool expenditure for low volume bodies was reduced by using 'steel panels of 
a relatively small area applied to a timber framework. Its users were 
generally confined to the specialist coachbuilding firms, and those 
companies producing special small volume models. For example, Thrupp & 
Xaberly built bodies for Humber Pullman limousines and Humber Imperial 
saloons for a number of years after the war, using a framework of small 
hardwood members connected by light metal plates. 249 As explained in 
chapter 5, the virtual elimination of the car chassis by the early post-war 
period knocked out the market for special bodies on mass-produced chassis, 
consequently further weakening the already small demand for woodworking 
skills in the car industry. 
The specialist producers and steel bodies 
Even in the 1930s, all-metal bodies were, surprisingly, not the sole 
preserve of the high volume producers. For example. SSt the name Swallow 
took when it went into car manufacturing, decided to build its own all-
metal body in 1937. Rubery Owen made the doors and roof, Sankey of 
Wellington the quarter panels, and Pressed Steel and other firms supplied 
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various pressings. But when the body was assembled it would not fit 
together. It took several months before the problems were sorted out and 
production proper started in the spring of 1938. Although the company still 
coachbuilt some models, one consequence of this shift to all-metal was that 
experienced metal workers, in particular lead-loaders and dingers, were now 
needed and many were recruited from the Briggs plant in Dagenham.~49 
Another firm that built its own metal bodies was the London coachbuilder 
Park Ward, who patented their all-steel coachbuilt body in 1933, and by 
1937 were "in large-scale production" for the 4~ litre Bentley chassis, as 
many as 10 bodies a week going through their works.260 Barkers had also 
adopted the system to a lesser extent in the late 1930s.~5' This all-steel 
coachbuilt body was, according to Automobile Engineer, better described as 
"built-up all-metal".2s2 A major reason for its adoption was that it 
eliminated the problem of body noises, squeaks, and rattles, caused by the 
timber members expanding in damp conditions, and which represented a high 
proportion of rectification costs borne by the coachbuilder. 
Automobile Engineer noted that there was a scarcity of craftsmen 
bodymakers, due mainly to the absence of facilities for training them. The 
future was with metal and with engineering principles rather than 
coachbulldlng craftsmanshlp.263 The type of labour to build the Park Ward 
bodies was a matter for argument in early 1936, the manager believing that 
metal workers should do the job, while the JUVB shop committee argued for 
bodymakers. National officials then met the management and "laid claim to 
perform all work on the body, receiving the parts from the metal shop in 
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the same manner as wood sections come from the Kill and assembled by our 
members.- The NUVB was successful in this instance.25~ 
Rolls Royce and Bentley had the majority of their inter-war annual 
average of 1,500 bodies built at Hooper, Park Ward, Barker, Windover, 
Thrupp & Maberly and other high-class coachbuilders.;;;!i$ In the late 1930s, 
the cost of a Park Ward unpainted and untrimmed all-metal Bentley body 
shell was t70, and they were producing 300 per annum. Rolls Royce looked at 
alternatives to this and tried to cost them. 
Table 6jl Rolls-Royce costing of alternative metal bodies 
Body 'A' - all-steel front end and centre pillars die-pressed, panels 
semi-pressed by hand and reinforced with timber. 
Body 'B' - all-steel front end and centre panels, all panels die-pressed 
and reinforced with timber. 
Body 'C' - all-steel shell. 
Iccling CC5t per Sa~dni iler llcd.y Hi n1 IIIlJ III nlJmller De,e~~.uy 
CQst.. ~ eyer fark Ward.. to re,cYer ,ap1hl !:cst. 
, A' t20,OOO t42.50 t27.50 727 
'B' t55,OOO t36 t34 1600 
'C' t76;OOO: t28 t42 1800 
Lloyd argues that it was therefore much cheaper for Rolls Royce to jump 
right through to Body 'C'. If they had adopted Body 'A', then tbe increase 
in output necessary to justify scrapping existing dies and adopting Body 
'B' at a cost of t55,OOO and a saving of t6.50 a body, would be 8,400. 
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Similarly, a move from Body 'B' to Body 'C' would necessitate an increase 
in output of 9,500 bodies. 256 
During the war, Rolls Royce plumped for Body 'C'. They felt that 
coachbuilt bodies would be doubtful in quality, that probably a maximum of 
60% of the "ageing craftsmen" who could build "one-off" bodies would 
survive the war, and consequently, the quantities of bodies would be too 
low to build an economical number of chassis annually. Discussions with 
Pressed Steel revealed that the cost would be t250,OOO, but each body would 
cost about half what a post-war Park Ward would cost. And as the surface of 
the pressings was now so good, less work was needed before painting. The 
cost of the tooling meant that at least 5,000 bodies of exactly the same 
design would be needed to benefit from the cost reduction. "This seemed to 
conflict entirely with the pre-war assumption that most Rolls-Royce owners 
preferred to buy custom-built coachwork as an expression of tbeir own 
individuality." But as one manager put it, "we had no alternative but to 
buy these tools or go out of the automobile business".~~7 
Conclusion - Effect on the NUVB 
Unlike the situation in the bus and railway carriage industries where 
all-metal body production came in to the same factories and workshops which 
had built all-wooden and/or composite bodies, in the car industry pressed 
steel car bodies were generally built in completely new, and non-unionised, 
factories. The main exceptions were Austin and Vauxhall, but by the time 
steel bodies were built in these factories, the NUVB had little, if any, 
membership or organisation in their body shOps. NUVB bodymakers in the 
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Coventry factories saw their traditional job~ threatened as an increas1ng 
proportion of the growing numbers of Coventry cars were bod1ed elsewhere. 
At the same time, those car bodies still built 1n Coventry generally needed 
a diminishing input of woodworking skills, and more metalworking skills. 
How the Coventry branch tried to cope with this 1s analysed in chapter 8. 
The big new steel body shops were in the Pressed Steel factory at 
Oxford, the Briggs factory at Dagenham, and, after 1945, F1sher & Ludlow at 
Castle Bromwich,2ss as well as smaller shops such as Nuffield Metal 
Products in Birmingham, and British Light Steel Press1ngs 1n Acton (a non-
motor industry press shop, founded in 1930, which started to manufacture 
body shells when purchased by Rootes in 1937).~$~ It was in these centres. 
in particular, that the union would have to organise if it was to reta1n 
its claim to organise body shop workers. Why it failed to do this in 
Oxford, and how the TGWU succeeded there, is also examined in chapter 8. 
But the threat was not just from the TGWU. Referring in 1937 to the 
enormous development of metal pressing shops in the Midlands in the 
previous year or two. NUVB Midland organiser John Francis reported that 
"certain metal working unions" had tried unsuccessfully to get NUVB members 
removed from metal bodymaking finishing operations in Coventry. Two years 
later; he argued "It is nat difficult to understand that the Metal Workers' 
Unions, seeing that some of their members are engaged in making the dies 
for power pressing. and others are employed in welding the pressed section 
together, in those factories which are apart from the ordinary motor car 
shops, should conclude that wherever the steel sections are assembled and 
welded. their members should do the work." 
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In true craftsman style he rejected their claims, "Vehicle Building, 
whether in wood or metal, is as much the proper province of our members as 
ever it was". But he went further, and discussing the situation generally 
with steel buses, railway carriages, and cars, he concluded. "Wb~t is 
needed is that our members shall fully realise the importance of this 
matter and shall lose no opportunity of claiming their right to this work. 
There is little value in talking of demarcation linesj the old cry of 'wood 
to wood and metal to metal' no longer has any value. 'Go in and claim the 
job' is the modern variant".2GO 
However, the only successful way that could be done was to organise on a 
mass baSiS, and not as a craft. But the union's whole structure, and its 
poliCies, were rooted in craft unionism. As a result, even when in some 
areas it broke away from this attitude, the craft legacy h~unted it. In 
1950, for example, one of the Midlands organisers reported that when a few 
months earlier they had been organising Nuffield Ketal Products in 
Birmingham, they had elected shop stewards from among spot welders, but the 
management had initially refused to recognise them.' They were told that the 
NUVB was not the right union for spot welders, and that it was a job for 
the TGW.:ze1 
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(B) THE ALL-METAL BUS BODY 
Apart from one or two earlier hand-made productions, such 3S the all-
steel passenger body exhibited by Brush at the first Commercial Kotor 
Exhibition at Olympia in 1907,262 the all-metal bus body made its first 
serious appearance in Britain about 1925. It consisted of non-ferrous alloy 
rolled sections for the main framework members, and about 200 bodies were 
built by this method over the next few years, Short Brothers of Rochester, 
for example, developing a bus with duralumin body members. In 1929 the 
steel-framed bus body was produced by Metropolitan Cammell, after many 
years of experience of constructing all-steel railway rolling stock. Other 
forms of steel construction ~lere also devised, by Short Bothers among 
others, and it was estimated that in the seven years following 1929 some 
4,000 metal bus bodies, steel and otherwise, were put into service.~·~ 
Weymann's Addlestone works were taken over by Metropolitan-Cammell, who 
introduced all-metal bus construction there in about 1932.~~· Some of the 
staff soon left to join Park Royal and helped them change over to all-metal 
work, their first-metal bus being produced in 1933. Park Royal did not go 
into volume production of all-metal bodies for another couple of years,~·· 
but by the late 1930s about half of their output was the all-metal variety, 
ordered by London Transport and several municipal undertakings, while most 
of the company undertakings (mainly under BET.> still favoured the 
composite body.266 By this time Metro-Cammell's Birmingham works were 
solely concerned with metal bus work, and some two-thirds of the Addlestone 
factory's output was all-metal.~67 
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Composite construction took even longer to die out than in the car 
industry. One of the reasons for this was the cost to the manufacturer. To 
warrant the building of an all-steel body, the manufacturer had to 
standardise one design and adhere to it because of the expense of the die 
and press tools involved; and this was only possible if there was a 
sufficient market. For the producer of single orders or small batches, 
therefore, composite bodies were cheaper. Further, changes of design could 
be more rapidly made with composite construction. The shape of new members 
could be altered easily, and production started immediately. Also, in the 
1930s at least, it was almost impossible to produce certain types of metal 
section, which, for example, prevented the metal body builder from gaining 
a foothold in the market for the streamlined single-deck coach. 
There were varying claims for the superiority of one type of body over 
another when considering repair work. Composite builders argued that the 
operator could often produce from the raw material many of the structural 
parts required. The potential of fire damage was probably not slgnific~ntly 
greater in the wood-framed body, as the all-metal body also had wooden 
floorboarding which would be the first thing to ignite. The main cbarge 
against the composite body was that wood had inherent problems, such as 
rotting, lia~ility to insect pests, variation in density, and the failure 
of joints. 
The protagonists of the composite body also argued that a number of 
factors had given composite construction a bad name. The development of 
public service vehicles in the inter-war years attracted new firms to the 
industry, and municipalities, anxious to encourage local industry, gave out 
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orders to firms with neither the experience nor facilities for bodywork. 
This resulted in a large number of inferior composite bodies being put into 
service. Further, attempts by transport authorities to encourage price-
cutting among tendering companies again led to inferior products, often 
through cutting weight down too much. Finally, inferior types of ash were 
often used, or the wood was kiln-dried, which would drive out the sap 
necessary for its preservation.~6a 
Eventually, composite bodywork was replaced by all-metal. Park Royal 
Vehicles, for example, built its last composite double-decker in 1951, 
leaving this work in the future to the Chas H.Roe factory in Leeds, which 
had been acquired in 1947. Roe acquired a reputation for its teak-framed 
composite buses.~G3 Having built an all-metal bus in 1934, it decided to 
concentrate on the market for composite buses. But it too responded to the 
light-weight era of the mid-1950s by merging teak-framed lower decks with 
aluminium alloy upper decks.~70 Duple, a producer mainly of single-deck 
luxury coaches, made its first all-metal double-decker in 1950. 271 
There could, however, often be a substantial amount of woodwork in the 
nominally all-metal bus. Park Royal Vehicles and Weymanns were jointly 
involved in building the London Transport RT double-decker bus from 1947 
onwards, and this contained a sizeable amount of timber, which was only 
virtually eliminated in the LT Routemaster replacement bus of the late 
1950s. 272 All-metal bodywork produced by Brush, before the second world 
war, and for a period after it, had both floors made of tongued and grooved 
softwood boards, covered in linoj while ceilings of plywood or hardwood 
were screwed to hardwood fillets in the framing, as were all outside 
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aluminium panels. A new patent design introduced in 1946 cut out most of 
this wood, the only timber being the floor-board members and two battens in 
the roofj the external panels on this body were pop-riveted to the pillars 
and rails. But at the same time, the majority of Brush's orders for the 
early post-war years were for composite bodies. 273 In fact, of some 74 
British firms producing passenger bodywork in 1957 only 9 did not still 
offer some form of composite constructlon.274 
Construction 
In the mid-1930s the NUVB was aware of the potential problems ot the 
all-metal bus. Halliwell, commenting on the 1933 Commercial Motor Show, 
pointed out that there was scarcely a passenger-carrying vehicle exhibited 
which was not of metal construction. "This change of material for the main 
construction gives cause for deep thought. It is necessary to watch closely 
that the change of material used does not change the type of labour thlt 
has always been accustomed to do such work.N~75 
Riveting was the technique usually adopted on the all-metal bus, as a 
1937 descriptIon of the Metro-Cammell-Weymann patented system at Weymanns· 
Addlestone works shows (though at least one manufacturer had an all-welded 
structure27.). The frame was assembled in units on large horizontal jigs, 
where the various metal members were bolted into position, before being 
transferred to a riveting table where pneumatic tools were used. The lower 
deck would be framed up and the interior panels riveted onj it would then 
be mounted on the chassis, and the upper saloon floor put in place. The 
framed upper deck. with roof already panelled. would be lowered on and 
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connected. The exterior panelling would then be fixed on. The main pillars 
of the frame were shaped in such a way that they were grooved to 
accommodate a hardwood fillet to facilitate panel attachment by screw. 
Unlike the pressed steel car, the strength of the all-metal bus was 
obtained in the body frame, without stressing the exterior panels; and 
spot welding was used only for the construction of accessory items such as 
seat frames and window pans. 277 
Problems with who did the metalwork on bus construction and repair were 
nothing new for the NUVB. The all-metal bus, however, took the whole issue 
a stage further. Where the union had already established the practice of 
doing certain metalworking jobs on composite buses, they were less likely 
to be displaced, especially in repair shops, where the main threat to 
employment prospects came from the durability of the all-metal bus. And, in 
manufacture, they were not confronted with new firms taking away work from 
older established companies, as was the situation 1n the car industry with 
Pressed Steel. 
The actual practice in the various bus-building shops was that, in the 
absence of metalworking labour, the existing workforce of coachbu1lders 
tended to do all the metalwork. For the erection of the frame, engineering 
fitters would generally be employed, presumably because they either 
fabricated the necessary metal sections or were already employed on other 
fitting work in the firm. One firm that bought in its own metal sections, 
actually employed coachbuilders to erect the frame. 2 ? 
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Similarly. where there was no sheet metal work department. then 
bodymakers did all panel fixing, as at Brush in Loughborough. This company 
bought in all their panel work, and only recruited sheet metal workers when 
they needed extra panel-fixers to meet a big order for 200 all-metal bodies 
from London Transport in 1935.27~ Where a sheet metal department existed in 
a works, then the practice of who fixed the panels depended on whether 
there was wood packing in the frame to carry the panels. Where there was, 
then the job was one of "metal-to-wood" and the panels would be screwed on 
by bodymakers. Where there was no wooden packing. then the operation was 
"metal-to-metal" and the sheet metal worker would fix the panel by means of 
self-tapping screws. A similar division prevailed on the attachment of 
mouldings; where there was a metal to wood contact, bodymakers would do the 
job, but not where there was metal to metal.~eo 
NUVB reaction 
Two problems for the NUVB are highlighted by this review of employers' 
practice. The first was the introduction of semi-skilled workers on the 
metal assembly.2~1 The second was that of demarcation with other Skilled 
trades, in particular sheet metal workers and AEU fitters (which will be 
explored below when the Scottish experience is examined>. Problems with 
. 
other skilled workers could only be dealt with. generally. as they arose. 
and much would depend on the particular management·s attitude to the claims 
of rival unions. But with semi-skilled workers. the NUVB could either try 
and prevent their introduction if at all possible. or. alternatively. atter 
1931, seek to organise them. 
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The situation was complicated by the existence of two types of employer 
- the bodybuilders, who generally did no engineering work, and who were 
either covered by, or followed, the coach trade agreementi and those firms 
either producing the complete product, or having an engineering side, who, 
in turn, were covered by, or followed, the EEF national woodworkers' 
agreement. For the exclusively bodybuilding firms, the NUVB attempted in 
1936 to get their coach trade agreement to cover all types of vehicles, by 
inserting the phrase "wood or metal". This was aimed primarily at 
developments on the passenger side of the industry, but as a number of 
firms producing private car bodies were on the brink of moving to all-metal 
construction, the employers resisted the claim. They did not want to enable 
the NUVB to speak for whatever class of labour might be introduced on this 
work.2S2 As it happened, at Park Ward the union successfully thwarted a 
move to bring in metal workers soon afterwards (see section A above). 
The London NFVT employers then (about 1937-38) suggested to the union 
that they jOintly inspect the operations at a number of bus and coacb 
factories, including Weymanns, Park Royal, and Strachans, in order to 
classify the types of labour, being introduced on to metal bodies, within 
the scope of the existing agreement. A consensus was generally reached at 
the time, in the London area at least, that "erectors" were the equivalent 
of "vicemen", who were paid 3d per hour below the skilled rate, but were 
l~d above brush hands and hammermen. 2e.3 This situation was not challenged 
until after the war (and will be explored in Section D below). 
Among the engineering employers, a number of bus builders were in 1937 
still only employing skilled labour, such as Crossley of Manchester, 
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English Electric (formerly Dick Kerr) of Preston, and Leyland Motors, and 
any problems experienced there would be of demarcation with skilled 
metalworking unions. At Brush, skilled AEU labour was employed on the 
erection of the steel skeleton until, despite a strike, they were displaced 
by semi-skilled labour in 1937. Metro-Cammell and the Birmingham Railway 
Carriage & Wagon Company were already employing a special class of l~bour, 
regarded as semi-skilled, on the assembly of metal work, who had been 
drafted over from the railway side of these contract shops.~-· 
Metro-Cammell had taken over the Midland Railway Carriage & Wagon 
Company in 1928, and used their Washwood Heath works for bus-building 
during the 1930s. In 1932 the NUVB challenged the management at these works 
on the use of metal workers to fix wooden treads in bus staircases, and 
wearing plates on the treads. The organiser claimed that an interview with 
the management demonstrated "our claim to the greater part, by far, of the 
construction of the so-called all-metal bus". But the company employed 
three types of labour on the all-metal bus. The panels were beaten and cut 
by sheet metal workers; bodymakers fitted and fixed the (external) panels 
(the internal panels being riveted, as in the description of the M-C-W 
system at Addlestone above> and did any necessary woodwork; and the shell 
was built by "steel coachbuilders", a class of labour already making steel 
carriage underframes and steel wagons. The last group consisted at skilled 
men (on the engineering fitter's rate) who prepared the material, and semi-
skilled riveters and holders-up who did the actual assembly, as was also 
the case at the Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company.~e. 
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At the Handsworth works of the latter company, these semi-skilled metal 
workers were recruited into the BUVB in 1935, after a policy decision by 
the union's Birmingham District Committee. Some semi-skilled metal workers 
also appear to have been recruited at the Metro-Cammell works~'·b (see 
chapter 7). When the union came up against problems of metal work on both 
buses and underground trains at Metro-Cammell in 1938, John FranCiS, 
Midlands organiser, argued that "nothing short of claiming the whole work 
of constructing the steel railway coach would enable us to 'sensibly' claim 
that our members should do the work in question".2~7 The same sentiment 
obviously applied to metal buses. 
At Leyland Motors, skilled labour was retained on the work, but a 
dispute arose as to which trade should do it, leading to the company 
temporarily closing down the body shop in 1933. BUVB members there went on 
strike for a fortnight in April 1934, before winning a signed agreement 
giving them the work of erecting the all-metal bus body. However, the 
company approached members in the shop later that year and, "after 
protracted negotiations", secured a modification of the April agreement, 
that caused a wave of protest from other branches in the north west. This 
was not surprising, as the result of the members' concession was that 
vehicle builders had retreated back to woodwork. They now did all the 
wooden~.1nternal work <such as floorboarding), mounted the upper saloon on 
the lower, and the body on the chassis. They built those unit assemblies 
where the main operation was bolting or screwing through wooden parts, but 
where it was bolting through metal or hot riveting, fitters did the work. 
Fitters also erected the body framework and did the necessary hot riveting 
on it. External panels and beading were fixed by sheet metal workers, while 
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internal panels and moulding were shared between vehicle builders and sheet 
metal workers. 2ee In explaining this retreat, it can only be surmised that, 
with Leyland's expansion of bus work, plenty of work remained available for 
bodymakers, even given their reduced area of operation. 
Nuva members did not always take kindly to the new work on the repair 
side of the industry, and in 1932, Francis had highlighted the reluctance 
of some Midlands members at tackling repairs on the new all-metal buses.~~· 
However, much more dramatic were the demarcation problems that arose with 
other unions, especially the Sheet Metal Workers. In Manchester a 
demarcation comndttee was set up in the mid-1930s at the Corporation 
Transport Hyde Road depot, to deal with disputes between the NUVB and the 
Sheet Metal Workers; and northern organiser Floyd noted ·This question will 
arise shortly in all Corporation Depots as the All-metal Bodies come in for 
repair from time to time".~90 The introduction of the all-metal trolley bus 
in London brought demarcation problems not just at the Central Repair depot 
at Charlton, but also at running depots. Here the HUVB claimed "all work 
above the chaSSiS", and organiser Penn commented "we have to see that our 
members do the job, even to the extent of being metal workers".~~' 
The" most extreme and protracted series of demarcation disputes took 
place in Scotland on both bus body manufacture and repair. Here the problem 
did not arise with the introduction of the all-metal bus, but was merely 
exacerbated by it. The gradually increasing use of metal in buses 
threatened the livelihoods not just of bodymakers, but also, ironically, 
those of the traditional vehicle building metal tradesmen - the coach 
smiths and coach fitters. 
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Demarcation Battles in Scotland 
"We have no desire to interfere with the legitimate work of other 
craftsmen, but they must be made to understand that the Vehicle Builder's 
function is well described by the deSignation, and whether panels are fixed 
by pins, screws, bolts, or rivets, it is the Vehicle Builder who should do 
same." (George Symington, NUVB Scottish Organiser):292 
The line of demarcation between the bodymaker and the tinsmith had to 
some extent been established in Scotland in 1915 when the firm ot Wylie & 
Lockhead had asked bodymakers to cut and shape the metal panels on Post 
Office vans. The bodymakers had refused to do this, as, at this time, it 
was not considered to be bodymakers' work, and the firm agreed to employ a 
tinsmi tho 2'331 This case was in the minds of both unions when a dispute arose 
at the Glasgow bus-builders, Cowiesons, in 1926, coachsmiths claiming th.!t 
tinsmi ths were doing their work. :;':';;04 A j oint meeting of union 
representatives considered two issues - the coachsmiths' claim to acetylene 
welding, and the demarcation between body makers and tinsmiths. 
The tinsmiths conceded the right of coachsmiths to cut and bend iron. 
while the tinsmiths would continue to weld the jOints as before on this 
job. Charlie KlIne, Scottish EC Officer and prominent Glasgow branch 
commdttee member, pointed out that it was impossible for the NUVB to give 
up the claim to welding - "as owing to changing conditions in tbe motor 
industry our smitbs were now using all welding processes·. Further, that 
the unions should jointly cooperate "to prevent oxyacetylene welding from 
being done by cheap labour". The tinsmiths replied that they only claimed 
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exclusive rights to use the blowpipe where it was the status quo. On the 
other issue, the tinsmiths claimed that as "snips" were not part of a 
bodymaker's kit, the latter had no right to cut sheet metal. Symington 
agreed about the "snips", but argued that it was the custom in many shops 
for NUVB members to cut all plates required, though conceding that where 
tinsmiths were employed, they should do this. On both cases the unions 
agreed to accept the status quo position.2~5 
While at Cowiesons in the next couple of years, the NUVB's complaints 
were generally against the management,296 inter-union disputes were 
breaking out elsewhere in Scotland. At the Coplawhill worksbops of Glasgow 
Corporation Transport, the tinsmiths claimed all metal work on the back end 
of buses. 2'n Almost simultaneously tinsmiths claimed the fixing on of metal 
panels at the Scottish General Transport Workshops in Kilmarnock. BUVa 
organiser, Symington, argued that the line of demarcation was that the 
sheet metal worker did "all cutting, beating and f1tting", while the 
bodymaker did Hall fixing, unfixing and assembling". Recognising that 1n 
recent years, NUVB bodymakers in a number of shops had allowed the sheet 
metal worker to pin on the panels, he contended that this had happened 
mainly in piecework shops. The Scottish District Council resolved, wherever 
pOSSible, to enforce the demarcation line.2~~ 
A questionnaire sent out to all Scottish branches in early 1930~~~ 
revealed, according to Symington, that the sheet metal worker had "m3de 
deep inroads in performing many operations well with1n the skill of our 
members". Outside of Glasgow, apart from Falkirk, the BUVa had retained a 
bigger proportion of the work. In Glasgow itself, about half of the 25 
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shops listed had sheet metal workers employed - the others either having 
very little such work, or sub-contracting it out. There were 21 sheet metal 
workers in 10 shops, while Cowiesons alone employed another 21. All 
oxyacetylene welding was done by tinsmiths, except at Cowiesons, where they 
shared it with NUVB coach fitters. In more than half the shops, tinsmiths 
fixed the panels <which the NUVB claimed as their job), but apart from that 
operation, there were only two small shops, apart from Cowlesons, where 
there was substantial tinsmith involvement in other NUVB areas. At 
Cowiesons the tinsmith fixed the panels, shared the fixing of the back 
wings with the bodymakers, and fixed and unfixed the valances. HOVB coach 
fitters fixed and unfixed the front wings, and unfixed the back wings, 
while the bodymakers unfixed the panels. ::aoo 
At this stage, however, the two unions were still generally on good 
terms, with the Sheet Metal Workers supporting the NUVB during a dispute at 
Cowiesons in 1930; and the NUVB engaging with the Sheet Ketal Yorkers and 
the Woodcutting Machinists in an active joint recruiting campaign there a 
few months later. 401 Two years later, an incredible battle took place 
between the two unions. Early in September 1932 the Sheet Ketal Workers at 
Cowieson walked out on strike, because an NUVB coach smith was "cutting. 
fitting and fixing a metal pillar plate" - work they claimed as theirs. 
Fear of the consequences of not acting guided the Glasgow NUVB branch 1n 
deciding to "operate our constitution and organise this branch of the 
trade". 
The branch secretary rang General Secretary Nicholson, who practically 
promised two or three NUVB panel beaters to fill the breach. The branch 
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comndttee agreed that all unemployed NUVB sheet metal workers and panel 
beaters, prepared to work at Cowiesons, should contact their branch 
secretary immediately. The committee also decided to consider for 
membership all eligible panel beaters, and that unemployed members of the 
branch committee should interview panel beaters applying for Cowiesons, to 
decide on their eligibility;302 and also asked the Scottish organiser to 
start organising sheet metal workers in vehicle building shops.~<~~ 
By late September, there were 3 NUVB panel beaters in the shop, and 
another two were accepted into membership. But a Sheet Metal ~orkers' 
picket had stopped 4 "flat workers" from going in. Another 2 panel beaters 
had joined the NUVB by early October, while 2 panel beater members of the 
Coppersmiths' Society had started work there, and taken out membership of 
the NUVB Industrial Section, while retaining their own card. The Scottish 
organiser and the Glasgow branch president also gave the management tbe 
right to let their panel beater members work overtime under the 
circumstances. 304 The situation quickly deteriorated, and when the Sheet 
Metal Workers' picket stopped 2 panel beaters, who were prospective NUVB 
members, from continuing work, it was decided to raise a counter-picket of 
four from the branch's unemployed members and pay them 2s6d daily.~v. 
Glasgow Trades Council attempted to bring the two sides together, but 
some of the meetings were called off when the Sheet Metal Workers rejected 
the terms of reference. 306 The Sheet Metal Workers also refused to attend 
any conference with either the NUVB or the Coppersmiths unless those 
unions' members on sheet metal work at Cowiesons were withdrawn.~o7 At one 
stage the NUVB offered them the chance of becoming Signatories to their 
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Scottish agreement, but withdrew this and offered priority of replacement 
to the sheet metal workers on strike, once currently suspended NUVB panel 
beaters had been taken back. The NUVB would then give the Sheet Metal 
Workers equal right provisionally to work the disputed operations, while 
they agreed a demarcation line based on past practice.~·,a 
Relations worsened and reports of trouble on the picket line, in 
February 1933, led the NUVB to increase its counter-picket to 6, and then, 
unsuccessfully, to suggest a mutual withdrawal of pickets.#o~ When in mid-
Karch, Cowiesons wanted another panel beater, the NUVB branch committee 
accepted into membership a panel beater they had recently refused a card -
but only on the understanding that if Cowiesons took him on, he would be 
the first to be paid off in the event of any panel beaters being 
discharged. 310 When, in late Karch the firm took on a Sheet Metal Workers' 
union member as a supervisor, the NUVB members unanimously agreed to strike 
the next day if he was not removed. The stoppage occurred, lasting 
approximately "eight minutes" before the management conceded,~l' and 
probably convinced the Sheet Metal Workers of their weakening position. By 
the middle of April 1933 both picket lines had been withdrawn, after more 
than six months. The NUVB informed Cowiesons that Sheet Metal Yorkers' 
union members could be started, if not prejudicial to their own position in 
the panel beating department; and the Sheet Metal Workers tacitly accepted 
the NUVB claim that both unions had a mutual right to perform the disputed 
operations. 312 
Two years later, in 1935, Symington claimed that the NUVB's actions at 
Cowiesons had ensured that, with the firm now starting to produce an all-
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metal body, the bodymaker would not suffer. But strike action was necessary 
to defend this position. New machines for "fabricating and weld1ng N sheet 
metal were installed, and several non-unionists employed on them. NUVB 
members struck to compel their dismissal, arguing that as the innovation 
was superseding work previously done by them, they should bave the right to 
work the machines. But after about ten days, tbe Sheet Metal Workers' Union 
organised the non-unionists. The employers' association, the SNVBA, was 
brought in, as was the Ministry of Labour, and tbe non-unionists eventually 
removed. Further trouble with tbe Sheet Metal Workers flared up again later 
tbat year, with the Scottish TUC's arbitration coming out against the Sheet 
Metal Workers' action. 31:::;0 
In the mid-1930s, the area of inter-union conflict in Scotland sbifted 
from the manufacture of composite and all-metal bus bodies to their repair. 
A 3-week strike in 1935 at tbe Central S.M.T. Company Workshops in 
Motherwell, won union recognition, and was followed by the union's right to 
repair metal bus bodies, and the return of certain operations to body~kers 
from the Sheet Metal Workers. 314 More serious for the NUVB were tbe 
problems at the Glasgow Corporation Transport Department Workshops which 
were to drag on for years. A dispute arose in 1934 at tbe Larkfield bus 
workshops as to ~hether bodymakers or sheet metal workers should fix a 
certain part. To the NUVB's disgust, arbitration by the Scottish TUe 
awarded the cutting of boles to the Sheet Metal Workers, but stated "Th~t 
this decision must not be taken to modify the established practice of the 
Vehicle Builders to bore holes through metal."31. Furtber demarcation 
trouble then nearly resulted in a stoppage of work. By early 1936 the 
Corporation workshops were in "a virtual state of guerilla warfare", 
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matters having been considerably aggravated by the "all-metal" bus coming 
in for repair. Organiser Symington saw the trouble there and at Cowiesons 
as "practically a life and death struggle, realising that if we fail, mny 
bodymakers are going to be out of employment".;::n6 
NUVB coachsmiths as well as bodymakers were involved in the demarcation 
wrangles. The NUVB suggested that a coachsmith be employed on angle iron 
fra'mework repairs, an operation claimed by the Sheet Ketal Workers. 'ihen 
the management agreed, they could not operate it because a third union, the 
Associated Blacksmiths, who controlled the smithy, intimated they would 
strike if an HUVB coachsmith performed any work previously done by them. 
The main argument was still with the Sheet Ketal Workers, however, with a 
stoppage of work imminent several times, before the Scottish TUC were 
called in again. As, due to special circumstances at Larktield, sheet metal 
workers had repaired damaged angle irons on composite buses, the STUC 
decided they should continue to do such repairs on both composite and all-
metal buses while the personnel remained unchanged. But they believed it \ 
was really coachsmith's work, and that the Corporation should employ one to 
prevent a future problem. Initially, the Corporation refused to do so, and 
strike notices were tendered by the HUVB, whereupon the management offered 
to train in the use of oxy-acetylene welding an NUVB smith in the 
department who held a dual card with the Associated Blacksmiths. »17 
Later in 1936, the Corporation's buses were changed aver from petrol to 
heavy ail engines, which required forming a pocket in the front and near 
side panels. The sheet metal workers took most of this work when it came 
in, and the bodymakers retaliated by doing same sheet metal work. The 
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manager proposed a line of demarcation, but NUVB members rejected this and, 
when they threatened industrial action. the management modi fed their 
position to the complete cutting operation (drilling excepted) being 
carried out in alternate weeks by the Vehicle Builders and the Sheet Metal 
Workers, until such time as the two unions arrived at a common 
understanding on the procedure to be followed. 31e 
Inter-union relationships went from bad to worse in 1937, both unions 
being censured by the STUC for poaching ex-members of the other unioni and 
then the NUVB formally withdrew from a Joint Working Agreement, alleging, 
among other things, that the Sheet Ketal Workers had approached Edinburgh 
and Dundee Corporation Transport Departments to transfer to sheet metal 
workers operations performed by vehicle builders. 319 
Relations temporarily improved, but demarcation problems recurred in 
1939. By then the AEU had tried to secure the operation of assembling metal 
bodywork at Coplawhill. 320 But while problems with the AEU persisted, they 
were small compared to what Symington called the "demarcation XarathonM 
with the Sheet Ketal Workers.:321 In 1941 both the BUVS and the Sheet Metal 
Workers cl;imed all riveting on the assembly of all-metal buses in the 
Corporation workshops. When the latter union took exception to BUVB members 
riveting certain parts, the BUVS offered to suspend work on these 
operations and ask the STUC to arbitrate. This was refused, and the Sheet 
Metal Workers struck for a few days. Although they returned 
unconditionally, a state of "guerilla warfare" ensued. 322 
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During the rest of the war there were strikes at two other Scottish 
workshops by Sheet Ketal Workers trying to force managements to give them 
work the NUVB were doing.~13 The NUVB EC met Sheet Ketal Workers' Union 
representatives in 1942 to find a line of demarcation at the Glasgow and 
Manchester Corporation shops, where there had also been trouble, but were 
unsuccessful,314 and problems persisted throughout the war period. 
Conclusion 
The transition from wood to metal as the main material of bus body, 
construction was not at all uniform. Factories moved to all-metal ~ 
construction at different times, some keeping on composite work and others 
noti and composite bodies themselves varied widely in the relative amounts 
of wood and metal used. The repair shops of the bus operators reflected 
these differences. 
With some employers keen to use semi-skilled labour where possible, and 
other trade unions, notably the Sheet Ketal Workers, anxious to claim the 
increasing amount of metalwork, the NUVB faced a double challenge. The 
intensitY'ot this varied. Thus, where members believed there was sufficient 
work for. them in the residual wooden areas, as at Leyland, they reacted 
verT differently from fellow members whose whole livelihood was potentially 
threatened, as in Glasgow. The strength of the NUVB response depended very 
much on the speed of the transition, and the presence or absence of other 
unions who might organise an alternative metalworking labour force. 
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C. THE ALL-STEEL RAILWAY CARRIAGE 
Unlike the car and bus-building industries, the materials used in 
railway carriage body building did not exhibit a neat, if overlapping, 
chronological sequence of "all-wooden" to "composite" to "all-metal". The 
technical means for producing all-metal railway carriage bodies w~s 
available at an early stage through riveting, but the major drawba~k wa~ 
the cost factor. This had to be set aside when the need for fire preventIon 
dictated the introduction of fire-proof carriages on the tube railways at 
the London underground system in the first decade of this century. 
Most railway contract shops built all-metal "cars" for the various 
London underground lines, as well as supplying a large export ~rket. TL~ 
railway companies, however, apart from occasional building at all-met~l 
carriages themselves, and one very large purchase of them by LM3 in 1926, 
were committed to the extensive use of wood in their own building and 
purchasing programmes. There was a gradual increase in the amount of ~t$l 
used but some all-wooden carriages were still being built in the 19406. 
The historians of British good wagons point to a similar development 1n 
that the co~lete changeover from wood to metal in wagon underfr$~s tool 
60 years. Wood was cheap, and easily worked with hand tools. Iron ~nd $teel 
were more durable than wood but their inital cost before the first world 
war was greater, while defective wooden members could be quickly 
renewed. 325 However, after the war, supplies of good hardwood became 
scarcer, and therefore costlier, while the increased de~nd for rolled 
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steel sections brought down their price. But timber frames continued 1n use 
due to other cost factors. For example, shortly after grouping. the LK3 re-
equipped its Earlestown wagon works with expensive wood-working m3chinery. 
which committed that works to continuing to produce wooden-framed wagons. 
while other LMS centres were producing steel-framed ones. ~~b 
With the formation of the four railway groupings in the e~rly 19205. 
there was a substantial amount of re-equipment in the various carri3ge 
works, which would have increased the overall investment in woodworking 
maChinery. And as late as 1936, the GWR, which had brought in composite 
construction much earlier than the other three companies, w~s still 
sufficiently committed to wood to purchase a very large woodworking machine 
to replace a significant amount of handwork that was still necessary.~·' 
One important factor in the slow transition was the nature ot the work 
of the railway company workshops. While the manufacture of car bodies w~~ 
separated from their repair, railway companies, like bus and tram 
operators, provided their own repair facilities. The railw3Y workshops' 
reason for existence was to repair existing rolling stock, and ~nutacture 
of new stock was largely a secondary consideration. Railway carriage 
bodies, like trams, had an enormously long life compared to cars or bU$e~. 
and repair faCilities were therefore geared toward past IMnu!acturlng 
techniques, and hence had to be based around woodworking skills. Any new 
building undertaken in the workshops had to use the equipment to bandj this 
situation was fUrther compounded by the depression of the early 19305 which 
limited the capital available for investment in updated coachbul1dlng 
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methods.~2~ Finally, the pressures pushing many bus operators towlrd 411-
metal buses in the 1930s were not present on the railways. 
Early "all-metal" stock 
There were early experiments on all-metal stock for London undergrcunj 
trains, and the all-metal car, built for the Great Northern, Piccadilly and 
Brompton Tube Railway by the Metropolitan Company in 1904, was reckoned to 
be one of the first to run in Britain. 329 But in 1905 the Board of Trade 
decreed that, because of serious fires on other underground systems, all 
future cars for London's tube railways had to be of metal construction. 
Brush started building some that year for the Great Northern and City tube 
railway, the only wood in them being some teak in the interior, ·chiefly 
for ornamental purposes". ::;':;'0 In 1910 Hurst Nelson bull t 60 all-steel c.us 
for the District Railway, which were the first ones for an underground lin. 
other than the tube lines.3~1 And in 1914 the London, Tilbury and Southend 
Railway also introduced them, buying from Hurst Nelson, the Metropollt~n 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company, and the Gloucester Railway Carriage & 
Wagon Company.:3~2 Most, if not all, rolling stock manufacturers were 
involved in supplying all-steel cars for the London underground railways in 
the first thirty years of the century.333 
Similar early developments on the main-line railways were also conne~t~d 
with electrification. Dick Kerr built a special rail car for the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway Company to run on the Liverpool Overhead Rll1wlY. To 
conform to the necessary weight restrictions, this was built with ~lumlnlu~ 
fittings, and began service in 1906. 334 The Lancashire and Yorkshire 
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Railway built its own all-metal electric stock at its Newton Heath works 
for the Manchester to Bury electric service, which started operating 1n 
April 1916. The cars were built entirely of steel and aluminium (the only 
wood in them was a trough of jarrah for the main cable from the collector 
to the control chamber> and remained in operation until 1959-60. ~~~ 
The pattern of change 
As noted above, the replacement of wood by metal took place over a 
number of decades. In 1958, wood-panelled vehicles still formed a 
substantial part of British Railways' passenger rolling stock, and it was 
estimated at the time that these would not be finally out of service until 
1965. 336 There was, however, no uniform pattern of change from wood to 
metal in the four railway groupings, and this can best be appreciated by 
looking at the experience of each of them in turn. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century GWR coach bodies were 
constructed entirely of wood. Same 480 sq.ft of mahogany panelling w~a 
required for the standard coach, plus 780 feet of ornamental moulding -
partly to cover the jOints of the panelling, and partly to conform with the 
fashion of'the daY.337 However, vehicle maintenance was heavy owing to th$ 
number of split panels. whose removal and replacement also involved the 
destruction of the covering mOUldings and their consequent renewal. >,. A~ 4 
result, odd steel panels were introduced on an experimental basis. to 
replace defective wooden ones.33~ Ordinary steel or iron plates were 
initially tried, but these corroded badly in time, as the tannic acid In 
the oak framing of the body reacted with moisture to attack the plates. 
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This problem was solved by using galvanised .teel panels.~40 Steel body 
panelling was then introduced on new stock from 1910 or 1913,~4' and by 
1917, the floors were made of galvanised corrugated steel sheets. ~4~ 
Roof maintenance was another recurrent heavy item of expenditure, as 
leaking roofs led to damage to the body-framing and the carriage interior. 
GWR practice was to use tongued and grooved boards which were fixed on to 
oak roof sticks which had been bent to shape. The boards were then covered 
with· canvas saturated with white lead and boiled oil to render the. 
waterproof, and several coats of paint applied. In time the paint perished, 
and if repair was delayed until the canvas had perished and cracked, there 
was no alternative but to replace it.34~ 
Galvanised steel roofs were introduced by the GWR from 1922, making them 
the first of the four companies to standardise steel roofs.;44 But there 
was no attempt at this time to change the framing material. In 1914 an 
experimental coach was ordered with steel body framing as well as stedl 
panelling, but was not completed until 1921. The company did not adopt it, 
probably because they felt that a wooden-framed coach, with sufficient 
fire-proofing, ;was -almost as good an insurance against fire.~4. A number of 
facto~s were. put forward in 1939 as to why the GWR had not adopted al1-
steel coaches; ·these were that they were heavier, they required a greater 
heating surface, were liable to corrosion, and were noisier. »4_ 
The LXS group, however, were innovators in making a substantial order or 
all-metal stock from outside contractors in 1926, reputedly the first ~ll­
steel carriages, apart from the London underground, to be used in Brita1n. 
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235 3rd class coaches were ordered from four different firms - Cdmmell 
Laird in Nottingham, the Birmingham Railway Carriage and Yagon Company, 
Leeds Forge, and the Metropolitan. The carriages were built by two 
different methods, jig assembly, and direct assembly on the underframe, in 
order to get some reliable data on how steel coaches operated under British 
conditions. They were more expensive than their wooden counterparts, and 
weighed about 5% heavier, but lower maintenance costs were anticipated. ~., 
This purchase had little effect on their own construction practice, the LKS 
not even bringing in steel for body side and end panelling of new stock 
built in its own shops until 1930; roofs and cornices were then changed to 
steel from 1932, but window framing remained wooden.~4. The LKS do not 
appear to have built their own all-metal body until 1938-39 at the Derby 
works,~43 and its other carriage works, at Wolverton, was still building 
composi te stock in 1947. :360 
The LNER group were even slower and did not build any steel panelled 
stock until 1935, at Doncaster. From 1936 until 1943 only their York works 
built new steel-panelled stock, these being supplemented from outside 
contractors. But wooden-panelled stock continued to be built at both York 
and Donca~ter, with the last teak carriages being produced in 1943, though 
York produced a number of deal-panelled bogie brake vans in 1945-40. Tb. 
Doncaster works did not even start to produce significant numbers of Gteel-
panelled vehicles until 1950. The LIER had purchased some all-steel stock 
in 1927-28, but on a much smaller scale than the LKS - some 20 carriages 
from the Metropolitan Company, and 34 bogie brake vans from Cammell-Laird. 
The coaches, as well as being slightly heavier, were also about ~O\ mare 
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expensive than the LIER all-teak design, and this was the major factor In 
deciding not to build them themselves. :351 
The fourth grouping, the Southern Railway, seems to have moved over to 
composite construction soon after grouping in 1923, and they quickly 
followed LMS in changing to all-metal carriage bodies, producing a 
prototype body in October 1941. While this had a steel frame and p3nels, it 
still retained a wood and canvas roof. 300 of these were produced at 
Lancing and Eastleigh between 1945 and 1948, by which time the Eastlelgh 
works had gone over to totally all-steel stock.3$~ 
NUVB reaction 
What was the union's and its members' reaction to these develop~nts? 
In general, the introduction of metal panelling in the different workshops 
did not cause any particularly loud protest (there is certainly no ~ntlon 
of any in the union's surviving national records), possibly because ~tal 
panels would have to be screwed on to the wooden frame,,u.a and that would. 
have been seen as bodymakers' work, as it was in the early 19205 at 
Swindon. The practice on repair work at Wolverton prior to 1949 gives ~n 
indication of:the bodymakers' role there. A bodymaker inspector would ~rk 
the panels needing renewal; a bodymaker would then measure the panels 
required, a metal machinist would cut, drill, and punch the new panels. A 
fitter would finish them, and a painter paint them. The bodymaker would 
then release the old panel and fix the new. Where cutting a bad panel 1ro~ 
a good panel was necessary, this would be done by a fitter; and, similarly, 
when a new panel was fixed, any extra fitting would be done by 11 fitter .• ~. 
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Metal framing, and with it, metal to metal operations, was potentially 
much more threatening. Here, there was definitely an attempt by the union 
to safeguard its position in the railway company workshops, right from the 
first world war. When the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway company started 
small-scale building of all-metal coaches in 1914 a deputation of Newton 
Heath bodymakers attended an emergency meeting of the Manchester-based UKSC 
executive committee which resolved that the "building up of coaches" was 
considered to be bodymakers' work. The NUR had apparently already laid 
claim to this work, and the Sheet Metal Workers were also seen as potential 
rivals. A few months later the Springburn UKSC branch, which covered two 
different companies' workshops, raised the issue of the union pressing its 
claim for the construction of steel railway coaches, thus suggesting the 
problem was also affecting them in one of the Glasgow ShOpS.3S5 
However, as is clear from the above review, it was not until just before 
the second world war that any of the railway companies started building 
all-steel carriages on a systematic basis. This gathered pace in the 
immediate post-war period, and the union's attempts to deal with tbis major 
change will be examined in section D below. 
The situation in the railway contract sbops was different. Here, all-
metal construction had been a growing part of their workload since the 
beginning of the century. Tbe Metropolitan Carriage & Wagon Company was 
already by the late 1920s producing substantially more steel-framed than 
wooden-framed railway carriages, though often the steel-framed ones were 
finished internally with wood. 3s6 As discussed in section B above, this 
company, along with the Birmingham Railway Cariage & Wagon Company, used 
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semi-skilled labour on all-metal assembly operations. Cammell Laird, which 
only built rolling stock from 1919 till 1931 at the latest, specialised in 
steel work; to produce panels, one man would use a pneumatic riveting 
hammer, while a youth would hold up on the underside of the panel, and a 
boy would heat the rivets. 3S7 
With the rationalisation brought about by the Metro-Cammell merger, the 
two Birmingham firms were the main contract shops building railway 
carriages in the 1930s, apart from Cravens of Sheffield and the Gloucester 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company. Their cost structure inevitably dictated 
the behaviour of their competitors in the depressed market for rolling 
stock. In employment terms, though, the railway contract shops, 
particularly in the 1930s, had only a fraction of the labour working in the 
railway company carriage workshops. The NUVB national leadership did not 
therefore perceive the need, at this time, for any national policy on steel 
carriages in the contract shOps. Local branch organisation was relied upon 
to retain as much work as possible. 
However, the situation in both the railway company and contract carriage 
shops was unlike the motor car factories, where the NUVB was generally 
being squeezed out of body shop work due to the major shift in the location 
of steel body production. The union was entrenched in most railway carriage 
shops, and from the late 1930s to the early 1950s was able to develop, and 
largely implement, a national policy on all-metal railway work, which will 
be covered in section D below. 
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D. POLICY DEVELOPKEITS 
The need for a national policy on metal bodywork became pressing when 
the LMS Railway decided to build the all-metal coach at the end of the 
1930s. The Derby branch got Halliwell to approach the Company with regard 
to who was to build them. The General Secretary told the EC in April 1938 
that he believed "our members would have this work given to them", but 
asked them to treat this as "confidential for the time being". 
It was established that bodymakers should erect the coaches, but there 
was a problem over the necessary welding, as by now welding had displaced 
riveting as the main method of joining metal to metal. The Derby works had 
a large staff of welders, and the negotiations focussed on the question of 
spot welding. NUVB organiser Floyd and BUR General Secretary Marchbank 
attended a joint meeting of bodymakers and welders at Derby in November 
1938 to discuss the question of bodymakers doing the spot welding, but the 
meeting failed to reach agreement. The NUVB then reached a settlement with 
the company that bodymakers should do the spot welding. The company agreed 
that a number of them should take a course at the works, while the Derby 
NUVB branch also organised a welding class at the local technical college. 
By January 1939, work had started, with bodymakers being put on the job, 
but the IURwelders protested and it was then agreed that a certain number 
of coaches would be built with both bodymakers and welders doing the spot 
welding.~-~ Later in the year the Derby branch believed they had been 
"successful in claiming quite a proportion of the work" on the all-metal 
coaches.3S~ 
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Reacting to these initial problems with the NUR, the NUVB executive met 
branch representatives from the main railway centres, in March 1939, to 
obtain details on all-metal construction and to instruct the members to do 
the work, especially the welding operations. 360 One immediate result was at 
the LNER York works, where the NUVB branch decided to go in for the welding 
of panels, and the secretary wrote to the local education department about 
members going to a welding class. In July the branch formally applied to 
the manager for the whole of the work on steel bodies, though no progress 
was made on this as York were not building them yet, and there were only a 
few in service.3~1 Then, in November 1939, Halliwell attended a conference 
with the GWR concerning welding operations at Swindon, where the principle 
was tacitly accepted that men who lost an operation should perform the 
welding on the all-steel coachesj and the welding issue was also raised at 
the Southern Railway's Eastleigh carriage works.4~~ 
After the railway shop conference in Karch, the EC decided to hold a 
special delegate meeting in September "to discuss the policy ariSing out of 
the new developments in the industry". The conference lasted two d~ys, two 
representatives from each division attending along with the EC officers and 
the organisers. 363 While "the introduction of Steel Coaches" was to be an 
item, and obviously meant railway coaches, the conference record only 
refers to "Ketal Body Construction" in the light of the existing coach 
trade agreement, where it suggested that a schedule of work be agreed upon, 
and specified rates for these operations be embodied in the national 
agreement. It was also felt that the existing NUVB constitution "was wide 
enough to embrace all workers without exception engaged upon the repair and 
production of all types of vehicles".3~4 
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Welding Classes 
The March 1939 railway conference had encouraged branches to arrange 
welding classes at technical institutes. The Manchester District Council, 
for example, requested the EC to formulate a scheme to assist members 
taking up a course of instruction in "Sheet Metal Work (including 
Welding)". The only area dissenting was Ireland where "With regard to 
bodymakers being trained to do welding, it was felt that this scheme could 
not apply to Eire, as the line of demarcation is strictly adhered to, and 
all trades highly organised, it would, therefore, be impossible for 
bodymakers to take up the welding. "366 There was also growing interest in 
welding classes at the September meeting, and the Liverpool District 
Council submitted a resolution "That the EC shall reimburse our members who 
take recognised courses of instruction which will equip them for the 
changing conditions of our industry", which appears to have been 
accepted. 366 
In the southern area, organiser Barnett reported that by October 1939, 
some 150 members had visited the British Oxygen Company in three separate 
parties and had received a full afternoon's demonstration in welding of 
various types. Branches were circularised for names for a further session. 
Later in the year he reported that Bournemouth members had also visited 
BOC, and that classes could be followed at the BOC Cricklewood works, 
costing 10sed per day. or two guineas a week (but three guineas if electric 
welding was included>. In mid-1941 the LPTB Fulwell shop committee helped 
to re-establish welding classes at the Middlesex Technical College.~~7 
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There were developments elsewhere. In Scotland, places were secured for 
young members on welding classes run at Coatbridge, while in Glasgow it was 
decided that the normal Motor Body Trades courses should include training 
in welding for the last year apprentice bodymaker and journeymen 
classes.~6s In Wigan the technical college agreed to help fix up a welding 
class, and the local Northern Counties company allowed their welding plant 
to be available for the use of NUVB members. As this firm were expecting a 
large War Office contract, in return they asked for the union's cooperation 
in supplying labour. 36a Nationally, the executive agreed to pay the fees of 
anyone completing a session of welding classes, and then later decided to 
pay for anyone doing a second course. 370 
The All-Metal Agreement 
At the union's first Annual Delegate Meeting in 1945, the EC preSident's 
address came to the heart of the matter: "In this ever-changing world of 
tOday, with the new methods of production and new materials, we cannot 
remain static with an antiquated technique ... It will be difficult for the 
old craftsman to acknowledge that their coachmaking skill is being 
superseded, our job is to advise him to leave his glue pot and use the 
weld1ngplant whenever and wherever new methods are introduced." 
At this conference, Sheffield No.1 branch proposed that "bodymakers" 
should do "all work, including riveting and welding, on metal and composite 
bodies". This was amended to read "vehicle builders".371 The EC reported to 
the 1946 Delegate Keeting that this resolution had been carried out "in all 
shops where our members are engaged". But this was qualified by the rider 
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that it was creating "great difficulties in all types of shops - railway, 
bus, and private.M~72 The three main areas where the union attempted to 
implement this policy were among the bus-builders under the coach trade 
agreement, the railway workshops, and the railway and bus contract shops 
under the engineering agreement. 
Regarding the 1939 delegate meeting decision on getting metalwork 
written into the national coach trade agreement, the union had already 
attempted this in 1936 (see Section B above). The war presumably stopped 
any effort to progress the 1939 resolution, and it was not until 1945 that 
the unions met the employers to define extra occupations to come under the 
national agreement. 373 No agreement had been reached when the union claimed 
the bodymaker's rate for the assembly and erection of metal-framed bus 
bodies at Park Royal. At a national conference in August 1946 the employers 
offered the viceman's rate (3d below the skilled rate) for detail work and 
sub-assemblYi and the bodymaker's rate minus 1d for final assembly and 
erection, except where timber components were fitted, when the full rate 
would be paid. This was an advance on the current position, where, as noted 
in section B, erectors were usually paid the viceman's rate. 374 
" One month later, a settlement was finally reached against the background 
of a dispute at Brush (which had now transferred from the EEF woodworkers' 
agreement to the coach trade agreement). AEU members had been used here on 
the prototype of a new busj when this went into production, their numbers 
had been increased, whereupon the NUVB walked out. As Brush needed NUVB 
labour for its composite orders (which were in the majority) it was anxious 
for a settlement. While the NUVB got some concessions on the Brush 
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question, they got what they wanted on the other two issues - the 
bodymaker's rate for final erection, and, a long-standing point of 
contention, the upgrading of the coach fitter to the full skilled rate. ~7~ 
What became known as the "All-Metal Agreement" applied to "workmen employed 
on the manufacture and repair of metal-framed bodies". There were 3 grades. 
The first grade for "Final Erection and Alignment" would be paid the normal 
skilled rate. The second grade, "Unit Assembly", would be 1d per hour less 
(the old coach fitter's rate), and the third grade, "Detail Work", would be 
paid at the viceman's rate. 37G 
This agreement was greeted with protest in some quarters, particularly 
the north-west,377 and at the next policy conference in 1948, an attempt to 
scrap the agreement was lost by about 2 to 1. The bone of contention was 
the acceptance of grading, something the union had traditionally resisted. 
Employers were reputedly taking advantage of the lower rates, and the 
probationary periods, to take on vice-hands rather than top-rate fitters. A 
joint conference of the Liverpool, Manchester, and Yorks & North-East Area 
Councils had voted for the ending of the agreement, and in Liverpool the 
union had completely resisted its introduction. Similarly, Scotland, which 
were not party to it, argued for its abolition. The opposition seemed 
confined to these areas, and it was eventually decided to try to remove the 
" . 
lower rates"and the probationary periods in the agreement. n. 
The union's acceptance of grading had been a recognition of the fact 
that at several large employers <particularly in the London area), 
categories of labour not catered for in the existing agreement were paid a 
variety of rates. By signing the agreement they not only tidied this up, 
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but also staked the union's claim to this type of work. However, it was one 
thing to claim this work, but another to find the members to do it. On top 
of the immediate post-war problem of a shortage of skilled vehicle building 
labour, some members were reluctant to take on the work. At the beginning 
of 1950, one of the London organisers, Bell reported, "There is a definite 
trend for an extension of metal construction in this district, and it will 
require our members to take over this change of material. I can appreciate 
that our older members will not be keen to change over from wood, but it is 
essential that we should get in quickly. Unless we do we shall be making a 
mistake which it will not be possible to retrieve. "37' 
Three months later, Bell admitted that he had spent a lot of time on 
demarcation questions on metal-framed bodies "due mainly to the reluctance 
of our members to take on the work .... The AEU are at all times anxious to 
get hold of it, and it makes it much more difficult when, after having been 
successful in claiming the job, I am unable to find our members who are 
prepared to do this work. The change of material is rapidly spreading. and 
we shall be obliged to adapt ourselves to it. "3$':0 
Railway Workshops 
.r 
By·the end of the second world war there were only 6 railway company 
workshops still building new railway carriages - Derby and Wolverton (LKS>, 
Doncaster and York (LIER), Swindon (GWR) and Eastleigh (SR). In the next 
few years they were all eventually involved in the building of all-steel 
carriages, and agreements were made at each workshop on allocatIng the work 
between the various trades. Here, what had been agreed in one shop tended 
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to act as a precedent in another. When York NUVB branch came up against a 
rival claim, by NUR members in the frame shop, to build all-steel coaches 
in 1944, they used the Derby (LMS) agreement to win their claim . .i<'~' 
Initially, however, the pace of change was slow. While Eastleigh 
produced all-steel stock immediately after the war, some of this continued 
to have wooden roofs. The LMS produced some all-steel stock in the early 
post-war years, presumably at Derby, but the other two companies continued 
building composite stock. The Swindon works even produced composite stock 
for the London Midland region in the first years following nationalisation 
of the railways in 1948. 3e2 Both the LNER works had been damaged by bombs 
during the war; Doncaster, bombed in 1940, built little stock until a new 
carriage building shop was ready in 1948, and the York carriage building 
shop, burnt down in 1944, was not replaced until 1947. These two works 
continued to build composite stock, with wooden roofs, based on pre-war 
LIER designs - the last such corridor stock being built in 1950, while non-
corridor stock continued until 1953.~~3 A further factor curtailing the 
number of new steel coaches constructed was the severe steel shortage of 
the late 1940s. But in 1951, the first British Railways standard all-steel 
stock, with the body shell welded to the underframe, finally appeared. ~~4 
At Eastleigh in 1946, a division of labour was worked out on all-steel 
stock between the fitters, sheet metal workers, welders, and bodymakers. 
Most welding was carried out by welders, though it seems the bodymakers did 
some. What the bodymakers definitely did do was erect the various welded 
sections on to the underframe, do the necessary bolting and cold riveting, 
and hang the doors. They also bolted the top half of the block board 
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partitions into position. The floors of cross-boarded selected softwood 
were laid in the finishing shop. No reduction of staff occurred, and it was 
noted that "skilled woodworkers quickly and satisfactorily adapted 
themselves to the erection of steelwork".#liIs 
However, there was a serious demarcation dispute at Swindon. In 1946, an 
NUR official got the management to reverse an earlier decision and agree 
that the riveting of roof panels to the metal cant rail was semi-skilled 
work and should be done by Grade 2 fitters, and not by bodymakers (who had 
previously screwed the roof panels to a wooden cant rail). After work on 
the disputed coaches had been at a standstill for several months, the 
Ministry of Labour intervened, and the matter was referred to the TUC 
Disputes Committee, who found in the NUVB's favour.~s-
At Derby, a further agreement was reached in 1947 regarding demarcation 
between the bodymaker and the sheet metal worker, the latter only coming in 
to complete the final welding process. 3e7 The 1949 agreement reached at 
Wolverton was especially significant. Here, metal machinists cut tbe 
various metal sheets to size for pillars and panels, and did any necessary 
drilling. The bodymakers then assembled the various members in sub-assembly 
.~ . 
jigs. for welding by HUR welders, and sub-assemblies in main assembly jigs 
for welding,~ doing any necessary fitting themselves. Tbe erection on the 
underframe was the bodymakers' job, apart from weldingi the bodymaker doing 
all fitting. fixing, bolting and riveting.4QS 
Once the railways were nationalised, and the main carriage building 
centres were actively engaged on all-metal construction, the union w~s 
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concerned about the differing practices at th~ various carriage works, 
pointing out "discussions and agreements on lines of demarcation have been 
entered into locally. These agreements do not run along parallel lines in 
all cases. II At a conference in September 1949,,""'3 NUVB representati ves from 
the workshops and contract shops decided the Wolverton Agreement was the 
best practice to adopt, though, subsequently, Swindon NUVB went even 
fu rther and secured the we 1 di ng operations as we 11. ,",'30 
As carriage design altered, then further disagreements on demarcation 
were bound to occur. In 1952, for example, the NUVB resisted an AEU claim 
to some of their work,3g1 while at Eastleigh the BUVB approached. the 
management regarding the welding operations.~~~ However, the main objective 
of the union had been achieved, and most of the metal work was now 
performed by their members. 
Railway and bus contract shops 
The battleground in the contract shops was Birmingham. Complementary to 
their early post-war policy of demanding the skilled rate, the local 
District ComDittee also made a push for all the work on the all-steel buses 
and railway· carriages. They were more successful on buses. 
When pop-riveting was introduced at Metro-Cammell's new Elmdon bus-
building works, it was initially given to fitters on the semi-skilled rate. 
But an agreement in December 1949 laid down that, where it was incidental 
to their normal work, bodymakers and finishers should do this at the 
skilled rate. The line of demarcation between fitters, on the one hand, and 
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bodymakers and finishers was to be the same on the all-metal bus as it was 
on the composite. This was rightly seen by the union as a major 
breakthrough after twenty years of much of this work having been carried 
out by semi-skilled-rated fitters. It took, however, a fortnight's strike 
by all members at the company's Midland [Washwood Heath] works to force the 
company to operate the agreement.3~~ Two years later, a works conference at 
Elmdon failed to agree the NUVB claim that all the work on the all-steel 
bus should be under the national woodworkers' agreement. The company then 
refused to operate the 1949 agreement on a new chassisless bus, but a six 
week strike reinstated it, and, in the process, gained the skilled rate for 
many NUVB fitters.:394 
The union made less progress on the railway carriage issue. The 
Birmingham District Committee followed the policy adopted in the British 
Railway workshops of aiming for the Wolverton Agreement, 399 but the EEF h~d 
prepared itself for this challenge. Their Woodworkers' Ad Hoc Committee had 
already considered a similar application from the NUVB at Cravens and 
recommended to the Management Board that, while the interior fitting ot 
railway coaches came under the national woodworkers' agreement, "the 
construct~on' ot the steel shells was normal engineering work on which it 
, .". 
was quite.permis~1ble to employ appropriate classes of engineering labour 
at appropriate rates of pay". :a'i1 .. 
Early in 1951, with steel carriages being introduced at Metro-Cammell's 
Midland works, Birmingham organiser Evans declared "This is a matter we 
will fight to the end".397 Works conferences were held at both the Midland 
and Saltley works of Metro-Cammell, and then a local conference 1n August 
- 429 -
1951. Prior to this, Metro-Cammell had written to the Birmingham 
engineering employers that as the NUVB carried out most operations on this 
class of work in British Railways shops, "this factor may be difficult for 
us to combat". The union clarified that it was only claiming the operations 
as performed in the Wolverton Agreement. Nevertheless, the company argued 
that it had used semi-skilled labour on this work for over 30 years, and 
that it had the steelwork labour available, unlike British Railways. 
Metro-Cammell were aware that the claim was nat purely local, as similar 
applications had been lodged with Cravens, the Gloucester Railway Carriage 
& Wagon Company, Chas Roberts, and R.Y.Pickering, as well as the Birmingham 
Rail way Carriage & Wagon Company. 3· .. 61 However, the EEF refused to deal with 
it nationally, as certain firms which had "hitherto been unmolested by the 
unions" would become involved; they confined their role to giving advice, 
while the various companies had to deal with the situation locally . ..i/ .••• Not 
surprisingly, references back to works conferences brought the union no 
results. But the Birmingham NUVB were becoming isolated, as similar claims 
were not pursued any further at Cravens and the Gloucester company. 
Mass meetings were then held of the members at the three Birmingham 
, '. ' .. 
shops that would be affected when the British Railways contract for steel 
coaches was introduced - namely the Handsworth works of the Birmingham 
Railway Carriage & Wagon Company, and the Saltley and Midland works of 
Metro-Cammell. As the organiser commented, "When the jab is introduced into 
the shops, that will be the signal for all our people to take a decisive 
action on this very vexed question".40'~ The NUVB executive then backed the 
Birmingham District Committee's wish to bring all members out at the three 
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works. But when the job was brought into the Midland works, there was no 
strike. 401 
The union was then forced to modify its position, and claimed the work 
only on the British Railways steel carriages rather than all the steel 
carriage work that came into the affected companies. While this was an 
obvious retreat, the employers were still worried, and the Birmingham 
engineering employers informed the EEF that "the union is fighting for its 
existence, and would have nothing to lose by pursuing the fight to the 
end". They were concerned that, in the absence of a clear national policy 
by the Federation, there might be "some ill-considered concession" at 
another railway carriage builder. They had "no need to remind the 
Federation of the very serious repercussions which would result throughout 
the industry <particularly the motor industry) if any sort of success were 
to attend the BUVB in this matter".402 But the issue petered out, with the 
union claiming that it had gained some concessions from the "Birmingham" 
company, and that the job was theirs apart from the building of the steel 
shell, which only involved a small number of workers.40~ 
By the early 1950s the BUVB had generally achieved its aim of winning 
the right of its members to do as much metalwork as possible on buses and 
railway carriages. It was, undoubtedly, as George Symington had written in 
the mid-1930s, "practically a life and death struggle" (see section B 
above), but the union had survived a major change in the material with 
which many of its members worked. 
